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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to address the issue of the modernist musical artwork, specifically in terms of 
the spatialization of musical time, in aesthetic and music-analytic terms. Firstly, it focuses on the 
notion of musique informelle as it was expounded in Adorno’s essay ‘Vers une musique informelle,’ 
(1961) and its place in Gianmario Borio’s elaboration of this in terms of an aesthetics of the 
informel. Secondly, it proposes a further expansion of these aesthetics via a double strategy: a 
comparative reading of Walter Benjamin’s critique of philosophies of time (including the work of 
Henri Bergson), language and objects, and furthermore a reconceptualization of both Adorno’s 
and Borio’s aesthetics in terms of a new theory of the object (as sound-object) in light of a new 
reading strategy. This reading is based on Walter Benjamin’s notion of the dialectical image, which 
proposes a new form of philosophical interpretation. The theorizations of the sound-object and 
the dialectical image furnish a basis for a re-conceptalization of the (in)formel, allowing for the 
interpretative reading of the music of three composers in particular: Edgard Varèse, Morton 
Feldman and Iannis Xenakis. Particularly, the study of a number of their works, including 
Intégrales (Varèse), On Time and the Instrumental Factor and Words and Music (Feldman), and Duel 
(Xenakis), reveals what Adorno terms their (truth) content, in their mediation of rationalization 
and intuition. Finally, it is argued that these modernist works can in turn bring new insights into 
Adorno’s aesthetics of the modernist work of art. 
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Introduction 
This dissertation addresses an issue of fundamental importance in regard of the modernist 
musical artwork—the tension between the temporality of music and the modernist emphasis on 
spatialization. This tension, seen both as an aesthetic and a compositional problem, was of 
central concern to Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, who attempted repeatedly to elucidate it, 
drawing extensively on conceptualizations of temporality elaborated by Henri Bergson and 
Walter Benjamin. It is a central theme of Adorno’s celebrated essay on the state of the musical 
avant-garde around 1960, ‘Vers une musique informelle,’ in which he sought to determine how 
modernist musical creativity might escape the impasse of integral serialism and the totalizing, 
rationalizing tendencies inherent in the utilization of dodecaphonic procedures. Although 
Adorno’s concept of a musique informelle had a quasi-utopian character, which he himself appears 
to have regarded as being yet to be realized, it is the principal argument of the present thesis that 
this concept, if reconceptualized in the light of both the Bergsonian and Benjaminian ideas that 
profoundly influenced Adorno’s thinking on temporality, as well as Adorno’s own later thinking 
on time in his posthumously published Aesthetic Theory, can not only yield fruitful new 
perspectives on the tension between temporality and spatialization in the modernist musical 
artwork, but also illuminate the compositional practices of such figures as Edgard Varèse, Iannis 
Xenakis, and Morton Feldman, whose music, as a manifestation of what one might describe as 
an ‘alternative musical modernism,’ had largely fallen outside Adorno’s purview. Furthermore, I 
argue that the concept of the ‘image’, with its concrete spatial and visual connotations, is 
pertinent to understanding these composers’ work, and, crucially, how Benjamin and Adorno’s 
concept of the ‘dialectical image’ in particular furnishes both a mediating concept and 
interpretational tool to this end, capable of revealing the objective ‘truth content’ (to use their 
formulation) of these modernist artworks.  
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Thus, my principal research question is to explore the relation between ‘musical time’, ‘musical 
space’, and ‘historical time’, as manifest in the work of these three composers, drawing on key 
concepts deriving from Adorno’s aesthetics, and Benjamin’s philosophy of history and theory of 
language. Adorno’s aesthetics bring together theoretical considerations and practical 
interpretations of works of art: as the latter often reveal their character as riddle-like, theories are 
necessarily unfinished and as such, cannot fully explicate the creative tensions inherent in 
modernist artworks. Adorno’s aesthetics considers these works as part and parcel of a historically 
and socially mediated reality which cannot be subsumed under a general theory, no matter how 
finely defined or how broad its concepts. It is precisely the fragmented material present in 
modernist works of art which create the conditions for an aesthetics of this kind.  
 
The thesis falls into two parts. Part I comprises four chapters that are concerned with theoretical 
issues, focusing on musique informelle and Adornian and Benjaminian explorations of temporality 
and spatialization. Part II, which comprises three chapters, offers readings of the music of 
Edgard Varèse, Morton Feldman, and Iannis Xenakis in the light of the issues and concepts 
explored in Part I.  
 
Chapter 1 examines Adorno’s 1961 essay ‘Vers une musique informelle’ from a historical 
perspective, and details pertinent aspects of his thinking on the problematics of temporalization 
and spatialization in relation to the modernist musical artwork in order to provide a context for 
the discussion that follows. Chapter 2 then proceeds to consider a notable attempt both to 
critique and to elaborate Adorno’s concept into an aesthetics of the musical informel—Gianmario 
Borio’s Musikalische Avantgarde um 1960: Entwurf einer Theorie der informellen Musik [The Musical 
Avant-Garde around 1960: Outline of a Theory of the Musical Informel], which was published 
in 1993. In spite of its importance, this text has received comparatively little attention in English-
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language scholarship to date. In his examination of compositional praxis in the 1960s, Borio 
noted a shift away from an overriding preoccupation with pitch towards a new concern with 
texture, which led him to develop the concept of the ‘sound-object’ (a term which should not be 
confused with Pierre Schaeffer’s notion of an objet sonore,1 from which it is distinct). As I attempt 
to demonstrate, Borio’s elucidation of certain features of avant-garde compositional praxis is 
richly suggestive of ways in which the reach of Adorno’s concept could be extended. 
 
The third and fourth chapters pursue the implications of Borio’s thinking. I argue that his 
attempted re-conceptualization of musique informelle can be fruitfully amplified by drawing on 
Adorno’s late thinking on time in Aesthetic Theory and a number of other late texts, in which he 
revisited key concepts evolved by Walter Benjamin and was led to modify substantially his theory 
of the artwork. Chapter 3 takes as its starting point a central preoccupation of Adorno’s aesthetic 
theory, the problematization of musical time in relation to historical time, and attempts to 
explore the implications of the late shift in his thinking on questions of historical time and 
temporality more generally, but which Adorno did not have an opportunity to pursue specifically 
in relation to the modernist musical artwork before his death in 1968. In this chapter, I draw 
extensively on the work of noted scholars who have examined this late turn in Adorno’s thought 
arising from his reengagement with Benjaminian concepts, including Shierry Weber Nicholson, 
Susan Buck-Morss, Richard Wolin, Rolf Tiedemann, and Rainer Rochlitz. A central focus of 
their work is the Benjaminian concept of the ‘dialectical image’—which, as I shall argue in Part II, 
offers a modality of critical reading and understanding of the musical art object on its own terms. 
                                                
1 See Pierre Schaeffer, Traité des objets musicaux: essai interdisciplines, (Paris, Seuil, 1966). Schaeffer defines the sound 
object (object sonore) as different from the musical object (objet musical) in the ‘Historical Situation of Music’: ‘By 
sonic object I mean here sound itself considered in its sonic nature, rather than the material object (instrument or 
any device whatsoever) from which it comes’ (Pierre Schaeffer, op. cit., p. 23, footnote 3). For an in-depth study, 
see Carlos Palombini, Pierre Schaeffer’s Typo-Morphology of Sonic Objects, (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Durham, 1993)  
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In Chapter 4, I pursue these ideas in relation to the temporal dimension of the modernist 
musical artwork, additionally drawing on Benjamin’s theories of a language of objects and his 
critique of historicist understandings of time. On this basis, I propose a new understanding of 
Borio’s concept of the sound-object which enables us to amplify the notion of musique informelle, 
showing how it can illuminate the treatment of temporality and spatialization in the work of 
Varèse, Feldman, and Xenakis, amongst others. The double reading of the post-war avant-garde 
musical work in this sense attempts to combine the analytic of the structural functioning of 
textures (as sound-objects) with the philosophical reading of the work as dialectical image. 
 
The three chapters of Part II apply the theoretical considerations evolved in Part I to the work 
of Varèse, Feldman, and Xenakis in turn. Chapter 5 focuses on Varèse’s handling of the idea of 
musical space, drawing on the research of, amongst others, the musicologists Helga de la Motte-
Haber, Jonathan Bernard and Thimotée Horodyski. Varèse’s anti-systematic approach to musical 
composition is critically situated in the larger philosophical context of the musical avant-garde 
and the central concern of this thesis with spatialization. Chapter 6 explores the notion of the 
image in the work of Morton Feldman, who developed the compositional technique of the 
‘instrumental image’. This study is heavily indebted to the exhaustive work on Feldman by 
Sebastian Claren. In Chapter 7, the music of Iannis Xenakis is examined in relation to the 
questions raised in this thesis concerning the spatialization and reification of musical temporality. 
This case in point, as a recent study by Benoît Gibson has revealed, is concerned with the 
notions of texture, sound objects and the apparent self-borrowing in Xenakis’s work, allowing 
for a deepening of the reading strategy proposed in this thesis, that of the dialectical image. 
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As I hope to show, although Adorno scarcely engaged with Varèse’s music in his writings,2 and 
the music of Xenakis and Feldman was unknown to him,3 their work can still be usefully 
considered in the light of his aesthetics, yielding rich insights into fundamental issues of musical 
modernism.  Indeed, my decision to focus on these composers was motivated by my conviction 
of their potential to illuminate Adorno’s aesthetics, precisely because they present a differing 
image of modernist compositional praxis which nonetheless occupies an honoured place within 
the twentieth-century musical avant-garde. 
 
Given the complexity of the issues explored in this dissertation, it quickly becomes clear that 
they necessitate an interdisciplinary methodology appropriate to their heterogeneity, drawing on 
historical musicology, philosophical aesthetics, literary theory, historiography, and musical 
analysis in an attempt to elucidate this aspect of modernist thinking and musical composition.  
Furthermore, the choice of area and topic of research encompasses a number of questions of 
both (aesthetic) philosophical and music-analytic nature, requiring a double strategy. Firstly, a 
reading strategy, drawing on the critical-theoretical authors’ own methods, while at the same time 
                                                
2 In fact, Adorno writes in generally positive terms of Varèse’s démarche as a composer who, being a trained engineer, 
was able to import ‘technological elements into his compositions not in order to make them some kind of 
childish science, but to make room for the expression of just those kinds of tension that the aged New Music 
forfeits. He uses technology for effects of panic that go far beyond run-of-the-mill musical resources.’ Theodor 
W. Adorno, ‘The Ageing of New Music,’ in Richard Leppert (ed.), Essays on Music. Theodor W. Adorno, p. 194; 
originally in Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Das Altern der neuen Musik,’ in Der Monat (May 1955); GS 14 (1973), pp. 
143-167; translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor and Frederic Will, ‘The Ageing of the New Music,’ in Telos, Vol. 77 
(Autumn 1988), pp. 95-116 
3 This claim, however, does not disavow the contemporary affinities between these authors. For example, Xenakis’s 
famous article ‘Vers une musique stochastique’/’Auf der Suche nach einer stochastischen Musik’ appeared in the 
same issue of the Gravesaner Blätter/Gravesano Review (Iannis Xenakis, ‘Auf der Suche einer Stochastischen 
Musik / In search of a Stochastic Music,’ in Gravesaner Blätter, Vol. 4, No. 11-12, (1958), pp. 98-111 and 112-122), 
as Adorno’s equally well-known essay (Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Musik und Technik,’ in Gravesaner Blätter, Vol. 4, 
No. 11/12; republished in Klangfiguren (1959) GS 16 (1978), pp. 229-248; translated by Wesley Blomster,  ‘Music 
and technique,’ in Telos, Vol. 32 (Summer 1977), pp. 79-94) 
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taking into account recent developments in the reception and readings of their work; and 
secondly, a method for analyzing particular compositions by a number of composers which does 
justice to the works themselves, whilst at the same time individuating the philosophical-
theoretical framework through this practical method. The latter departs from traditional analysis, 
which is focused on the parameters, structures and forms of musical works. Adorno himself 
made the crisis of the traditional work-concept – the ‘jolting of the “work”’4 – one of the central 
issues in Philosophy of New Music;5 Carl Dahlhaus6 observed the crisis of the musical work of art as 
an organic, autonomous ‘work’ in twentieth century music, whilst Gianmario Borio7 and others8 
                                                
4 Theodor W. Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, (2006), p. 29: ‘Jolting of the Work.’ ‘The transformations that music 
has undergone during the past 30 years have scarcely been recognised to their full extent. (...) The thought of 
future renewal, whether in the form of great and consummate artworks or of the blessed accord of music and 
society, simply denies what has happened and can be suppressed but not undone. Under the constraint of its 
own objective logic music critically cancelled the idea of the consummate artwork and severed its tie with the 
public.’ Originally in Theodor W. Adorno, Philosophie der Neuen Musik, (Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1949); translated 
as Philosophy of New Music, translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor, (Minneapolis, Minn.; London, University of 
Minnesota Press, 2006) 
5 Ibid., p. 34: ‘Today, however, this movement has turned against the closed work and everything that it implies. The 
sickness that has befallen the idea of the work may stem from the social condition that does not offer what 
would be binding and confirming enough to guarantee the harmony of the self-sufficient work. The prohibitive 
difficulties of the work, however, are revealed not in reflection on them but in the dark interior of the work 
itself.’ 
6 Carl Dahlhaus, Über den Zerfall des musikalischen Werkbegriffs, (Beiträge der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Musik, 
Vienna, 1971), p. 9-26 
7 Gianmario Borio, Musikalische Avantgarde um 1960 : Entwurf einer Theorie der informellen Musik, (Laaber, Laaber-Verlag, 
1993); Borio also cites Carl Dahlhaus, ‘Plädoyer für eine romantische Kategorie: Der Begriff des Kunstwerks in 
der neuesten Musik,’ in Neue Zeitschrift für Musik, Vol. 130, No. 1, (1969), pp. 18-22;  Carl Dahlhaus, Schoenberg 
and the new music : essays, (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 
8 In this regard, the work of Xenakis scholars such as Mihu Iliescu, Makis Solomos, Benoît Gibson and Horacio 
Vaggione, amongst others, on the ‘morphology’, self-borrowing, montage and compositional technique in 
Xenakis’ music will also be considered. See Mihu Iliescu, Musical Et Extramusical. Eléments de pensée spatiale dans 
l'oeuvre de Iannis Xenakis, (Ph.D. Thesis, Paris, Université de Paris I, 1996); Benoît Gibson, The Instrumental Music of 
Iannis Xenakis: Theory, Practice, Self-Borrowing, (Iannis Xenakis Series), (Hillsdale, NY, Pendragon Press, 2011); 
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understood this crisis to be necessitating the proposition of an analytic strategy, which draws on 
the (morphological)9 analysis of textures, as the transformation of global as well as local sound 
complexes over time.10 Textures in this sense are no longer defined by their place within the 
fixed totality of the work as before, but by the transformations they undergo. This method11 is 
therefore not a reductive one – i.e. of temporal essences to which all elements of the work can 
be reduced or linked; rather, it accepts the insights into the changed character of the works 
themselves, as often open-ended.  
 
I have already suggested that recent studies of Adorno’s aesthetics offer valuable new insights 
into his enterprise, particularly insofar as they attempt to read his work ‘against the grain’ — an 
approach deriving from (post-)modernist theory.12  One of the most well-known philosophers in 
                                                                                                                                                  
Horacio Vaggione, ‘Determinism and the False Collective. About Models of Time in Early Computer-Aided 
Composition,’ in Contemporary Music Review, Vol. 7 (1993), pp. 91-104 
9 Mihu Iliescu, op. cit., p. 393 
10 Gianmario Borio, op. cit. 
11 Other approaches include Experiental and phenomenological approaches to the analysis of compositions, as proposed 
by Evan Jones for the music of Iannis Xenakis. See Evan A. Jones, ‘An Experiental Account of Musical Form in 
Xenakis's String Quartets,’ in Evan A. Jones (ed.), Intimate Voices: Shostakovich to the avant-garde. Dmitri Shostakovich: 
the string quartets, (Rochester, NY, University Rochester Press, 2009), pp. 138-156. See Chapter 4 in this thesis for 
critique. 
12 Interestingly, as I shall shortly note, a ‘reading against the grain’ seems to appear as a topic in itself in the work of 
several of the (secondary) authors considered in this dissertation. Any critical, systematic ‘reading’ of Adorno’s 
work started with the work of Max Paddison’s seminal Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music. However, we also based our 
own method on the insight of Peter Bürger’s, Andreas Huyssen’s, Jochen Schulte-Sasse and Albrecht Wellmer’s 
work. Wellmer in particular inspired this alternative reading of Adorno, especially in light of the latter’s 
understanding of Beckett’s ‘black’ dramas. We presented a paper on the electroacoustic works of Iannis Xenakis, 
drawing on Wellmer. See Andreas Huyssen, After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986); Albrecht Wellmer, Endgames: the irreconcilable nature of modernity : 
essays and lectures, (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought), (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1998) and 
Agostino Di Scipio’s work in this field. Xenakis’s own understanding of time, history and musical temporality 
will be addressed in this dissertation, drawing on this preliminary work. 
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this regard and a student of Adorno is Jürgen Habermas,13 whose critique of Adorno’s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment is a case in point,14 in turn causing a polemic.15 Recently, Adorno’s work has also 
been studied in this light, 16 in turn considered by some as prefiguring their ‘deconstructive’ 
readings; others see it in contrast to particular modernist and poststructuralist readings of his 
work.17 However, I propose a reading of Adorno in conjunction with a number of relevant texts 
which attempts to re-contextualize them by situating them amongst other texts; in a sense I 
                                                
13 See particularly Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, (Cambridge, Polity, 1992); 
and Jürgen Habermas, Technik und Wissenschaft als “Ideologie,” (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1968)  
14 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Re-Reading Dialectic of Enlightenment,’ translated 
by Thomas Y. Levin, in New German Critique, Vol. 26 (Spring/Summer 1982), pp. 13-30 
15 See Richard Leppert, Introduction, in Richard Leppert (ed.), Essays on Music, Theodor W. Adorno, (Berkeley, Calif.; 
London, University of California Press, 2002), footnote 75. He cites the most important actors in this debate as 
Karin Bauer, Adorno's Nietzschean Narratives: Critiques of Ideology, Readings of Wagner, (Albany, State University of 
New York Press, 1999), pp. 32-39; Peter Uwe Hohendahl, ‘Dialectic of Enlightenment Revisited: Habermas's 
Critique of the Frankfurt School,’ in Reappraisals: Shifting Alignments in Postwar Critical Theory, (Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 1991), pp. 99-130; Robert Hullot-Kentor, ‘Back to Adorno,’ pp. 5-29 
16 Christopher Rocco’s reading of The Dialectic of Enlightenment, for example,  is critical of Jürgen Habermas’s critique 
of Adorno and Horkheimer’s work, and he challenges what he considers ‘the critics' charge of ‘totalizing’ theory 
and ‘performative contradiction’ and suggest that what Habermas sees as an impassable aporia in theory 
construction is ‘in fact a deliberate move to question the book's own (conscious) attempt to criticize the whole 
and so avoid the premature closure that marks all conceptual systems.’ His approach rests on the one hand on 
an analysis of Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s critique of unified conceptual systems and on the other hand how in 
the structure of the Dialectic itself, a tension is set up ‘between its parts that precludes reading it as merely a 
work of total theory.’ See Christopher Rocco, ‘Between Modernity and Postmodernity: Reading Dialectic of 
Enlightenment against the Grain,’ in Political Theory, Vol. 22, No. 1 (February 1994), p. 71-97. 
17 Ben Agger, A critical theory of public life: knowledge, discourse, and politics in an age of decline. (Critical Perspectives on 
Literacy and Education) (London-New York, Falmer Press, 1991), p. 19-42; Rainer Nägele, ‘The Scene of the 
Other: Theodor W. Adorno’s Negative Dialectic in the Context of Poststructuralism,’ in Jonathan Arac,  
Postmodernism and politics, (Theory and History of Literature, Vol. 28) (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 
1986), pp. 91-111; Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics and Postmodernism, 
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991); Joel Whitebook,  ‘From Schoenberg to Odysseus: Aesthetic, Psychic, and Social 
Synthesis in Adorno and Wellmer,’ in New German Critique, 58 (Winter 1993), pp. 45-64, as cited in Richard 
Leppert, Essays on music. Theodor W. Adorno, (Berkeley, California-London, University of California Press, 2002), p. 
23 
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follow the strategy of a double reading, as presented by the scholar Karl Markus Michel18 and the 
critical approach of Albrecht Wellmer.19 The interrelationships Adorno’s texts will form include 
in the first place and above all his contemporary, Walter Benjamin.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
18 Michel proposed a double reading of Adorno as ‘Lektüre’ and ‘Gegenlektüre.’ For Michel the ‘Lektüre’ include  ‘1. 
Die Kunstwerke und die Kunst,’ ‘2. Ästhetisches Urteil,’ ‘3. Das Subjekt der Kunst,’ ‘4. Ästhetische 
Produktivkräfte,’ ‘5. Kunst als Natur-Geist,’ and (palindromically ordered) ‘Gegenlektüre’: ‘5. Kunst als Partei,’ ‘4. 
Kunst als Monopol,’ ‘3. Kunst als Knoten,’ ‘2. Kunst als Überfeld,’ ‘1. Kunst als absolute Ware.’ See Michel, 
Karl Markus, ‘Versuch, die “Ästhetische Theorie zu verstehen,’ in Burkhardt Lindner and W. Martin Lüdke, 
Materialien zur ästhetischen Theorie Theodor W. Adornos, Konstruktion der Moderne, (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 
1980), pp. 41-107.  
19 Albrecht Wellmer, ‘Wahrheit, Schein, Versöhnung. Adornos ästhetische Rettung der Modernität,’ in Ludwig von 
Friedeburg and Jürgen Habermas (eds.), Adorno-Konferenz 1983, (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1983), pp. 138-
176; translated as ‘Truth, Semblance and Reconciliation: Adorno’s Aesthetic Redemption of Modernity,’ in Telos, 
Vol. 62, (Winter 1984-85), pp. 89-115 
20 Their friendship and professional contacts as well as the relationship between their work, has been documented 
by the following authors, amongst others: Gerhard Kaiser, Benjamin. Adorno. Zwei Studien, (Frankfurt, Athenäum 
Fischer Taschenbuch, 1974); Shierry Weber Nicholsen, ‘Aesthetic Theory’s Mimesis of Walter Benjamin,’ in Tom 
Huhn and Lambert Zuidervaart (eds.), The Semblance of Subjectivity. Essays in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, (Cambridge, 
Mass, The MIT Press, 1997), pp. 55-92 
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CHAPTER 1: Musique in formel l e  and the Crisis of the Musical Work of Art 
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Introduction 
This chapter outlines Adorno’s concept of a musique informelle21 as a possible answer to the 
problems raised by the crisis of the modernist musical artwork, and, particularly, the totally 
reified integral serialist music of the 1950s. The genesis of this particular concept lies in Adorno’s 
response to modernist tendencies in the visual arts in the 1950s, and specifically art informel,22 a 
term coined by the French art critic and curator, Michel Tapié in his Un art autre.23 The visual arts 
revealed a hitherto unknown aspect of modernism for Adorno, who had largely eschewed 
writing about them.24 Another important element in his developing aesthetic in the 1960s was 
concerned with the work of Samuel Beckett.25 Beckett’s plays and novels, together with the 
                                                
21 As to what musique informelle is, Adorno is adamant that it escapes definition, but he starts his essay by saying that it 
refers to ‘Metzger’s term, an a-serial music,’ in other words a music which does not use the serial composition 
method. ‘What is meant is a type of music which has discarded all forms which are external or abstract or which 
confront it in an inflexible way. At the same time, although such music should be completely free of anything 
irreducibly alien to itself or superimposed on it, it should nevertheless constitute itself, and not in terms of 
external laws.’ The importance, for now, lies in the understanding of this concept as an Idealbild, a not-yet-
existing type of music. From the vantage point of the present, it becomes clear that the informel he refers to 
stands not only in relation to a future musical conception, but the concept has a history itself, leading back to the 
art informel of the Paris painters from the 1940s, as well as the more contemporary tachiste painters.  
22 Jean Paulhan, L'Art informel. Éloge, (Paris, 1962); Simon Groom, An art autre : Michel Tapié and the informel adventure in 
France, Japan and Italy (London, University of London, 1999); Michel Ragon, Cinquante ans d'art vivant : chronique 
vécue de la peinture et de la sculpture, 1950-2000: abstraction, informel, tachisme, cobra, art brut, nouvelle figuration, nouveau 
réalisme, lettrisme, École de New York, École de Londres, pop art, op art, cinétisme, etc (Paris, Fayard, 2001); Galerie 
Heseler, Un Art Autre : Tachismus-Informel-Lyrische Abstraction : Ausstellungskatalog, (Munich, Die Galerie, 1985) 
23 Michel Tapié, Un art autre où il s'agit de nouveaux dévidages du réel (Paris, Gabriel-Giraud et fils, 1952) 
24 Adorno’s most important theoretial consideration consisted of a discussion of the relation between music and 
painting, see Theodor W. Adorno, Über einige Relationen zwischen Musik und Malerei. Die Kunst und die Künste, (Berlin, 
Akademie der Künste, 1967); infra  
25 Rolf Tiedemann, ‘“Gegen den Trug der Frage nach dem Sinn.” Eine Dokumentation zu Adorno’s Beckett-
Lektüre,’ in Frankfürter Adorno-Blätter, Vol. 3 (1994), pp. 18-77; for a different reading of Adorno’s Beckett-
reading, see James M. Harding, ‘Trying to Understand Godot: Adorno, Beckett, and the Senility of Historical 
Dialectics,’ in Clio, Vol. 23, (Autumn 1993), pp. 1-22; and J.M. Bernstein, ‘Philosophy’s Refuge: Adorno in 
Beckett,’ in David Wood (ed.), Philosophers’ Poets, (London, Routledge, 1990), pp. 177-181 
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concept of art informel opened new paths in the art at the centre of his oeuvre: modernist music.26 
The confrontation with what he saw as the totally rationalized (integral serialist)27 musical work, 
resulted in the theorization of a new concept of the musical artwork as musique informelle. This 
concept not only consists of aesthetic speculations on musical form (no longer a top-down 
application of traditional formal models), but also on musical time. The roots of these ideas, 
especially the notion of spatialization of time and consciousness, lie in the work of the French 
philosopher Henri Bergson, and in Walter Benjamin’s reading of these concepts in historical and 
philosophical terms. 28  Adorno’s particular reading of their work resulted in a re-
                                                
26 Nels J. Rogers, Theodor W. Adorno's Poetics of Dissonance: Music, Language and Literary Modernism, (Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Pennsylvania, 2001). As Rogers sums up the thesis’s argument, ‘Adorno's account of the historical 
dynamic of literary modernism is compared and contrasted with the historical dynamic of modern music, 
arguing that key concepts informing Adorno's understanding of the dynamic of modernism – artistic material, 
aesthetic autonomy and subjective expression--developed from his intimate knowledge of the music of the 
Second Viennese School.’ She continues this reasoning by explaining that when Adorno returned to Germany in 
1949, ‘he turned to literary criticism as a means to disseminate his views on modern art to a broader audience 
than musical topics allowed. In essays on the literary works of Goethe, Hölderlin, Eichendorff, Heine, George, 
Kafka, Brecht and Beckett, Adorno describes [a] language which extricates itself from the means-ends logic of 
instrumental reason as music-like in nature or as playing over into music.’ Adorno’s understanding of the music 
of Schoenberg, specifically the ‘formal dissonance’ in these essays, according to Rogers, ‘also indicate that 
Adorno had begun to question the central status of music in the postwar period.’ Her thesis’s central claim, 
however, is rather controversial: ‘Adorno’s literary essays are central to understanding why the trajectory of 
modernism outlined in the posthumously published Aesthetic Theory runs from Beethoven to Wagner, to 
Schoenberg, to Beckett and not, in the latter case, to Boulez, Stockhausen or Cage.’ In my thesis, this final claim 
will be confronted with Adorno’s actual renewed interest and reconnection with the musical avant-garde, not 
simply as a wholesale rejection presented by Rogers. For a more nuanced view than than of Rogers of this fase 
in Adorno’s thinking, see Rainer Rochlitz, ‘Language for One, Language for All: Adorno and Modernism,’ in 
Perspectives of New Music, Vol. 27 (Summer 1989), pp. 18-36  
27 The term ‘integral serialism’ stands apart from pure dodecaphonic technique (which exclusively pertains to a series 
of twelve pitches). In the few cases I may have used the term ‘serial’ or ‘serialist’ alone, I always mean to refer to 
the former.  
28 See Claire Blencowe, ‘Destroying Duration. The Critical Situation of Bergsonism in Benjamin’s Analysis of 
Modern Experience,’ in Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2008), pp. 139-158 
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conceptualization (or ‘redemption’29) of the reified concept of universal progress as artistic 
progress; in direct relation to this historical re-conceptualization in discontinuous terms stands 
the notion of musical time, especially in terms of non-linearity. However, as we shall see, Adorno 
found the possibility of a non-developmental temporal conception as spatialized time problematic. 
In the chapters that follow, I will draw on Benjamin’s concepts of allegorical time and the image 
to suggest ways in which of Adorno’s concept of musique informelle can be fruitfully extended 
without ignoring his reservations. 
 
  
                                                
29 This idea of ‘redeeming’ a concept, which has seemingly entered uncritical terminological jargon, such as progress, 
will be revisited in this thesis. Another related concept, modernism, was similarly reconceptualized by Albrecht 
Wellmer: Albrecht Wellmer, ‘Truth, Semblance, Reconciliation: Adorno's Aesthetic Redemption of Modernity,’ 
in Telos, Vol. 62, (1984), pp. 89-115 
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The musical work of art: the (pre-)history of a concept 
Adorno’s perception of the contemporary crisis of the modernist musical artwork arises from his 
understanding of the artwork itself, which in turn resulted from his engagement with a long 
philosophical tradition that originated at the end of the eighteenth century30 in the philosophy of 
Enlightenment thinkers. One of the first important figures in the discipline of (philosophical) 
aesthetics, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762)31 conceived of the artwork as a monad – 
drawing on a central concept of Leibnizian philosophy32  – which imitates and represents.  In 
this regard, the concept of mimesis, 33  often associated with Plato’s 34  rather negative 
                                                
30 For a book-length discussion of the musical work of art, see Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Work: 
an Essay in the Philosophy of Music (Oxford; New York, Oxford University Press, 1992). 
31 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Aesthetica, (Frankfurt, 1750-1758), reprint (Hildesheim; New York, 1986) 
32 Alexander Aichele, ‘Die Grundlegung einer Hermeneutik des Kunstwerks. Zum Verhältnis von metaphysischer 
und ästhetischer Wahrheit bei Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten,‘ in Studia Leibnitziana, Vol. 31, No. 1 (1999), pp. 
82-90. As Aichele explains: ‘A. G. Baumgarten's foundation of aesthetics as a branch of philosophical reflection 
is itself deeply rooted in Leibnizian metaphysics. From this starting-point Baumgarten comes to a kind of 
monadological concept of the work of art, that gets now an inexhaustible and truth-representing meaning.’ 
Aichele further argues that for Baumgarten, this truth of the work of art ‘cannot be recognized rationally, for it is 
impossible for human beings to be aware of a beautiful object's “metaphysical truth,” which can only be 
perceived by the senses as – to quote Baumgarten – “aesthetical truth.”’ Fortunately, it is possible to transfer 
some aspects of ‘aesthetical’ truth to ‘logial’ truth by means of a ‘rational and schientific’ hermeneutics. For 
Aichele, finally, ‘the interest in art is therefore at the same time an interest in the cognition of the metaphysical 
cosmic order, and Baumgarten's aesthetics similarly are the first foundation of philosophical hermeneutics of art.’ 
33 Mimesis in Adorno’s work is different from mere imitation. For example, Martin Jay writes on the opposing 
conceptions of mimesis in ‘Mimesis and Mimetology: Adorno and Lacoue-Labarthe,’ in Tom Huhn and 
Lambert Zuidervaart (eds.), The Semblance of Subjectivity. Essays in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, (Cambridge, Mass., The 
MIT Press, 1997), pp. 29-54. Jay writes that on the one hand ‘[…] in the much older Platonic critique of mimesis 
its danger was understood to be undermining of a stable notion of truth, which is threatened by duplicitous 
copies of mere appearances, here it is precisely the opposite worry that is at work: the anxiety that mimesis 
means privileging an allegedly ‘”true” original over its infinite duplications.’ In contrast, ‘the competing 
intellectual tradition known as the Frankfurt School found much in mimesis to praise, […] in its struggle to 
counter the reigning power of instrumental rationality in the modern world.’ He continues by pointing to 
Benjamin’s influential texts of 1933, ‘On the Mimetic Faculty,’ and ‘The Doctrine of the Similar,’ which 
subsequently led Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno to mourn ‘the loss or withering of a primal and 
inherently benign human capacity to imitate nature as the dialectic of enlightenment followed its fateful course. 
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conceptualization of music as an ‘image of an image,’35 is of note here as a concept with a history 
of its own.36 A more imaginative concept of the image in Aristotle,37 influenced a number of artists, 
including Morton Feldman.38 For Adorno, art both resists and internalizes mimesis: 
                                                                                                                                                  
Although they recognized the sinister potential of mimetic behavior when combined with the instrumental 
rationality it generally opposed  - a potential realized precisely in the mcking Nazi mimicry of the Jews and 
duplicated in the culture industry at its most repressive – by and large, mimesis served as an honourific term in 
their vocabulary.’ (p. 30) 
34 Edith Watson Schipper, ‘Mimesis in the Arts in Plato’s Laws,’  in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 22, 
No. 2 (Winter, 1963), pp. 199-202: 'In the Laws, the last and longest and most laborious of his dialogues, Plato 
briefly outlines a theory of the mimetic arts (technai eikastikai or mimetikai) which develops further and clarifies 
what he has said about art in the third book of the Republic. The mimetic arts, mentioned at different times, 
include music, dancing, poetry, drama, painting, and sculpture; and so correspond to what now would be called 
the fine arts. Mimetikai, used of the arts, had a current and popularly accepted meaning, that of duplicating in 
another medium the appearances of things which could be experienced outside their representation in art. Many 
commentators and translators of Plato have assumed that he held this popular opinion as to artistic imitation, 
largely due to the account in the tenth book of the Republic of the painter from life who copies appearances.' 
35 See Barbara R. Barry, ‘In Adorno’s Broken Mirror: Towards a Theory of Musical Reproduction,’ in International 
Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music, Vol. 40, No. 1 (June 2009), pp. 81-98; Barry states that: ‘As well as 
reflecting fragmented social and political structures, music's shattered form was symptomatic of another 
conceptual dislocation in the context of art a rupture in the connection between beauty and truth, long 
considered to be intrinsic to art. Central to that concept was art's power of mimesis, where the visual arts created 
vivid images that shape our view of the world, and music evoked its inner reality as the narrative of emotion, 
conveyed by coherent design. So powerful was this view of art as intensified experience that it reversed the 
denigrating hierarchy of Plato's cave. Instead of Plato's lowly ranking of art as the 'image of an image' a 
reflection of life which is in turn an image of transcendent Ideas art becomes itself heightened reality. More 
powerful even and dangerous than music's famed ability to change human behaviour and affect even inanimate 
nature, music could attain an even higher level, as the direct experience of the Divine. Even if such an intense 
connection may last no more than a moment, its dazzling radiance, like the brilliance of the sun, throws 
everything else into shadow. Such a connection leaves a profound trace in memory and occurs when the musical 
elements have an integral bond, so that the work forges a vital link between composer, performer and listener.’ 
(p. 82) 
36 Maria Villela-Petit, ‘Art et vérité. La réhabilitation herméneutique de la mimèsis et ses limites,’ in Les E ́tudes 
philosophiques, No. 2, Recherches en phénoménologie (April-June 1998), pp. 219-236 
37 See Krisanna M. Scheiter, ‘Images, Appearances, and Phantasia in Aristotle,’ in Phronesis, Vol. 57, (2012), pp. 251-
278. She argues that phantasia is the capacity to produce image and explains (perceptual) appearances: ‘Images, 
however, are not merely pictorial for Aristotle. We can have an image of any perceptual experience, not just 
 28 
The spirit of artworks is their objectivated mimetic comportment: it is opposed to mimesis and at the 
same time the form that mimesis takes in art. As an aesthetic category, imitation cannot simply be 
accepted any more than it can simply be rejected. Art objectivates the mimetic impulse, holding it fast 
at the same time that it disposes of its immediacy and negates it.39 
In terms of music,40 and more specifically musical performance, Barbara Barry sees Adorno’s 
contribution to the history of intellectual engagement with this concept regarding the latter’s 
insistence on interpretation41 as a necessary condition of music. Performance ‘aims to fill the 
lacunae left by notation as objective problem-solving; and its complement, interpretation, aims at 
decoding the cipher to convey the work with the immediacy of creative life.’42 Whilst the study 
of the score may allow for the intellectual understanding of music, however, ‘it is only through 
reproduction that music can be fully experienced.’43 For Adorno, ‘music's specific and unique 
criteria can only be fully expressed through performance. The attempt to reconcile the divergent demands 
of music as writing (space) and music as expressive mimesis (time) Adorno calls the plight of music.’44 This 
                                                                                                                                                  
visual perceptions. Furthermore, images do not bring about perceptual appearances through two distinct 
processes,’ in ibid., p. 252 
38 See Chapter 6 in this thesis. In his essay Between Categories, Feldman refers to Aristotle’s concept of the image as an 
image of time, understanding it not only as a visual concept, but as fundamental to understanding the unfolding 
of time. 
39 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, op. cit., p. 285 
40 Mimesis in musical terms and in relation to Adorno’s terminology, has been covered by scholars including Max 
Paddison, Adorno's Aesthetics of Music, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993). See also: Christa Bürger, 
‘Mimesis and Modernity,’ in Stanford Literature Review, No. 3 (Spring 1986), pp. 63-73; Josef Früchte, Mimesis: 
Konstellation eines Zentralbegriffs bei Adorno, (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1986); Martin Jay, ‘Mimesis 
and Mimetology: Adorno and Lacoue-Labarthe,’ in Tom Huhn and Lambert Zuidervaart (eds.), The Semblance of 
Subjectivity. Essays in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, (Cambridge, Mass, The MIT Press, 1997), pp. 29-54; Richard Wolin, 
‘Utopia, Mimesis, and Reconciliation: A Redemptive Critique of Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory,’ in Representations, Vol. 
32 (Autumn 1990), pp. 33-49 
41 Barbara Barry, op. cit., p. 81 
42 Ibid., p. 81  
43 Ibid., p. 81 
44 Ibid., p. 81; [my stress] 
 29 
relation between opposed artforms, as is traditionally thought, is central to the study of twentieth 
century music. Adorno’s engagement with the idea of one art imitating another art – of temporal 
arts (Zeitkünste, such as music and poetry) and spatial arts (Raumkünste, such as painting and 
sculpture) – was the object of study in his article ‘On Some Relationships between Music and 
Painting,’45 to which I will return later. 
 
Other concepts such as aesthetic beauty46 and truth47 were seen as ethical forces within the work. 
In brief, works of art were considered from a philosophical point of view as mediating48 social and 
historical information,49 seen as part of the work’s content.50 The Enlightenment philosopher par 
                                                
45 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘On Some Relationships between Music and Painting,’ translated by Susan Gillespie in 
Musical Quarterly, Vol. 79, No. 1, (Spring 1995), p. 66-79 
46 It was important for Baumgarten to distinguish between good and bad art; good art was not only connected to 
beauty, but also to ethics. 
47 Kirk Pillow, ‘Form and Content in Kant's Aesthetics: Locating Beauty and the Sublime in the Work of Art,’ in 
Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 32 (1994), pp. 443-459 
48 Ibid. 
49 Max Paddison argues  in his Chapter “The problem of mediation” that Adorno himself was very well aware of the 
problematic character of the relation of music to society and of the ‘natural’ and ‘historical’ within musical 
material. He suggests that the concept of mediation and musical material should be seen in a broader context of 
ideas. Mediation can be seen on three different levels: (i) musical works are mediated ‘in themselves’ (as the 
dialectic of construction and expression); (ii) musical material is culturally and socially mediated (as the relation 
of musical to social production, reproduction, distribution and consumption); and (iii) musical material is 
historically mediated. See  
50 Georgina Born, ‘On Musical Mediation: Ontology, Technology and Creativity,’ in Twentieth-Century Music, Vol. 2 
(2005), p. 7-36: ‘Music is perhaps the paradigmatic multiply-mediated, immaterial and material, fluid quasi-object, 
in which subjects and objects collide and intermingle. It favours associations or assemblages between musicians 
and instruments, composers and scores, listeners and sound systems – that is, between subjects and objects. 
Music also takes myriad social forms, embodying three orders of social mediation. It produces its own varied 
social relations – in performance, in musical associations and ensembles, in the musical division of labour. It 
inflects existing social relations, from the most concrete and intimate to the most abstract of collectivities – 
music’s embodiment of the nation, of social hierarchies, and of the structures of class, race, gender and sexuality. 
But music is bound up also in the broader institutional forces that provide the basis of its production and 
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excellence, Immanuel Kant, proposed his theory of aesthetic judgement in the 1790s, separating 
‘not only artists but receivers of art as well’ from ‘the mundane and particular.’51 This judgement 
(originally not limited to the arts or any particular class of objects) should be made universally, by 
any person – suspending ‘all private points of view,’ experienced disinterestedly,52 and ought to be 
purposive yet without specific purpose,53 and should be based in a modality of satisfaction, a ‘reconciliation 
of al our mental faculties.’54  Of the three types of art, music belongs to the ‘beautiful play of 
sensations’55 and is considered to be transitory rather than lasting. The question as to whether 
and how it may furnish a basis for knowledge (of essentially a fleeting, isolated experience 
(Erlebnis)) in the work of art is an understanding, as we will see, Walter Benjamin subsequently 
developed. It is important to note here that Benjamin and Adorno criticized the universal nature 
of a number of Kant’s categories and conceptualizations.56 As Adorno wrote: 
To be able to say with good reason why an artwork is beautiful, true, coherent, or legitimate does not 
mean reducing it to its universal concepts, even if this operation – which Kant both desired and 
contested – were possible. In every artwork [...] the universal and the particular are densely intertwined. 
                                                                                                                                                  
reproduction, whether élite or religious patronage, market exchange, the arena of public and subsidized cultural 
institutions, or late capitalism’s multi-polar cultural economy.’ (p. 7) 
51 Ibid. 
52 ‘The first moment of Kant's Analytic of the Beautiful asserts that our liking in the beautiful cannot originate from any 
interest and that in the beautiful 'we are not compelled to give our approval by any interest, whether of sense or 
of reason (§5,52).’ But Kant also insists that the liking in the beautiful does not create any interest in the object 
either. […] The requirement that a pure judgment of taste be devoid of all interest forms the foundation of 
Kant's important distinction between aesthetic liking and the pleasure that may accompany moral judgment or 
action.” Ibid.; see also Lydia Goehr, op. cit., p. 168 
53 Ibid., p. 168: ‘If an object looks as if it were designed for a moral, practical or scientific end, and the viewer takes 
account of that end, then the viewer is not contemplating the object aesthetically.’ 
54 Ibid., p. 169 
55 Immanuel Kant, op. cit., §6-16; see also Lydia Goehr, op. cit., p. 169  
56 For Adorno’s study of Kant in terms of the artwork’s autonomy in particular, see: M. W. Skees, ‘Kant, Adorno and 
the Work of Art,’ in Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 37, No. 8 (2011), pp. 915-933; James M. Harding, 
‘Historical Dialectics ant the Autonomy of Art in Adorno’s Ästhetische Theorie,’ in Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism, Vol. 50, (Summer 1992), pp. 183-195 
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Kant touches on this when he defines the beautiful as “that which pleases universally without 
requiring a concept.”57 
Coupled with necessity (of pleasing universally – each and every person), universality remains an 
‘ineluctable concept.’58 In Adorno’s view, conceptualizations external to the work of art, or the  
requirement of the subsumption of particulars to the unifying concept transgresses against the idea of 
conceptualization from within that [my italics], by means of the concept of finality, was to correct in both 
parts of the Critique of Judgment the classificatory method of ‘theoretical,’ natural-scientific reason that 
emphatically rejects knowledge of the object from within.59 
Judging artworks based on external, universal criteria, as Kant proposed, is problematic: even 
works which seem to fulfil all of these criteria could potentially still be uncritical works which 
appear as ornamental cultural objects (Kulturobjekte); consequently, there are no bad artworks for 
Adorno, as they would disqualify themselves as art. In this regard, modern art escapes the 
definition of Kantian art as universally beautiful: ‘Other works, indeed new art as a whole, 
contradict that judgment and are hardly universally pleasing, and yet they cannot thereby be 
objectively disqualified as art.’60 
 
Adorno’s analysis of the work of art reveals its dialectical tension, without a third moment in 
which the objective and the subjective are overcome, radically situating the mediation in the 
artwork itself, as Peter Bürger has argued.61 Adorno criticizes Kant by pointing out the latter’s 
                                                
57 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, op. cit., p. 165 
58 Ibid., p. 165 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 As Peter Bürger writes: ‘[…] die Vermittlung zwischen Kunst und Gesellschaft ist nicht in einem Dritten (einer 
gesellschaftlichen Instanz) zu suchen, sondern im Kunstwerk selbst. Bei aller Gegensätzlichkeit ihrer ästhetischen 
Anschauungen sind Lukács und Adorno darin einig: Sie suchen die gesellschaftliche Vermittlung des 
Kusntwerks in diesem selbst auf.’ [‘The mediation of art and society is not to be found in a third party (a social 
instance), but in the artwork itself. Despite all the differences of their aesthetic views Lukács and Adorno agree: 
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objectivizing of aesthetics by means of universal conceptual formalization. Adorno wrote in this 
regard that 
This formalization is, however, contrary to aesthetic phenomena as what is constitutively particular. 
What each artwork would need to be according to its pure concept is essential to none. Formalization, 
an act of subjective reason, forces art back into precisely that merely subjective sphere – ultimately 
that of contingency – from which Kant wanted to wrest it and which art itself resists.62 
In the course of the nineteenth century, the concept of the artwork became a historically changing 
object of study in its own right. In her article ‘Being True to the Work,’ Lydia Goehr notes the 
newfound importance of ‘being true’ to the concept of the musical work (Werktreue) at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century in the writings of Ernst Theodor Amadeus Hoffmann, 
whose 
Conception [of the artwork] corresponds closely to that accepted today. Thus, a musical work is held 
to be a composer’s unique, objectified expression, a public and permanently existing artifact made up 
of musical elements (typically tones, dynamics, rhythms, harmonies, and timbres). A work is fixed with 
respect, at least, to the properties indicated in the score and it is repeatable in performances. 
Performances themselves are transitory sound events intended to present a work by complying as 
closely as possible with the given notational specifications.63 
                                                                                                                                                  
they look for the social mediation in the artwork itself’] in Peter Bürger, ‘Das Vermittlungsproblem in der 
Kunstsoziologie Adornos,’ in Burkhardt Lindner and W. Martin Lüdke (eds.), Materialien zur ästhetischen Theorie 
Theodor W. Adornos, (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1980), p. 169; cf. also: Peter Bürger, Vermittlung - Rezeption - 
Funktion. Ästhetische Theorie und Methodologie der Literaturwissenschaft (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1979) and  
Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Thesen zur Kunstsoziologie,’  in Peter Bürger (ed.), Seminar: Literatur- und Kunstsoziologie, 
(Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1978), p. 204-21; and Peter Bürger, Theory of the avant-garde (Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 56 
62 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, op. cit., p. 166 
63 Lydia Goehr, ‘Being True to the Work,’ in Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter, 1989), p. 55 
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Goehr’s subsequent research on the history of the musical work concept develops this 
perspective even further.64 Early nineteenth-century music critics were increasingly required to 
attempt to grasp the work itself, ‘in isolation from any particular performance.’65 Goehr refers to 
Carl Maria von Weber, who wrote that 
In order to judge properly any work of art that depends on a performance within the temporal 
dimension, it is essential for the critic to have a tranquil and unprejudiced mind, open to every kind of 
impression but unscrupulously free of definite opinion or emotional inclination, except of course a 
conscious preparedness to accept the subject matter in question. It is only in this way that we can give 
the artist complete sway over our state of mind and enable his emotions and characters to transport us 
into the world of his creation.66 
As to the ontological question of what a work of art is (as an object), 67 this is related to the 
work’s historical and temporal aspects, its place in history or its historicity, and, moreover, to the 
historical mediation of the regulatory concept 68  of the work of art itself and its aesthetic 
systematization.69 In opposition to this view, the understanding of art history as continuous 
                                                
64 In many ways, this book’s influence on our current work is invaluable, although doing it justice here is impossible 
given the limitations of the chapter’s (and the thesis’s) scope. Some of the aspects of the work concept’s history 
in the oeuvre of Benjamin and Adorno will be further discussed in later chapters. 
65 Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works : an Essay in the Philosophy of Music, op. cit., p. 238 
66 Carl Maria von Weber and John Warrack, Writings on music (Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press, 
1981) 
67 For an overview of the ‘analytic approaches’ to the work of art, as a definable object, see Lydia Goehr, op. cit., 11-
86  
68 This argument of the work of art as a regulatory concept, rather than an object with an identity, plays a central 
role in Lydia Goehr magnum opus mentioned above, specifically Lydia Goehr, ‘Chapter 4: The Central Claim’ in 
‘Part II: The Historical Approach,’ The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works : an Essay in the Philosophy of Music, op. cit., 
p. 89-119.  
69 Alicja Helman, ‘The Present-Day Meaning of a Work of Art,’ in Artibus et Historiae, Vol. 4, No. 8 (1983), pp. 155-
164. This article is an interesting attempt to synthesize different conceptualisations of the work of art, including 
music and the work concept in the twentieth century. It contains a number of positions and interpretations 
which attempt to deal with the crisis of the concept at hand. However, the crisis of the work of art is seen as a 
naïve reflection of choices made by artists in the work of critics. The crisis seems like an external, psychological 
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would rest on the flawed claim that one system must necessarily follow another one – in which the 
work of art is defined, either positively or negatively – simply because systems (or indeed non-
systems) have succeeded one another. However, these systems, as inextricably bound to the idea 
of progress (and reaction), are themselves culturally and historically bound to the world in which 
we live, and to a world in which the creators of the artworks lived at the time of their creation.70  
So, although the concept of the work of art itself is bound to the genealogy of bourgeois society 
and capitalism, itself the result of historical and social processes (vide Marx), it is possible to 
consider works from an earlier time (in which there was no such precise concept of the work of 
art) as artworks.71 However, it is impossible to see the concept of the work of art apart from 
these actual works, a-historically. In other words, to speak of works of art at all is to speak of the 
historical and social situation in which the concept of the work – with its privileged, non-
functional role, as exemplified by Paul Valéry’s l’art pour l’art – is allowed to exist as a meaningful 
separate category. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
problem; her critique is therefore not an immanent one. Helman fails to brings into relief the artwork as socially 
and historically mediated. Her conclusion is paradoxically that artworks will disappear shortly.  
70 See Jean Molino, ‘Technology, globalisation, tribalisation,’ in Jean-Jacques Nattiex (ed.), Musiques, une encyclopédie 
pour le XXIème siècle, (Collection Cité de la musique) (Paris, Actes Sud, 2003), pp. 69-85 
71 As we will see shortly in Benjamin’s critique, this position is rather more far-reaching than the naive experience of 
works from the past, as the original is inevitably lost. Cf. Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its 
Technological Reprodicibility.’ Lydia Goehr also criticises the anachronistic defining of objects from the past as 
artworks, especially those who originated in a time and place when such a concept was not yet established, see 
Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, op. cit., p. 114-115: ‘This epistemological claim presupposes 
that certain if not all kinds of meaning and truth are depedent upon the existence of particular conceptual 
schemes. That presupposition allows one to affirm that, given that we have an explicit concept of a work, Bach 
composed works.’  
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The modernist work of art in crisis 
In the twentieth century, philosophers have pursued this quest for a better understanding of the 
artwork and how it is different from other objects. Heidegger,72 who was critical of traditional 
aesthetics,73 posits that a real artwork74 reveals a ‘world’ and and an ‘earth’ disclosing the world of 
people in history.75 Although Adorno criticized Heidegger on his use of jargon (especially the 
notion of authenticity),76 in terms of the artwork, both Heidegger and Adorno theorize mimesis 
as mimetic movement and how it parallels aesthetic judgment, particularly in the way it is construed 
in light of Kant's doctrine of the sublime.77 Notable attempts have also been made to read the 
                                                
72 Martin Heidegger, The Origin of a Work of Art in Poetry, Language, Thought, translated by A. Hofstadter, (New York, 
Harper and Row, 1971). This is a translation of Martin Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, (Stuttgart, Reclam, 
1960). For a discussion of this essay in light of the secondary literature as to question of what the 'world' and 
'earth' in Heidegger mean, see: R. Raj Singh, ‘Heidegger and the World in an Artwork,’ in The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 3, (Summer, 1990), pp. 215- 222 
73 Ibid., p. 215: ‘Apart from explicating the nature and the role of artworks and their connection with the world, 
truth and historical unfolding of Being, Heidegger also presents a critique of traditional aesthetics in The Origin of  
a Work of Art. Traditional aesthetics is similarly taken to task in his interpretation of Nietzsche’s “will to power” 
as art in Nietzsche,Vol. 1.2 According to Heidegger, the field of aesthetics has been unable to rise above the 
bifurcation of reality into subjects and objects and the use of the worn out concepts of matter and form in its 
attempts to define the nature of artworks.’  
74 For Heidegger, an ‘artwork’ (Kunstwerk) is different from a mere ‘piece of art’ (Kunststück), which shows a simple 
artisan quality, or is part of larger collection. See Rudi Visker, ‘Kunst en grofvuil: Heidegger, Levinas en de 
overgang [‘Art and Bulky Rubbish: Heidegger, Levinas and the Transition’],’ in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, Vol. 68, 
No. 3 (Autumn 2006), pp. 583-612 
75 Singh, op. cit., p. 217: ‘A fuller interpretation of Heidegger’s assertions would be that an artwork discloses the 
world of a (historical) people, and at the same time shows the nature of human being's (worlding) world. It 
shows us how the world historically worlds, in showing how it has worlded for “this people.” It performed an 
ontological function for the people who installed it, and it gives us a glimpse of their world in a different way.’ 
76 Theodor W. Adorno, Jargon der Eigentlichkeit. Zur deutschen Ideologie, (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1964); GS 6 
(1973), pp. 413-526; translated by Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will, The Jargon of Authenticity, foreword by Trent 
Schroyer, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973) 
77 Tom Huhn, ‘The Movement of Mimesis: Heidegger’s “Origin of the Work of Art” in Relation to Adorno and 
Lyotard,’ in Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 22, No. 4, (1996), pp. 45-69 
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artwork as a (utopian) model for political action,78 for example, by Berthold Brecht, Hanns Eisler, 
and Georg Lukács, 79  although these are inherently problematic. Walter Benjamin for one 
                                                
78 See for example, Bret R. Wheeler, ‘Modernist Re-enchantments II: From Aestheticized Politics to the Artwork,’ in 
The German Quarterly, Vol. 75, No. 2 (Spring, 2002), pp. 113-126. Wheeler's reading of these theorists is itself an 
example of a politicisation of the artwork. From an almost impossibly problematic beginning of the article, 
Wheeler states that ‘In its youth, indeed, the union of art and politics excited a vast spectrum of intellectuals with 
a promise of redemption from the cold rationality of a disenchanted world. Sociologists, philosophers, even 
jurists and artists discerned in the work of art the instantiation of an original unity of human agents-a political 
community untroubled by fragmentation, mediated relations, and politics absent moral agency.' In the rest of 
this highly problematic article, Wheeler reads in the (modernist) artwork a redemption that is 'no longer 
transcendent,’ but immanent, by referring to Max Weber's dictum:  “Sie übernimmt die Funktion einer, 
gleichviel wie gedeuteten, innerweltlichen Erlösung.” (“It takes over the function of in as how many meaningful 
ways, an innerworldly [immanently] redemption.” [My translation]) The redemption once anticipated by religious 
worldviews was now preserved in art. This was consonant with the demands of a modern world – a secular form 
of integration and an immanent rather than transcendent medium of interaction. Thus the alternative political 
modality proffered by the aesthetic operations of the artwork.’ Although this could have been an interesting 
search for the links and differences between politics and (modernist) artworks, Wheeler simplifies, misrepresents 
and ultimately misunderstands the critical theorists’ work to a point of meaninglessness, for example, when he 
writes that 'in the modernist artwork the heterogeneous subject and object of the world of experience come to 
share the world of the artwork from which they are also only analytically distinct. In the artwork subject and 
object, medium and material, form and content have become homogenous. Artistic beauty is thus the shadow in 
the cave [referring to Plato], indicating a transcendental agreement of subject and object, a philosophical truth 
about existence that finds its home nowhere but in the work of art.’ p. 116 This is problematic, as it destroys 
precisely the dialectic between the different terms, especially between subject and object, as we will see in this 
thesis. The 'transcendental agreement' is also false. He  totalises the concept of autonomy – autonomy, according 
to him, being 'the ability to exist (or to 'mean') without norms or standards except those given to itself in the 
very activity of signification.' The problem here is that autonomy in this way escapes the dialectic once more: 
there is no autonomy at work in the artwork if the social (or political) context does not allow for it, which 
indicates a mediation at the level of the modern artwork and its uncomfortable place as a non-functional entity. 
Wheeler misunderstands this completely. His image of redemption in the artwork ['Hence the artwork, in 
Lukács's terms that would have also agreed in slight variation with Adorno's, is a mimetic reproduction of a 
redeemed world in which subject and object are homogeneously conceived, tending toward one another'] would 
then indicate a false work, and would therefore not even be regarded as an artwork as such. He tries hard to 
show how what he calls the 'frame' of the artwork as different from it utopian core (‘At the same time, however, 
the frame of the work, which mimics the tragic unattainability of this redemption, accompanies this formal 
mimetic operation occurring on the level of the work's signification.’ He is also incorrect when he states on p. 
117 ‘within the artwork, the constituents of the work's significance manifest a utopian political hope, a hope for 
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an association that is not falsely reconciled to the whole – to the semblance – by an anterior concept or rule. 
However, this uncoerced, and hence also unreconciled whole emerges not from an indeterminate space, i.e., 
within a world of unconditioned action or voluntaristic practice. Rather, the determinacy of this emancipatory 
irreconcilability is the boundary, or the frame, of the artwork.’ It is also not clear what Wheeler means by 
‘signification’; in the case it refers to the meaning of the artwork, then the idea that ‘signification occurs almost 
exclusively at the level of form rather than referential content [what is meant by  ‘referential content’ is also not 
clear] is problematic. Above all, it is false to state that subject and object are homogenous in the modernist 
artwork, especially in relation to Adorno's aesthetic theory. As I will argue in this thesis, in the avant-garde 
artwork, if not all modernist artworks worthy of that name, the tension is not between a resolved ‘utopian’ 
mimetic core and its unreconciled ‘frame’, but between fragmented material and the dissolution of form – which 
could be better understood, for example, in light of Adorno's concept of musique informelle. If it is at all correct 
what Wheeler portends, that ‘aesthetics offered redemption as an artistic illusion’, then it can only be seen in a 
negative way, or it would be a travesty to the work of Adorno, if not of Lukács. Adorno clearly states that the 
artwork as an illusion is not one of utopian reconciliation, neither at its core, nor negatively in its ‘frame’. For 
example, Wheeler argues that Lukács’s (failed) Habilitation in 1918 ‘articulated a vision of the artwork as a 
negative model for politics. In the artwork the figural space of which the work consists is determinate; it has 
discrete borders that distinguish it from the world of reality. But within these borders there is both a freedom for 
the particular constituent parts of the work and a harmony in their common goal of bringing forth a semblance, 
an id ea l  aes the t i c  ob j e c t  [my stress] that the artwork seems to be representing.’ It is this misunderstanding 
which undoes the earlier ‘negative model’ interpretation of the artwork for political reasons, which is highly 
problematic in itself. The modernist artwork is never, in whatever sense of the word, an ideal aesthetic object. 
However, Wheeler compounds his error in the next sentence: ‘This non-coerced community of particulars is 
possible by virtue of what Adorno would later call the ‘subjektive Paradoxie von Kunst: Blindes – den Ausdruck 
– aus Reflexion – durch Form – zu produzieren; das Blinde nicht zu rationalisieren sondern ästhetisch überhaupt 
herzustellen.’ (‘the subjective paradox of art – blindly, to produce an expression – from reflection – through 
form; not to rationalize this blind [object], but to make [it] aesthetic at all.’ [My translation]) He concludes 
incorrectly and somewhat bizarrely, that ‘So it was that aesthetics offered redemption as an artistic illusion. And 
with this we have ascertained a bipartite truth for modernism: first, that there was a faculty, an aesthetic one, that 
putatively offered access to the world and allowed agents to interact immediately (hence, it is a faculty that 
redeems politics from liberalism); and, second, that this faculty is concretized in that artwork, as the artwork 
both signifies without extraneous mediation and also mimics – by virtue of it being a world set apart – a perfect 
political community, even in a seemingly abstruse and intensive form as a fiction.’ If modernist art, following 
Adorno and Benjamin, has anything to say, it is the mediation of fragmented and contradictory elements of 
societal upheaval, rather than Wheeler’s reading of it as the ideal of utopia in a ‘frame’ of unreconciliation. In 
that sense, redemption can not be found simply in the artwork in the way Wheeler posits in his reading of these 
theorists. 
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expands on Marx’s work,80 especially the relation between capitalism and the work of art’s 
potential for political action, in the second version of his essay The Work of Art in the Age of its 
Technological Reproducibility, right from the opening paragraph:  
Marx adopted an approach which gave his investigations prognostic value. [...] Since the 
transformation of the superstructure proceeds far more slowly than that of the base, it has taken more 
than half a century for the change in the conditions of production to be manifested in all areas of 
culture. How this process has affected culture can only be assessed, and these assessments must meet 
certain prognostic requirements. [...] Theses defining the developmental tendencies of art can 
therefore contribute to the political struggle in ways that it would be a mistake to underestimate.81  
 
Of twentieth-century philosophers who engaged with concepts of the artwork, however, Adorno 
is unquestionably one of the most important, especially with regard to the works of the musical 
post-war avant-garde. Through the contact with contemporary composers from Schoenberg and 
Webern onwards, but especially the composers of the 1950s and 1960s, Adorno came to occupy 
an influential position, both as an authority and a critic, especially through his involvement in the 
Darmstadt Ferienkursen. 82  However, the reception history of his ideas is highly complex. 
                                                                                                                                                  
79 For an excellent overview of the debates by these authors on the intersection of aesthetics and politics, see the 
anthology: Ronald Taylor (ed.), Aesthetics and Politics: Debates between Bloch, Lukács, Brecht, Benjamin, Adorno, with an 
afterword by Fredric Jameson, (London, NLB, 1977; Verso, 1980) 
80 Benjamin also explains some of the Marxist theorists’ positions in terms of art, history and politics in Walter 
Benjamin, ‘Eduard Fuchs, Collector and Historian,’ in Selected Writings, Marcus Jennings (ed.), Vol. 3,  
(Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, 1996), pp. 260-302 
81 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reprodicibility’, in Selected Writings, Vol. 3, p. 
101 
82 Heinz-Klaus Metzger and Rainer Riehn, Musik-Konzepte Sonderband „Darmstadt-Dokumente”, Vol. 1, No. 99, (Munich, 
Edtion text+kritik, 1999); Gianmario Borio and Hermann Danuser (eds.), Im Zenit der Moderne: Die Internationalen 
Ferienkurse für Neue Musik Darmstadt 1946-1966, 4 Vols., (Freiburg im Breisgau, Rombach, 1997); I will discuss 
Adorno’s presence in Dramstadt in more detail below, especially concerning the essays he presented, The Ageing 
of the New Music (1956 and Vers une musique informelle (1962). For a historical overview of the Darmstadt avant-
 39 
Important figures like Pierre Boulez, for example, sought to employ earlier Adornoian concepts 
in order to justify their own ideological position83 and the creation of the Darmstadt ‘myth,’84 yet 
ignored the more critical position that Adorno took subsequently in texts such as ‘The Ageing of 
New Music.’85 Crucially, as Hellmut Federhofer points out, the question as to the meaning of the 
concepts themselves, including the work of art, received a ‘completely new answer’ through this 
exchange, and ‘unwittingly revalued the avant-garde and lifted it as a cultural-political factor into 
collective consciousness.’86 
 
Adorno’s writings about the artwork87 and his perception of its contemporary state of crisis are 
deeply rooted in broader philosophical concerns in his oeuvre.88 His analysis of the dialectics of 
                                                                                                                                                  
garde and its influence on the following generation of composers, see: Célestin Deliège, Cinquante ans de modernité 
musicale: de Darmstadt à l'IRCAM. Contribution historiographique à une musicologie critique, (Sprimont, Mardaga, 2003); 
Deliège mentions the notion of musique informelle in his work (p. 917-918), when he asks the question: ‘La 
question ici posée est bien de savoir s’il [Adorno] n’est pas erroné de mêler le formalisme à l’avant-garde?’ [The 
question here is to find out whether he [Adorno] was not mistaken to mix formalism with the avant-garde?’] 
83 See Edward Campbell, Boulez, Music and Philosophy, (Music in the Twentieth Century), (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) 
84 Hermann Danuser, ‘”L'École de Darmstadt” et son mythe,’ in J.-J. Nattiez (ed.), Musiques du XXe siècle, (Arles, 
Actes Sud-Cité de la musique, 2003) 
85 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Das Altern der neuen Musik,’ in Der Monat (May 1955); GS 14 (1973), pp. 143-167; 
translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor and Frederic Will, ‘The Ageing of the New Music,’ in Telos, Vol. 77 (Autumn 
1988), pp. 95-116; also in Richard Leppert (ed.), Essays on Music. Theodor W. Adorno, op. cit., pp. 181-202 
86 Hellmut Federhofer, ‘Das negative Kunstwerk in der Musikphilosophie Adornos,’ in Archiv für Musikwissenschaft, 
Vol. 47, No. 4 (1990), pp. 247-248: ‘Der enorme Einfluss, den Adorno im persönlichen Verkehr mit zahlreichen 
Komponisten auf die Praxis ausübte, liesst eine solche Einschränkung kaum gerechtfertigt erscheinen. Denn mit 
Schönberg und Webern, an deren Schaffen die Avantgarde anknüpfte, gewann Adorno als kritische Instanz 
zugleich Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der Neuen Musik während der Fünfziger- und Sechzigerjahre. Die 
Frage nach ihrem Sinn erfuhr durch ihn eine vollkommen neue Beantwortung, die zwar nicht Schönbergs 
Zustimmung fand, aber unversehens die Avantgarde ästhetisch aufwertete und als kulturpolitischen Faktor in 
das allgemeine Bewusstsein erhob.’ 
87 See Ludwig Finscher, ‘Über den Kunstwerkbegriff bei Adorno,’ in Otto Kolleritsch (ed.), Adorno und die Musik, 
(Graz, Universal Edition, 1979), pp. 64-70 
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Enlightenment revealed the other side of rationalism—the tendency towards total rationalization, 
revealed in the barbarism of two world wars and industrialized mass killing. Importantly, he 
contended that the artwork could not escape this rationalization under the influence of 
increasing technification (to use a term coined by Eric Krakauer in his seminal work on Adorno’s 
critique, The Disposition of the Subject: Adorno’s Dialectics of Technology)89 and the relentless quest to 
dominate nature—the central focus of Adorno’s dialectics of subject and object. According to 
Adorno and his colleague Max Horkheimer,90 the relation between subject and object is more 
important than the attempt to define what an object is.91 Their critique of Enlightenment shows 
how nature has become objectified, building on Georg Lukács’ concept of the reification of 
consciousness. As Krakauer explains, Adorno and Horkheimer introduce their own version of 
Lukács’ concept of the reification of consciousness: 
Consciousness, indeed thinking itself, defines and hypostatizes itself, imposes proper limits upon itself. 
It thereby sacrifices its motility or dynamism, its self-differentiation, its alteration through reflection 
upon itself. It makes itself into a determinate thing, object, or res, the proper limits of which can be 
policed and maintained. At the same time, and to the very extent, that consciousness reifies itself, it 
                                                                                                                                                  
88 See Martin Zenck, Kunst als Begriffslose Erkenntnis. Zum Kunstbegriff der Ästhetischen Theorie Theodor W. Adornos, 
(Theorie und Geschichte der Literatur und der Schönen Künste, Texte und Abhandlungen), (Munich, W. Fink, 
1977) 
89 Eric L. Krakauer, The Disposition of the Subject: Reading Adorno's Dialectic of Technology, (Evanston, Ill., Northwestern 
University Press, 1998) 
90 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente, (Amsterdam, Querido, 
1947); GS 3 (1981); translated by John Cumming, Dialectic of Enlightenment, (New York, Herder & Herder, 1972); 
with regards to Horkheimer’s part in the writing of this work, as well as his role in establishing the Frankfurt 
School, see: Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Zeugnisse. Theodor W. Adorno zum sechzigsten Geburtstag. Im 
Auftrag des Instituts für Sozialforschung, (Frankfurt am Main, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1963) and John Abromeit, 
Max Horkheimer and the Foundations of the Frankfurt School, (Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press, 
2011) 
91 See Eric L. Krakauer, op. cit., p. 23  
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also reifies the world, that of which it is conscious. The world is determined as a conglomeration of 
objects.92 
For Krakauer, thinking can be understood as technology, ‘the poser/knowledge that generates and 
regenerates itself, [...] essentially a mode of thinking or reasoning.’93 This is what Adorno and 
Horkheimer call ‘technological rationality’; 94  as such, thinking has become an ‘organ of 
domination.’95 Thinking posits itself ‘as removed from nature and set up over against it,’96 in 
‘enlightened progress, a movement out of ensnarement in nature or myth.’’ 97  Thinking’s 
repression of itself as natural is its own reification, the natural itself ‘that stands before subjective 
thinking or the thinking subject, […] the positing of the natural as objective has also posited it as 
dependent upon thinking’98 as found in the work of Kant and Hegel. ‘Nature as object becomes 
regarded as a reflection of the preeminent thinking subject, as essentially subjective thinking.’99 
Objects are then nothing more than manipulatable and exploitable, ‘at the complete disposal of 
technological rationality, complete because nature-as-object is itself essentially rational and 
subjective.’’100 In cutting out anything outside itself, thinking as technological rationality sacrifices 
‘the very task of thinking: a reaching beyond itself, a moving or stretching toward the other [or 
the non-identical with itself].’101 Apart from Krakauer,102 the Dutch philosopher Saskia Wendel 
                                                
92 Ibid., p. 23 
93 Ibid., p. 23 
94 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, (New York, Herder and Herder, 1972), p. 121 
95 Krakauer, op. cit., p. 39 
96 Ibid., p. 39 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Krakauer, op. cit., p. 23 
101 Ibid., p. 26 
102 Ibid., p. 24. Quoting Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (p. 39) ‘Perception [Vorstellung] is, to be 
sure, only an instrument. Human beings distance themselves in thought from nature in order to set it up before 
them in such a way as to dominate it’, Krakauer argues that ‘thinking distinguishes and distances itself from 
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points out that subjective thinking in this way has forgotten that it is also object in its physicality, 
in being sensory and empirical.103  For Adorno, then,  
the object stands against the subject. The result of this confrontation is a resolution of the object in an 
absolute identity which is represented by the subject. The subject is identified with thinking, and the 
object with non-thinking, with the other of thinking and of the mind, with the sensory, with matter, 
but also with temporariness, history, contingency.104  
This is a crucial point, if we want to understand the importance of the object, even more so the 
(musical) artwork, as mediating this tension between object and subject, space and time. As we 
shall see, Benjamin contended that, as objects, artworks speak a silent language of their own, 
independent of our subjectivizing. 
 
The work of art’s content: social and historical mediations 
It is important to understand this conception of thinking in order to grasp how artworks 
function in a societal context. Rather than defining what an artwork is or represents, Adorno 
attempts to show this dynamic between art and society. In the opening pages of Aesthetic Theory, 
he writes that ‘nothing concerning art is self-evident anymore, not its inner life, not its relation to 
the world, not even its right to exist.’105 Against the freedom of modernist art, he posits that art is 
always limited to a particular, which ‘comes into contradiction with the perennial unfreedom of 
the whole. In it the place of art became uncertain.’106 Adorno refers to the idea that, in the totally 
                                                                                                                                                  
nature so as to escape the subjugation to nature and the vulnerability to nature’s power, and instead to obtain 
power over nature. This very distancing is what Horkheimer/Adorno call enlightened progress, a movement out 
of ensnarement in nature or myth (both are the same).’ I will return to the reconceptualization of the concept of 
progress later. 
103 Saskia Wendel, ‘Adorno over de mogelijkheid van metafysica,’ in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, Vol. 66, No. 4, (2004), pp. 
627-648 
104 Ibid. 
105 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, op. cit., p. 1 
106 Ibid. 
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administered world, art carved out a position of autonomy107 (in opposition to heteronomous 
artforms)108 from the social function it once had, in what he terms ‘the cultic function and its 
(after-)images [Nachbilder], through the idea of humanity.’109 On the question whether art and 
artworks are still possible, Adorno writes that art may have severed its relation to its own 
preconditions, as this  
question is kindled by art’s own past. Artworks detach themselves from the empirical world and bring 
forth another world, one opposed to the empirical world as if this other world too were an 
autonomous entity. Thus, however tragic they appear, artworks tend a priori toward affirmation.110  
However, for Adorno art does not root itself in first principles; in this sense the concept of art is 
not to be gleaned from one set of rules, but 
is located in a historically changing constellation of elements; it refuses definition. [...] The effort to 
subsume the historical genesis of art ontologically under an ultimate motif would necessarily flounder 
in such disparate material that the theory would emerge empty-handed except for the obviously 
relevant insight that the arts will not fit into any gapless concept of art.111 
It is this historical understanding of the becoming of art, rather than a fixed being which underlies 
Adorno’s position; in such a way that he declares that the definition of art ‘is at every point 
indicated by what art once was, but it is legitimated only by what art became with regard to what 
                                                
107 For a critique of Adorno’s understanding of art’s autonomy as well as Peter Bürger’s, see Lambert Zuidervaart, 
‘The Social Significance of Autonomous Art: Adorno and Bürger,’ in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 
48, No. 1 (Winter, 1990), pp. 61-77 
108 ibid.; Bürger’s central claim about Adorno is that he ‘misreads the autonomy of art and systematically neglects 
heteronomous art.’ (p. 61); see also Chapter 7 for Xenakis’s theorising of a new heteronomous music, in praxis 
relating to his composition of Duel (1959) for 2 orchestras and 2 conductors. 
109 Ibid. See below for a further exploration of the idea of humanity and the multiple threats of rationalisation and 
political oppression. 
110 Saskia Wendel, op. cit. 
111 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, op. cit., p. 2 
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it wants to, and perhaps can, become.’112 This double movement consists of both a quantitative 
difference vis-à-vis the merely empirical and a qualitative adoption of this difference which renews 
the concept of art. In a seemingly anachronistic fashion, Adorno claims that ‘much that was not 
art – cultic works, for instance – has over the course of history metamorphosed into art; and 
much that was once art is that no longer.’113 In other words, what is considered to be art at one 
point may lose this status, or vice versa; this is essentially a dialectical view of artworks as not 
simply historically determined, but gaining or losing the qualification as artworks from their 
inner constitution in relation to the society and historical moment in which they are considered 
aesthetically. In this regard, Adorno argues that Hegel was correct in considering art as historical 
and transitory, but that it did not occur to him that the substance of art (its ‘absoluteness’, in 
Hegel’s term)114 was not identical or subsumed in art’s own life and possible death.115 The 
particular way Adorno expresses this is in itself important, in that there is an implicit link with 
the work of Walter Benjamin: ‘What reactionary cultural pessimism once vociferated against 
cannot be suppressed by the critique of culture: that, as Hegel ruminated a hundred and fifty 
years ago, art may have entered the age of its demise.’116 As the scholar and translator of 
Adorno’s work Robert Hullot-Kentor argues, this may certainly refer to Benjamin’s essay The 
Work of Art in the Age of its Mechanical Reproduction, ‘a title on which Adorno works repeated 
                                                
112 Ibid., p. 3 
113 Ibid., p. 3 
114 See Valentina Ricci, ‘The Role of Erinnerung in Absolute Knowing: History and Absoluteness,’ in Valentina Ricci 
and Federico Sanguinetti (eds.), Hegel on Recollection: Essays on the Concept of Erinnerung in Hegel’s System, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 1-20; F. Chiereghin, ‘Absoluteness and Temporality in 
Hegel’s concept of History, in Verifiche: Rivista Trimestriale di Scienze Umane, Vol. 27, No. 3-4 (1998) 
115 Adorno further develops his critique of Hegel’s theory of time, which he sees a ‘simple dichotomy between the 
temporary and the everlasting’ and its relation to the primacy of the general in his philosophy of history. See 
Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik, op. cit., p. 321 
116 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 3 
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variations, often in ways that cannot be matched with adequate compactness in translation.’117 
One of those other references can be noted in the previous paragraph, where Adorno explicitly 
refers to a passage of the same essay by Benjamin: 
Posed from on high, the question whether something such as film is or is no longer art leads nowhere. 
Because art is what it has become, its concept refers to what it does not contain. The tension between 
what motivates art and art’s past circumscribes the so-called questions of aesthetic constitution. Art 
can be understood only by its laws of movement, not according to any set of invariants.118 
Walter Benjamin’s writings refer to these new media, particularly the way in which they allow for 
the reproduction of works of art; he argued that around 1900,  
technological reproduction not only had reached a standard that permitted it to reproduce all known 
works of art, profoundly modifying their effect, but it also had captured a place of its own among the 
artistic processes. In gauging this standard, we would do well to study the impact which its two 
different manifestations – the reproduction of artworks and the art of film – are having on art in its 
traditional form.119  
The one thing lacking in even the most perfect reproduction, according to Benjamin, is the  
here and now of the work of art – its unique existence in a particular place. It is this unique existence 
– and nothing else – that bears the mark of the history to which the work has been subject. This 
history includes changes to the physical structure of the work over time, together with any changes in 
ownership. [...] what is really jeopardized when the historical testimony is affected is the authority of 
the object, the weight it derives from tradition. One might focus these aspects of the artwork in the 
concept of the aura, and go on to say: what withers in the age of the technological reproduction of the 
work of art is the latter’s aura.120 
                                                
117 Ibid., p. 368 
118 Ibid., p. 3 
119 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reprodicibility’, in Selected Writings, Vol. 3, p. 
102 
120 Ibid., p. 103 
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Returning to the idea that art’s substance lies in its transitoriness, Adorno argued that the revolt 
of art against the teleological attitude towards the objectivity of the historical world, became a 
revolt against art itself. Importantly, Adorno distinguishes between the substance of art and art’s 
own historical trajectory, a distinction of critical importance for an understanding of the work of 
art in this thesis. As we will see, the question whether artworks can exist at all in the twentieth 
century, and which form such works would adopt, is the central question of this thesis, in light of 
the work of the modernist composers I consider here. Furthermore, ‘whether art is abolished, 
perishes, or despairingly hangs on, it is not mandated that the content [Gehalt]121 of past art 
perish. It [art’s content] could survive art in a society that had freed itself of the barbarism of its 
culture.’122 The concept of content, as Adorno scholars acknowledge, is central to his aesthetics.123 
As an English term it is used as a translation of two distinct German words: Inhalt and Gehalt, 
which – as Robert Hullot-Kentor explains in his translation of Aesthetic Theory – ‘in aesthetic 
                                                
121 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, op. cit., p. 3 
122 Ibid., p. 4 
123 See for example Zuidervaart’s argument in Lambert Zuidervaart, Adorno's Aesthetic Theory, The Redemption of Illusion, 
(Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1991), p. 122-124. He explains that there are two dialectics of note: ‘One is a 
dialectic between discursive and nondiscursive knowledge. The other is a dialectic between mimesis and 
rationality within art as a mode of discursive knowledge.’ (p. 122) It is the second dialectic which is relevant here: 
‘a tension between mimetic expression and rational construction or, in traditional terms, between content [Inhalt] 
and form [Form]’ (p. 124) Zuidervaart argues that Inhalt ‘can be approached from two independent sides, as 
either an artistic sublimation of objectified impulses or an artistic transmutation of objectified elements and 
relations in their non-identity [...] ‘Content’ [Inhalt] comes to stand for mimetic non-identity within works of art.’ 
(p. 124) The other term – form – is ‘important for Adorno because it is a way in which artworks both oppose 
society and communicate with it.’ (p. 123) Gehalt is understood by Zuidervaart as ‘import’ and is not simply 
musical but also social (p. 123). Gehalt, then, refers to the dialectic of form and content, and is to be understood 
as a dynamic concept, not a static, formalist one: ‘Unless one traces the contours of content [Inhalt] , form [Form], 
and their dialectic [Gehalt], one misses the way in which social tensions “shape” the artwork itself.’ (p. 123). See 
also James Buhler, ‘Book Review,’ in Indiana Theory Review, Vol. 15, No. 11, (Spring 1994), pp. 139-163, more 
specifically pp. 148-150 
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contexts, serve to distinguish the idea of thematic content or subject matter from that of content 
in the sense of import, essence, or substance of a work.’124  
 
As far as the modernist musical artwork in particular is concerned, Adorno addressed the 
relationship between its content and its place in history explicitly in an important essay, ‘The 
Relationship between Philosophy and Music,’125 in which he argues that to consider music as 
temporal at its core – a universal quality that on which all philosophers can agree – is ultimately 
another illusory conceptualization. This is how he introduces the problem: 
[The] consideration of the contemporary relation of philosophy and music leads to the insight that the 
timeless essence of music must be viewed as a chimera. Only history itself, real history with all its 
suffering and all its contradiction, constitutes the truth of music. This, however, means nothing else 
than that one cannot acquire a philosophical knowledge of music by constructing its ontological origin, 
but only from the standpoint of the present.126 
This passage highlights Adorno’s insistence on the importance of cognition [Erkenntnis] 127 (or as 
he momentarily calls it the ‘penetrating knowledge’ of music) which results from considering the 
fleeting experience of music and the attempt to translate it into knowledge. This principle of 
                                                
124 Ibid., p. 368. Hullot Kentor continues his explanation by indicating that the meaning of these words is far from 
absolute: ‘The distinction, however, is not terminologically fixed in German or in Adorno’s writings. One 
concept may well be used in place of the other. In some sections of Aesthetic Theory, it is relatively easy to 
recognize which concept is at stake, as for instance in the lengthy development of the relation of form and 
content, where content is obviously ‘Inhalt.’ In these passages, the German is given when the conept is first 
introduced. At other points in the text, however, differentitation becomes more difficult.’ Hullot-Kentor also 
admits that at one point he had to resort to translating ‘Gehalt’ as ‘substance’; however, the German ‘Substanz’ 
is normally translated as ‘substance.’ 
125 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Über einige Relationen zwischen Musik und Malerei. Die Kunst und die Künste.’ 
Anmerkungen zur Zeit, Vol. 12, (Berlin, Akademie der Künste, 1967); translation in Theodor W. Adorno, ‘On 
Some Relationships between Music and Painting,’ translated by Susan Gillespie, in The Musical Quarterly, Vol. 79, 
No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 66-79 
126 Ibid. 
127 The translation of the German ‘Erkenntnis’ can be both ‘cognition’ or ‘knowledge,’ depending on the context. 
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reading an artwork in its particularity is the result of the contemplation of the work, not simply 
empirically or purely philosophically, but through a dialectical process to which we will return in 
subsequent chapters. 
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Vers une musique informelle: towards a theory of post-serial musical form 
The central focus of the next section of this chapter is Adorno’s concept of musique informelle, 
especially as it informs the notion of a music which could potentially liberate itself from the 
constraints of formal models traditionally seen as fundamental to the unfolding of musical time. 
The importance of this concept is often interpreted as forward-looking – presenting a ‘horizon’ 
as Adorno writes – opening new perspectives to composers and philosophers. The reception of 
the concept – though diverse and not universally acknowledged – can nonetheless be seen in the 
composition of new works, and in the implications it could have for theorizations of this 
contemporary oeuvre, regardless of explicit references to Adorno’s concept. A number of 
authors have analyzed the conception of musique informelle from a historical and musical point of 
view, including Martin Zenck.128 However, the most important systematic work building on this 
concept, radically expanding it, both in itself and as constitutive of an aesthetic of the informel, is 
Gianmario Borio’s book Die musikalische Avantgarde um 1960. 129  Other works elaborating 
Adorno’s concept of the informel include Michel Ratté’s book L’expressivité de l’oubli130 and Nels J. 
Rogers’ thesis Theodor W. Adorno’s Poetics of Dissonance. 131  Their respective methodological 
approaches can be described as music-historical, music-philosophical and literary-critical. Ratté’s 
book also develops a theory of forgetfulness which builds on elements from Vers une musique 
informelle, while at the same time exploring concepts from Bergson’s The Creative Evolution, in 
                                                
128 Martin Zenck, ‘Auswirkungen einer “musique informelle” auf die neue Musik: zu Theodor W. Adornos 
Formvorstellung,’ in International Review of Aesthetics and Sociology of Music, Vol. 10, No. 2, (1979), pp. 137-165 
129 Gianmario Borio, Musikalische Avantgarde um 1960 : Entwurf einer Theorie der informellen Musik, (Laaber, Laaber-
Verlag, 1993). While Borio’s work features in this chapter, his text will also be confronted with other approaches 
to Adorno’s writings. 
130 Michel Ratté, L'expressivité de l'oubli – Essai sur le sentiment et la forme dans la musique de la modernité, (Brussels, La lettre 
volée, 1999), p. 18 
131 Nels Rogers, Theodor W. Adorno's Poetics of Dissonance: Music, Language and Literary Modernism, (Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Pennsylvania, 2001), p. 327 
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which he argued that the experience of time as duration can be better understood based on the 
idea of creative intuition rather than rational intellect.132 Adorno used Bergson’s conception of 
time, especially in his critique of the music of Claude Debussy and and Igor Stravinsky, as 
evidenced in the Philosophy of New Music.133 
 
Adorno and the musical avant-garde in Darmstadt 
Prior to his return to Darmstadt in 1961, Adorno had formulated a general critique of integral 
serialism as a totalizing system, which he regarded as pseudo-objective and overdetermined in its 
compositional technique, especially as presented in his essay ‘The Ageing of the New Music’ 
(1955).134 However, subsequent essays reflect a more forward-looking stance towards a music 
aesthetic liberated from traditional forms, genres and tonality, as well as dodecaphonic and 
integral serial techniques. The most prominent articulation of this appeared in Vers une musique 
informelle (1961).135 This article coincided with Adorno’s return to the Darmstadt summer course 
in 1961 after a four-year absence. In music-historical terms, four aspects of the essay can be 
distinguished: the changes to the musical work of art Adorno observed; the essay’s presentation 
in the Darmstadt Ferienkurse; the research Adorno did in support of the central claim; and its 
open, forward-looking character. 
 
                                                
132 Henri Bergson, Arnaud François, and Frédéric Worms, L'évolution créatrice, (Quadrige. Grands Textes,. Paris, 
Presses universitaires de France, 2007); translation as Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, translated by Arthur 
Mitchell, (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1911) 
133 Theodor W. Adorno, Philosophie der neuen Musik, GS 12, p. 176; Adorno argues that Stravinsky has finished off 
musical Bergsonism. ‘Strawinsky und seine Schule bereiten dem musikalischen Bergsonianismus sein Ende. Sie 
spielen den temps espace gegen den temps durée aus.’ 
134 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘The Ageing of the New Music’, in Adorno, T.W. and R. Leppert, Essays on music : Theodor 
W. Adorno. 2002, Berkeley, Calif. ; London: University of California Press), pp. 181-202 
135 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Vers une musique informelle’, in Darmstädter Beiträge (1961); republished and revised in 
Quasi una Fantasia (1963); GS 16 (1978), pp. 493-540; Theodor W. Adorno, Quasi una fantasia : essays on modern 
music, (London; New York: Verso, 1992) 
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Firstly, as Nels Rogers points out, developments had occurred in the intervening period which 
for Adorno, at least, signaled that new music was again becoming a critical art form and not 
merely sound patterns [Klangtapeten]136 affirmative of the status quo. Adorno tended to see these 
developments as part of a general critique of the anti-subjectivism of integral serialism.137 
 
Secondly, the presentation of the thesis in Darmstadt was held as a manifesto-like conference, in 
homage to ‘the country, in which the tradition of the avant-garde is at one with the civil courage 
to [produce] the manifesto’ and gave it a French title: Vers une musique informelle. The long text, 
which Adorno presented in two seminars, links up with several elements from an earlier 
critique,138 although it contains at the same time a more positive position towards the avant-garde 
composers and traits of a utopian perspective of music, expounded theoretically through the 
concept of the informel.139 
 
Thirdly, according to Gianmario Borio, this new attitude developed in response to Heinz-Klaus 
Metzger’s hostile critique of “The Ageing of the New Music” in his article ‘Abortive Concepts in 
                                                
136 The translation of Klangtapete as ‘sound pattern’ is not correct, but should read ‘musical wallpaper’, often used in 
connection with the music of Eric Satie, who created his famous ‘musique d’ameublement’ – music to furnish a 
room with. This distinction is important, as the idea of the sound pattern is highly relevant to the music of both 
John Cage and Morton Feldman, who specifically engaged with the idea of changing patterns – often without 
the usual developmental techniques seen as essential to the compositional technique. 
137 Nels Rogers, op. cit., p. 273; for a discussion of the serialist work of art and the crisis of the work concept, see 
below.  
138 Cfr. ‘The Ageing of the New Music,’ a presentation Adorno gave in April 1954 for the Süddeutsche Rundfunk. 
‘Das Altern der neuen Musik,’ in Der Monat (May 1955); GS 14 (1973), pp.143-167; translated by Robert Hullot-
Kentor and Frederic Will, ‘The Ageing of the New Music,’ in Telos, Vol. 77 (Autumn 1988), pp. 95-116; also in 
Richard Leppert (ed.), Essays on Music. Theodor W. Adorno, pp.181-202 
139 Gianmario Borio, Musikalische Avantgarde um 1960 : Entwurf einer Theorie der informellen Musik, (Laaber, Laaber-
Verlag, 1993), p. 102  
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the Theory and Criticism of Music’, which appeared in Die Reihe in 1961,140 and in which he 
outlined his own concept of an ‘a-serial’ music.141 Metzger’s essay prompted Adorno to study 
                                                
140 Heinz-Klaus Metzger, ‘Abortive Concepts in the Theory and Criticism of Music,’ in Die Reihe, Nr. 5, 1961, pp. 
21-29 
141 A-serialism has been identified with the concept of musique informelle – amongst others by Edward Campbell, who 
writes: ‘In “Difficulties” (1964), Adorno reconsiders some of the issues previously tackled in 'The Ageing' and in 
Vers une musique informelle. While Boulez and Stockhausen were still committed to serialism, he retained his 
misgivings about the ‘total determination’, ‘progressive rationalisation’ and ‘reification’ which he believed were 
implicit to it and on this basis he reasserts that the ageing of new music was taking place, and that ‘the best’ of 
his Darmstadt colleagues, who were unhappy with this view in 1954, now seemed to be mostly in agreement 
with it. … Boulez is, presumably, counted among their number. … Boulez in his Darmstadt lectures reprises the 
criticisms of serial practice, which he first formulated in ‘Current Investigations’. While musique informelle or a-
serialism [my stress] remains the goal towards which new music should be working, [Adorno] is as unable as 
before to define it with any degree of precision other than to say that it could serve to relate the wealth of 
integral serialist detail to the composed whole.’ Campbell thus would appear to equate musique informelle with 
Metzger’s notion of an a-serial music. This projection of an uncritical dialectics (as opposed to Adorno’s 
negative dialectics) onto this concept, which Adorno precisely tried to avoid, is not useful; to say the least, it 
paints these theorisations in dualistic terms rather than dialectical ones, let alone that they can be ‘sublated’ at all, 
especially in light of Adorno’s critique of transcendental, universal concepts. As will be argued later in this thesis, 
the ahistorical aspect of this Hegelian synthesis and the pretence of a ‘redemption-within-reach’ are themselves 
further illusory conceptualisations. In the same way, atonality is a negation of tonal procedures, however, it 
remains in thrall to the tonal language through this negation. Aserialism in this sense is still related to serialism 
and does not escape its grasp, even negatively. As Erik Ulman has shown, Sylvano Busotti Due voci of 1958 
furnishes an example of an a-serial compositional language.  See Erik Ulman, ‘The Music of Sylvano Bussotti,’ in 
Perspectives of New Music, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer, 1996), pp. 186-201: ‘Bussotti experimented with “integral” 
serial procedure, but his self-proclaimed “extroverted and egocentric character” remained irreconcilable with its 
impersonal rigor. In fact, he had no sooner encountered the new serialism than, in the 1958 Due voci, scored for 
the unusual combination of soprano, ondes Martenot, and orchestra, he left it behind, proclaiming his music 
‘aserial’ as Webern, Schönberg, and Berg had been ‘atonal.’ Building on Metzger’s (and Adorno’s) dialectical 
conception of atonality, in which, as Metzger writes, ‘The privative “a” marks the negation of tonality, and the 
way this negation constantly refers atonal music back to tonality,’ Bussotti established what he saw ‘as a 
dialectical relationship with serial music. Although Due voci’s complex textures, angular and unpredictable 
gestures, and prevailing dissonance all owe a great deal to the sonic world of post-war serialism, Bussotti rejected 
the rational and detached methodology which underlay his models. In his prefatory note to the score, Bussotti 
describes aserialism as the “dialectical rebellion of the humanistic attitude in the man who writes music, against 
the stiff aridity of systems,” a rebellion defined by its radical and improvisatory subjectivity: “For the first time in 
his life the composer disposes with memoranda, sketches, and the usual preliminary studies, and writes [almost 
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intensively works such as Boulez’s Le marteau sans maître and Third Piano Sonata, Stockhausen’s 
Klavierstück I, Zeitmaße and Gruppen, and Cage’s Piano Concert.142 As Borio notes, it could not have 
escaped Adorno as an attentive observer around 1960 that the new tendencies in evidence in 
such works necessitated a reconceptualization of his music aesthetics—especially in their 
increasing deviation from the original aims of serial thought.143 In Klavierstück I,144 for example, 
Stockhausen uses serial ‘group’ technique, structuring groups of pitches according to an external 
ordering principle; and although these principles regulate quantitative relations between the 
groups (such as the degree of density and velocity), they do not, however, constitute qualitative 
relations between the intervals as in punctual serial technique. The intervals, which still had 
specific expressive characteristics for Webern, lose these qualities because of the structural 
merging of the spatial and temporal dimensions in the series (time as a function of space, 
essentially). Most importantly, the ordering principles remain anonymous, because they do not 
                                                                                                                                                  
every page] directly onto the transparencies (which are then used to reproduce the manuscript).” In other words, 
Due voci infuses the gestural and sonic world of the serial avant-garde with the intimacy and subjectivity which 
serialism had sought through impersonal rationality to avoid. It represents the beginning of Bussotti's attempt to 
reconcile the anachronistic humanism of his early works with a new, experimental style.’ (p. 188) 
142 Gianmario Borio, op. cit., p. 102: ‘Diese Neueinstellung erklärt sich hauptsächlich als Folge der Replik Metzgers 
auf Adornos Aufsatz Das Altern der neuen Musik, die sich Ende der fünfziger Jahre in einer intensiveren 
Beschäftigung mit Werken wie Le marteau sans maître und der dritten Klaviersonate von Boulez, Zeitmasse und 
Gruppen von Stockhausen sowie dem Klavierkonzert von Cage konkretisiert.’ 
143 Walter Gieseler shows in his Komposition im 20. Jahrhundert that, over the course of less than a decade, 
Stockhausen’s (and other serial composers’) serial technique made remarkable steps: from integral serial 
(punctual) technique, via group composition (with small groups of pitches, rhythms etc. given a semi-serial 
treatment), to so-called field composition (voices as such disappear even more than in group-composition as the 
statistical organization of mass structures of approximate determination substitutes individually determined 
tones). The group technique is apparent in the eponymous work Gruppen (1955-57) for three orchestras. 
Stockhausen’s Zeitmaße (1955/56) is an example of field technique, which interestingly stretches its into the 
domain of time as time-fields [Zeitfelder]. Field-composition in his view seems to include non-serial works and 
techniques such as used by Iannis Xenakis’ stochastic technique as used in Metastaseis and Pithoprakta. I shall 
return to the latter’s compositional praxis later in this thesis. See Walter Gieseler, Komposition im 20. Jahrhundert : 
Details, Zusammenhänge. (Celle, Moeck, 1975) pp. 81-95 
144 See Figure 1 below 
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manifest themselves immanently from within the composition. Adorno may have regarded such 
scores as an indirect answer to his critique and at the same time as a challenge to renewed 
reflection. Philosophy of Modern Music – with its innovative concepts of musical material, 
compositional subject, the language character of music, and the spatialization of musical time – 
greatly influenced composers and critics, and the increasing signs of a positive response to his 
ideas prompted his return to Darmstadt.  
 
Fourthly, Adorno sensitively observed the appearance of a new phase of the musical avant-garde, 
when composers gradually became more conscious of the fact that while it was possible to 
account for a number of parameters of music, it seemed increasingly less desirable to do so. As 
Nels Rogers observes, ‘something was always left up to chance, particularly with regard to the 
temporal dimension of music.’145 Developments of this nature seemed to signal the possibility of 
escaping the impasse of total rationalization of the musical material which Adorno saw as the 
principal problematic feature of integral serialist composition. It is in this theoretical context that 
Adorno’s interest in musical time can be understood, namely as a consideration of time from a 
perspective which is neither simply mathematical nor a philosophical critique of new music. 
                                                
145 Nels Rogers, op. cit., p. 274 
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Figure 1: Karlheinz Stockhausen, Klavierstück I, p. 1 
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Musique informel l e  and free atonality   
In a different interpretation of the the central tenet of the essay, Martin Zenck, however, claims 
that Adorno took the position of an ‘adviser without advice’ [ratloser Ratgeber], stating that 
Adorno reaches back to the period of Schoenberg’s free atonal compositions (especially 
Klavierstück No. 3 from op. 11 and Erwartung op. 17,146 which are at the centre of the ideal-type of 
musique informelle),147 while criticizing serial music as if it were dodecaphonic. Syntactically, the 
situation for the serial composer was radically different, in that the language-like character of 
music had been altered, so that ‘for the listener Gestalt and structure had become inextricably 
linked.’148 From the temporal perspective Erwartung is rather significant, as it aims to ‘represent in 
slow motion everything that occurs during a single second of maximum spiritual excitement, 
stretching it out to half an hour.’149 Another crucial influence on Adorno’s conceptualization of 
                                                
146 In the musical example taken from the vocal score of Erwartung, op. 17, a passage was chosen to highlight the 
atonal language, the tempo changes and the material’s strong inter-relatedness: the melody to the words ‘Und 
drei Tage warst du nicht bei mir… keine Zeit… so oft hast du keine Zeit gehabt in diesen letzten Monaten’ 
[bar 285] is repeated and varied on the next page in the music to the words [In blitzartiger Erinnerung] ‘Ah, jetzt 
erinnere ich mich der Seufzer im Halbschlaf wie ein Name.’ It is no coincidence that Adorno not only showed 
a great interest in the music itself, but in the text’s reference to aspects of memory, time (and the lack thereof), 
dreams, and the Name. At this point in the thesis, I simply want to draw the attention to these details in order to 
better understand the general line of inquiry into music as an art in time, with a strong (virtual) spatial aspect. 
One could also read this passage in Benjaminian terms: the textual aspect mentioned above and the indication ‘in 
blitzartiger Erinnerung’ reveal an uncanny aspect of the psychological state of the character in Erwartung which 
flits and moves between different moments. The connections between the different elements of the text have an 
underlying musical connection, which supports the sense of unity, however, not in a traditional sense of unity of 
drama, but more akin to the structure of dreams. Cf. Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
147 It is clear that Adorno did not actually think that a return to free atonality was historically possible. Zenck 
explains this by referring to the syntactic difference of atonal composition and the post-war state of musical 
composition; in particular, atonal composition still referred to tonal musical gestures in its avoidance of 
traditional harmonic progressions, consonant intervals, etc). Cfr. Martin Zenck, op. cit., p. 147 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid. 
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musique informelle, was paradoxically not a musical one, but the so-called art informel, a term coined 
by the Frenchman Michel Tapié in his work Un art autre.150 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
150 Michel Tapié, Un Art Autre, où il s’agit de nouveaux dévidages du reel, (Paris, Gabriel-Giraud, 1952); translated as ‘An 
Other Art. Observations of Michel Tapié,’ in Kristine Stiles and Peter Selz, Theories and Documents of Contemporary 
Art: a Sourcebook of Artists’ Writings, (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2012), pp. 43-44 
Figure 2: Arnold Schoenberg, Erwartung, Op. 17 (1909-1927), p. 32 
Figure 3: Erwartung, p. 33 
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However, in reconnecting with the avant-garde, Gianmario Borio suggests Adorno had other 
motives as well.151 At the theoretical level, there are the consequences of a postulate Adorno 
formulated only later: the apparent relationships of the ‘unconscious writing of history’152 carried 
out by works of art, which otherwise remain inaccessible, through empirical observations or 
purely philosophical considerations. It is in this sense, that the concept of the dialectical image 
attempts to explode the seemingly static artwork, in confronting it with the listener or viewer. 
Art (particularly music) constituted a particularly well-suited cultural locus in which recognition 
of overlapping social tendencies could be discovered.153 This philosophical position, however, 
necessitates a continuous analysis of new compositional techniques. As Borio notes, it could not 
have escaped Adorno as an attentive observer around 1960, that in the swift musical 
development new perspectives had opened up and that they demanded a reconceptualization of 
his music aesthetics. 
 
                                                
151 Gianmario Borio, op. cit., p. 102 
152 See also Peter Bürger; he, too, argues that art can be seen as unconscious historiography, with two possible 
solutions as to the question of the mediation of art and society: firstly, one can ask the question of those social 
instances through which, on the one hand, society works itself into the work of art, and, on the other hand, how 
the work interacts with society.  Strangely, Bürger claims that Adorno and Lukács did not pursue this, because of 
the Hegelian concept of mediation they follow, which states that mediation is not a middle between two 
different opposites, but the process itself of the dialectical transition of the one into the other.  This means that 
mediation between art and society cannot be found in a third, social instance, but lays in the work of art itself.    
The society of a certain time enters the form of the work of art when the artist devotes himself to engaging with 
musical material – which is the result of a historical process that incorporates layered, historical experience.  See 
Peter Bürger, Das Vermittlungsproblem, op. cit. 
153 In a discussion about the genesis and contents of the Philosophy of New Music, which Adorno and Rudolf Stephan 
had in 1960 in the studio of the Süddeutsche Rundfunk in Stuttgart, Adorno underlined the meaning of music 
for his philosophical concepts; he stated that ‘many experiences, which I then tried to hold on to philosophically, 
were originally made in the aesthetic realm, before all in compositions’. 
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The second reason, according to Borio,154 is to be found in the change of the aesthetics of 
composition itself. The increasing diversion from the original goals of serial thought, as shown in 
the compositions of Boulez and Stockhausen,155 could have been regarded by Adorno as an 
indirect answer to his critique and at the same time as a challenge, to engage in renewed 
reflection. The reception of the Philosophy of Modern Music – as I have indicated before, with its 
concepts of material, compositional subject, language character and spatialization (of time) – 
became more apparent on the part of the composers and critics and prompted the return of 
Adorno to Darmstadt.156 As I have argued, Adorno noted a new phase in the musical avant-
garde, as composers increasingly found dissatisfaction in the total control of all parameters of 
music, with pitch as primordial. In this regard, Nels Rogers observes prosaically that although 
this control seemed exhaustive, ‘something was always left up to chance, particularly with regard 
to the temporal dimension of music.’157 Morton Feldman was the first to introduce a graphic 
notation, in an attempt to grasp the (limited) degree of freedom for the performer in choosing 
both the timing and the precise harmonic content of chords, whilst specifying the register with 
more precision. 158 Feldman devised a system in which squares and rectangles distributed over 
three registers (high, middle and low) relate to pressing down a number of high, middle and low 
keys on the keyboard (in Projection 3), whilst exact pitches remain free to the player. However, he 
                                                
154 Gianmario Borio, op. cit., p. 102 
155  As Walter Gieseler shows in his Komposition im 20. Jahrhundert, over the course of less than a decade, 
Stockhausen’s serial technique made remarkable steps: from integral serial (punctual) technique, via so-called 
field composition (with small groups of pitches, rhythms etc. given a semi-serial treatment), to group 
composition. The last coincides obviously with the eponymous work Gruppen (1955-57) for three orchestras. See 
Gieseler, W., Komposition im 20. Jahrhundert : Details, Zusammenhänge, (Celle, Moeck 1975), pp. 81-95 
156 Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance, translated by Michael Robertson 
(Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1995), pp. 512-517 
157 Nels Rogers, op. cit., p. 274 
158 The influence of Feldman’s Projections series on John Cage own compositional technique has been documented, cf. 
Sebastian Claren, op. cit., p. 45-48 
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also specifies the number of keys to be pressed down. The title Projections refers to Feldman’s 
attempt not to compose, but to project sounds in space and time.159 
It is not the projection of sound or its simulation which is central to the conception of this piece, 
but the propagation of sound in the room, which Feldman believed can be achieved when the 
compositional rhetoric (as reified) in conventional notation is avoided. It is rather striking how 
Feldman’s original idea – inspired by Varèse, but resulting in a new notational system – fed back 
into Varèse’s own practice, three years later, when he composed Déserts (1953). Varèse was highly 
interested in notating amplitudes; it is understood that he substituted Feldman’s instrumental 
registers for dynamics. 
 
The influence, however, of John Cage’s music – especially his Music of Changes, based on chance 
operations (as gleaned from the I ching) –  was later theorized by Pierre Boulez in his lecture on 
‘Alea’(dice)160 in 1957. 161 As the musicologist Edward Campbell argues, Boulez also attempted – 
                                                
159 Ibid., p. 45 
160 Pierre Boulez, ‘Alea,’ translated by David Noakes and Paul Jacobs, Perspectives of New Music, Vol. 3, No. 1 
(Autumn/Winter, 1964), pp. 42-53. In this article, Boulez criticizes both pure chance music and, without irony, 
integral serialism.  
161 Peter Griffith, John Cage, (Oxford, OUP, 1981) 
Figure 4: Morton Feldman, Projection 3 for 2  pianos (1950), p. 1 
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to a varying degree of success – to adopt some of the insights he gleaned from Adorno’s concept 
of musique informelle into his own compositional philosophy.162 
 
  
                                                
162 See for example, Pierre Boulez, ‘L’informulé,’ in Revue d’esthétique, Vol. 8 (1985), pp. 25-29; and the short article 
‘T.W. Adorno,’ in Jean-Jacques Nattiez (ed.), Orientations: Collected Writings by Pierre Boulez, translated by Martin 
Cooper, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 517-518 
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Michel Tapié’s art  informel  
The origins of musique informelle can be found in the art informel, a notion termed by the French 
curator Michel Tapié. He wrote in Un art autre - An Unknown Art (1952) 
Everything has been called into question once more since that cascade of revolution going from 
Impressionism to Dada and Surrealism: we are beginning to realize what that means, and at which 
point this total review has caused the epoch in which we live to be especially thrilling. After centuries, 
if not a millennium, during which conditions evolved so slowly that in the normal rhythm of life, 
chance could not be perceived, and in which artistic problems (even ethic-aesthetic ones) were safe, 
[...] an entire system of certainty has collapsed.163 
Tapié describes a three-stage movement of progressive becoming, one where the ‘ossified’  past 
‘order’ is shown to be false, leading via an ‘intoxicating anarchy’ to a new order, or as he calls it,  
a ‘new system of ideas about the range of our potential becoming.’164 He places the search for 
the unknown future of this potential becoming in opposition to the academy, which in his eyes 
has died. 
It is, after all, shocking to know that one is going to the unknown (it must always be like this for the 
creators, but it has never been so explicitly evident), and at this point we still find St. John of the Cross 
to give us the most pertinent advice: “In order to go to a place where you have not been, you must 
take an unfamiliar route.” The academy has died, has it not?165 
Tapié points to a different conception of art, one which he leaves open for new non-systematic 
developments in the artists’ techniques; these differed to the point that they can be described 
negatively – as opposed to thematic works: 
                                                
163 Michel Tapié, ‘An Other Art. Observations of Michel Tapié,’ in Kristine Stiles, and Peter Selz, Theories and 
Documents of Contemporary Art: a Sourcebook of Artists’ Writings, (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2012), 
p. 44 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid. 
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The problems do not consist of replacing a figurative theme with an absence of theme, which is called 
abstract, non-figurative or non-objective, but really to create a work, with or without a theme, in front 
of which – be it aggressiveness, banality or sheer physical contact – one perceives gradually that one’s 
customary hold on the situation has been lost. One is […] called to enter [into either] ecstasy or 
madness for one’s traditional criteria, one after the other, have been abandoned.166 
Tapié explains that this loss of certainty includes a new sense of adventure, as something 
unknown both in terms of what will come next and 
where it will be the spectator who is left to move to the next station which may be of infinitesimal or 
astounding violence[....] This tendency of almost utopian yearning attempted, however, to bring 
together the diverse artists of this non-movement. In many ways, what is apparent is the lack of a 
common style or –ism. Onto this canvas of conceptual confusion he projects a minimal project of an 
anti-systematic nature. Behind the multitude of approaches, however, one artist in particular referred 
to here was the Belgian-French poet, writer and painter Henri Michaux.167 168 
It is his biographer Nina Parish who explains that the violence is crucial in the work of Henri 
Michaux,169 whilst Tapié functioned as the ‘unofficial spokesman for this disparate group,’170 
                                                
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Henri Michaux (1899-1984); see Marguerite Hui Müller-Yao, Der Einfluß der Kunst der chinesischen Kalligraphie auf die 
westliche informelle Malerei, (Ph.D. Thesis Bonn, Cologne, 1985); Müller-Yao, Marguerite, ‘Informelle Malerei und 
chinesische Kalligrafie,’ in Heinz Althöfer, Informel, Begegnung und Wandel, (Schriftenreihe des Museums am 
Ostwall, Vol. 2), (Dortmund, 2002); Rolf Wedewer, Die Malerei des Informel. Weltverlust und Ich-Behauptung, (Munich, 
Deutscher Kunstverlag, 2007) 
169 Nina Parish, Henri Michaux: experimentation with signs, (Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2007), p. 54 
170 Ibid.  
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which apart from Michaux included Jean Dubuffet. Apart from his writings,171 Tapié organized 
exhibitions.172 It was his aim 
to formulate a common denominator that might link the artists of post-war Paris who were 
experimenting with art as a starting-afresh, actively flouting all formal aesthetic conventions and 
instead placing the accent on fluidity, matter and gesture. These artists were opposed to traditional 
formalism and to the various en vogue forms of geometrical abstraction that had been introduced by 
the Cubists, continued by the Russian Constructivists, and encouraged by the Bauhaus movement 
after the Second World War.173 
The central focus of this art was the focus on the material, as Parish writes: 
Informal art instead appeared to highlight the precedence of matter over form. The exponents of art 
informel shared the opinion that painting should also be concerned with recording the actions of the 
artist in the process of painting, in which respect they have an affinity with the American school of 
Abstract Expressionism. An indirect, intuitive awareness of mental states and external phenomena 
would be communicated through this experimentation with matter and gesture.174 
Parish explains how the exhibition in December 1952 formed the artistic counterpart to the 
publication of Tapié’s manifesto, Un Art autre: où il s’agit de nouveaux dévidages du réel.175 It 
functioned as an amalgam of the two exhibition titles mentioned above, written by Tapié, in 
which Michaux was cited as a precursor of the art informel tendency alongside Fautrier, Wols, 
Dubuffet, Georges Mathieu, Jackson Pollock and Alfonso Ossorio.176 Interestingly, another artist 
                                                
171 Ibid., p. 55: ‘Tapié wrote several articles and prefaces to catalogues on Michaux, for example, ‘Au Pays d'Henri 
Michaux' for an individual exhibition at the Galerie René Drouin in 1948.’ 
172 Nina Parish, op. cit., p. 55: ‘In particular, ‘Peintures non abstraites: où il s'agit d'un nouveau dévidage du réel’ 
[‘Non-abstract painting, or a new unwinding of the real’] in June 1952 at the Studio Paul Fachetti, and ‘Un art 
autre' at the same gallery in December of the same year.’ 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid.  
175 Michel Tapié, Un Art Autre, où il s’agit de nouveaux dévidages du reel, (Paris, Gabriel-Giraud, 1952) 
176 Parish, op. cit., p. 55 
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who exhibited in May 1957 with Michaux and Dubuffet, was the German artist Wols,177 a name 
referred to by Adorno in his Vers une musique informelle.178 Art autre was far from constituting an 
established group or school of artists. This label was instead suggested by Tapié to classify a 
number of highly individual artists who had no desire to participate in an organized group. 
Indeed, he emphasizes the importance of individuality throughout Un Art autre and even states 
that the artists included were not working together with a collective aim: 
I provisionally indicated this adventure as Significance of the Informel: [the following artists] brilliantly 
participate in it by the spirit of their researches (but without any thought of a collective project), and 
[which is] so much the better for it, in every sense: Tobey, Hartung, Bryen, Hofmann, Sutherland, 
Riopelle, Guiette, Soulages, Serpan, Graves, Brauner, Ubac, De Kooning, Appel, Gillet, Rothko, Sam 
Francis, Ronet, Russell, Arnal, Phillip Martin, Capogrossi, Dova, Kline, the sculptors Germaine 
Richier, Maria, Baskine, Butler, Paolozzi, Kopac, and Claire Falkenstein.179 
Parish describes at length Dubuffet’s and Michaux’s negative reactions against the ‘poorly 
written classification.'’ In L’Informe: Mode d’emploi, an influential exhibition and accompanying 
catalogue that explore the work of many different artists using Georges Bataille’s notion of 
‘l’informe’, an unravelling, rather than a progressive control, of form, Rosalind Krauss and Yves-
Alain Bois call the contemporary literature about l’art informel ‘deplorable’: describing it as ‘high-
                                                
177 Ibid., p. 56. Wols’s own work will be discussed below. 
178 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Vers une musique informelle,’ in Darmstädter Beiträge (1961); republished and revised in 
Quasi una Fantasia (1963); GS 16 (1978), pp. 493-540 
179  Ibid., p. 56: ‘J'ai désigné provisoirement cette aventure SIGNIFIANCE DE L'INFORMEL: y ont 
magistralement participé par l'esprit de leurs recherches (mais sans aucune pensée de travail collectif, et tant 
mieux, dans tous les sens: Tobey, Hartung, Bryen, Hofmann, Sutherland, Riopelle, Guiette, Soulages, Serpan, 
Graves, Brauner, Ubac, De Kooning, Appel, Gillet, Rothko, Sam Francis, Ronet, Russell, Arnal, Phillip Martin, 
Capogrossi, Dova, Kline, les sculpteurs Germaine Richier, Maria, Baskine, Butler, Paolozzi, Kopac, et Claire 
Falkenstein.’ 
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flown generality, metaphysical bran, satiated with adjectives and metaphor, rhetorical flurries, 
and wind (and especially, not the slightest effort of historical analysis).’180 
 
Formel/informel, informal/formless: preliminary considerations 
What is important, however, is precisely this tension between the formal/formalized and the 
informal/formless at the centre of the conception of these different artists’ creations. However, 
the critical element, directed against the provisory classification of their work under its catch-all 
guise – be it art informel or art autre, has somehow been transported into the practice of the 
composers of musique informelle. Adorno’s reference to the manifestos of the French avant-garde 
in his ‘Vers une musique informelle’ implies this lack of precision, especially its grand gesture of 
stating its proponents’ work as new, or at least different (as opposed to what is traditional and 
received). Not only did he fear that a new order had been bestowed upon the postwar music – in 
its serial conception – but that the other music was largely uncategorized – if one only thinks of 
the differences between the music of Cage, Ligeti, Stockhausen, Feldman and Xenakis – like the 
artists unwittingly grouped under Tapié’s banner of art informel. This lack of definition is also 
apparent in Adorno’s own conception of musique informelle, as if the precursors he mentions – 
including Schoenberg’s Erwartung – could not guarantee a real musique autre. It can neither be 
explained from the point of view of ignorance – Adorno knew most of these composers from 
performances at Darmstadt and elsewhere – nor from the position of a possible future music 
alone. From an aesthetic point of view, musique informelle had already appeared before it was 
named. Adorno’s terminology can therefore rather be seen as the inspiration for a new aesthetic, 
                                                
180 ‘La littérature de l'époque sur ce que l'on a appelé l'art informel est en général déplorable: des généralités 
ampoulées, du bran métaphysique, de l'adjectif et de la métaphore à satiété, des flonflons rhétoriques, du vent (et 
surtout, pas le moindre effort d'analyse historique).’ 
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as Gianmario Borio argues.181 In that sense, finding a true, hidden meaning of the original 
concept – as a universal category – is of little import to the larger question of what the function 
is of Adorno’s concept (its ‘besogne’ or ‘job’ as Bataille would call it).182 In that sense, an 
aesthetic which includes the informelle/informe and the formalizations which go against the idea 
of a historically necessary form (as a closed-circuit process, applied irrespective of the sound 
material and its environment), or structuring strategies (which can be equally restrictive). The 
‘precedence of matter over form’ does, however, not mean that formal thinking has become 
obsolete altogether; the serial composers had already had to admit (their endeavour to create a 
music organized by rows of 12 pitches, eventually including matrices of 12 rhythms, 12 
articulations, 12 dynamic markings, etc.) that a clear structuring process does not necessarily lead 
to an articulated form. 
 
In the music of Morton Feldman, this tension between the sound and its articulation changed 
with the composition of In Search of an Orchestration, as he said in the fourth Radio Happening – a 
friendly exchange of ideas with John Cage on a number of topics – when he made it clear that 
the articulation of form by means of sounds was no longer a musical requirement. In fact, he 
avoided the traditional formal indicators completely: no more opening and closing gestures, 
                                                
181 See Chapter 2 for a more in-depth discussion of Borio’s position 
182 George Bataille defined this term in his article ‘Informe.’ As Elisabeth Arnould-Bloomfield explains, it is not to 
be confused with the meaning of the use of the word, but its ‘thingness’: ‘La “besogne,” telle que la définit 
Bataille dans l’article “Informe”, n’est pas ce qui relève de la signification voire de l’usage du mot, mais ce qui, 
ayant trait à sa choséité – son poids historique et sa matérialité signifiante – met en jeu ces effet toxiques. Quand à 
“l’aspect” que Bataille introduit dans “Le Langage des Fleurs”, et qu’il veut substituer au mot, c’est ce qui, 
frappant les yeux des humains et introduisant dans la conscience la “presence réelle” de l’objet, tire le langage 
dans la direction de la “nature et de ses obscures decisions”: la mort, l’excès, la pourriture.’ In Elisabeth 
Arnould-Bloomfield, Georges Bataille, la terreur et les lettres, (Villeneuve d’Asq, Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 
2009), p. 33. Bataille’s interest in the seductive qualities of the monstrous and the ‘informe’ can be situated in the 
context of a brutal materialism and his break with surrealism. See Elisabeth Arnould-Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 32 
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including dynamic  articulation (Cage remarked there were still some louder sound complexes in 
Intersections). In a sense, this leveling of gestures articulating formally important moments in the 
composition were not only removed from his compositional technique, the idea that these 
mnemonic tools – to remind the audience something was about to begin, change, or had come 
to an end – were seen as elements of a linguistic conception of musical composition, to which 
the creation of meaning – through repetition, variation and transformation of the same motifs, 
themes and harmonic complexes – was central. 
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Adorno and the crisis of the work concept 
It is with regard to the ‘complex(es) of meaning’183 in musical works of art, and how they may or 
may not be language-like in their construction and form, that the position of Adorno can be 
expounded. Adorno’s analysis of the critical position of the artwork is important, precisely as it 
takes into account the musical post-war avant-garde. As a conceptual and historiographical 
framework, his theories have been rejected by some music historians, most notably, by Hermann 
Danuser. 184 In Die Musik des 20. Jahrhunderts, he contended that they are ‘little suited as an 
historiographical foundation; they must rather be considered as an object of historiography 
[themselves].’185 However, as the German musicologist Hellmut Federhofer argues, Adorno’s 
influence on composers’ practice would suggest that this is arguably not a justifiable 
restriction. 186  He explains that through the contact with contemporary composers, from 
Schoenberg and Webern onwards, but especially the composers of the 1950s and 1960s, Adorno 
came to occupy an influential position, both as an authority and a critic, whose concepts were 
received by the Darmstadt summer course audience. The history of this reception of Adorno’s 
work is a double-edged sword. Important figures like Pierre Boulez, for example, infamously 
wrote that ‘any musician who has not experienced – I do not say understood, but truly 
experienced – the necessity of dodecaphonic language is USELESS. For his entire work brings 
                                                
183 Carl Dahlhaus argues in this regard that Adorno was not perfectly clear: ‘The term “context of meaning”, one of 
the basic categories in Adorno’s aesthetics, is an ambiguous concept inasmuch as it remains an open question 
whether the context as such already guarantees meaning or whether the expressive or gestural meaning 
associated with amusical motif fits into a contet which then defines and modifies it – similarly to the way a word 
fits in a sentence.’ Carl Dahlhaus, Schoenberg and the New Music, translated by Derrick Puffett and Andrew Clayton, 
(Cambridge, Cabridge University Press, 1987), p. 160 
184 Hermann Danuser, Die Musik des 20 Jahrhunderts, (Neues Handbuch der Musikwissenschaft, Vol. 7), (Laaber, 
Laaber Verlag, 1984) 
185 Ibid. p. 300. As quoted by Hellmut Federhofer, ‘Das negative Kunstwerk in der Musikphilosophie Adornos,’ in 
Archiv für Musikwissenschaft, Vol. 47, No. 4 (1990), pp. 247-263: ‘[...] eignen sich wenig für ein historiographisches 
Fundament, sie müssen vielmehr als Gegenstand der Geschichtsschreibung betrachtet werden.’ 
186 Hellmut Federhofer, ‘Das negative Kunstwerk in der Musikphilosophie Adornos,’ op. cit., pp. 247-263 
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him up short of the needs of his time.’ 187 Boulez subsequently sought to employ earlier 
Adornoian concepts in order to justify his own ideological position,188 yet ignored the more 
critical position that Adorno took subsequently in texts such as ‘The Ageing of New Music’. 
Federhofer points out that the question as to the meaning of the concepts themselves, including 
the work of art, received a ‘completely new answer’ through this exchange, and ‘unwittingly 
revalued the avant-garde and lifted it as a cultural-political factor into collective consciousness.’189 
 
Most importantly, Adorno saw that traditional conceptions of the artwork as it had developed 
since the late eighteenth century190 – which  variously defined it as unitary, organic, autonomous, 
self-sufficient, imitating nature, and answering to various aesthetic laws of beauty, the sublime 
and truth, had come under pressure. These pressures were not simply external, but were revealed 
as inherent in the artwork itself, and were manifest in an increasing fragmentation of its 
                                                
187 Pierre Boulez, ‘Possibly…’ (1952), p. 113 
188 Edward Campbell, Boulez,Music and Philosophy, p. 52-53 Campbell writes that ‘the question of the historical or 
ahistorical nature of serialism was not so easily settled, however, and in “Aesthetics and the Fetishists’ (1961), 
Boulez again refers to the ‘refusal to accept history and the historical perspective’ as a criticism which has been 
made against him. Calling upon Adorno for support, he reflects that a composer must draw out the 
consequences which are implicit in the language which has been inherited, and he postulates the existence of ‘a 
dialectical relationship between history and the individual’ in which history provides a challenge for the 
individual while the individual is charged with reconfiguring history in some kind of irreversible way. Caught up 
in this dialectic, it is consequently impossible for the composer to be independent of his time.’ 
189 Federhofer, op. cit., p. 247-248: ‘Der enorme Einfluss, den Adorno im persönlichen Verkehr mit zahlreichen 
Komponisten auf die Praxis ausübte, liesst eine solche Einschränkung kaum gerechtfertigt erscheinen. Denn mit 
Schönberg und Webern, an deren Schaffen die Avantgarde anknüpfte,gewann Adorno als kritische Instanz 
zugleich Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der Neuen Musik während der Fünfziger- und Sechzigerjahre. Die 
Frage nach ihrem Sinn erfuhr durch ihn eine vollkommen neue Beantwortung, die zwar nicht Schönbergs 
Zustimmung fand, aber unversehens die Avantgarde ästhetisch aufwertete und als kulturpolitischen Faktor in 
das allgemeine Bewusstsein erhob.’ 
190 As I have mentioned before, for a discussion of the musical work of art, see Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of 
Musical Works, op. cit. 
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material.191 Adorno himself made this crisis of the traditional work-concept – to the extent that 
he even spoke of the ‘jolting of the “work”’192 in se – one of the central tenets of his argument in 
Philosophy of New Music193: 
The transformations that music has undergone during the past 30 years have scarcely been recognized 
to their full extent. (...) The thought of future renewal, whether in the form of great and consummate 
artworks or of the blessed accord of music and society, simply denies what has happened and can be 
suppressed but not undone. Under the constraint of its own objective logic music critically cancelled 
the idea of the consummate artwork and severed its tie with the public.194 
For Adorno the reason for the crisis of the concept of the artwork may refer to the societal 
upheaval of the period, although not in a reflective – and thus a naive – representational fashion: 
Today, however, this movement has turned against the closed work and everything that it implies. The 
sickness that has befallen the idea of the work may stem from the social condition that does not offer 
what would be binding and confirming enough to guarantee the harmony of the self-sufficient work. 
The prohibitive difficulties of the work, however, are revealed not in reflection on them but in the 
dark interior of the work itself.195 
Other authors, including the musicologist Carl Dahlhaus196 have understood this as a central 
issue concerning the work of art in the twentieth century. Christoph Hubig,197 defines Dahlhaus’s 
                                                
191 See, amongst others, Reinhard, Kager, ‘Einheit in der Zersplitterung. Überlegung zu Adornos Begriff des 
“musikalischen Materials”,’ in Richard Klein and Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf (eds.), Mit Den Ohren Denken. Adornos 
Philosophie der Musik, (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1998), pp. 92-114; see also Max Paddison, ‘Chapter 4: A 
Material Theory of Form,’ in Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music, op. cit. Paddison shows how Adorno analyzed Alban 
Berg’s Pianosonata, Op. 1 to support this theorization of the material as increasingly fragmented.  
192 Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, p. 29: ‘Jolting of the “Work.”’ See also page 4 of this thesis. 
193 Ibid., p. 34 
194 Ibid., p. 29 
195 Ibid. p. 34 
196 Carl Dahlhaus, ‘Über den Zerfall des musikalischen Werkbegriffs,’ in Beiträge der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für 
Musik, (1971), p. 9-26 
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conceptualization of the work as an ‘intentional object [intentionales Gegenstand]’ of production, 
[whilst] reception reflects the status of the ‘musical material’ in an intentional way. [Dahlhaus] 
criticizes this ‘phony peace,’ based on the division of labour, between an aesthetics of the work, 
social history as well as reception-historical research and often postulates their ‘dialectical 
mediation’ in light of historical processes.’198 
 
As I will argue, the elaborations of Adorno already related the solving of the problem of the 
‘organic’ work of art as a historical construct, embedded in and mediated by historical processes. 
In Adorno’s view, the antithesis to this traditional concept is to be found in the serial work 
concept which, however, is a problematic conceptualization in itself because of its strict 
organizational principles derived solely from the series, which Adorno terms mechanical. The 
series is portrayed as an immanent part of the composition and therefore pretending to be natural, 
or to paraphrase Adorno, having become second nature. One of the architects of serial 
compositional technique, the composer Pierre Boulez, developed a conceptual framework for 
this technique; its aim is to limit the composer’s available arsenal of tools to a series of twelve 
                                                                                                                                                  
197 Christoph Hubig studied with Dahlhaus. His thesis was titled Dialektik und Wissenschaftslogik, (Berlin, 1978); in 
1983 he received his Habilitation with a thesis on Handlung – Identität – Verstehen in Weinheim. 
198 Christoph Hubig, ‘„Tragödie der Kultur“ revisited: Carl Dahlhaus’ Konzeption des Kunstwerks als Alternative zur 
Simmel-Cassirer-Kontroverse’ (Stuttgart): ‘Dahlhaus wiederum, an Droysen, Ingarden sowie kritisch an Adorno 
orientiert, begreift ‘Werk’ als ‘intentionalen Gegenstand’ von Produktion, und Rezeption reflektiert den Status 
des ‘musikalischen Materials’ intentionalistisch. Er kritisiert einen arbeitsteiligen ‘faulen Frieden’ zwischen 
Werkästhetik, Sozialgeschichte sowie Rezeptionsforschung und fordert regelmässig deren ‘dialektische 
Vermittlung’ in Ansehung der historischen Prozesse.’ Carl Dahlhaus: Werk, Wirkung, Aktualität – Staatliches Institut 
für Musikforschung Berlin, 10-13 Juni 2008, p. 5. Hubig’s paper at the Dahlhaus conference was one of several 
focussing on the work concept in Dahlhaus. The others debating this issue were Albrecht Wellmer (Überlegungen 
zum Werkbegriff) and Gianmaria Borio (Über den sozialen Gehalt des musikalischen Werkes). The latter’s position will 
be discussed in more detail below. It is also worth mentioning that the Festschrift published for Dahlhaus's 60th 
birthday refers to this central focus on the musical artwork, as it is titled Hermann Danuser, Helga De la Motte-
Haber, Leopold Miller (eds.), Das musikalische Kunstwerk. Geschichte - Ästhetik - Theorie. Festschrift Carl Dahlhaus zum 
60. Geburtstag, (Laaber, Laaber Verlag, 1988) 
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chromatic tones, extending this logic to other musical parameters, equally to be organized in 
series of twelve.199 Moreover, he states that the series is the dominant force in not only offering 
the composer this new vocabulary, but also as a structuring method. Form, and temporal 
unfolding, are a byproduct of a series of durations. This, he observes, is also a reaction to the 
traditional formal schemes, which are considered to be pre-existing entities, in other words 
(uncritically) received devices or clichés which outline the shape or ‘morphology’ of the material: 
Today’s serial thinking emphasizes that the series has to generate not only the vocabulary, but must 
also apply to the structure of the work; [this] has to do with a comprehensive counter-reaction against 
classical thinking which conceives of form, just as general morphology, as something preexistent. 
Serial thinking knows no given ranking orders or general structures in which a certain thought is cast, 
on the contrary: the composer who helps himself to a determined methodology, creates out of his 
expressive needs every time the objects which he requires, and the necessary form to organize these 
objects. Classical tonal thinking relies on a world view which is determined by the laws of gravitation 
and attraction; serial thinking is based on a world of unceasing expansion.200 
The principal issue is the concept of the series as a historically necessary and logical consequence 
in relation to the crisis of the work of art in the twentieth century. In this integral serialist view, 
the organization of musical material can only be achieved by adherence to the central concept of 
                                                
199 For a comprehensive, critical analysis of the development of Boulez's thought see Campbell, E., Boulez,  For an 
account of this generation of composers, see Célestin Deliège, De Darmstadt à l'IRCAM. Cinquante ans de modernité 
musicale. 
200 Pierre Boulez,  in … (1961), quoted by Borio, op. cit.: ‘Das heutige serielle Denken hebt mit Nachdruk hervor, 
dass die Reihe nicht nur das Vokabular zu erzeugen hat, sondern sich auch auf die Struktur des Werkes 
erstrecken muss; man hat es also mit einer umfassenden Gegenreaktion auf das klassische Denken zu tun, 
welche die Form, ebenso wie die allgemeine Morphologie, als etwas Präexistentes ansieht. Das serielle Denken 
kennt keine vorgegebene Rangordnungen oder allgemeine Strukturen, in die einer bestimmtes Gedanke 
eingegossen wird, im Gegenteil: der Komponist, der sich einer determinierter Methodologie bedient, schafft sich 
für seinen Ausdruckswillen jedesmal die Objekte, deren er bedarf, und die notwendige Form zur Organisation 
dieser Objekte. Das klassische tonale Denkenberuft auf einen Weltbild, das durch die Gesetze von Schwerkraft 
und Anziehung bestimmt ist; das serielle Denken gründet sich auf eine Welt in unaufhörlicher Expansion.’ 
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the series. In particular, it is propagated as an immanent musical device, not as an extramusical 
imposition; moreover, the primacy of pitch is conceived of as primus inter pares amongst the other 
parametric series. Boulez attempted to define this in Penser la musique aujourd’hui, a canonical work 
on serial technique, as follows: 
In this respect, I want to remind [of the fact] that it seems to me necessary to conceive the 
interchangeability of sound elements as a structural basic phenomenon; at the same time, it is 
necessary to underline that they are organized following a process of a diminishing order of priority. I 
abandon the idea of using the word hierarchy here which implies a subordination, in a way, while 
these phenomena are indeed independent, if not in their existence, at least in their evolution: they 
obey a common principle of organization of structures, whilst their procreation demonstrates the 
divergences provoked by their own character. With the aim of a dialectics of composition, the order 
of priority appears to me to come back to the pitch and to duration, dynamics and timbre belonging 
to the second order categories.201 
Boulez claimed not only that the parameters of pitch, duration, dynamics and timbre are 
interchangeable – which, given a neutral exchange value, would allow for their equality – but, at 
the same time, claims pitch as the most important one – which, obviously, he cannot avoid given 
that the series rests not on the number twelve as such, but on the twelve pitches of the chromatic 
total. It would seem arbitrary, for example, to limit the number of timbres in a composition to 
twelve, let alone use this number as the basis for any other parametric series. In fact, this shows 
                                                
201 Pierre Boulez, Penser la musique aujourd’hui, (Gonthier, Mainz, 1963), p. 37: ‘A ce propos, je tiens à le rappeler, il me 
semble indispensable de concevoir l’interchangeabilité des composantes sonores comme un phénomène 
structurel de base; dans le même temps, il nous faut souligner qu’elles s’organisent suivant une progression d’une 
primordialité décroissante. Je renonce à employer ici le mot de hiérarchie qui implique, en quelque sorte, une 
subordination, alors que ces phénomènes sont réellement indépendants, sinon dans leur existence, du moins 
dans leur évolution: ils obéissent à un principe commun d’organisation des structures, cependant que leur 
engendrement manifeste des divergences suscitées par leur caractères propres. En vue d’une dialectique de la 
composition, la primordialité me paraît revenir à la hauteur et à la durée, l’intensité et le timbre appartenant à des 
catégories d’ordre second.’ 
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how the built-in hierarchy is not only necessary, but itself arbitrary. That it is a hierarchical 
system indeed becomes apparent from the lines immediately following the above passage, as 
Boulez attempts to find support for his position via a historical rationalization, both in musical 
practice and the history of notation: 
The history of univer sa l  [my stress] musical practice guarantees these functions of diminishing 
importance, which notation confirms by [showing] the different stages of its transformation. Pitch 
systems and rhythmic systems, concurrently, always appear as highly developed and consistent, while it 
would often be troublesome to draw out theories codified on [the basis] of dynamics or timbres, 
abandoned most often for [reasons of] pragmatism or ethics [...].202 
Although Boulez uses the series in his early works in a thematic way, Edward Campbell argues 
that ‘the basic series or pitch collection has become a source of qualities, which Boulez abstracts 
from it and combines,’203 including the manipulation of the temporal dimension. Although he 
moved away from the more mechanical and automatic results dictated by the series, Boulez 
nevertheless legitimates serialism via a claim as to its historical necessity in the aftermath of the 
postwar period’s turn away from the earlier dodecaphonic and neo-classical compositional 
systems. As noted, this historical movement is qualified as natural; its opponents including those 
composers holding onto earlier compositional theories as well as those who develop different 
compositional strategies, are seen as opposing history itself; they are anti-historical.204 Boulez 
attempts to justify this position by taking recourse to, as seen above, historicized rationalizations, 
                                                
202 Ibid., p. 37 : ‘L’histoire de la pratique musicale universelle se porte garante de ces fonctions d’importance 
décroissante, ce que la notation vient de confirmer par les différentes étapes de sa transformation. Les systèmes 
de hauteurs et les systèmes rythmiques, concurremment, apparaissent toujours comme hautement développés et 
cohérent, alors qu’on serait souvent en peine de dénicher des théories codifiées pour les dynamiques ou les 
timbres, abandonnés le plus souvent au pragmatisme ou à l’éthique (ainsi de nombreux tabous en ce qui 
concerne l’emploi de certains instruments ou de la voix.’ 
203 Edward Campbell, Boulez, Music and Philosophy, op. cit., p. 217 
204 Pierre Boulez, ‘Possibly ...’, 1952, p. 113; see also Pierre Boulez, ‘Aesthetics and the Fetishists’ (1961), in 
Orientations.: Collected Writings, (Harvard, Cambridge (MA), 1990), p. 39-40 
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and, moreover, he calls ‘upon Adorno for support, [by reflecting] that a composer must draw out 
the consequences which are implicit in the language which has been inherited,’ 205  whilst 
postulating the existence of ‘a dialectical relationship between history and the individual’206 in 
which ‘history provides a challenge for the individual while the individual is charged with 
reconfiguring history in some kind of irreversible way.’207 Campbell concludes that as he is 
‘caught up in this dialectic, it is consequently impossible for the composer to be independent of 
his time.’208 
 
Adorno’s own theorizations address the question of the status of the concept of the work after 
this upheaval. In his view, the traditional organic conceptualization of music – in which all parts 
are elements of an organic whole and replaced by the serial compositional system – is to be 
reinvented in the concept of musique informelle. Adorno, reading the visual artworks of the 
informelle Kunst, associated with artists such as Wols (whose original name was Alfred Otto 
Wolfgang Schulze)209 could lead a way out of this crisis: 
But following the liquidation of the organic language of music, music once again, thanks to its 
immanent organization, has become the very image of the organic. There is an analogy here to certain 
striking thematic tendencies in contemporary painters like Schultze and Ness [sic]. For music the 
organic ideal would be nothing but a rejection of the mechanical. It would be the concrete process of 
                                                
205 Edward Campbell, op. cit., p. 217 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid. 
208 ibid. 
209 Wols,  (1913-1951). Ian Chilvers and John Glaves-Smith (eds.), Dictionary of Modern and Contemporary Art, (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 759-760 
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a growing unity [werdenden Einheit] of parts and whole and not their subsumption under a supreme 
abstract concept, together with the juxtaposition of the parts.210 
 
Although Campbell observes the vague aspect of Adorno’s concept,211 even as presented in the 
late writings, he does not actually follow this through in the way Borio does. As I will argue, the 
aspect of this Hegelian synthesis in historical terms, and the pretension of a ‘redemption-within-
reach’ can function as a critique of a historicist and idealist conceptualizations of historical time, 
as well as musical temporality.  
  
                                                
210 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Vers une musique informelle,’ p. 307 (English translation); GS Band 16, p. 527 in the 
original German. 
211 See for example p. 91 in ‘Late Adorno: 1964-1969’: ‘In “Difficulties” (1964), Adorno reconsiders some of the 
issues previously tackled in “The Ageing” and in “Vers une musique informelle.” While Boulez and Stockhausen 
were still committed to serialism, he retained his misgivings about the “total determination,” “progressive 
rationalization” and “reification” which he believed were implicit to it and on this basis he reasserts that the 
ageing of new music was taking place, and that “the best” of his Darmstadt colleagues, who were unhappy with 
this view in 1954, now seemed to be mostly in agreement with it.’ (See Adorno, 2002, p. 656-9) Campbell 
estimates that ‘Boulez is, presumably, counted among their number.’ Boulez, in his Darmstadt lectures ‘reprises 
the criticisms of serial practice, which he first formulated in 'Current Investigations'.’ Campbell concludes that 
‘while musique informelle or a-serialism remains the goal towards which new music should be working, he is as 
unable as before to define it with any degree of precision other than to say that it could serve to relate the wealth 
of integral serialist detail to the composed whole.’ 
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Key aspects of musique informel l e  I: form 
Adorno’s encounter with art informel proved fruitful for his attempt to theorize a comparable 
musique informelle, in which he sought to address the question of how the modernist musical 
artwork could resist totalizing tendencies in the integral serialist musical language – and especially 
in regard of musical form. As we have seen, in early integral serial compositions, form tended to 
become a mere by-product of the series. For Adorno, this was unsatisfactory: he identified a 
contradiction between the quest to total compositional determinism and the neglect of formal 
considerations. In propounding the notion of musique informelle, he sought to overcome the 
problems inherent in the traditional organic conceptualization of music in which all parts are 
elements of an organic whole, and which had been replaced by the serial compositional system. 
Beyond the influences already established by the different authors above, a final source of 
inspiration should be mentioned: the so-called ‘intuitive drawings’ of the artist Wols. According 
to the art historian Delphine Bière, 
From the early 1930s to 1951, Wols experimented with the possibilities of drawing on the trajectory of 
the hand on the ‘very small sheet to comprise the world.’212 In this reduced transformed flat space, in 
which the line comes unmoored and unravels the representation process, unstable meandering forms, 
to life. Hesitatingly, the drawing explores a variety of undetermined relations, rejecting the external 
representation of the pictorial object to invent new forms.213 
Wols was active across a wide range of media, including photography, painting and writing and 
was well-read in fields extending beyond the visual arts, such as music, zoology, botany and 
Eastern philosophies. However, he attempted to break down the barrier between the different 
arts. Bière writes that for him 
                                                
212 Wols and Hans Joachim Petersen, Wols: die Aphorismen (Munich, Schirmer Mosel), p. 32 (i.e. aphorism No. 70) 
213Wols, Delphine Bière-Chauvel and Lieu d'art et action contemporaine de Dunkerque, Wols, dessins (Paris, 
Archibooks), p. 14 
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Each medium determines what the others were not, at the same time striving for the 
decompartmentalization of genres that defines the multiple, varied nature of Wols’ output. His various 
artistic activities interact, defying any categorization while revealing the same instability in their 
constituent elements. The relations between his practices and methods and gender conflicts, are a 
rejection of restrictive professionalization and of the linear in an artistic process, but always pertaining 
to the study of the material aspect of natural phenomena.214 
Furthermore, she argues in Representations: A mental image that Wols explored the possibilities of 
‘psychic automatism’ as preached by the Surrealists in the 1930s, as well as their use of dreams. 
According to Bière, Wols’ drawings ‘repudiate representation, but not the representation of the 
mental image.’215 She points out that although ‘his watercolours are populated with figures, 
landscapes and characters,’216 they have ‘no counterpart in the real world, other than certain 
recurrent clues.’ 217 She adds that ‘the precise, assured graphic style does not override the 
ambiguity of the objects – hybrid beings subject to the metamorphoses and otherworldly 
situations imposed by the painter.’218 In contrast to traditional representational art, Wols ‘perceives 
nature in relation to his own inner world, and the artwork as the medium for a visual process 
nourished by the mental image.’219 In her view, the ‘outer natural world’ has been ‘transformed 
by the inner vision.’220 Wols’ art occupies a ‘phantasmagorical realm’ which ‘takes on its own 
physiognomy, manifested by the quality of the medium, in particular the line.’ 221 
                                                
214 Ibid., p. 14 
215 Ibid. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid., p. 16 
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Wols’ style underwent a change after his internment as a German national from September 1939 
to October 1940; rather than recognizable objects, he started making collages. As Bière analyses 
the drawing The Feet (1939), she sees that 
the line becomes both outline and link, lending the massed and amalgamated figures an enigmatic 
presence. As the vector of expression and sole element unifying the whole, it heightens the presence 
of the transformed, intertwined objects and beings, fixing them in an undefined spatial position. The 
watercolour proceeds by associations of “visual remnants” and isolated objects (a crank, a brick wall, 
an insect, etc.) that lose their identity as things to become a composite whole, denoting the distance 
between fantasy an idea.222  
In other words, Wols’ style does not impose a pre-arranged form, but allows for associations and 
amalgamations of disparate elements, though at the same time preserving a certain degree of 
figurative recognizability, however dream-like or illogical their interrelations may appear. 
 
Adorno was quick to notice the significance of Wols’ artistic practice, and saw that it could open 
up new creative possibilities for composers. This is explicitly confirmed by a key passage in Vers 
une musique informelle, in which he comes closest to offering a definition of the concept in musical 
terms, as I have argued before, where he compares how music has become the ‘very image of the 
organic’ once more, analogous with the work of Wols, ‘nothing but a rejection of the 
mechanical.223 The traditional conception of the ‘organic’ work of art, in which the details in 
themselves only become meaningful through their interaction with the form, were to be 
abolished in musique informelle, admittedly in the Hegelian sense of Aufhebung or ‘sublation.’ 
Musique informelle would, historically at least, have gone through the serial negation by means of 
the ‘mechanical,’ in which an abstract superstructure – or global form – generates the individual 
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elements, to then be linked without reciprocal connection. The musique informelle that Adorno 
proposed would not pursue a simple restitution of the ‘organic’ work of art, but the re-adoption 
of the idea of the organic through an advancing process of unification in the work. Rather, 
musique informelle, was to be 
a type of music which has discarded all forms which are external or abstract or which confront it in an 
inflexible way. At the same time, although such music should be completely free of anything 
irreducibly alien to itself or superimposed on it, it should nevertheless constitute itself in an objectively 
compelling way, in the musical substance itself, and not in terms of external laws.224  
The question of musical form in the twentieth century is a central preoccupation in Adorno’s 
aesthetics, and in order to grasp more fully the significance of the observations cited above, they 
must be read in conjunction with a number of other texts that articulate a critique of traditional 
forms. A major theme of the collection Quasi una fantasia, of which Vers une musique informelle is 
the final essay, is the reification of these forms, and I shall consider these writings in more detail 
later in the thesis. For the moment, I shall confine myself to discussing Adorno’s discussion of 
this question in one particularly important and illuminating source, the posthumously published 
Aesthetic Theory, as this text continues to explore the issues concerning form that were raised in 
Vers une musique informelle. 
 
In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno returned once more to the question of form in relation to the 
modernist artwork. His thinking on this question had derived fresh stimulus from his encounter 
with the work of Samuel Beckett (especially The Unnameable and Endgame),225 which renewed his 
interest in the musical avant-garde and the possibility for the musical artwork to reinvent itself. 
                                                
224 Theodor W. Adorno, op. cit., p. 272 
225 See Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Versuch das Endspiel zu verstehen,’ in Rolf Tiedemann (ed.), Noten zur Literatur, 
(Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1981), pp. 281-321; for further reading, see Hans-Dieter König, Neue Versuche, 
Becketts Endspiel zu verstehen. Sozialwissenschaftliches Interpretieren Nach Adorno, (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1996) 
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(Again, I will return to examine Adorno’s engagement with Beckett’s work later.) His discussion 
of form underwent further elaboration in relation to fundamental themes of his work, and 
particularly his continuing exploration of the dialectic between society and the avant-garde 
musical artwork. In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno connects the idea that social relations are sedimented 
in the artwork with the changed imagery of the industrial era, first referring to concepts 
presented in Walter Benjamin’s celebrated essay The Work of Art in the Age of Its Mechanical 
Reproduction and the implications for the artwork of increasing technification: 
What hits the mark in the various reflections on art in what journalists call the technological age, 
which is just as a much marked by the social relations of production as by the level of productive 
forces, is not so much the adequacy of art to technical development as the transformation of the 
experiential forms sedimented in artworks.226 
For Adorno the experience of art as mimesis can no longer express a pre-industrial world – in 
which the natural was not fully dominated – in its images: 
The question is that of the aesthetic world of imagery: pre-industrial imagery irretrievably had to 
collapse. The sentence with which Benjamin’s reflections on surrealism began – ‘it no longer feels 
right to dream about the blue flower’227 – gets to the heart of the matter. Art is mimesis of the world 
of imagery and at the same time its enlightenment through forms of control.228 
The ‘blue flower’ mentioned by Adorno is symbol for romantic longing and refers to the ‘blaue 
Blume’ of Novalis’s Heinrich von Ofterdingen.229 The world to which it refers seems lost, or at least 
its imagery no longer accessible for the world of art to represent. What penetrates into every 
aspect of experience in this regard, is the loss of immediacy, especially the experience of nature: 
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That today any walk in the woods, unless elaborate plans have been made to seek out the most remote 
forests, is accompanied by the sound of jet engines overhead not only destroys the actuality of nature 
as, for instance, an object of poetic celebration.[...] This may help clarify the anorganic aspect of 
Beckett’s as well as of Celan’s poetry.230 
The images of the postindustrial world are, according to Adorno, those of a corpse.231 He had 
already mentioned these strong affinities between Beckett’s work and music in Stravinsky: A 
Dialectical Portrait: ‘Beckett’s “je vais continuer’, with which his novel of despair [The Unnameable] 
comes to an end, without our being able to say whether that end is still one of despair, neatly 
encapsulates a factor unifying modern literature and music of every kind.’232 Subsequently, 
Adorno shows how certain modernist movements attempt to maintain the now impossible idea 
of an aesthetic universal, even if ‘an element of universality cannot be eliminated from technique 
any more than from the movement of nominalism as a whole.’233 Adorno refers specifically to 
two different artistic media and styles: 
Cubism and composition with twelve tones related only to one another are, in terms of their idea, 
universal procedures in the age of the negation of aesthetic universality. The tension between 
objectivating technique and the mimetic essence of artworks is fought out in the effort to save the 
fleeting, the ephemeral, the transitory in a form that is immune to reification and yet akin to it in being 
permanent.234 
                                                
230 Ibid., p. 219 
231 The idea of the world as rotting or as dead is one found in the work of other writers, as mentioned above. 
Georges Bataille’s critique of surrealism (as propounded by André Breton) resulted in a similar materialism, 
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It is here that Adorno recognizes the temporality at the heart of art’s truth content, lost in genres 
such as nature poetry, as explained above.235 More important even, is the idea of the dialectic of 
technique and experience – one which is seen as the notion of systems and system building on 
the one hand (Adorno refers here to cubism and dodecaphony, rather different in their 
conceptions and domains of painting and music) – and the notion of a temporal unfolding of the 
experience of the transitory. In other words, art is seen as both an attempt to capture the 
fleetingness of experience and to survive artistically in a more permanent fashion. This tension 
can be seen in musical terms as one of the central concerns of the composers studied in this 
thesis. Morton Feldman, for one, spoke of the ‘incomprehensibility’ of the material, and how 
technique can only ‘structure’ it.236 Xenakis, for example, proposes the notion of a formalized 
music, not to create yet another immutable composition-technical system, but to bring to light 
tendencies already present in the material which can be understood from a statistical point of 
view. At another level, the tension, for Xenakis, consists of the search for universals in an age of 
the negation of universals, however, not to re-establish them uncritically. His rather brave 
attempt to formalize, as we will see, is always balanced with the recognition of intuition. Adorno 
noted this tendency: 
Incidentally, art’s impulse to objectivize the fleeting, not the permanent, may well run through the 
whole of its history. Hegel failed to recognize this and for this reason, in the midst of dialectics, failed 
to recognize the temporal core of art’s truth content.237 
                                                
235 Adorno clearly refers to his critique of Hegel as presented in the opening pages of Aesthetic Theory, to which he 
returns here. See above in this chapter concerning the artwork’s transitoriness. 
236 See Chapter 6 of this thesis. Feldman discusses a number of related issues in the essay Morton Feldman, 
‘Between Categories (1969),’ in B.H. Friedman (ed.), Give My Regards to Eighth Street, Collected Writings of Morton 
Feldman, (Cambridge, MA, Exact Change, 2000), pp. 83-89 
237 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, op. cit., p. 219 
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In the next passage of the same part of Aesthetic Theory, Adorno continues this inquiry into the 
mediation of the universal and the particular from the point of view of form. Keeping in mind 
the above focus on the mediation of time and truth content at the heart of the work of art, 
Adorno criticizes the nominalist prescriptions of canonical forms, whilst showing how they 
functioned historically. Critique in this sense is bound to an assessment of the adequacy of forms, 
in other words how well they reveal truth: 
Prototypical in this regard is the distinction between closed and open forms, which is relevant to all 
theory of form. Open forms are those universal genre categories that seek an equilibrium with the 
nominalistic critique of universality that is founded on the experience that the unity of the universal 
and the particular, which is claimed by artworks, fundamentally fails.238 
This refers to the illusion created by artworks in their assertion that the sum of their parts 
amounts to a unified whole, and is mimetic of a world-at-peace – which Adorno refers to as a 
failure or a lie. This appearance of wholeness suggested by traditional formal strategies (for 
example in the ‘closed’ genre of the sonata) is at the centre of Adorno’s critique. He argues that 
this illusory whole is undermined by the intrusion of the heterogeneous in (musical) forms: 
No pregiven universal unprotestingly receives a particular that does not derive from a genre. The 
perpetuated universality of forms becomes incompatible with form’s own meaning; the promise of 
something rounded, overarching, and balanced is not fulfilled. For this is a promise made to what is 
heterogeneous to the forms, which probably never tolerated identity with them.239  
Moreover, Adorno argues that forms which ‘rattle on’ after they have become outmoded or 
reified do ‘injustice’ to the form as described above. Furthermore, he puts forward the idea of a 
loss of the distinction between form as infused with characteristics and particulars, and form as 
something rounded, overarching and balanced. In the case that form has ‘become reified with 
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regard to its other,’ it is ‘no longer form.’240 The ‘reified’ form here is therefore distinct from the 
heterogeneous forms of musique informelle, as well as the formalized structural procedures pursued 
by Xenakis, for instance.  
 
Historically, what keeps forms alive in this regard, is the constant tension the composer or artist 
creates between what is expected by the audience and how far such a form can be stretched 
against the traditional, in order to keep the work’s temporal core sufficiently animated. In this 
connection, it is especially interesting to note Adorno’s discussion of nominalism above all in 
relation to the reification of musical form, a tendency he noted as evinced from the time of the 
origination of the concept of the artwork itself. Discussing Bach’s sense of form, for example, 
Adorno argues that it ‘did not consist in showing respect for traditional forms but rather in 
keeping them in motion, or better: in not letting them harden in the first place.’241 Although he 
sees Bach as an opponent of bourgeois nominalism, Adorno states that he ‘was nominalist on 
the basis of his sense of form.’242 Vitally, Adorno infers that the nominalist artwork then, ‘should 
become an artwork by being organized from below to above, not by having principles of 
organization foisted on it.’243 However, dialectically this bottom-up approach to the organization 
of form requires a counterweight, as ‘no artwork left blindly to itself possesses the power of 
organization that would set up binding boundaries for itself: investing the work with such a 
power would in fact be fetishistic[...].’244 So, even if form is to be created from the material level 
up, it needs to avoid fetishizing this material as a sufficient creator of meaningful forms – in 
other words if sounds really would speak for themselves, they would fall back into the world of 
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Klangreiz – as pure enjoyment of sounds. Consequently, in the next passage, Adorno shows how 
the objective element – the artefactual or made aspect of artworks – reveals itself, even when 
attempts are made to create open forms.  
The artifactual character of the artwork is incompatible with the postulate of pure relinquishment to 
the material. By being something made, artworks acquire that element of organization, of being 
something directed, in the dramaturgical sense, that is anathema to the nominalistic sensibility. The 
historical aporia of aesthetic nominalism culminates in the insufficiency of open forms, a striking 
example of which is Brecht’s difficulty in writing convincing conclusions to his plays.245 
Although Adorno is speaking about historical, earlier open forms as well as Brecht’s theatre, this 
aporia becomes rather piquant when seen in the context of musique informelle. However, both 
closed and open forms, which he discusses below, pose problems to the artist, for different 
reasons. In particular, he contrasts the rondo (an ‘open’ form) with the sonata (a ‘closed’ form): 
A qualitative leap in the general tendency to open form is, moreover not to be overlooked. The older 
open forms are based on traditional forms that they modified but from which they maintained more 
than just the external trappings. The classical Viennese sonata was a dynamic yet closed form, and this 
closure was precarious; the rondo with the intentional freedom in the alternation of refrain and 
couplets, was a decidedly open form. [...] The rondo lent itself better to cheap standardization than did 
the dynamically developing sonata, whose dynamic, in spite of its closure, did not permit typification. 
The sense of form, which in the rondo at the very least gave the impression of contingency, required 
guarantees in order not to explode the genre.246 
In Adorno’s opinion, open forms as seen in the work of Bach247 (the Presto of the Italian 
Concerto), Mozart (notably his Rondos), and Beethoven see an increasing tendency towards the 
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contingent: in other words, forms are rationalized to such an extent that the elements which did 
not fit perfectly are progressively eliminated. 
Contingency impinged on form. Ultimately, contingency is a function of growing structuration. This 
explains apparently marginal events such as the temporally contracting scope of musical compositions, 
as well as the miniature format of Klee’s best work. Resignation vis-a-vis time and space gave ground to 
the crisis of nominalistic form until it was reduced to a mere point, effectively inert.248 
After discussing historical examples of open forms, Adorno returns to the concept of musique 
informelle in connection with the work of the New York painters grouped together under the 
banner of action painting – assumedly, including the work of Jackson Pollock, coined by the critic 
Harold Rosenberg,249 and further theorized by Clement Greenberg,250 who focused on the 
objectness of the productions.251 Adorno writes: 
Resignation vis-à-vis time and space gave ground to the crisis of nominalist form until it was reduced 
to a mere point, effectively inert. Action painting, l’art informel, and aleatoric works may have carried the 
element of resignation to its extreme: the aesthetic subject exempts itself of the burden of giving form 
to the contingent material it encounters, despairing of the possibility of undergirding it, and instead 
shifts the responsibility for its organization back to the contingent material itself. The gain here is, 
however, dubious.252 
The danger of the contingency of the material (as for example, the idea of letting sound speak 
for itself), to which the impetus of giving form to the work is returned, lies in the resignation of 
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subjectivization – normally considered a problem in Adorno’s aesthetics – and the retreat to a 
level of arbitrariness dictated by the material. In other words, Adorno warns for an overly 
optimistic development of any new art, as it risks creating yet another new form of false 
consciousness.253 
Form purportedly distilled from the contingent and the heterogeneous itself remains heterogeneous 
and, for the artwork, arbitrary; in its literalness it is alien to art. Statistics254 are used to console for the 
absence of traditional forms. This situation holds embedded in itself the figure of its own critique.255 
Finally, for Adorno this double bind, on the one hand the closed-off forms of the past which 
have outlived their critical potential by becoming static or reified, and on the other hand the 
open forms even he had momentarily regarded as potentially redemptive in the guise of musique 
informelle, cannot be simply bypassed. This critical insight, however, contains the core of his 
dialectics of the (nominalist) critical work of art: 
Nominalist artworks constantly require the intervention of the guiding hand they conceal in the 
service of their principle. The extremely objective critique of semblance incorporates an illusory 
element that is perhaps as irrevocable as the aesthetic semblance of all artworks. Often in artistic 
products of chance a necessity is sensed to subordinate these works to, effectively, a stylizing 
procedure of selection.256 
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In sum, Adorno argues that this ‘guiding hand’ in the shaping of the work cannot be eradicated 
without succumbing to total objectification of the material as a static image (an important point 
to which I shall return in subsequent chapters), or by becoming an utterly reified cultural object. 
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Key aspects of musique informel l e  II: musical time 
The second key aspect of musique informelle concerns musical time – the central theme of this 
thesis. The problem of musical time had become a central preoccupation of the post-war musical 
avant-garde, and was of particular interest to Adorno, as it was related to his wider philosophical 
concerns, and especially his thinking on metaphysics as presented in major works such as 
Negative Dialectics and his critique of Heideggerian Dasein257 in The Jargon of Authenticity.258 I shall 
return to examine the development of Adorno’s thinking on time more generally and on musical 
time in particular in later chapters. Here, I will confine myself to sketching some of its most 
important features insofar as they have a bearing on the comprehension of his concepts of 
musique informelle and of the modernist musical artwork. 
 
A major influence on Adorno’s thinking on time was the work of the French philosopher Henri 
Bergson, in particular the distinction Bergson drew between mechanical clock time (temps espace) 
and time as lived or experienced (temps durée). The French author and musician Michel Ratté 
observes that in his discussion of Stockhausen’s important article ‘...how time passes’,259 Adorno 
‘treats Bergson’s distinction between temps espace and temps durée as an established fact.’260 Ratté 
claims that this is the answer to the question of which conception of subjective temporality is the 
best suited to interpret the temporality that is ‘at work’ in music. He explains that, for Adorno, 
musical time is ‘simply the Bergsonian duration (temps durée),’261 but does not make clear where 
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the latter articulates this position explicitly. Ratté’s comments, however, are problematic. The 
scholar and editor of Bergson’s collected writings, Frédéric Worms, argues that Bergson sought 
to establish that only one of the types of time could be ‘correct’, which ultimately lead him to 
force the unity of everything, in the universe. It is this that he tries to establish, in tracing the moments 
through mathematical equations when one passes from a purely mathematical point of view [which is] 
convertible and simultaneous, to conscious points of view which won’t be any longer [mathematical], 
and between which one must choose. It is a form of solipsism which leads him to a form of globalism, 
when, taking into account the relations, would have allowed to think both local singularities and the 
structure of the whole.262 
However, in the quotation below on absolute time from Negative Dialectics (in the section ‘The 
Concern of Philosophy’), Adorno actually discusses Bergson’s thesis, as well as that of Husserl’s 
phenomenology. Firstly, Adorno confronts Bergson’s position against universal concepts with 
his ‘irrational’ philosophy of immediate intuition, based on a dualistic philosophical framework: 
Bergson, in a tour de force, created another type of cognition for non-conceptuality’s sake. The 
dialectical salt was washed away in a differentiated tide of life; solidified reality was disposed off as 
subaltern, not comprehended along with its subalternity. The hater of the rigid general concept 
established the cult of irrational immediacy, of sovereign freedom in the midst of unfreedom. He 
drafted this to cognitive modes in as dualistic an opposition as that of the Cartesian and Kantian 
doctrines he fought had ever been; the causal–mechanical mode, as pragmatistic knowledge, was no 
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more affected by the intuitive one than the bourgeois establishment was by the relaxed and self-
consciousness of those who owe their privileges to that establishment. 263 
Adorno then criticizes this immediacy of the intuitions as conflating the durée or lived time with 
the rationalized chronological time (a critique confirmed in the above quotation by Frédéric 
Worms), and stresses how Bergson’s dualism requires what amounts to a dialectical re-
conceptualization of the concept of time: 
The celebrated intuitions themselves seem rather abstract in Bergson’s philosophy; they scarcely go 
beyond the phenomenal time consciousness which even becomes an underlying chronological physical 
time–spatial time, according to Bergson’s insight. Although it takes an effort to develop, the 
interactive mode of mental conduct does continue to exist in fact as in the archaic rudiment of 
mimetic reactions. What preceded its past holds the promise beyond the ossified present. Intuitions 
succeed only desultorily, however. Every cognition including Bergson’s own needs the rationality he 
scorns, and needs it precisely at the moment of concretion.264 
In other words, and against the very Bergsonian critique of spatialization – of both time and 
consciousness – Adorno argues that every fleeting thought, cognition (and, in Benjaminian terms, 
the experience of artworks), requires precisely a certain degree of reification. Although this is  
dreaded by Bergson as a form of rationalization of consciousness, it is necessary in order for the 
experiential to become knowledge.265 To return to Vers une musique informelle, Adorno refers 
implicitly to the Bergsonian dualist concept of time on several occasions: 
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Stockhausen becomes aware of it [i.e. the antinomy of material and composition] in the context of the 
problem of the relationship between physically measurable and authentically musical time.266 
In another key passage, he also noted that in traditional listening ‘the music unfolds from the 
parts to the whole, in tune with the flow of time itself. This flow – that is to say, the parallel 
between the temporal succession of musical events and the pure flow of time itself – has become 
problematical and presents itself within the work as a task to be thought through and 
mastered.’267 
 
Michel Ratté observes in this regard that Bergson’s theory had other important implications for 
Adorno’s theory of music, drawing attention to two other important passages in Quasi una 
fantasia. The first comes from Stravinsky: A Dialectical Portrait: ‘As a temporal art, music is bound 
to the fact of succession and is hence as irreversible as time itself. By starting it commits itself to 
                                                                                                                                                  
so zufallig und vermittelt wie ihr Subjekt, und darum, angesichts der chronometrischen, stets zugleich “falsch”.’ 
He explains how consciousness may make reparations to 'time', if at all possible, what has been done to it under 
the banner of logic/science. It is indeed part of a larger discussion on the real risks of reification of 
consciousness, here in the form of time consciousness. However, at the same time he admits that time wouldn't 
be the same without logic. He explains how Bergson tried to 'reconstruct' temps durée as lived duration, and the 
[lived] experience of time. However, at the same time as temps durée is being saved from the 'abstraction of 
philosophy' and the causal-mechanical logic of the natural sciences, the concept is not dialectical but self-
defeating: what Adorno calls the 'dynamic element' [dynamisches Moment] of the concept of temps durée is made 
absolute – in 'disgust' or avoidance (Adorno uses the French 'dégoût') of the reification of consciousness – and 
therefore loses its dynamic (also described as 'inhaltliches Moment' or element of content). In this way it is itself 
reified into a 'branch/department' of the same consciousness, albeit as a particular and privileged form of 
cognition. Temps durée or 'subjective lived time' together with its (dynamic) content becomes as coincidental and 
mediated as its subject, and therefore 'false', in view of chronometric time. To explain this, Adorno states that 
the triviality suffices that the subjective experiences of time, measured by clock-time, are exposed to illusion, 
although no clock-time would be without the subjective experience of time, which is concretised by this. Adorno 
argues that no clock time would exist, if it was not for the subjective experience of time, from which it [clock 
time] was reified. 
266 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Vers une musique informelle,’ op. cit., p. 288 
267 Ibid., p. 271 
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carrying on, to becoming something new, to developing.’268 The second is, once more, found in 
Vers une musique informelle: ‘It is no doubt true that the phrase about the irreversible nature of 
history, the wheel of time which cannot be turned back, says everything and nothing.’269 
According to Ratté,270 Adorno refers here once again to key Bergsonian themes: firstly, music, 
like the duration of consciousness, constitutes an irreversible succession; and secondly, music, 
like consciousness, is subjected to the irreversibility of time, but at the same time, it finds the 
possibility to be free in that the accumulated past exists as experience to it (music). In this way 
the medium of irreversible time is also evolution: consciousness constantly relates to the 
complete accumulated past beginning from the new perspectives that are offered at every 
moment, and the subject finds in this way the possibility to be something else than a past which 
constitutes its substance only in that it is accumulated. All of these are key ideas deriving from 
Bergson’s The Creative Evolution. In Ratté’s view, Adorno was convinced of the fact that music is 
normatively destined to become. In this way, for Adorno, Bergson’s theory had a function which 
established something akin to a foundation-in-hindsight, after the experience of a musical work. 
Adorno argues that 
The illusion is that a succession of pure sounds can in reality stand outside time, while what the notes 
signify in space is nevertheless to be deciphered in temporal sequence, however far the notation may 
have strayed from measuring time. A succession in time that denies its own progressivity sabotages the 
obligations of becoming, of process; it fails to motivate why this should follow that and not something 
else unless it has been determined by what precedes it or conversely, unless it reveals ex post facto that 
what has preceded it was, in reality, its own precondition.’271 
                                                
268 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Stravinsky: A Dialectical Portrait’, in Quasi una fantasia, op. cit., p. 150 
269 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Vers une musique informelle,’ op. cit., p. 275 
270 Michel Ratté, L’Expressivité de l’oubli, op. cit., p. 139 
271 Ibid. 
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Adorno thus sees the unfolding of musical time as essential for the creation of form: in other 
words, form can only be ‘established’ through this motion, rather than being imposed a priori. 
This formal ‘becoming’ (through a ‘bottom-up’ approach to structure and, ultimately, to form) 
consequently stands in opposition to the reified musical forms of the past; in this way, musical 
time is not a chronological sequence, but a creative, experiential force. Themes and motifs, 
developmental technique, and ultimately the interaction of contrasting musical elements are the 
technical aspects which allow for this experience of transitoriness, as discussed above in relation 
to the contents of the work of art. 
 
In Adorno’s view, the key to the possibility of the modernist musical artwork lay in precisely this 
formal ‘becoming.’ As we have seen, he considered the striving for unification as it is manifested 
in traditional musical artworks to be no longer possible – for two reasons: firstly, because of the 
destruction of the organicist work-concept in integral serialism; and secondly, because the state 
of the musical material had become so fragmented that any attempt at unification would create a 
false, illusory image of the world. If artworks were to be possible at all, they had to find a way to 
redeem the illusion that they ineluctably created: and his concept of musique informelle attempts to 
escape this impasse. However, his theorization of the musical informel in this sense has a strongly 
utopian character, as he evidently did not believe that the kind of modernist musical artwork that 
he envisaged had yet been attempted. In the next chapter, I will examine this issue in more detail, 
and discuss some of the most important critiques of Adorno’s concept. 
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Introduction 
The chapter revisits key elements of Adorno’s concept of musique informelle in light of Gianmario 
Borio’s critique and theorization of an aesthetic of the informel. In turn I will attempt to show 
how Borio’s aesthetics can be employed for a reading-against-the-grain of Adorno’s concept – in 
contrast to historical and hermeneutic readings, for example by Martin Zenck – especially by 
drawing on the notion of the sound-object as well as Walter Benjamin’s theories of the object and 
the dialectical image. As I have already argued, the concept of musique informelle is one of the most 
important contributions to theorizing the possible/valid modernist artwork in the postwar 
period. A number of musicologists and composers have engaged with it both theoretically and 
practically, especially in its supposed utopian aspects.272 Adorno's text effectively opened new 
perspectives to theoreticians, including Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf, and composers, amongst others, 
Dieter Schnebel, Aldo Clementi, György Ligeti, and Brian Ferneyhough.273 The reception of the 
concept, though diverse and not universally acknowledged – can nonetheless be seen in the 
composition of new works, and in the implications it could have for theorizations of these 
contemporary oeuvres, regardless of explicit references to Adorno’s concept. A number of 
authors have analyzed the conception of musique informelle from a historical and musical point of 
view, including Martin Zenck.274 However, the most important systematic work building on this 
concept, radically expanding it, both in itself and as constitutive of an aesthetic of the informel, is 
                                                
272 For a debate of what utopia means in the work of Benjamin and Adorno, and others, see: 
http://www.heathwoodpress.com/somethings-missing-study-dialectic-utopia-theories-theodor-w-adorno-ernst-
bloch/ 
273 Max Paddison and Irene Deliège, Contemporary Music: Theoretical and Philosophical Perspectives, (Farnham, Ashgate, 
2010) 
274 Martin Zenck, ‘Auswirkungen einer “musique informelle” auf die neue Musik, zu Theodor W. Adornos 
Formvorstellung,’ in International Review of Aesthetics and Sociology of Music, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1979), pp. 137-165 
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Gianmario Borio’s book Die musikalische Avantgarde um 1960. 275  Other works elaborating 
Adorno’s concept of the informel include Michel Ratté’s book L’expressivité de l’oubli276 and Nels J. 
Rogers’ thesis Theodor W. Adorno’s Poetics of Dissonance. 277  Their respective methodological 
approaches can be described as music-historical, music-philosophical and literary-critical. Ratté’s 
book also develops a theory of forgetfulness which builds on elements from Vers une musique 
informelle, while at the same time exploring concepts from Bergson’s The Creative Evolution. As we 
have seen, Bergson’s work influenced Adorno’s concept of time, albeit negatively. Finally, I 
argue that a complementary explicatory model is possible, if one revisits those aspects of 
Benjamin’s thinking on history (and especially his concept of the dialectical image) which 
provided a starting point for Adorno’s theorizations; and also his theory of the language of 
objects. Moreover, as I have already mentioned in passing, in certain later writings such as 
Aesthetic Theory, further theorizations on musical time indicate a development in Adorno’s 
thought which can fruitfully expand both Borio’s aesthetics and re-conceptualize Adorno’s 
musique informelle. 
 
  
                                                
275 Gianmario Borio, Musikalische Avantgarde um 1960 : Entwurf einer Theorie der informellen Musik, (Laaber, Laaber-
Verlag, 1993). While Borio’s work features in this chapter, his text will later be confronted with other approaches 
to Adorno’s writings. 
276 Michel Ratté, L'expressivité de l'oubli – Essai sur le sentiment et la forme dans la musique de la modernité, (Bruxelles, La 
lettre volée, 1999), p. 18 
277 Nels Rogers, Theodor W. Adorno's Poetics of Dissonance: Music, Language and Literary Modernism, (Philadelphia 
University of Pennsylvania, 2001), p. 327 
 101 
Readings of musique informel l e  – affirmation, reaction and interpretation 
The importance of musique informelle in light of the crisis of the musical work of art can hardly be 
underestimated. The reception history of the concept in itself presents a plethora of opinions 
and further theorizations, paradoxically hardening and using the concept as a means to justify 
specific artistic projects, often mutually irreconcilable. Moreover, a concept of such richness can 
be misappropriated, as Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf argues in an essay on the music of Brian 
Ferneyhough,278 by what he terms ‘conservative, outright reactionary composers,’279 who would 
go as far as taking recourse to Adorno’s concept precisely to show how they had known all along 
that there was something suspicious with integral serial technique. Mahnkopf argues that 
Adorno’s text is conscious of the ‘irreversible elements in the musical evolution,’ which he sees 
as very close to the ‘production and aesthetics of Brian Ferneyhough.’280 Although he is aware of 
the reductive nature of his speculations to linking a single composer with Adorno’s concept, he 
claims that Ferneyhough had formed his own aesthetics281 before he had mastered German well 
enough to have read Adorno’s work.282 Furthermore, he seems unaware of some of the problems 
in Adorno’s conceptualization; on this basis, an interpretation of what the concept should mean 
                                                
278 Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf, ‘Vers une musique figurelle?,’ in Contrechamps, No. 8, (1988), pp. 45-63 
279 Ibid., p. 53 
280 Ibid., p. 53 
281Ibid., p. 53. See also Brian Ferneyhough, ‘Form, Figure, Style: an Intermediate Assessment (1982),’ in Darmstädter 
Beiträge zur Neuen Musik, Vol. 19, (1982), pp. 64; reprinted in J. Boros and Richard Toop (eds.), Brian Ferneyhough. 
Collected Writings, (Amsterdam, Harwood Academic, 1995), pp. 26; translated into French by J. Demierre, ‘Forme, 
Figure, Style – une évaluation intermédiaire,’ in Contrechamps, 3, (1984), p. 88 
282 Ibid., p. 53; the passage discussed above includes the following original passage: ‘Il serait naïf – malgré tous le 
points communs sur le plan du contenu, entre ces deux textes exemplaires – de considérer que l’oeuvre de 
Ferneyhough, correspondant parfaitement à ces phrases, incarne la ‘musique informelle’ d’Adorno. Il ne s’agit 
pas de determiner en quoi l’un est le précurseur direct de l’autre ni de faire une étude comparative entre le ‘cadet’ 
et son ‘maître’ potentiel. De tels rapprochements seraient tout simplement incompatibles avec des personnalités 
ayant une manière de penser et de sentir aussi originale, d’autant plus qu’il est biographiquement prouvé que les 
vues fondamentales de Ferneyhough avaient déjà pris forme lorsqu’il maîtrisa suffisamment l’allemand pour lire 
Adorno.’ 
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is then used to argue for similarities with Ferneyhough’s project. As already stated before, even 
integral serialist composers such as Pierre Boulez quickly and pragmatically adopted elements of 
Adorno’s concept into their own self-justifying theorizations. However, the problem more 
generally is not if a certain composer’s music adopts elements from Adorno’s concept, but how 
exclusively it claims to do so, to the detriment of all other composers’ artistic interpretations. 
How, then, is musique informelle to be understood? An answer to this question can be found, on 
the one hand, in a historic interpretation, and on the other hand, a further development into a 
critical assessment of the informel, drawing conclusions of its inherent contradictoriness and 
utopian blind spots. The former position can be seen in the work of the German musicologist 
Martin Zenck, the latter in the development of and aesthetic of the informel by the Italian 
musicologist and philosopher Gianmario Borio. Especially Borio’s groundbreaking work on the 
music around 1960 encapsulates both the contradictions and the potential for exploring this 
contemporary music. 
 
The conceptual inquiry explicated in this dissertation also builds a bridge into the non-
conceptual elements in the individual compositions; in other words, as these artworks claim to 
be more than the sum of their parts, the relation between the overall form (as organized, non-
linear temporal unfolding) must be confronted with the spatialized and object-like character of 
their architecture. In other words, the problem of the conditions of the artwork’s possibility and 
validity in Adorno’s perspective requires an inquiry into their temporal unfolding. However, as 
each composer’s compositional technique differs, a first, more general analytic conceptualization 
is nonetheless necessary. This approach is aimed at confronting the intuitive elements as well as 
the formal strategies employed in the production of these works. A point of departure in this 
could be seen in the work of Gianmario Borio into the musical avant-garde, as he situates the 
postwar avant-garde in terms of opposing compositional strategies – serialist versus informel (with 
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reference to Adorno’s concept of musique informelle and Heinz-Klaus Metzger’s notion of an a-
serial music)283. Especially with regard to Feldman’s music, he claims that it is important to 
understand that the latter is not aiming to eliminate ‘complexes of meaning’ 
[Sinnzusammenhänge]284 from his scores by using a purely intuitive method or a ‘coincidental 
disposition of the material.’285 This means that any analytic strategy adopted for these works, 
must start from the works themselves. Because they are not structured in a traditional way, 
conforming to the classic ‘work’ concept, a strategy is needed which brings out this critical 
aspect.286 The current approach is therefore not aimed at an exhaustive analysis of a body of 
compositions as separated from the conceptual considerations outlined above. Their relevance 
consists precisely in foregrounding their distinct treatment of the passage of time. As such, the 
analytic methodology refrains from totalizing claims, which would encompass all parameters 
separately, as is usual in certain forms of traditional analysis. Moreover, in each of the works 
considered a formal analytic approach is always mediated by the focus on the question of musical 
                                                
283 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Vers une musique informelle’, op. cit. 
284 Borio’s use of ‘complexes of meaning/signifcation’ refers to the creation of meaning at the level of the 
composition, in the first instance related to an extra-musical meaning. In this sense, meaning exists in the work’s 
structure. 
285 Gianmario Borio, Musikalische Avantgarde um 1960 : Entwurf einer Theorie der informellen Musik, (Laaber, Laaber-
Verlag, 1993) ‘Wenn man von manchen graphischen Paritutren wie Intersections 3 absieht, erkennt man, daß das 
Ziel Feldmans keineswegs die abschaffung des Sinnzusammenhangs durch zufällige Disposition des Materials 
war.’ 
286 Gianmario Borio gives an overview of the discussion about the concept of the work [Werkbegriff] in op. cit., p. 
77ff., especially in relation to the organic form and its history. He argues that in the classical (Viennese) work 
concept, a piece of music ‘with art(istic) character appears as a closed structure, whose parts are related in a 
functional way; the organic construction of the form guarantees that each element stands in a meaningful 
relation to the one preceding it and is grounded in the totality of the work [Werkganzen]. The classic concept of 
the artwork also implies an articulation of units of meaning [Sinneinheiten] in time, who by the force of a generally 
valid syntax are attached to one another. The work has a clear opening, a comprehensible progression and a 
meaningful ending.’ See also Carl Dahlhaus, ‘Plädoyer für eine romantische Kategorie – Der Begriff des 
Kunswerkes in der Neuesten Musik’ [1969] and ‘Über den Verfall des musikalischen Werkbegriffs’ [1971] in Carl 
Dahlhaus, Schönberg und andere : gesammelte Aufsätze zur Neuen Musik, (Mainz, Schott, 1987) 
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time and space. In that sense, it proved more fruitful to engage with aspects beyond the scope of 
traditional analysis, such as the placement of the instruments in the concert space, as well as 
composition-technical aspects.287 This expansion of the parametric method as such appears 
necessary. It is here that Benjamin’s theory of a language of objects becomes crucial, not only 
because of the demands of the works themselves but because of the inherent (organicist) bias of 
traditional analysis. Gianmario Borio’s own approach takes Peter Bürger’s Theorie der Avantgarde 
as its methodological guideline; Bürger’s thesis argues that the crisis of the category of the 
(organic) work of art288 demands a new model, in this case the ‘informal’289 work of art.290 In his 
view, the  
                                                
287 Analysis of the work of Xenakis, for example, can be seen in the light of his theory of time, in the sense that he 
allows for an increased rationalization of the compositional process. This often includes a number of stages 
preliminary to a (final) written or printed score, for example the mathematical operations executed on a number 
of devices including computers and machines of his own design (UPIC). Sometimes a trace of these exists in the 
form of drawings on (millimeter) paper or computer print-outs. See for example the first part of our paper: Joris 
De Henau, ‘Gmeeoorh (1974) for Organ by Iannis Xenakis – Towards a Critique of the Arborescence,’ in 
Proceedings of the International Symposium ‘Iannis Xenakis’ (University of Athens, Greece, May 2005), Athens, 2006.   
288 ‘In the organic (symbolic) work of art, the unity of the universal and the particular is posited without mediation; 
in the non-organic (allegorical) work to which the works of the avant-garde belong, the unity is a mediated one. 
Here, the element of unity is withdrawn to an infinite distance, as it were. In the extreme case, it is the recipient 
who creates it. Adorno correctly emphasizes: ‘Even when art insists one the greatest degree of dissonance and 
disharmony, its elements are also those of unity. Without it, they would not even be dissonant.’ The avant-
gardist work does not negate unity as such (even if the Dadaists had such intentions) but a specific kind of unity, 
the relationship between part and whole that characterizes the organic work of art.’ In Peter Bürger, Theory of the 
avant-garde (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 56 
289 As to the precise definition of ‘informal’: this term does not signify a casual nonchalance or purely random 
approach, but refers to the notion of musique informelle as developed by Adorno in his essay with the same name 
in Theodor W. Adorno, Quasi una fantasia : essays on modern music, (London ; New York: Verso, 1992). As I have 
explained above, the term originated in painting as art informel. The work of some of its (German) proponents, 
a.o. Wols, was evidently known to Adorno. See Chapter 1 in this dissertation. 
290 Peter Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1974), p. 76-80; translation in Peter Bürger, Theory of the 
avant-garde, (Theory and history of literature, Vol. 4.) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 32. 
Bürger describes how the disintegration of the category of the organic work of art happened in the avant-garde 
movements of the twentieth century by means of two pairs of both aesthetic and production-technical concepts: 
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singular sonorous event of the informal work then claims  [...] a validity, which goes beyond its rating 
within the structural or formal context. This could lead to a paradox that the work, whilst fixed in its 
details, is no longer a finished work. It is not about the temporal unfolding of meaningful elements or 
the objectification of structures, but about passing moments of an in principle  endless process of 
transformation of the matter. 291 
In the case of the music of Edgard Varèse, one work in particular can be considered as 
historically crucial in the development of a texture-based compositional praxis: Intégrales. The use 
of what Varèse himself termed sound masses is seen in the light of the dodecaphonic and other 
contemporary compositional systems. Especially Varèse’s insistence on the non-totalizing aspect 
of his structural approach, which develops a number of these sound masses through an open 
process of textural transformations, rather than melodic or thematic variations, will be considered. 
The inherent spatialized aspect of the composition itself, as acoustic or spatial, rather than a 
purely linear development, can be seen as the critical treatment of the musical material, towards a 
new (non-linear) understanding of its temporal unfolding. 
 
Other works which embody the problematic in a particularly pertinent form are Morton 
Feldman’s In Search of an Orchestration as well as the music composed for Words and Music, a radio 
play by Samuel Beckett. Feldman’s collaboration especially reveals his understanding of the 
literary form of the allegory, which proved influential in his own musical form-building as well as 
the temporal, non-linear aspect of the allegory, which I will show as central to the work of 
Walter Benjamin’s analysis of the concept of the allegorical image. This allegorical image was 
                                                                                                                                                  
the new and the allegory on the on hand, chance and montage on the other hand. It is under influence of 
montage technique that a new sort of work concept appeared, which stands in opposition to the organic work of 
art. Its false consciousness is criticized by Bürger, who paraphrases Adorno: ‘The organic work of art that 
pretends to be like nature projects an image of the reconciliation of man and nature.’ Peter Bürger, Theory of the 
avant-garde, op. cit., p.78 
291 Ibid., p. 80 
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based on Benjamin’s analysis of the seventeenth-century German Trauerspiel, or mourning play.292 
Finally, Feldman’s Second String Quartet and Why Patterns? reflect Feldman’s preoccupation with 
memory, temporal unfolding in relation to formbuilding and structuration; he shows how the 
similarity between different patterns are forced into in the mind’s eye to construct forms – 
however, due to the great length of these works, this formal feeling is undermined and itself 
shown to be a reifying, spatializing factor. 
 
Additionally, a number of works by Xenakis represent a different aspect of the same dialectic 
between formalizing strategies and more loose, even intuitive compositional techniques: a 
number of his electro-acoustic works, as well aspects of works such as Terretektorh, Evryali and 
Duel 293  will be considered from this perspective. The case for the inclusion of Xenakis’s 
compositions in relation to the apparent antithetic concept of musique informelle will be made from 
the point of view of the temporal organization, as well as the particular treatment of the material. 
In this regard, the French musicologist Benoît Gibson has shown294 how the implicit use of self-
borrowing and montage in Xenakis’s work reveal a new aspect of the notion of the object, as 
one between element and texture. 
 
The works of the composers investigated here reveal different compositional strategies, from the 
informel in the above sense, to the formalized approach of Xenakis. These approaches, which are 
more fluid than what meets the eye or the ear at first, rather than an opposition of the 
                                                
292 Please refer to Chapter 3 and 4 for a detailed discussion of the different types of image in Benjamin and their 
relevance for the aesthetics of the music studied in this thesis. 
293 Duel is considered to be conceived as an open form, based on insights drawn from game theory. See Benoît 
Gibson, The instrumental music of Iannis Xenakis : theory, practice, self-borrowing (Hillsdale, NY, Pendragon Press, 2011), 
p. 15 
294 Benoît Gibson, The instrumental music of Iannis Xenakis : theory, practice, self-borrowing (Hillsdale, NY, Pendragon Press, 
2011) 
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intuitive/formalized, this pair is revealed to be dialectical. Here, (composing) subject and sound 
object are not simply a further rationalization of the material into static products (as, according 
to Adorno, was the case with Wagner’s music,295 or even in the Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring)296 but a 
genuine discovery of the object, not only with temporal qualities, but with as an object-in-space 
as well. A second element in this analytical strategy therefore consists precisely of the 
micrological aspect: the import of notation, something already pointed out by the musicologist 
Walter Gieseler: 
Notation allows for the release of ‘fleeting’ musical structures from to the pure temporal unfolding 
and to make them ‘long-lasting:’ because of notation the experience of time can become a spatial 
experience. Notation is an image of a system of musical relations, and allows for the possibility of it to 
become a developed, highly differentiated and timeless structure. 297  
                                                
295 Adorno argues that Wagner's operas display a tendency to produce ‘stage images,’ in other words, perfect 
illusions, of (invisible) music and drama. However, in terms of perception, for Wagner, the eye alone does not 
suffice. According to Adorno, he is of the opinion that music holds something ‘unerfasst,’ something which is 
not completely subsumed under the reifying ratio, while the ‘art of the eye’ conforms to the world of particular 
things, the reified world of praxis, and therefore presents itself as twinned to the spirit of technological progress. 
See Philosophie der neuen Musik, GS 12 p. 196 
296 In the same text GS 12, pp. 176-177, Adorno connects the tendencies in Wagner with the music of Debussy and 
Stravinsky: ‘Strawinsky hat die räumlich-flächenhafte Konzeption der Musik von Debussy geradewegs 
übernommen, und die Technik der Komplexe ebenso wie die Beschaffenheit der melodischen Atommodelle ist 
Debussystisch. Die Neuerung besteht eigentlich nur darin, daß die Verbindungsdrähte zwischen den Komplexen 
durchschnitten sind, die Überreste differential-dynamischen Verfahrens abgebaut werden. Hart stehen die 
räumlichen Teilkomplexe gegeneinander. Die polemische Negation des weichen laisser vibrer wird zum Beweis 
von Kraft gemacht, das Unverbundene, Endprodukt der Dynamik, geschichtet wie Marmorblöcke. Was 
ineinander tönte, verselbständigt sich als gleichsam anorganischer Akkord. Verräumlichung wird absolut: der 
Aspekt der Stimmung, in dem alle impressionistische Musik etwas von subjektiver Erlebniszeit festhält, ist 
beseitigt.’ He concludes that the difference is that the threads which usually serve to connect the elements of the 
musical structure are cut and that the complexes are contrasted harshly. Spatialization becomes absolute, he 
argues, as the aspect of the intonation, in which all impressionist music held on to something from the 
subjective experiental time, has now been waylaid.  
297 This quotation is taken from Walter Gieseler’s overview and synthesis of the problematics of this period’s 
compositional technique, especially in the chapter on composition and notation: ‘Notation ermöglicht es, daß 
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In their attempts to break the stranglehold of music as in essence purely temporal, the spatial 
aspect of the score, as well as their spatialized presence in the concert hall, lies at the basis of the 
new treatment of the musical material. György Ligeti famously formulated this shift from the 
manipulation of individual parameters to the constitution of textures, whose meaning is no 
longer determined from the point of view of the composition’s fundamental structure:298 
Whilst under ‘structure’ [Struktur] a more differentiated framework is meant, whose constituent parts 
are distinguishable, and which as a product of the correlation of this is to be considered, what is meant 
with ‘texture’ is a homogenous, less articulated complex in which the constituent elements disappear 
nearly completely. A structure can be analyzed along the lines of its components; a texture can better 
be described through global, statistical characteristics.299 
In this case, analysis can no longer be the ‘reconstruction of fundamental structures, to which 
invariables, recurrences and types of variations can be ascribed or reduced to; it rather works 
comparatively and searches to expose the construction principles, which constitute the 
conditions and principles of transformation.’300 The textural approach also takes into account the 
construction of the works as textures, from the perspective of the score. The study of electro-
acoustic music, for example, requires this approach, as a score is almost always lacking.301 
                                                                                                                                                  
‘flüchtige’ musikalische Gebilde dem puren Zeitablauf zu entheben und ‘dauernhaft’ zu machen: durch Notation 
kann Zeiterfahrung zu raümlicher Erfahrung werden. Notation ist Abbild eines musikalischen Bezugsystems, sie 
macht dieses als entwickeltes, hochdifferenziertes  und zeitunabängiges Gebilde erst möglich.’ Walter Gieseler, 
Komposition im 20. Jahrhundert : Details, Zusammenhänge (Celle, Moeck, 1975), p. 175 
298 Gianmario Borio, op. cit., p. 87 
299 György Ligeti, Wandlungen der musikalischen Form, in Die Reihe, Vol. 7, (1960), pp. 5-15. Cf. footnote 29, as cited by 
Borio, p. 87 
300 idem, p. 87. Borio quotes from György Ligeti, Wandlungen der musikalischen Form, op. cit. 
301 Exceptions are, amongst others, Stockhausen’s early electro-acoustic Studies. 
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Parameters should therefore no longer be considered in isolation, but from a global 
perspective.302 
 
As I have argued, Adorno’s essay Vers une musique informelle problematizes not only the musical 
work of art as a (static) category, but also the temporal unfolding within: 
It may well prove to be the case that serial and post-serial music is founded on quite a different mode 
of apperception [Apperzeption], in so far as music can be said to be based on apperception at all. In 
traditional listening the music unfolds from the parts to the whole, in tune with the order of time 
[Ordnung der Zeit] itself. This flow – that is to say, the parallel between the temporal succession of 
musical events and the pure flow of time itself – has become problematical and presents itself within 
the work as a task to be thought through and mastered.303 
Building on the above insights, a third element in this analytic strategy confronts the textural 
aspects of the composition with the conceptual framework of the compositional strategies of the 
composers. In the case of Feldman, his own methods can shed a light on the actual works, as 
they often are composition-technical considerations rather than intentional ones – especially as 
relating to his notion of the orchestral image.304 The same can be said for Xenakis and Varèse, 
                                                
302 Iannis Xenakis famously used stochastic processes in various ways, as well as other mathematical procedures, in 
the organization of large groups or numbers of tones and sounds. A remarkable example is his composition 
Pithoprakta (1955-1956) for orchestra with its characteristic ‘sound clouds,’ organized by Xenakis’s stochastic 
method.  
303 Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, ‘Vers une musique informelle,’  in Adorno, T.W., Quasi una fantasia : essays on 
modern music. 1992, London ; New York: Verso. 336 p., p. 271. ‘Die serielle und postserielle Musik dürfte auf eine 
prinzipiell verschiedene Apperzeption angelegt sein, sofern man von Musik überhaupt sagen darf, daß sie auf 
Apperzeption angelegt ist. Das traditionelle Hören verläuft so, daß die Musik sich, gemäß der Ordnung der Zeit, 
von den Teilen zum Ganzen her entfaltet. Solche Entfaltung, also das Verhältnis der in der Zeit aufeinander 
folgenden musikalischen Inhalte zum puren fließenden Zeitverlauf, ist problematisch geworden und stellt sich in 
der Komposition selbst als zu durchdenkende und zu bemeisternde Aufgabe.’ Adorno, GS 16, pp. 494-495 
304 See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of this concept. Feldman applies this as part of his compositional 
technique, specifically in ‘On Time and the Instrumental Factor.’ 
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whose texts, sketches, and drawings can serve as analytic tools for the analysis of their work. In 
all three cases, the transformation (transfer305 or even translation)306 of notated tones into sounds, is 
at the centre of their compositional approaches. It is at this stage that the notion of image can be 
seen as the global texture of a composition, not only as a spatial, sonorous entity unfolding in 
time, but one which questions this subordination of space into the spatialization of time. The 
image takes on a double task: firstly, as a way to interpret the composition from the ground up, 
consisting of a number of transformations of textures, resulting in an image-like appearance, and 
secondly as a dialectical image shedding light on their position in the socio-historical context of the 
postwar musical avant-garde. Although the appearance of the dialectical image is revelatory in 
this sense, its critical consequence reveals something about Adorno and Benjamin's aesthetics as 
well: a critique of a normative aesthetics and philosophy of history which, in the case of Adorno, 
touches upon the ends of his own dialectics of the artwork. 
                                                
305 The relation between ‘graph’, score and sound is complex in the case of Xenakis; some authors argue that the 
(acoustic) realisation of the graph employed by Xenakis does not always correspond precisely to the sound as 
such. See Makis Solomos, Iannis Xenakis, (Mercuès, P.O. Editions, 1996), p. 70. Cited in Joris De Henau, op. cit., p. 
3 
306 Sebastian Claren, Neither: die Musik Morton Feldmans (Hofheim, Wolke, 2000), p. 110. Feldman’s particular 
technique focuses on the creation of a succession of timbres, but as Claren says, ‘the instruments themselves 
should disappear in the case of this translation, to achieve a pure, abstract sound, which is Feldman’s actual 
concern.’ He also goes into more detail as to the differences in conception of translation in the work of Jasper 
Johns and Morton Feldman. See Sebastian Claren, op. cit., p. 326-334. Johns’s approach was often referencd by 
Feldman – who understood variation as a form of translation as defined by Johns: ‘Take an object. Do something 
to it. Do something else to it. Etc.’ See Jasper Johns, ‘Sketchbook Notes,’ in Art and Literature, Vol. 4, (Spring 
1965), p. 185-192; See also Chapter 4 for a discussion of Benjamin’s view on translation. 
 111 
Adorno’s critique of music and painting 
The presentation in 1961 in Darmstadt of the concept of musique informelle may have seemed 
strange to the participants, not least since its origin in the language of plastic arts had not 
previously been theorized. Adorno mentions two representatives of art informel only once— 
Bern(h)ard Schultze307 (not to be confused with Wols)308 and Ness309 —however, in a way that 
illuminates his choice of this concept. Gianmario Borio contextualizes this reference, by 
mentioning that Adorno is supposed to have found the idea for musique informelle after visiting the 
Quadriga exhibition in Frankfurt in 1952.310 The references in his work to actual plastic or visual 
arts are rather scarce. In a central passage from his On Some Relationships between Music and Painting, 
                                                
307 Bernhard Schultze was the cofounder of the Frankfurt painters’ group Quadriga. See: Gerhard Leistner (ed.), Tanz 
der Migofs. Bernard Schultze 1915–2005, (Regensburg, 2005); Sabina Schultze (ed.), Bernard Schultze. Innerer Monolog, 
(Cantz, Ostfildern, 2005); Kunstsammlung Nordrhein-Westfalen (ed.), Einblicke. Das 20. Jahrhundert in der 
Kunstsammlung Nordrhein-Westfalen, (Düsseldorf, Cantz, Ostfildern-Ruit, 2000); Rolf Wedewer and Lothar Romain 
(ed.), Bernard Schultze, (München, 1991); Theo Rommerskirchen, ‘Bernard Schultze,’ in viva signatur si!, (Remagen, 
Rolandseck, 2005); Peter Prange, ‘Schultze, Bernard,’ in Neue Deutsche Biographie (NDB), vol. 23, (Berlin, Duncker 
& Humblot, 2007), p. 706 
308 Wols was influenced by Bernhard Schultze. Work illuminating this link as well as his concept of the image 
include: Gerd Gaiser, Aktuelle Malerei : von Arp bis Wols (Munich, Knorr & Hirth, 1963), Ralf Busch and Wols, 
Wols – das druckgraphische Werk (Hamburg, Christians, 2004), Hubert Salden, Wols' Bildkonzept, Hans J. Petersen, 
Wols: Leben und Werk im Spiegel gewandelter Wahrnehmung (Frankfurt am Main, Lang, 1994). See also Chapter 1 in 
this thesis. 
309 According to Gianmario Borio, Ness is possibly a mis-spelling of the sculptor Rolf Nesch, because Adorno 
mentions Nesch in Ohne Leitbild, see Theodor W. Adorno, Ohne Leitbild. Parva aesthetica (Frankfurt am Main, 
Suhrkamp, 1967), p. 183 
310 Gianmario Borio, op. cit., p. 90. Borio refers to a book on this exhibition, see: Kurt Winkler, Neuexpressionisten 
(Quadriga), in Berlinische Galerie, Stationen der Moderne: die bedeutenden Kunstausstellungen des 20. Jahrhunderts in 
Deutschland, (Berlin, Berlinische Galerie Museum für Modern Kunst, Photographie und Architektur, 1989), p. 
416-426. Borio states that it is a widespread problem in current Adorno scholarship to claim that Adorno wrote 
his Aesthetic Theory without recourse to actual artistic production of the postwar period, and ought to be seen as 
immanently following his philosophical position. He states that in case of informel painting, Bernhard Schultze 
noted the presence of Adorno at the opening of Galerie 22 in 1957; cfr. Informel. Symposion Informel 8-12 October 
1982, (Saarbrücken, Moderne Galerie des Saarländischen Museums, 1983), p. 233 
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however, Adorno criticizes once again – as before in Philosophy of New Music – the 
‘pseudomorphosis of music and painting’, especially in relation to time: 
Today’s turn makes the tendency’s emancipation from that ‘as if.’ It has been driven to [the point] 
where literal convergence arrives at the limits not only of the individual arts, but of art as something 
antithetical to reality. Time is not spatialized into geometric coexistence, but rather—precisely as 
time—planned, disposed of, organized from the top down as a whole, as only visual surfaces once were. 
Equivalent to the large-scale procedure that so disposes, that treats time like a cartoon, there is a no 
less painterly procedure on a small scale. It expresses itself most clearly in electronics, but can also be 
observed in the realm of music that makes use of more or less traditional methods of sound 
production.311 
He continues with a critique of the use of tones as if they were colours on the palette of a painter, 
and the implication of this ‘atomization’ to the demands of (traditional) musical time.  
Composers are operating with individual tones the way painters operate with individual colour values; 
although as a rule the tones may no longer be separated from each other, like dots, but may be more 
densely layered, still they represent almost the entirety of the composition. The integration of total 
planning and the atomization into tones correspond.312  
The result of this atomization is that what Adorno terms the ‘unit of construction’ is reduced to 
the relation between these individual tones. This form of composition is characterized by its 
homophony and block-like ordering.  
                                                
311 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Über einige Relationen zwischen Musik und Malerei,’ (Die Kunst und die Künste. 
Anmerkungen zur Zeit, Vol. 12) (Berlin, Akademie der Künste, 1967); ‘On Some Relationships between Music 
and Painting,’ translated by Susan Gillespie, in The Musical Quarterly, Vol. 79, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 66-79 
312 Ibid. 
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The concept of [the] line is not applicable to it, any more than it knows true polyphony; in its place, 
the sounds, in their simultaneity, have become extraordinarily nuanced and differentiated in 
themselves, exploiting discoveries made by the early Stravinsky, among others.313  
It is at this point that Adorno reveals his understanding of this sort of music as going against 
‘developmental’ music, and he hastens to mention the composers of the Second Viennese 
School in this regard: 
That which can be seen in traditional music, including Schoenberg, Berg and Webern, to apply 
specifically to the temporal dimension – the entire art of development and thematic transition – 
becomes irrelevant to the composers; at best, tone progressions in the sense of the newly available 
series still retain something of that art.314 
Adorno refers in the above passage both to the ‘punctual’ serial music of the early fifties, but at 
the same time, he notes that the new medium of electronic music may preserve some aspect of 
the idea of a musical line or phrase. Not only is this an indication of Adorno’s limited knowledge 
of electroacoustic music, it is more importantly an indication of the problem of a new aesthetic 
theory. Adorno later recognizes this as the ‘alienation phenomenon,’ or the disappearance of the 
boundaries between the arts.315 This new work of art, according to Borio, would neither be a re-
edition of the Gesamtkunstwerk,316 nor an idealist conception of a meta-aesthetics of all arts. 
                                                
313 ‘On Some Relationships between Music and Painting,’ translated by Susan Gillespie, in The Musical Quarterly, Vol. 
79, No. 1 (Spring 1995), p. 68 
314 Ibid., p. 68 
315 Gianmario Borio, op. cit., p. 91 
316 See Theodor W. Adorno, ‘On Some Relationships between Music and Painting,’ op. cit., p. 74: ‘The Wagnerian 
Gesamtkunstwerk and its derivatives were the dream of that convergence [of space and time] as abstract utopia, 
before the media themselves permitted it. It failed by mixing media, instead of making the transition from each 
to the other by way of its own extremity.’ 
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The loss of boundaries is to be explained both as a large-scale projection of a critique of the 
harmonized work concept, which has been finished by the montage of the historical avant-garde. The 
arts strive beyond themselves; their constructs want to be ‘objects amongst objects.’317 
Benjamin’s theory of a language of objects becomes crucial with regard to Adorno’s aesthetics – 
namely the idea that the objects in question stem implicitly from a theory Benjamin had 
developed. This theory of a language of objects, as distinct from human language, allows for a 
communication of objects with each other, in a silent, non-linguistic fashion. The immanence of 
meaning within this language of objects is not subjective, in the sense that linguistic language is. 
This idea of ‘objects amongst objects’ in terms of the artwork strive indeed beyond their 
subjective moment of creation, a critical instance of emancipation from a totally subjective 
understanding of artworks as exclusively intentioned and dominated by the artist’s will. Adorno 
questions the supposed link between the artist’s intention and the autonomy of the work of art 
in his aesthetics. The harmonized work in this regard, is criticized from the historical position of 
the avant-garde (Adorno refers to the montage technique as the main agent) in its pursuit of the 
open work, amongst others. This operation seems to tie in the idea of the informel as critical of 
the traditional, harmonized work concept with its concurrent striving beyond a self-enclosed, 
monadological core. This is obviously a reference to the idea of the mediation of the artwork and 
its socio-historical content; however, as constructs these same artworks strike up a communication 
with other objects, in order to achieve and communicate their objective truth content as objects-
amongst-objects. The interpretation of this message, finally, is the task of the philosopher, as 
Walter Benjamin argues.318 
                                                
317 Gianmario Borio, op.cit., p. 91. ‘Die Entgrenzungen werden gleichsam als Projektion in große Dimensionen einer 
Kritik am harmonizistischen Werkbegriff gedeutet, die sich mit der Montage der historischen Avantgarden im 
Werk vollzogen hatte. Die Künste streben über sichselbst hinaus; ihre Gebilde wollen ‘Dinge unter Dinge’ werden.’ 
318 Cf. Chapter 3 and 4 for a detailed analysis of the concept of the object and the language of objects in the work of 
Walter Benjamin and its relevance for the discussion in this thesis. 
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Critique of a concept? 
Borio suspects that in this argumentative dichotomy, Adorno’s applies a form of nostalgia to pre-
avant-garde criteria of the artwork, a contradiction which ultimately held him back from 
developing a complete theory of form of musique informelle. Borio refers in this context beyond 
Adorno’s own conception, but at the same time he still regards it as preferable to theories of the 
open work, especially as formulated by the Italian semiologist Umberto Eco.319 The open work, 
defined as created through the reception, disavows the work concept and situates it radically as 
subjective; this position often conceives of the work as consisting of static objects, which can 
only generate movement through the interpretative act of listening to the transitions between 
structural elements. The underlying concept is one of music-as-process.320 As Borio argues, the 
merit in Eco’s conception lies in the recognition of the changed role of the perceiver (as reader, 
or listener, etc.), who is no longer bound to a singular reading of a work of art, but takes an 
active role in a never-ending process of explanation (performing, as it were, the role of an architect 
whose construction continuously reveals new sides).  
 
Eco’s conception of the open work is, however, problematic in two senses, especially with regard 
to his consideration of music. Firstly, he restricts ‘informel’ music to the variable forms of 
Stockhausen, Boulez, Berio and Pousseur321 and, secondly, he fails to argue his case from the 
                                                
319 Borio, op. cit., p. 89  
320 See for example Karlheinz Essl’s short paper on this topic: http://www.essl.at/bibliogr/klangkomp.html As he 
points out, this conception of the work-as-process was theorised by Konrad Boehmer, ‘Werk - Form – Prozeß’ 
in Ulrich Dibelius (ed.), Musik auf der Flucht vor sich selbst, (Munich, 1969)  
321 In terms of Pousseur’s electroacoustic music and its supposed open form, see John Dack, ‘The Electroacoustic 
Music of Henri Pousseur and the “Open” Form,’ in Björn Heile (ed.), The Modernist Legacy. Essays on New Music, 
(Farnham, Ashgate, 2009), pp. 177-190 
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point of view of the immanence of the work.322 Furthermore, Eco extracts his analytic criteria 
from the artist’s intentions, and from the reception of the open work. His definition of the open 
work falls short in the sense that it understands and explains the informel work as an 
epistemological metaphor, whilst naming precisely those cognitive categories – such as causality, 
tertium non datur, identity – which fail to describe the informel structures; at the same time, he 
reduces the formation of the work to an additive combination of set pieces with multiple 
meanings. According to Borio, it is only by reconstructing the compositional approaches and 
reflecting on the changes of artistic technique that an objective foundation of an informel 
aesthetics can be discovered, which Eco’s open work remains closed to.323 
 
  
                                                
322 From my experience as a member of the audience at the live broadcast of a meeting between Umberto Eco, 
Luciano Berio and Henri Pousseur during the ‘Eco in Fabula’ – project, in the Aula Pieter De Somer, Leuven, 
Belgium (24-27 February 1999), what remains a distinct memory is the apprehensive state of both Eco and Berio 
as to the legacy of both the concept of the open work and its interpretation in terms of at least its musical aspect. 
Eco repudiated its openness with regards to the multiplicity of possible readings of the works in question, Berio 
defended his own approach in rather strong but uneven terms, whilst Pousseur simply seemed to rejoice in 
presenting his own work (his opera Votre Faust uses pages with cut-out windows) to the moderator Jean-Pierre 
Rondas and the gathered audience. See Franco Musarra, Bart Van den Bossche, Koenraad Du Pont, Natalie 
Dupré, Rosario Gennaro, Serge Vanvolsem, Eco in Fabula. Umberto Eco in the Humanities. Umberto Eco dans les 
sciences humaines. Umberto Eco nelle scienze umane. Proceedings of the International Conference, Leuven (Belgium) 24-27 
February 1999, (Leuven, Leuven University Press, 2002) 
323 Gianmario Borio, op. cit., p. 89 
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Borio’s Critique of Adorno’s concepts of musique informelle and musical material 
In his chapter on Adorno’s concept of musique informelle, Gianmario Borio opens his account by 
citing the historical polemic against the constructivist tendencies of integral serialist composition, 
in the context of the Darmstadt Ferienkurse to which Adorno had returned. By following on from 
arguments in earlier texts, especially The Ageing of the New Music,324 Borio argues that Adorno’s 
text reveals a more positive attitude towards the avant-garde composers, in a turn towards even 
the utopian. In principle, this attitude can be explained as a new position taken up by Adorno, 
following Heinz-Klaus Metzger’s response to The Ageing, after a closer study of compositions 
such as Pierre Boulez’s Le marteau sans maître (1955)325 and his Third Piano Sonata (1955-57),326 
                                                
324 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Das Altern der neuen Musik,’ a speech given by Adorno in April 1954 at the Süddeutsche 
Rundfunk. The text was published in 1955 in the periodical ‘Der Monat,’ Vol. 7 (1955), and later in a extended 
version in the first edition of Dissonanzen. Musik in der verwalteten Welt (Göttingen, 1956), and can be found in 
Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 14, (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1973), pp. 143-167. See Gianmario Borio, op. cit., p. 
102 
325 Since its creation, the bibliography concerning Le marteau sans maître has grown considerably and whilst discussing 
various aspects, however, works devoted to the temporal organization and architecture include: Steven D. Winick, 
‘Symmetry and Pitch-Duration Associations in Boulez' Le Marteau sans maître,’ in Perspectives of New Music, Vol. 
24, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 280–321; Jésus Aguila, ‘Boulez: Vingt regards sur une page du Marteau sans maître,’ 
in Analyse Musicale, Vol. 41, No. 4 (2001), pp. 77–94; François Decarsin, ‘L’organisation du temps en musique sur 
l’axe passé/futur,’ In Les universaux en musique: Actes du quatrième congrès international sur la signification musicale, edited 
by Costin Miereanu, Xavier Hascher, and Michel Guiomar, (Serie Esthétique), (Paris, Publications de la 
Sorbonne, 1998), pp. 589–97; Wolfgang G. Fink, ‘”Schönes Gebäude und die Vorahnung”: Zur Morphologie 
des 5. Satzes von Pierre Boulez' Le marteau sans maître,’ in Pierre Boulez II, Muzik-Konzepte, 96, edited by Heinz-
Klaus Metzger and Rainer Riehn, (Munich: Edition Text und Kritik, 1997), pp. 3–61 
326 Works discussing the formal and temporal organization of Boulez’s Third Piano Sonata include Pascal Decroupet, 
‘Floating Hierarchies: Organisation and Composition in Works by Pierre Boulez and Karlheinz Stockhausen 
during the 1950s,’ in A Handbook to Twentieth-Century Musical Sketches, edited by Patricia Hall and Friedemann 
Sallis, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 146–60; William G. Harbinson, ‘Performer 
Indeterminacy and Boulez's Third Sonata,’ in Tempo (New Series), Vol. 169 (June 1989), p. 16–20. Allen B. Ruch, 
‘Pierre Boulez: Third Piano Sonata, Répons: Pierre Boulez (b. 1925)’, 2004 
http://www.themodernword.com/joyce/music/boulez_sonata.html [consulted on 05 January 2011]: ‘[The] 
desire to free the music from the “tyranny of the composer” would become more evident in Boulez's later works, 
and would inform the entire spirit and structure of his Third Piano Sonata. But rather than working towards 
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Karlheinz Stockhausen’s Zeitmaße (1955-56)327 and Gruppen (1955-57) 328 and his article on musical 
time ...how time passes ...,329 as well as John Cage’s Piano Concert. Crucially, Borio claims that other 
motives may have played a role: theoretically, the notion – which he only formulated later in 
Aesthetic Theory – of the work of art’s unconscious historiography [unbewußte Geschichtsschreibung],330 
which reveals certain connections, which cannot simply be uncovered by a empirical or purely 
philosophical approaches. A second motive was Adorno’s observation of the increased reception 
of his Philosophy of New Music, which had introduced the concepts of musical material, 
                                                                                                                                                  
increased freedom, for the next few years Boulez tightened the reins on his music, pursuing increasing levels of 
serialization: not only would pitch be regulated to mathematical formulae, but other dimensions such as rhythm, 
duration, intensity, and so on would also be subject to control. Despite Boulez's claims to the contrary, this was 
not a completely original idea -- Messiaen had tried and abandoned it, and Milton Babbitt had been 
independently working on a similar concept in America -- but Boulez's mania for organization, complexity, and 
large-scale works set him aside from his like-minded contemporaries.’ 
327 Concerning the organization of Stockhausen’s Zeitmaße, see Pascal Decroupet, ‘Gravitationsfeld Gruppen: Zur 
Verschränkung der Werke Gesang der Jünglinge, Gruppen und Zeitmaße und deren Auswirkung auf 
Stockhausens Musikdenken in der zweiten Hälfte der fünfziger Jahre,’ in Musiktheorie Vol. 12, No. 1 (1997), pp. 
37–51; Pascal Decroupet, ‘Une genèse, une œuvre, une pensée musicale ... en mouvement Zeitmaße de 
Karlheinz Stockhausen,’ in Revue Belge de Musicologie, Vol. 52 (1998), pp. 347–361; François Nicolas, ‘Comment 
passer le temps ... selon Stockhausen’ in Analyse Musicale, Vol. 6 (January 1987), pp. 44–55; Henri Pousseur, 
‘Zeitmasse: série, périodicité, individuation,’ in Musiques croisées, with a preface by Jean-Yves Bosseur, (Collection 
Musique et musicologie), (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997), pp. 171–189; Dieter Schnebel, ‘Karlheinz Stockhausen,’ in 
Die Reihe, 4 ("Young Composers"), 1958 [English edition 1960, 121–35]. The section ‘Zeitmaße oder 
Geschwindigkeit als Aspekt der Zeit’ is reprinted in Dieter Schnebel, Denkbare Musik: Schriften 1952–1972, edited 
by Hans Rudolf Zeller, (Cologne: M. DuMont Schauberg, 1972), pp. 230–235 
328 Similarly, see Imke Misch, ‘On the Serial Shaping of Stockhausen’s Gruppen für drei Orchester,’ translated by Dr. 
Frank Hentschel and Jerome Kohl, in Perspectives of New Music, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Winter 1998), p. 143–187; Imke 
Misch, Zur Kompositionstechnik Karlheinz Stockhausens Gruppen für 3 Orchester (1955–57), (Signale aus Köln: Beiträge zur 
Musik der Zeit, 2), edited by Christoph von Blumröder, (Saarbrücken, Pfau, 1999); Roger Smalley, ‘Stockhausen’s 
Gruppen,’ in Musical Times, Vol. 108, No. 1495 (September 1967), p. 794–797 
329 Karlheinz Stockhausen, ‘... wie die Zeit vergeht ...,’ in Texte zur Musik, vol. 1, (Cologne: M. DuMont Schauberg, 
1963), p. 99–139. A different version of the text was first published in Die Reihe, Vol. 3, (1957), pp. 13–42. The 
translation into English was by Cornelius Cardew, as ‘... How Time Passes ...’ and published in the English 
edition of Die Reihe, Vol. 3, (1959), pp. 10–40 
330 Theodor W. Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie (GS, Vol. 7), Frankfurt 1970, p. 272 and 286 
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compositional subject, the language character of music and spatialization – and a new phase in 
the musical avant-garde. In his understanding, this required a new theory – of musique informelle. 
Borio points out that this concept is arguably confusing, as the link with the visual artistic roots 
of the concept are hardly theorized, and two of the artists are mentioned only once. What is 
more important for Adorno, according to Borio, is the overcoming [Überwindung] of the organic 
work of art by the integral serial conception of the artwork, as well as the status of the work 
concept after this radical shift. However, Borio finds that Adorno’s argumentation can be 
criticized in two ways. Firstly, the conception of an ‘informel’ musical work of art, that ‘the 
constructivist negation of the organic conceives of itself, is abolished, and develops a new formal 
feeling, mostly using the categories of motivic-thematic music, which obscure rather than affirm 
Adorno’s intuition.’331 Secondly, in his critique of serial and aleatoric music, Adorno refers ‘all 
too often to old critical points of view. The reduction of the serial conception of the work to the 
idea of the mechanical is problematic.’332 For Borio it is the assumption of an analogy between 
aleatoric and serial outcomes, which is difficult to prove today,333 that ‘prevents Adorno from 
really recognizing the birth of sound-oriented musique informelle in the interaction between the two 
aesthetic perspectives.’334 
 
In Borio’s view, it was especially Adorno’s concept of musical material which seems to oppose 
any further development of his own concept of musique informelle: although he suggests that the 
material is subjected to historical changes, Adorno suspects that the use of unusual sounds 
                                                
331 Gianmario Borio, op. cit., p. 140 
332 Ibid. 
333 Martin Zenck, on the other hand, quotes Ligeti, who famously said that: ‘Principally, there is no difference 
between automatic results and products of chance: the totally determined becomes identical with the 
indetermined.’ In Martin Zenck, op cit, p.148; Adorno also referred to this in his Aesthetic Theory, without naming 
Ligeti. 
334 Gianmario Borio, op. cit., p. 104 
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(including what was once considered mere noise) constitutes a return to the ‘physical qualities of 
nature’ 335  of the sound, towards a pure enjoyment of alluring sounds, which relieves the 
composer from building meaningful constructs. In this sense, Borio laments the fact that 
Adorno scuppers the potential of an aesthetics of musical time, in which the objects no longer 
obey the traditional logic – generally speaking, as motivic-thematic thinking, often regarded to be  
central to compositional technique. 336 Borio stops short of accusing Adorno of failing to 
recognize the real progressive element in musique informelle: 
In this way Adorno missed the possibility to conceive of the relation between musical time and sound 
objects that differ from the motivic-thematic thinking and bring the physical qualities of the sound 
into account. This would have resulted in a relaxation of the request for stringency in the musical 
logic: categories which – as the relation between [musical] substances, developing variation, 
contrasting derivation – regulate the musical course of the ‘organic’ work, would have receded in 
favour of principles of meaningful combinations of more complex sound objects. The logic of the 
informal work could also be guided by criteria which distance themselves from the language character 
and orientate themselves according to the disposition of the heterogeneous [musical] objects in 
space.337 
No matter how flawed from the present perspective, for Borio, ‘in the generality of the music-
theoretical formulation, Adorno has, however, not overlooked the instances that long for a 
                                                
335 Ibid. 
336 See also Max Paddison for a similar argument: ‘This could be seen as the ideological aspect of Adorno’s 
aesthetics of music: the approach itself, which elevates fragmentation to the status of a structural principle, a ‘law 
of form’, also serves to conceal inconsistencies in the general logic of its own argument. […] the suspicion 
persists that, in spite of Adorno’s espousing of the fragment as critique of totalising systems, underlying his own 
work there is, nevertheless, an allegiance to totality and organic unity which derives from German idealist  
philosophy and from the emphasis on motivic-thematic integration in the tradition of Austro-Germanic 
instrumental music.’ Max Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music, op. cit., p. 264 
337 Borio, op. cit., p. 153 
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transformation of musical logic.’338 This is explicitly not a logic in the general understanding of the 
term, as Adorno explains in Vers une musique informelle: 
Concepts like logic and even causality, which the passion for order necessarily avails itself of, but 
which even the concept of musique informelle cannot entirely dispense with, do not literally operate in 
works of art, but only in a modified way. To the extent in which works of art share some of the 
features of reality, logic and causality also intervene, but only in the way in which they function in 
dreams. 339 
Gianmario Borio sees Adorno’s musique informelle from a historical perspective, as a concept 
which tries to go beyond the aporias of serial music. The informal in musique informelle can in this 
sense be regarded as a terminus negativus in the development of musical form. However, this does 
not refer to a completely form-free kind of music, but one that has freed itself from the 
generalities of heteronomous musical laws. One of these aporias is the contradiction between 
general laws of structure building and recognizable connections. It is consequently not surprising 
that Adorno opens his essay by considering the problems of listening and questions pertaining to 
musical time, as we have already seen: 
It may well prove to be the case that serial and post-serial music is founded on a quite different mode 
of apperception [Apperzeption], in so far as music can be said to be based on apperception at all. In 
traditional listening the music unfolds from parts to the whole, in tune with the flow of time itself. 
This flow  - that is to say, the parallel between the temporal succession of musical events and the pure 
flow of time itself – has become problematical an presents itself within the work as a task to be 
thought through and mastered.340 
                                                
338 Ibid. 
339 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Vers une musique informelle,’ English transl. p. 293, original p. 515. Borio also refers to 
Ligeti Apparitions as an example of the use of just such a type of dream-logic or pseudo-causality. Gianmario Borio, 
op. cit., p. 105 
340 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Vers une musique informelle,’ English translation page 271, original German p. 494-495 
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At the beginning of the 1960s, Adorno sees the problem of giving form to musical time as one 
of the unsolved tasks of music composition. Stockhausen developed a theory of musical time, 
which defines the pitches as functions of time, which claims to be founded in physics.  However, 
Adorno criticizes the merging of pitch and time in this regard. 
The objective time-factor in all parameters and the living experiential time of the phenomenon are by 
no means identical. Duration and pitch belong to different musical realms, even if in acoustics they 
come under the same heading [sic]. In the controversy on this point the concept is used equivocally. It 
covers both temps espace and temps durée, physically measurable, quasi-spatial time and experiential time. 
Bergson’s insight into their incompatibility cannot be erased.341 
In other words, the distinction between experienced and clock time as offered by Bergson 
remains crucial. Morton Feldman in particular would oppose Stockhausen’s view rather 
vehemently; to him sound already incorporates a duration. As Borio argues, 
Musical time is not something that can be structured by means of abstract principles but coincides 
with the real time of sounds. This conception of temporality criticizes the traditional musical logic; it is 
now about letting sounds ring out to let them exist in a quasi natural situation. The negation of 
structure, however, does not carry with it the anarchist traits of the most famous negation of musical 
meaning by [John] Cage342 
Borio’s interpretation attempts to overcome the impasse of Adorno’s fear for a fetishization of 
sound as raw Stoff343 (see infra) by proposing a new notion, which does not seem to immediately 
                                                
341 Ibid., p. 271 
342 Gianmario Borio, Musikalische Avant-garde um 1960, op. cit., p 153 
343 Musical material is, however, a dialectical concept that continued to change throughout his writings and cannot 
readily be seen as isolated from other categories. In his Aesthetic Theory, Adorno repeats the notion that the 
material is not a natural reality, but historically preformed: ‘Material is not natural material (Naturstoff), even when 
it is presented [to or by] the artists as such, but historical through and through.’  Carl Dahlhaus, amongst others, 
has criticized what he understands as the ‘reduction of the “natural given” to the “pre-musical” physical 
substance of music, because the relation between the natural and historical characteristics results in a dialectic of 
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totally dominate its material content, but at the same time includes some necessary conditions 
for the creation of form. This he terms sound object:  ‘[Feldman] pursues rather the formulation of 
a decentralized and asymmetrical logic, which liberates the sounds from any pre-determined 
system, whilst a configuration of time should rise from the sound object itself.’344 He finally pleads 
for a new analytic strategy – as other methods have proven ineffective – which ought to prove 
that this transformation of the function of musical time can clarify how meaning is construed in 
Feldman’s piano works, through criteria derived from the works themselves: 
The fact that the change in how musical time functions does not automatically signify the destruction 
of all musical logic, could be proven by the analytic efforts which try to illuminate – whilst other 
methods having become useless – the creation of meaning in Feldman’s piano works through work-
immanent criteria. 345 
An example of such a work is Feldman’s Extensions 3 
                                                                                                                                                  
material, which Adorno seems to ignore with this reduction of the material as historical only.’  See Carl Dahlhaus, 
‘Adornos Begriff des musikalischen Materials,’ in Carl Dahlhaus, GS 8 (Laaber, Laaber Verlag, 2005), p. 278 
344 Gianmario Borio, op. cit., 153 
345 Ibid. ‘In seinen leisen Klavierminiaturen verfolgte er vielmehr die Formulierung einer dezentralisierten und 
asymmetrischen Logik, die die Klänge von jedem vorgeordneten System befreit, wobei eine Konfiguration der 
Zeit aus dem Klangobjekt selbst entspringen soll. Daß die Umfunktionalisierung der musikalsichen Zeit nicht 
automatisch Vernichtung jeglicher musikalischen Logik bedeutet, können analytische Bemühungen beweisen, die 
– bei der Unbrauchbarkeit anderer Methoden – die Sinngestaltung in den Feldmanschen Klavierwerken durch 
werkimmanenten Kriterien zu klären versuchen.’ 
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Figure 5: Morton Feldman, Extensions 3 (1962), p. 8 
 125 
In  the above example,  Extensions 3 (1952), Feldman brings together the dimensions of space 
and time in a novel way. The music does not develop, but progresses in a stepwise manner; it 
‘spreads across’ space.346  In terms of register, the music is played in the four upper octaves of 
the piano, pianissimo. The two major sevenths at the beginning do not express ‘tension’, requiring 
a resolution, as Borio argues; instead, they ‘frame a sonorous space, containing the first notes, as 
well as the range (of a major seventh), which remains constant by the regular change of tone 
pairs.’347 Feldman avoids giving the impression of completing the chromatic total, which in a 
sense would create another harmonic tendency, with a potential for new patterns of expectation. 
This is achieved by repeating a note enharmonically (g♯= a♭) in b. 4.  Rhythmically, this 
section seems to have gradually longer durations. In bar 8 Feldman changes the temporal 
construction, not by changing the meter (which stays constant), but by the repetition of the 
major ninth e♭- f. The unfolding of time  which was based on homorhythmic  two-note chords, 
is now redefined by short ostinatos. In such a thin texture this change comes across as a slowing 
down of the temporal flow.  The following pause which lasts for 3 bars could be seen as a quasi-
rhetorical  device in such a concentrated composition; it functions however neither as a syntactic  
punctuation, nor as a bridge in a continuous chronological process. In his analysis, Borio refers 
to the concept of blankspace [Leerstelle],348 ‘a gap which enters a productive moment of uncertainty 
in the listening process.’349 This moment produces a new mode of time:  
                                                
346 Gianmario Borio, op. cit., p. 155 
347 Ibid. 
348 Gianmario Borio, op. cit., p. 155: ‘Mit einem Begriff Wolfgang Isers kann man sie als ‘Leerstelle’ definieren – eine 
Leerstelle, die ein produktives Unsicherheitsmoment in den Hörprozeß einführt. Durch sie wird ein neuer 
Modus der Zeit hergestellt: die leere empirische Zeit wird mittels Rückbeziehung auf die vorhergehende 
ereignishafte Zeitgestaltung zu Erlebniszeit, temps durée, umgedeutet. Chronologische Zeit erhält hier das 
Gewicht gestalteter Zeit; die Pause bildet die Extremform des Kontrastes, einen weder preiodischen noch 
aperiodischen Zeitverlauf.’ He attributes this to Wolfgang Iser. See Gianmario Borio, op. cit., p. 155 
349 Ibid. 
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the empty empirical time becomes experienced time, temps durée, by means of the retroactive 
relationship with the previous temporal arrangement. Chronological time contains here the weight of 
arranged time; the pause builds the extreme form of a contrast, a neither periodic nor aperiodic course 
of time.350 
Although the texture of the opening bars returns later in the piece, Borio refutes that this reveals 
a circularity in the form, within what he argues constitutes a  
fragmented work concept. Fast, syncopated rhythms, and “as loud as possible” clusters break off, 
releasing the hitherto retained energy – in spring-like eruptions, that are unwound in respectively 
sound aggregates and splinters. The four last measures seal the composition by fusing repetitive 
patterns and vertical aggregates, made more complex with appoggiaturas.351  
The clusters he mentions, to be played as loud as possible appear near the very end of the piece, 
in bars 127 and 131. For a moment it seems as if there might be a climactic resolution, as in a 
coda or finale, but the piece concludes on a quiet, solitary c.  
                                                
350 Ibid. 
351 Ibid., p. 158 
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Figure 6: Morton Feldman, Extensions 3, p. 13 
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Borio concludes his analytical remarks with the statement that this work – which was seen as a 
precursor to the work of minimal music composers – distinguishes itself from the latter precisely 
in the conception of musical time, as well the in the character of the respective patterns.352 These 
patterns, as in later works, are usually short and disparate in their relationship to one another. 
The music does not move through gradual changes from an opening pattern (which remains 
through all of it transformations essentially the same); instead Feldman’s music consists of 
‘rhapsodic transitions of one state of sound [Klangzustand] – which is at the same time the 
definition of temporal mode – to another.’353 Moreover, time does not move in a continual 
fashion as in  
the gradual process, of Steve Reich and Terry Riley; it is broken and fragmented, by which the gaps 
and the motionlessness (in which the continually progressive movement and filling-up of minimal 
music is expunged) build nerve points of the musical logic.354  
In other words, Feldman’s music is not generated from a hierarchically designed plan or starting 
position, but it approaches compositional technique from the standpoint of the a-directional, 
multi-perspectival work concept.355 This concept contrasts the work of the minimal composers, 
whose concept of time reduces the ‘temporal multiverse’ to the ‘one-dimensionality of onwards-
flowing time.’356 
 
  
                                                
352 Ibid. 
353 Ibid., p. 158 
354 Gianmario Borio, op. cit., p.158 
355 Ibid. 
356 Ibid., p. 159 
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Musique informel l e  – (in)formal considerations 
Rather than presenting a fundamental critique of Borio’s aesthetic of the informel, I propose a 
further development of this theory, expanding it into the music not taken into consideration by 
Borio. As we have already seen, certain aspects of Adorno’s essay Vers une musique informelle 
would allow for such an approach, including the overture to the art of the painters of not only 
the ‘movement’ identified rather speculatively by Tapié, but, crucially, by drawing on the work of 
Adorno’s friend Walter Benjamin. In order to achieve such further theorizations of the aesthetic 
of the informel, the important critique of serialism should figure in any further conceptualization 
of this sort. However, as has already been hinted at, such work was done in terms of 
compositional technique by composers such as Edgard Varèse and Iannis Xenakis. In one sense 
such an expansion of the aesthetics of the (in)formel is at work long before any of the composers 
already named in this thesis; influences Adorno would have considered central to his own 
aesthetics. Although it would go too far to consider here all of these music-historical elements 
which informed Adorno’s work, the (spatializing) tendency towards the treatment of musical 
material in the nineteenth century, would suggest that to be meaningful in music required that 
the composer should connect the individual elements, such as motifs and themes, in a fashion 
which could be perceived as interrelated, and this ought to be borne out by the overall form of the 
work. The extent of this formal unfolding, generally seen as a developmental structuring of musical 
material, was historically expounded by the music critic and champion of the music of Johannes 
Brahms, Eduard Hanslick, whose The Beautiful in Music (Vom musikalisch-Schönen)357 considers 
music as ‘socially moving forms,’ whose meaning is purely musical. In this discourse, themes and 
melodies form the core of the subject of music. However, Adorno’s aesthetics of music, despite 
being extraordinarily influenced by these ideas, also considered its dialectical opposite, in the 
                                                
357 Eduard Hanslick, Vom Musikalisch-Schönen (1854) (Leipzig, 1902, 10th edition) 
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music of Richard Wagner,358 whose Leitmotif technique seemed to attempt to break down the 
barriers between the musical and the extra-musical, by identifying a motif with a certain object, 
for example the Rhine gold in the Ring of the Nibelung. This critique of Wagner’s music has a 
history of its own, not only since Nietzsche’s critique of Wagner,359 but also in the work of 
Walter Benjamin – which is much less well-known. In his book Walter Benjamin and the Aesthetics 
of Power,360 the scholar Lutz Koepnik argues in this regard for an understanding of the impact of 
Wagner’s work in contemporary aesthetic and political terms; Benjamin’s evaluation ‘of the 
fascist spectacle clearly borrows from Nietzsche’s critique of Wagner,’361 and it ‘foreshadows in 
rudimentary form Adorno’s much more extensive thoughts in In Search of Wagner, written in 
1937/38 and published as a book in 1952.’362 According to Koepnik, Nietzsche criticized 
particularly ‘Wagner’s dictatorial modes of compositional address causing the erosion of 
aesthetic form.’363 In the process of trying to convert his audiences, Wagner ‘also sacrifices 
artistic authenticity to become a cultural institution of renewal.’ 364  Nietzsche argued that 
Wagner’s ‘megalomaniac visions of power’ force the composer to ‘dictate the ways according to 
which his works ought to be understood,’ whilst at the same time he treats ‘his compositional 
material with violence and, hence, in an unaesthetic fashion.’365 Crucially, both Nietzsche and 
Adorno find fault with Wagner’s inscription of political imperatives ‘right into the centre of his 
                                                
358 See Theodor W. Adorno, Versuch über Wagner, (Frankfurt am Main and Berlin, Suhrkamp, 1952); GS 13 (1971), 
pp. 7-148; translated by Rodney Livingstone, In Search of Wagner, (London, NLB, 1981) 
359 Karin Bauer, Adorno's Nietzschean Narratives. Critiques of Ideology, Readings of Wagner, (Albany, State University of 
New York Press, 1999) 
360 Lutz Koepnik, Walter Benjamin and the Aesthetics of Power, (Modern German Culture and literature), (Lincoln and 
London, University of Nebraska Press, 1999) 
361 Ibid, p. 102 
362 Ibid. 
363 Ibid. 
364 Ibid. 
365 Ibid. 
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works’ – which, according to Koepnik, destroys ‘their aesthetic integrity.’366 Whilst appealing ‘to 
the listener’s emotions,’ Wagner ‘denies autonomous forms of sense perception, and negates the 
individual body367 as a site of desire and spontaneity.’368  
 
Whether or not actively trying to avoid the totalizing aspect of Wagner’s designs, however, 
modernist composers such as Arnold Schoenberg attempted to combine aspects of the technical 
procedures of both these tendencies in music – resulting in a new atonal language, and a 
technique termed developing variation as well as new formal procedures. The post-war musical 
avant-garde insisted on taking this formal speculation even further. In this regard, Borio suggests 
that Adorno’s intertwining of temporal articulation and the creation of a new concept of musical 
form shows a possible link between his concept of musique informelle and mobile, variable forms, 
like Stockhausen’s concept of infinite form.369 Borio describes how this form concept, which 
Stockhausen had already worked out around 1960, is to be seen as an answer to the question of 
how to build complexes of meaning, in which specific moments with common characteristics 
can follow one another, without losing their individual profile (this is also called Momentform). In 
Adorno’s essay, this touching upon Stockhausen’s Momentform was rather en passant. However, in 
other texts, including Skoteinos,370 and Negative Dialectics Adorno criticizes this position implicitly: 
Absolutized  duration, pure becoming, the pure act – these would recoil into the same timelessness 
which Bergson chides in metaphysics since Plato and Aristotle. He did not mind that the thing he 
                                                
366 Ibid. 
367 See, famously, Jean-Jacques Nattiez’s argument in Wagner Androgyne, translated by Stewart Spencer (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 2014) 
368 Ibid., p. 103 
369 See Karlheinz Stockhausen, “Momentform: Neue Beziehungen zwischen Aufführungsdauer, Werkdauer und 
Moment,” in his Texte zur Musik, Vol. 1, (Cologn, Dumont, 1963), pp. 189-210. Infinite form or Momentform was 
established with the composition of Kontakte (1958-1960). 
370 Theodor W. Adorno, Drei Studien zu Hegel. Aspekte. Erfahrungsgehalt. Skoteinos oder wie zu Lesen Sei, GS 5, (Frankfurt 
am Main, Suhrkamp, 1963) 
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reached for, if it is to remain a mirage, is visible solely with the equipment of cognition, by reflection 
upon its own means, and that it grows arbitrary in procedure and related, from the start to that of 
cognition.371 
The German-Dutch composer Konrad Boehmer, who wrote both on Adorno’s concept of 
musical material372 and a timely and contemporary book on open form,373 theorized open form as 
a disintegration of the work, and speaks rather in terms of processes. Others, like the German 
musicologist Walter Gieseler, criticize this opposition between work and process; he argues that 
in this sense, a ‘“work” is always “in progress.” In this way temporally determined processes and 
‘timeless’ works (in the memory of the listener) are two sides of the same coin.’374 For Gieseler, 
moreover,  this idea of process – defined as the dynamic sequence of different states of a thing 
[object] or system – can have two aspects: determined, and stochastic processes. The former is 
characterized by one state distinctly resulting from the previous one, the latter by proceeding 
with a certain degree of probability. 
In that sense, a work is a determined process (however, not in a totalized sense); and so an open or 
ambiguous form can be described as stochastic (or statistical). However, the view is also possible, that 
                                                
371 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, op. cit., p. 9. ‘Die zum Absoluten erhobene Dauer, das reine Werden, der 
actus purus, schlüge um in die gleiche Zeitlosigkeit, die Bergson an der Metaphysik seit Platon und Aristoteles 
tadelt. Ihn bekümmerte nicht, daß,wonach er tastet, soll es nicht Fata Morgana bleiben, einzig mit dem 
Instrumentarium der Erkenntnis, durch Reflexion ihrer eigenen Mittel, zu visieren wäre und zur Willkür ausartet 
in einem Verfahren, das von vornherein unvermittelt ist zu dem der Erkenntnis.’ 
372 Konrad Boehmer, ‘Der Korrepetitor am Werk – Probleme des Materialbegriffs bei Adorno,’ in Zeitschrift für 
Musiktheorie 4 (1973), pp. 28-33 
373 Konrad Boehmer, Zur Theorie der offenen Form in der neuen Musik, (Darmstadt, Edition Tonos, 1967) (Second edition 
1988) 
374 Walter Gieseler: ‘Auch was nicht ‘Werk’ ist, kann Form haben, daß heißt zur sinnlich anschaulichen Erscheinung 
gelangen: So kann also der musikalische Prozeß Form haben. Schließlich wird der Zusammenhang des Werkes, 
sein für das Hören schlüssiger Aufbau erst im musikalischen Prozeß, im Ablauf des Ganzen erfahrbahr. Insofern 
ist ‘work’ immer ‘in progress.’ Somit sind zeitabhängiger Prozeß und ‘zeitloses’ Werk (etwa in der Erinnerung 
des Hörers) zwei Seiten einer Sache.’ Walter Gieseler, Komposition im 20. Jahrhundert : Details, Zusammenhänge, op. cit., 
p. 147 
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processes are always stochastic. Then the determined process would be, formulated in extreme [terms], 
a borderline case of stochastic processes; the dialectic unity of necessity and chance leans in this case, 
however, to the side of necessity.375 
Although Gieseler is concerned with various types of open forms, he states that process and 
work can’t be simply opposed politically: 
After such considerations it might no longer be easy to call indeterminate musical processes democratic 
because of the relaxed regulation and rule, [as it is] to defame musical ‘works,’ however, as signs of a 
conservative-reactionary mindset. A work is just not a repeatable static ‘thing,’ but a repeatable, more 
or less determined process.376 
Another avenue of further reasoning can be found in the work of Martin Zenck. In a return to 
the issue of form, Martin Zenck sees Ligeti’s writings377 as rather close in spirit to Adorno’s ideas. 
Both authors namely emphasize the importance of imagination in the constitution of musical 
form, which in their eyes reflects the disentanglement of serial and aleatoric compositional 
methods: 
One question is hard to avoid in this ‘freer’ phase of serial composition: when the determination 
through series have been shifted to more global categories of form and individual moments are made 
up of vague elements why then still serial manipulations? Could one not leave form, both in its global 
sequence as well as in all its details, to unrestrained imagination? The ideal of musique informelle is based 
on the temporal character of music, although not in the mundane sense, that music, in order to be 
                                                
375 Walter Gieseler, p. 147: ‘Demnach ist ein Werk ein determinierter Prozeß (allerdings nicht im totalen Sinne), 
offene oder mehrdeutige Form läßt sich dann als stochastisch (oder statistisch) beschreiben. Doch ist auch die 
Ansicht möglich, daß Prozesse immer stochastisch sind. Dann wäre, im Extrem formuliert, der determinierte 
Prozeß Grenzfall stochastischer Prozesse; die dialektische Einheit von Notwendigkeit und Zufall neigt sich in 
diesem Falle aber zur Seite der Notwendigkeit.’  
376 Walter Gieseler, op. cit., p. 147: ‘Nach solchen Überlegungen dürfte es nicht mehr leicht angehen, indeterminierte 
musikalische Prozesse, da ihnen Bestimmung und Herrschaft abgebaut seien, als demokratisch zu bezeichnen, 
Musik-‘Werke’ aber als Zeichen konservativ-reaktionärer Geisteshaltung zu diffamieren. Ein Werk ist eben nicht 
ein wiederholbares starres ‘Ding’ sondern ein wiederholbarer mehr oder weniger determinierter Prozeß.’ 
377 György Ligeti, ‘Wandlungen der musikalischen Form,’ in Die Reihe, Vol. 7, (1960), p. 4 
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alive, has to occur in time, but in the sense that the compositional task, according to Adorno remains 
‘how to reconcile temporal form and musical content.378 
Zenck states that both Ligeti and Adorno base what he terms their imaginative approach on 
Schoenberg’s notion of feeling for form [Formgefühl].379 Borio refers in this case to an interesting 
round table discussion at the Darmstadt Summer course in 1960 (in the same year as the 
publication on form,380 in which both Adorno and Ligeti, as well as a number of other 
composers and musicologists wrote). It seems that Adorno fully agreed with Ligeti’s thesis,381 
that it is not so much about the alternative between serial and aleatoric, but the loss of the 
‘vector-character’, a direction-constant of the composition. From the philosophical conception 
of music as a temporal art form Adorno infers the conviction that music is principally 
incompatible with spatial conceptions at odds with this temporal demand; for example, no 
musical event can be indifferent or contrary to the movement of time. In this sense, the 
conception of musique informelle as a music ‘with possibly many relations’ functions as an implicit 
critique of forms, lacking this direction of development that attempt to defeat Bergson’s concept 
of temps durée or experienced time through ‘focusing on the [here and] now’, attempting to 
                                                
378 Ibid. 
379 In a later article, ‘Form in der neuen Musik,’ in Darmstadter Beiträge zur neuen Musik, Vol. 10, Ligeti commented on 
Adorno’s essay and indicated its influence on his work. 
380 György Ligeti, ‘Wandlungen der musikalischen Form,’ op. cit. 
381 The mutual understanding of Ligeti and Adorno on the relation between determination and indetermination 
(chance), also bears on what Adorno calls the ‘illusory character’ [‘Scheincharakter’, cfr. Negative Dialectics] of 
music. Adorno translates the compositional issue of the interchangeability of chance and blind integration in the 
convergence of contingency and necessity, which achieve in their extreme the point of indifference of their ‘lack 
of the illusory’ [Scheinlosigkeit]. Adorno criticizes this ‘lack of the illusory’ : ‘Adorno kritisiert diese ‘Scheinlosigkeit’ 
als Schein, da Kunst den ästhetischen Schein nicht abzuwerfen vermag und der ästhetische als Teil des logischen 
Scheins den Schein als Anschein und Täuschung in der realen Welt nicht abschaffen kann.’ In other words, 
Adorno criticizes the loss of critical capabilities through aleatoric techniques, for when art/music resolves the 
illusion, when it doesn’t pose itself the illusion-problem [Scheinproblem], she loses the possibility to reflection 
[Widerschein] einer besseren Welt zu werden. Art only obtains this possibility , the ‘Methexis [taking part of things 
in ideas] to truth’, when it absorbs the logical ‘illusion’ and fights it as an opponent. 
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overcome ‘timelessness.’382 However, the sort of position as reflected by Stockhausen (in Borio’s 
opinion), is increasingly being challenged. As argued by Christine Eichel in this regard, ‘a 
philosophy of art which equally searches for ideal-typical isolated protagonists to verify general 
reflections, is challengeable in a time in which the artists themselves do not recognize the 
borders of their genres.’383  
 
Adorno’s musique informelle did not correspond with actual existing music. Gianmario Borio 
claims that no later compositions have fully put themselves the task to resemble or fulfill these 
principles. In my view, it is, however, possible to speak of tendencies that refer implicitly or 
latently to the contents of the essay. Paradoxically, the core of composers named in the essay, 
Boulez, Stockhausen and Cage, are the ones who have taken up the challenge of an informal 
music. 
  
                                                
382 Gianmario Borio, op. cit., p. 108 
383 Christine Eichel, Vom Ermatten der Avantgarde zur Vernetzung der Künste: Perspektiven einer Interdisziplinären Ästhetik im 
Spätwerk Theodor W. Adornos, (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1993) 
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Musique informel l e  as an alternative modernist music  
Composers who were outsiders in the 1950s, and whose works would gain increasing importance 
– like György Ligeti, Dieter Schnebel, Mauricio Kagel, and Franco Evangelisti384 – were receptive 
to several aspects of Adorno’s aesthetic. For example, Franco Evangelisti published a text of 
Adorno’s on technique, technology and contemporary music in the series he edited with others 
titled Ordini-Studi Sulla Nuova Musica.385 As Borio suggests, what is relevant here is not the 
precision or the textual faithfulness of this reception, but the independent development of 
kernels that were laid out in the theory. One could make an overview of compositions and the 
degree of relatedness to the concept of musique informelle. Several composers have named works 
with informal in the title, such as Aldo Clementi’s Informel cycle386 and the group of other 
composers from Rome, including the above-mentioned Franco Evangelisti, and Domenico 
                                                
384 Franco Evangelisti (1925-1980). See: Christine Anderson, Komponieren zwischen Reihe, Aleatorik und Improvisation: 
Franco Evangelistis Suche nach einer neuen Klangwelt, (Hofheim, Wolke, 2013); Franco Evangelisti, Heinz-Klaus 
Metzger, Rainer Riehn, Giacinto Scelsi, Dieter Schnebel, and Claudio Annibaldi. 1985. Franco Evanglisti. Musik-
Konzepte Vol. 43/44, edited by Heinz-Klaus Metzger und Rainer Riehn, (Munich, Text + Kritik, 1985). The 
composers mentioned here do not constitute and exclusive list. In this regard, Borio observes a certain 
continuity between the work of Evangelisti and that of Salvatore Sciarrino, for example in the latter’s Berceuse 
(1969). See Gianmario Borio, Der italienische Komponist Salvatore Sciarrino, in Neue Zeitschrift für Musik, Vol. 152, No. 
5, (1991), pp. 35 and Gianmario Borio, ‘Franco Evangelisti a Darmstadt, contro e dopo Darmstadt,’ in Friedrich 
Hommel and Wilhelm Schlüter (eds.), Logica e poesia. Darmstadt ieri e oggi. Testi - Immagini - Omaggi, (Internationales 
Musikinstitut Darmstadt, 1989) 
385 See Bernard Rands, Reports from Rome and Paris, in The Musical Times, Vol. 101, No. 1405 (March 1960), p. 174. The 
other composers involved in this publication were Domenico Guàccero, Egisto Macchi and Antonino Titone. 
386 Aldo Clementi (1925-2011), Informel n.1 for percussion and keyboard; Informel 2 (1962) for 15 performers; Informel 
3 (1961–63) for orchestra, (Milan, Suvini Zerboni, 1964). See Liste Internationale Sélective No. 22 (octobre 1964), in 
Fontes Artis Musicae, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September-December 1964), p. 186, Graziella Seminara, and Maria Rosa De 
Luca (eds.), Canoni, figure, carillons: itinerari della musica di Aldo Clementi: atti dell'incontro di studi, Facoltà di lettere e 
filosofia, Catania, 30–31 maggio 2005, (Milan, Suvini Zerboni, 2008) 
 137 
Guàccero,387 Giacinto Scelsi388 and Mario Bertoncini; York Hoeller’s389 Sonate Informelle also falls 
within this sphere.     
 
Figure 7: Aldo Clementi, In formel  3 (1961-1963), p. 7 
                                                
387 Domenico Guàccero, ‘L’”alea,” da suono a segno grafico,’ in La Rassegna Musicale, Vol. 31 (1962); Guàccero also 
co-produced radio programmes on electroacoustic music with Pietro Giomi in Milan. See Franceso Giomi, ‘The 
Work of Italian Artist Pietro Grossi: From Early Electronic Music to Computer Art music,’ in Leonardo, Vol. 28, 
No. 1 (1995), p. 37 
388 For a study of Giacinto Scelsi in this context, see Gianmario Borio, ‘Klang als Prozeß. Die Komponisten um 
Nuova Consonanza,’ in Klaus Angermann (ed.) Giacinto Scelsi Im Innern des Tons, (Wolke, Hofheim, 1993), pp. 11-25. 
English translation as ‘Sound as Process: Scelsi and the Composers of Nuova Consonanza,’ in Franco 
Sciannameo (ed.), Music as Dream: Essays on Giacinto Scelsi, (Lanham, Maryland, Scarerow Press, 2013) 
389 York Hoeller, (1944-). See Rainer Nonnenmann, York Höller, in Komponisten der Gegenwart, Hans-Werner Heister 
and Walter-Wolfgang Sperrer (eds.), (Munich, 2005) 
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Evangelisti and Bertoncini, for example, founded an improvisation collective called Nuova 
Consonanza,390 where they produced music using forms of distortions and oscillations of sounds 
from different instruments or new sounds sources. Scelsi explored the micro-level of individual 
tones. In contrast, Clementi – who was also a trained painter – worked with extensive chromatic 
textures, which are set in motion by means of a dense counterpoint. In one interview, with 
regard to the origins of the Informel pieces, Clementi explicitly refers to ‘the textures of Fautrier, 
Tapiès and Pollock,’ as well as the ‘informel continuum.’ 391 One of the most typical sonorities are 
clusters on the harmonium, obtained through use of a tool that presses down a large number of 
keys, while at the same time the player can modify the tessitura, location, dynamic and timbre of 
the cluster. This sonority is characteristic for the whole Informel cycle. Ligeti’s own works that are 
seen in the light of the informel are Aventures and Nouvelles aventures (1962-65), as well Apparitions 
(1958-59)392 and Atmosphères.393  
                                                
390 Gianmario Borio, ‘Klang als Prozeß,’ op. cit. 
391 Renzo Cresti: Come sono nati gli Informels? Aldo Clementi: ‘La mia ricerca veramente personale inizia con gli 
Informels. /.../ Conoscevo i quadri di Fautrier, Tàpies, Pollock e le texture di Dorazio, Tobey, l'idea di un continuum 
informale mi affascinava. I contrappunti che facevo nascere sulla carta a quadretti erano figure, immagini, 
configurazioni sonore. /.../ Il continuum non doveva essere solo una girandola, ma doveva avere anche un 
carattere di permanenza, come se i suoni ristagnassero. In Informel 1 considerai i punti su carta bianca come una 
vera costellazione senza suoni definiti. In Informel 2 adoperai un contrappunto attorno a un cluster. In Informel 3 il 
cluster diventò fitto. /.../ Le costellazioni sottoposte a rotazione cambiavano continuamente fisionomia, questa 
era l'idea di Calder per i suoi mobiles, un oggetto sempre uguale ma che cambia muovendosi.’ See Renzo Cresti, 
Intervista ad Aldo Clementi, in Piano time, No. 89-89, (July-August 1990). See also Renzo Cresti, Aldo Clementi, 
(Milan, Suvini Zerboni, 1990) 
392 György Ligeti, Apparitions (1958/59) for Orchestra, (Vienna, Universal Edition, 1971) 
393 For an early study of these works by Ligeti, see Erkki Salmenhaara, Das musikalische Material und seine Behandlung in 
den Werken Apparitions, Atmosphères, Aventures und Requiem von György Ligeti, (Acta Musicologica Fennica, 2), 
(Helsinki, Suomen Musikkitieteellinen Seura, 1969). For the score of Atmosphères, see György Ligeti, Atmosphères 
(Vienna, Universal Edition, 1961) 
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Figure 8: György Ligeti, Atmosphères  (1961), p. 8 
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For Ligeti himself, a certain ‘unconscious’ response to an ‘aesthetic problem which was in the air’ 
seem to have taken place; Ligeti argues, in relation to the music of Friedrich Cerha that when 
they showed eachother their current works, scores of Apparitions and Fasce respectively, how 
‘amazed and enthusiastic’ they both felt; rather interesting in light of what Ligeti described as 
happening  
Through the extreme ramifications of polyphonic structures and a kind of pulverization of musical 
development which the Darmstadt School went in for, there was a total flattening out of melodic, 
harmonic, and rhythmic features. A way out was offered by the concept of “static sound-spaces,” in 
which rhythmic progression is replaced by a very gradual internal transformation of the musical 
texture: instead of music as a form of movement, music as a state of being.394 
Ligeti, whilst describing the static essence of this type of music, still refers to it, paradoxically 
perhaps, as the development (with Cerha) of the concept of a musical continuum. In other 
words, whilst textures change internally, they do so rather slowly. He explains that this type of 
thinking was not limited to himself and Cerha, but included Scelsi, whose orchestral work 4 Pezzi 
su una nota sola, starts out ‘from almost the same stylistic and aesthetic assumptions.’395 In this 
context, Hans Rudolf Zeller implicitly noted the work’s origins in Scelsi’s personal experience of 
his time in a Swiss sanatorium, where he occupied himself by playing a single note on the piano 
for a number of hours every day.396 
                                                
394 György Ligeti and Inge Goodwin, ‘A Viennese Exponent of Understatement: Personal Reflections on Friedrich 
Cerha,’ in Tempo, New Series, No. 161/162, ...An Austrian Quodlibet... (June - Sep., 1987), p. 5 
395 Ligeti, op. cit., p. 5 
396 Hans Rudolf Zeller, ‘Scelsis Tonsystematik im Kontext der mikrotonalen Musik,’ in Giacinto Scelsi, Im Innern des 
Tons, (Hofheim, Wolke, 1993), p. 10. As cited by Hellmut Federhofer, ‘Das neue an der Neuen Musik des 20. 
Jahrhunderts,’ in Studien zur Musikwissenschaft, Vol. 47 (1999), p. 406-407: ‘[Zeller] berichtet, daß Scelsi mehrere 
Jahre in einer Schweizerischen Klinik verbrachte. Dort saß er “am Klavier und spielte stundenlang den gleichen 
Ton,’ was er für eine gute Therapie hilet. – Wer denkt in diesem Zusammenhang nicht an Franz Grillparzers 
Erzählung Der arme Spielmann: “Ein leiser, aber bestimmt gegriffener Ton schwoll bis zur Heftigkeit, senkte sich, 
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Figure 9: György Ligeti, Appari t ions  (1964), p. 2 and 3 
                                                                                                                                                  
verklang, um gleich darauf wieder bis zum lautesten Gellen emporzusteigen, und zwa immer derselbe Ton mit 
einer Art genußreichem Daraufberuhen wiederholt.”’  
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Borio’s thesis considers the crisis of the work from the perspective of form; he argues that the 
informel doesn’t actually mean a renunciation of the formal, but ‘it points rather to a cognitive 
arrangement which firmly recognizes designated [traditional] forms as inadequate and demands a 
re-conceptualization of form.’397 At the same time, Borio warns for pure speculation in terms of 
the criterion of the type of art, which even in its striving towards freedom from formal 
restrictions and the instantaneity of gesture, 398  still obeys Adorno’s thesis of aesthetic 
nominalism.399 In the case of painting, this refers to the ‘disappearance of the hierarchy of the 
complete composition in a continuum of brush strokes.’ 400  He states that ‘the categories 
extracted from the original context must be rethought with the help of the specific premises of 
compositional labour.’ 401  Apart from the gestures of an informel composition being 
communicated in the score, a second fundamental idea should be considered, in order to direct 
the gestures of the interpreters: 
                                                
397 Gianmario Borio, op. cit., p. 87: ‘Sie weist vielmehr auf eine geistige Disposition hin, die fest umrissene Formen 
als inadäquat erkennt und nach einer Neubestimmung des Formbegriffes verlangt.’ 
398 Ibid., p. 86 
399 According to Borio, Adorno’s argumentation reveals the central problem of modernist art in an unsurpassable 
fashion, and considers the historical avant-garde, whilst mistrusting the informel as another form of false 
consciousness: see Borio p. 86. He refers to a passage from Adorno’s aesthetic theory, where he mentions action 
painting, art informel and aleatorical composition. Ästhetische Theorie, GS Vol. 7, p. 329. See above for a 
discussion of this same passage.  
400 Borio, op. cit., p. 86: ‘Das stünde dem Kunstanspruch und der Ausdrucksqualität dieser Gebilde schroff entgegen. 
Informelle Kunst nimmt dort an dem von Adorno formulierten, nicht zu Ende gedachten ‘ästhetischen 
Nominalismus’ teil, wo sie die Hierarchie der ganzheitlichen Komposition in ein Kontinuum der Malspuren 
auflöst.’  
401 Ibid., p. 86: ‘Die aus ihrem ursprünglichen Zusammenhang herausgelösten Kategorien müssen anhand der 
spezifischen Prämissen kompositorischer Arbeit überdacht werden.’ 
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Likewise the fundamental idea of the informel of the mobility in music is conceivable only under 
conditions specific to genre. Mobility can refer to the exchangeability of the parts of open form or to 
the flexibility of the components of a complex sonorous structure.402 
It is here that Borio points to the confluence of the projects of art informel and musique informelle, 
the central point in his thesis: 
Nevertheless, at a [certain] point the coincidence of the informel in painting and music can be 
determined more sharply: in the separation of the structure by the texture. [...] the sequence of sound 
textures of [such] a composition cannot be explained by reference to fundamental structures; it points 
the observer always to the in t e rna l  cons t i tu t ion  o f  the  t extures  [my stress] on account of which the 
relations “homogeneity”, “differentiation”, “contrast” and “compression” attain new meanings.403 
 
  
                                                
402 Ibid., p. 87: ‘Ebenfalls ist die für das Informelle grundlegende Idee der Mobilität in der Musik nur unter 
gattungsspezifischen Voraussetzungen denkbar. Mobilität kann sich auf die Vertauschbarkeit der Teile einer 
offenen Form oder auf die Beweglichkeit der Bestandteile einer komplexen Klangbildung beziehen.’ 
403 Ibid., p. 87: ‘An einem Punkt läßt sich jedoch die Koinzidenz der informellen Projekte von Malerei und Musik 
schärfer bestimmen: in der Ablösung der Struktur durch die Textur. [...] Der Verlauf einer Komposition mit 
Klangtexturen kann nicht durch Verweis auf zugrundeliegende Strukturen erklärt werden; er weist den 
Betrachter stets auf die innere Konstitution der Texturen zurück, aufgrund derer die Beziehungen 
‘Homogeneität’, ‘Differenzierung’, ‘Kontrast’ und ‘Verdichtung’ neue Bedeutung gewinnen.’ 
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Dieter Schnebel’s Glossolal i e 404 
One composer in particular seems to have prefigured some of the aspects of the concept of 
musique informelle – the aforementioned Dieter Schnebel.405 In his analysis of Schnebel’s Glossolalie 
(1959-1960), Gianmario Borio stresses the importance of the score’s notation: instead of a 
traditionally notated score, Schnebel developed a catalogue of materials, or ‘preparations of 
materials’406 [Materialpreparationen]. For Schnebel musique informelle in turn refers to ‘an explosion of 
musical structure’ [Zersprengung der musikalischen Struktur] and ‘liberation of horizontally directed 
energies’ [Freisetzung von horizontal gerichteten Energien]. For Schnebel, musique informelle ‘allows music 
to become […] what is material: the shifting material which is realized as constantly renewing 
shapes.’407 This work is revelatory as it focuses on the antithesis of discursive and musical 
language, in recognition of Adorno’s essay on the relationship between music and language.408 As 
Borio points out, this also forms an important tenet in the musique informelle essay itself.409 The 
crucial element Borio does not mention is the implicit reference in this text to the work of Walter 
Benjamin, specifically his work on the language of objects, as mentioned before. Schnebel also 
plays on the idea of the word as sign, as an historical image, a trace of a barely readable layer of 
                                                
404 Dieter Schnebel, Glossolalie, (Mainz, Schott, 1961) 
405 Dieter Schnebel (°1930); His writings were published as Dieter Schnebel, Denkbare Musik: Schriften 1952–1972, 
edited by Hans Rudolf Zeller, (Cologne, M. DuMont Schauberg, 1972); Gianmario Borio, ‘Schnebels Weg vom 
seriellen Denken zur informellen Musik,’ in Werner Grünzweig, Gesine Schröder und Martin Supper (eds.), 
Schnebel 60, (Hofheim, Wolke, 1990), pp. 22-43 
406 Gianmario Borio, op. cit., p. 88 
407 Dieter Schnebel, ‘Komposition von Sprache – sprachliche Gestaltung der Musik in Adornos Werk,’ in Denkbare 
Musik, Schriften 1952-1972, ed. by Hans Rudolf Zeller, (Cologne, DuMont, 1972), p. 469. Cited by Borio, op. cit., p. 
115: musique informelle ‘läßt Musik zu dem werden, was sie materiell ist: schwingender Stoff, der sich in ständig 
neuen Gebilden verwirklicht.’ 
408 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Musik, Sprache und ihr Verhältnis im gegenwärtigen Komponieren,’ in Jahresring 56/57 
(Stuttgart, 1956); GS 16 (1978), pp. 649-664; translated by Susan H. Gillespie, ‘Music, Language, and 
Composition,’ in Musical Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 401-414; republished in Richard Leppert, 
Essays on Music. Theodor W. Adorno, pp. 113-126 
409 Gianmario Borio, op. cit., p. 115 
 145 
earlier times: in the score some words are written in the German gothic script, and is given 
almost allegorical status (the choice of words, as seen below include Soul [Seel(e)], Love [Lieb(e)]. 
These gothic written words are then phonetically indicated, creating a slight friction between 
Word (as sign) and word (as sound).    
 
Figure 10: Dieter Schnebel, Glosso la l i e  (1961), p. 12 
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Based on his reading of the work of Ernst Bloch,410 Schnebel sees the problem of the informel not 
as a problem of form, but as a one of matter [Materie]; in this sense, he argues, Bloch’s idea is a 
representation of matter, which as an energetic substance creates its own forms.411 Firstly, Bloch’s 
conception of form is directed against a naturalistic materialism, which propounds a mechanical 
movement of this matter, and secondly, it is directed against the deterministic presentation of 
matter as unmoving substratum of the world. Matter is thus economically and socially conceived 
as historical matter [Geschichtsstoff]. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to contrast the divergent readings of Adorno’s musique informelle without 
being exhaustive. These readings include historical perspectives, including Martin Zenck’s, and 
philosophical perspectives. However, these readings can be seen to find form as an aesthetic of 
the informel in the work of Gianmario Borio. He pleads for a re-conceptualization of form, 
drawing on his new perspective of texture and the sound object, as well as a renewed 
understanding of Adorno’s concept, itself based on this critical reading. In the following chapters, 
I will expand this aesthetics into the domain of musical time by drawing on the work of Walter 
Benjamin, as well as on Adorno’s own writings. 
  
                                                
410 For a comprehensive English language study of Ernst Bloch’s philosophy of music, see Benjamin M. Korstvedt, 
Listening for Utopia in Ernst Bloch's Musical Philosophy, (Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010); 
for a study on the relationship between Bloch’s and Adorno’s thought, see Wolfgang Gramer, ‘Musikalische 
Utopie: Ein Gespräch zwischen Adornos und Blochs Denken,’ in Bloch Almanach, Vol. 4 (1984), pp. 175-189  
411 Borio, op. cit., p. 115 
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CHAPTER 3: Historical Time, Musical Temporality, and the Dialectical 
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Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the problem of musical time, more precisely with the treatment 
of the relationship between time unfolding in musical works and historical time. In the twentieth 
century, philosophers have been interested in the question of time; after presenting a brief 
overview of this body of work, we will focus on the questions Benjamin and Adorno saw 
themselves presented with. In their view, the principal question is concerned with the way in 
which traces of historical processes – in the form of the material conditions – are embedded in 
everyday objects, including buildings, advertisements, as well as artworks, and how this historical 
and social residue can be revealed. For Benjamin, the prime object of study was Paris, which he 
termed the capital of the nineteenth century.412 This was also the locus of one of the most 
important methodological ‘disputes’ between Benjamin and Adorno concerning their respective 
conceptions of truth and the subject-object dialectic.413 In this regard, Richard Wolin argues that 
Like Hegel, Benjamin seeks unselfishly to surrender the movement of thought to the inner logic of the 
object under investigation, in order thereby to permit its essence to emerge unscarred by the 
prejudices of method. Unlike Hegel, however, whose dialectic advances through the subjective 
category of mediation, Benjamin’s conception of truth seeks to approximate the idea of ‘theological 
immediacy’ whereby things are called by their proper names and thus redeemed.414  
                                                
412 Several important works of Benjamin refer to this central idea of Paris. See Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 
(Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, 1999); ‘Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century,’ in Selected Writings, Vol. 3, 
pp. 32-49; and ‘The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,’ in Selected Writings, Vol. 4, op. cit., pp. 3-92 
413 Walter Benjamin, ‘Exchange with Theodor W. Adorno on the Essay “Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth 
Century,”’ in Selected Writings, Vol. 3 pp. 50-67; ‘Exchange with Theodor W. Adorno on “The Paris of the 
Second Empire in Baudelaire,’ in Selected Writings, Vol. 4, pp. 99-115 and ‘Exchange with Theodor W. Adorno on 
“The Flâneur” Section of “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,’ in Selected Writings, Vol. 4, pp. 200-214 
414 Richard Wolin, Walter Benjamin, an Aesthetic of Redemption, (Weimar and Now, Vol. 7), (Berkeley, Calif.; London, 
University of California Press, 1994), p. 163 
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Benjamin subsequently applied this theological conception to the work of art, leading to criticism 
from Adorno about the lack of mediation in his method.415 However, when faced with musical 
artworks, the issue of musical time is inseparable from this material context and cannot be 
understood outside it: from Adorno’s perspective, artworks are not just fashionable or superficial 
illusions, but mediate in their own way historical time. This crucial insight led Adorno to argue 
that valid artworks have a truth content in that they say something objectively true about the 
historical time they supposedly mediate. In order to read these works as objects, a number of 
related questions can be asked and positions established. Firstly, what precisely constitutes such 
an object, and how can works of art, including musical ones, be seen as historically and socially 
mediated, whilst having a time of their own? Secondly, the problem posed by the apperception of 
these objects requires a new conceptual approach, in an important measure referring to Freud’s 
theory of the dream image. Thirdly, the question can be asked as to how this constitutes a critique 
of the conceptual rigidity of earlier philosophies – the way in which philosophy functions as a 
language of concepts and conceptualizations – and how this made Benjamin search for an 
alternative philosophical approach. Finally, it is by proposing this reading-through-images, or the 
involuntary creation of moments of insight (or ‘illumination’ in the ‘Now-time’ as Benjamin 
terms it) which brings a new perspective on the dialectical image in terms of the modernist 
musical work of art. As I will argue, based on what Benjamin and Adorno named the dialectical 
image, this conception of the image does not achieve an exhaustive depiction of an object 
consciously informed by the traditional historical method, but one which allows for both the 
reader and the object to maintain their separate qualitative make-ups, without being wholly 
subsumed in the process of this reading, or of being read. 
 
                                                
415 Ibid., p. 163 
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The dialectical image as proposed by Benjamin was critically received by Adorno: on the one 
hand he had serious reservations (about its utopian and dream-image elements in particular), 
whilst on the other hand he employed it in his own work. These issues are outlined and 
discussed in the work of Susan Buck-Morss in her Dialectics of Seeing, 416  Shierry Weber-
Nicholson’s Exact Imagination, 417  Margaret Cohen’s Profane Illumination 418  and Anselm 
Haverkamp’s essay Notes on the Dialectical Image.419 Furthermore, Rainer Rochlitz has considered 
the implications for the artwork in general.420 However, this body of work on Benjamin’s 
theories has not been extended to consider music, despite Benjamin’s theories having 
considerable implications for the conceptualization of the musical material. On the other hand, 
Gianmario Borio’s critique of Adorno’s musique informelle was still working with an older 
understanding of Adorno’s aesthetics— in part based on his critique of Bergson’s dual concept 
of time. I propose an approach which applies these new insights to the study of the avant-garde 
musical artwork. However, the dialectical image can only be presented through examples rather 
than definitions421—otherwise it would regress into yet another concept with absolute roots. The 
importance of this alternative to the concepts and conceptualizations as critiqued is to set up 
                                                
416 Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing , Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project, (Cambridge, Mass.; London, the 
MIT Press, 1989) 
417 Shierry Weber-Nicholsen, Exact Imagination, Late Work , On Adorno's Aesthetics, (Studies in Contemporary German 
Social Thought) (Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1997) 
418 Margaret Cohen, Profane Illumination, Walter Benjamin and the Paris of Surrealist Revolution, (Weimar and Now, Vol. 5), 
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993) 
419 Anselm Haverkamp, ‘Notes on the “dialectical Image” (How Deconstructive is it?)’, in Diacritics, Vol. 22, No. 3/4 
Commemorating Walter Benjamin (Autumn-Winter, 1992), p. 69-80 
420 Rainer Rochlitz, Le désenchantement de l’art. La philosophie de Walter Benjamin, (Nrf Essais), (Paris, Gallimard, 1992); 
translated as The Disenchantment of Art. The Philosophy of Walter Benjamin, (New York, Guilford Press, 1996) 
421  This argument of ‘either/or’ (definitions/examples) is itself not mutually exclusive; the interpretation of 
definitions can obviously change over time. As I argue, however, the notion of the dialectical image itself has 
undergone a number of transformations. I will show how from its origins in the study of Paris in the nineteenth 
century Benjamin, and Adorno subsequently, developed the dialectical image into a much wider reading strategy, 
especially as it is concerned with (musical) works of art.  
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what Benjamin calls a ‘third locus,’ which mediates between concepts and material objects in the 
world. The image as a tertium datur never breaks the link with real objects, including the notion of 
sound objects (as I will argue in Chapter 4).  
 
If we understand – with these authors – how Benjamin philosophy of historical time is mediated 
in Adorno’s understanding of musical time, the idea of a universal unfolding – per the traditional 
understanding of musical temporality – itself becomes problematic. The sense that music is 
solely an art-in-time, then, must be reconsidered. This leads to an understanding of music and 
musical temporality as increasingly spatial. This view – problematic to Adorno – can be 
reconceptualized by drawing on Benjamin’s work, especially through his reading of works of art 
as dialectical images. These images avoid both the traditional conceptualization of works of art as 
static objects, and the case of music as simple temporal unfoldings. The dialectics of subject and 
object at work in the contemplation of a work of art come to a standstill in the sense that they 
momentarily arrest this temporal unfolding. Finally, this contradictory moment of standstill is 
confronted with Adorno’s insistence of the necessity for motion – the adherence to the motivic, 
developmental musical technique. This new understanding of Benjamin’s dialectical image in 
musical terms reveals itself as eminently able of briefly halting an hitherto fleeting experience of 
a type of music often seen as unintelligible in traditional music analytic and aesthetic terms.  
 
Music as a temporal art: history and critique 
The notion of temporal unfolding as an essential characteristic of music and poetry, setting it 
apart from the other, spatial arts was a distinction established by Johann Gottfried Herder.422 
                                                
422 Johann Gottfried Herder, (1744-1803). See George Iggers, The German Conception of History: The National Tradition 
of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present (Wesleyan University Press, 1983) (2nd edition); on the distinction in 
 153 
The German scholar Constanze Peres argues that the distinction was related to the Ut-pictura-
poesis problem – from Horace’s first century AD, De arte poetica – literally ‘as is painting so is 
poetry,’ or ‘poetry resembles painting.’ 423 Handed down through Plutarch, the philosopher 
Simonides famously described poetry as ‘vocal painting’ and painting as ‘silent poetry.’ 424 
Leonardo da Vinci realigned the paragone or hierarchical battle between the arts, by calling poetry 
blind painting: 
It was Lessing who thematized the Ut-pictura-poesia problem in his Laocoön (1766), his response in the 
polemic with Winckelmann’s and the Comte de Carlus’s art-historical classicism. Lessing tried to 
establish the boundaries between the plastic arts and poetry. Using the Laocoön statue exhibited in the 
Vatican Museum as an example, Lessing describes at the same time how the artist found the ‘fertile 
moment’ [fruchtbaren Augenblick] in which an entire story is summarized, in this case the story of the 
priest Laocoön and his sons. The spectator can empathize with the tension in the events, which shows 
a battle that is not yet won nor lost in this singular, ambivalent moment. He explains the 
independence of both visual arts and poetry in their relationship to space and time: ‘Time-succession 
[Zeitfolge] is the field of the writer, [in the same way] as space is the field of the painter.’425  
According to Peres, Lessing eventually ‘preferred poetry as an artform for its transitoriness, in so 
far as it does not statically represent the imaginative ‘fruitful’ or ‘incisive’ moment, but instead 
the course of events, which inspires the imagination.’426 Within three years Herder criticized 
Lessing for  
                                                                                                                                                  
terms of the two types of art, see Johann G. Herder, ‘Kritische Wälder, 1. Wäldchen’ (1769), in E. Naumann 
(ed.), Herders Werke. Auswahl in acht Teilen, Vol. 2 
423 Constanze Peres, ‘Raumzeitliche Strukturgemeinsamkeiten bildnerische und musikalische Werke,’ in Tatjana 
Böhme and Klaus Mehner (eds.), Zeit und Raum in Musik und bildender Kunst, (Cologne, Böhlau, 2000), p. 10 
424 Ibid., p. 10 
425 Ibid. 
426 Ibid., p. 11 
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reducing poetry to temporality, however, whilst it is rather music that is of this essence. The former 
also identified the dichotomy of spatial and temporal, static and transitory, simultaneous and 
successive arts with the plastic arts (to him synonymous with painting) and music.427  
Herder himself wrote that whilst a clear separation is possible, both the spatial and the temporal 
arts seem to attempt in different ways to let separate elements or tones coexist, or connect them: 
Painting completely works through space, in the same way as music through time-succession 
[Zeitfolge]... whilst with the former the effect of [plastic] art is based on the sight of the coexisting 
elements, so is the succession, the linking and change of the tones the means of the musical effect.428 
Herder also sees this distinction as normative, in the sense that music should not paint objects in 
space, and painting should not elicit in us an illusion of time-succession, otherwise, as Peres 
explains, the arts ‘will become bungled or dilettantish [stümperhaft].’429 
 
  
                                                
427 Ibid., p. 11 
428 ‘Malerei wirkt ganz durch den Raum, so wie Musik durch die Zeitfolge... Wie bei jener auf dem Anblicke des 
Koexistenten...die Wirkung der Kunst beruhet, so ist in dieser das Sukzessive, die Verknüpfung und 
Abwechslung der Töne das Mittel der musikalischen Wirkung.’ Johann Gottfried Herder, ‘Kritische Wälder, 1. 
Wäldchen’ (1769), in Herders Werke. Auswahl in acht Teilen, ed. E. Naumann, Part 2, p. 19-70, 128-129. As cited by 
Constanze Peres, op. cit., p. 11 
429 Ibid., p. 11 
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Musical time in twentieth-century philosophy 
In this next section I consider a number of the twentieth-century approaches to the study of time, 
by way of introducing the problem of musical time in twentieth-century music. However, as will 
become clear, even listing or classifying the different ways of considering the problem of time 
proves rather difficult. Hence a focus is required as to how specific theories held sway over the 
artistic programmes of a number of composers considered here. This means that a connection 
between the historical idea of music as a temporal art became a critical issue for composers, 
whose compositional technique underwent a considerable change under influence of their new 
insights – as we will see in the last three chapters of this dissertation. From the broad range of 
philosophies of time, some have had more of an influence than others; for example, Henri 
Bergson’s theories were held in high estimation for a considerable period of time. However, 
other ways of approaching the issue of time have been equally influential. Constanze Peres, 
amongst others, distinguishes three basic approaches: ‘scientific,’ ‘existentialist,’ and ‘empirical-
analytical.’430 Her overview groups philosophers according to these three approaches:  
(i)  Time in this first, scientific sense is considered as the fourth dimension of a space-time 
continuum, which ‘according to the calculations of relativity theory as a variable ‘t’ 
measures a relative value, and which is symmetrical and not directed, in other words 
reversible. Reference values like past, present and future play no role at all.’431   
(ii)  A second conception of time goes ‘against the physically founded conceptions of time 
and its mere calculating or geometric-spatial conception [...] for example Husserl’s 
phenomenology,  the existential-analytical approach of Heidegger and the vitalist 
                                                
430 Ibid., p. 19-24 
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philosophy of Bergson. These conceptions share the absolutely fundamental status of 
time.’432  
(iii)  Finally, empirical and analytic philosophy consider time from an experiential and a 
linguistic point of view, respectively. Proponents of this theory are William James (a 
pragmatist and empiricist),433 Bertrand Russell and John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart,434 
who argue that the experience of time can be seen as twofold: an A-series is formed by 
our expression of the experience of time as ‘past-presence-future,’ in such a manner that 
the relative value always functions in the presence of a speaking ‘I’. A second, B-series is 
formed by (descriptive) expressions independent from the point of view of a specific ‘I’, 
such as ‘before (something)’, ‘simultaneous (with)’ – later (than)’, which then found the 
successive nature of time as such. 
 
Although in essence meant as a brief and general overview of twentieth century philosophical 
approaches to the understanding of time, Peres’s list is incomplete and extremely reductive. As 
argued below, it is against such categorizations that Benjamin and Adorno’s philosophies argue, 
especially in their critical reading of historical conceptions of time, Bergson’s conception of time 
as temps durée (duration) and temps espace (spatial time or clock-time) and how to translate these 
insights into the language of music and musical temporality. However, before turning to 
Benjamin and Adorno’s conceptions of historical and musical time, I consider another relevant 
book which deals directly with the changing conceptions of time in twentieth century musical 
history: Eva-Maria Houben’s Die Aufklärung der Zeit: zum Utopie unbegrenzter Gegenwart in der Musik 
                                                
432 Ibid. 
433 See the chapter on the perception of time in William James, The Principles of Psychology, (New York, Henry Holt, 
1890) 
434 See John M. E. McTaggart and S. V. Keeling, Philosophical Studies, (New York; London, Longmans, E. Arnold & 
Co., 1934) 
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des 20. Jahrhunderts.435 In it, the author sets out to define the general tendency of twentieth century 
art as a ‘sublation’ [Aufhebung] and an ‘overcoming’ [Überwindung] of time. At first, she sees a 
number of similarities between artistic programs of numerous artists, including the writers Rainer 
Maria Rilke, Anatole France, visual artists Paul Klee436 and Wassily Kandinsky, and composers 
like Ferruccio Busoni, who ‘developed the presentation of a “sublation of time” [Aufhebung der 
Zeit] in the sense of a sublation of the course of time, the temporal succession.’437 Later, Ernst 
Krenek is quoted as ‘opposing the course of time, which finds its expression in the idea of 
regressiveness [Rückläufigkeit].’438 These ‘different statements,’ according to Houben,  
allow to close in at first on a uniform chain of thought; nevertheless, straight away it must be asked, to 
what extent the conceptions are to be generalized as a “sublation” or an “overcoming” of time, [or] 
the thought of an “opposition” to time.439  
In other words, it is a perilous endeavour to frame the question of musical time in its different 
guises and presence in the work of twentieth century composers, and especially in its relation to 
space, or more precisely the issue of the spatialization of musical time. However, Houben 
subsequently develops this mystical conception of time into a typology of a large number of 
temporal-spatial compositional approaches. Its philosophical underpinnings are based on the 
                                                
435 Eva-Maria Houben, Die Aufhebung Der Zeit: Zur Utopie unbegrenzter Gegenwart in der Musik des 20. Jahrhunderts, 
(Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, 1992), p. 18 
436 See Massimo Cacciari and Paul Klee, L'angelo Necessario. (Milano, Adelphi, 1986); translated by Massimo Cacciari, 
The Necessary Angel, (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1994); on the correspondences between Wols 
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438  Ernst Krenek, Über Neue Musik: Sechs Vorlesungen Zur Einführung in Die Theoretischen Grundlagen. (Wien, 
Ringbuchhandlung, 1937), as quoted in Eva-Maria Houben, op. cit., p. 213 
439 Eva-Maria Houben, Die Aufhebung der Zeit, ibid. 
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work of Jean Gebser, a twentieth century ‘integral’ philosopher. 440  The thesis includes a 
consultation of composers, including Bernd-Alois Zimmermann, and Houben’s own experience 
as a musician, particularly as an improviser.  This inquiry results in a proposed typology of 
musical time in twentieth-century compositional practice according to the following categories: 
a) standstill [Stillstand], b) dissolution of space [Raumauflösung], c) spatial contraction 
[Raumzerdehnung] and d) volatilization [Verflüchtigung], framing the central (Gebser-inspired) 
concept of un-time [Unzeit] ‘in the sense of a spiral-shaped progression.’441 These concepts ‘are 
pictoral descriptions of processes of dissolution: space, which through conceptualization, 
periodicity and invariance also increases clarity in music, is dissolved, disintegrated, expanded to 
the limits and beyond of human comprehension.’442 This poetic conceptualization of musical 
temporality is highly problematic, as it often resorts to a theological, ‘integral’ language, especially 
in its attempts to systematize the totality of twentieth century musical repertoire. 
 
Another work on musical time with comprehensive claims is Jonathan Kramer’s The Time of Music.443 
It details not only traditional notions of musical time, but also the changing understanding and 
perception of time in the twentieth century. Of particular interest are the chapters dealing with 
what Kramer terms temporal multiplicity (Chapter 6), linearity and non-linearity (Chapter 7), 
discontinuity and the moment (Chapter 8), the perception of musical time (Chapter 11) and the 
notion of timelessness and vertical time (Chapter 12). It is this last Chapter that is of the greatest 
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441 Houben, op. cit., p. 17 
442 ibid. 
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interest to the current thesis, as it details the sources of vertical time, amongst others in the work 
of Morton Feldman.444 Kramer explains: 
The composer whose music perhaps best epitomizes vertical time was Morton Feldman. While Cage 
has remained concerned with the compositional process, which can be linear even when the resulting 
music is not, Feldman simply put down one beautiful sound after another. Feldman’s aesthetic had 
nothing to do with teleology: ‘I make one sound and then I move on to the next.’445 
Interestingly, Kramer also refers to the work of Samuel Beckett: 
The creation of extended, non-linear nows is common to many artworks of our century. The plays of 
Samuel Beckett, for example, create an extended present without past and future.446 
Kramer draws on the work of Ruby Cohn, who explains that Beckett’s plays are ‘endless 
continua’,447 without a beginning or an end. In a subsequent ‘analytic interlude’ he points out that 
Cohn’s penetrating criticisms of Beckett’s plays, only briefly excerpted here, exemplify the only viable 
way to analyze the extended present in temporal artworks. A structural analysis of time in an artwork 
is not really possible when the time that work creates is a timeless present. [...] It is not simply that 
adequate analytic tools have not been developed. There is a fundamental incompatibility between the 
nature of vertical time and the process of music analysis, at least as it is traditionally construed. Many 
of the things analysis values most are what vertical time pointedly denies: tonal, rhythmic, and metric 
hierarchies; contrast; closure; development. Most analytic methods are hierarchic, implicitly if not 
explicitly, but vertical music is antihierarchic.448 
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445 Wim Mertens, American Minimal Music, translated by Jan Hautekiet, (New York, Alexander Broude, 1983), p. 106. 
Cited by Jonathan Kramer, op. cit., p. 386 
446 Jonathan Kramer, op. cit., p. 387 
447 Ruby Cohn, Just Play: Beckett’s Theater (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 35. Cited by Jonathan 
Kramer, op. cit., p. 388 
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Even Kramer, whilst criticizing traditional analysis, does come up against the boundaries of his 
own descriptive method, which he concludes after a brief analysis of Fredric Rzewski’s Les 
Moutons de Panurge (1973): 
It is not by accident that this analysis has studied the minimal linear aspects of the piece in 
considerable detail [sic]449 yet has only general things to say about the nonlinearity. Once the three 
large nonlinear structures – the additive-subtractive process, the canonic procedure that results when 
the players get lost, and the melody itself – are described, what else can be said? Since these three 
structures are laid out in the score itself, the analysis really has noth ing  [my stress] to add of large-scale 
significance. It must look instead to the smaller linear processes and details. 
Kramer’s reflection upon his own inability to analyze this work indicates the generalizing 
tendency of many of the points he makes. His book attempts to list all types of musical time, 
leading to the following concluding remarks: 
[...] all varieties of musical time that civilization has known exist today. The eclecticism of musical 
styles in the last quarter of the twentieth century comes, in part, from the coexistence and interaction 
of very different temporal structures. We as listeners (and as composers and performers) know, and 
know how to utilize, many varieties of musical time. Thus the meaning of our music are vast and 
varied. And, in response, our listening strategies are (or at least should be) flexible and creative.450 
With this conclusion, the difficulty of understanding the changes in musical time, especially as 
understood by composers of the musical avant-garde of the postwar period, becomes clear. 
Since Kramer’s overview of and attempts to show the interaction between different types of 
musical time, scholarship has moved on to new levels of understanding. In the following part of 
                                                
449 The complete analysis is laid out in less than two pages of text (with another page of comments on the analysis); 
the latter describes mostly the linear aspect of this (self-declared) non-linear work: ‘the gradual addition of new 
notes; the increase in the number of successive eighth notes; the emergence of metric regularity; the long-range 
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the increase in their number of voices.’ See Jonathan Kramer, op. cit., p. 393 
450  Ibid. 
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this chapter, the idea of the possibility of discontinuous time in the musical artwork is studied in 
terms of a theory of musical time not included in Kramer’s work. In fact, his generalizing 
statements on, amongst others, Feldman and Beckett, are contradicted by their collaborative 
projects, including Feldman’s opera Neither and his music for Becket’s radio play Words and Music. 
 
The radical alternative to these theories of a generalist type can be found, in my estimation, in 
the aesthetics and philosophy of time in the work of Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno. 
In this regard, and in order to fully contextualize and relate Adorno’s and Benjamin’s respective 
aesthetics, a brief overview of the main works of the secondary literature reveals a plethora of 
interpretations. This combined literature can be grouped according to subject matter. In the first 
place, the by now standard works on Adorno's Aesthetic Theory must include Lambert 
Zuidervaart’s book by the same name.451 Moreover, a collection of essays on Aesthetic Theory, The 
Semblance of Subjectivity452 was published under his and Tom Huhn’s editorship, in an attempt to 
highlight Adorno’s critique of traditional concepts, by ‘reconceptualizing philosophical insights 
that restores their critical and speculative sharpness in a society that blunts both critique and 
speculation.’ 453  This work is of seminal importance in any study of Adorno’s aesthetics. 
Introducing the authors and showing the scope of this project, Zuidervaart writes:  
The philosophical underpinning of Adorno's project is illuminated in the essays on The Semblance of 
Subjectivity […]. Rolf Tiedemann’s essay demonstrates that a “utopia of knowledge” guides all of 
                                                
451 Lambert Zuidervaart, Adorno's Aesthetic Theory. The Redemption of Illusion, (Studies in Contemporary German Social 
Thought), (Cambridge, Mass.; London, The MIT Press, 1991) 
452 Tom Huhn, and Lambert Zuidervaart, The Semblance of Subjectivity : Essays in Adorno's Aesthetic Theory (Studies in 
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Adorno's work and that without it both Adorno’s aesthetics and his critiques of society and 
philosophy would lose their point.454  
In disagreement with contemporary German thinkers, Adorno, like Ernst Bloch, ‘holds that 
historical labour is necessary for the arrival of a “true society,” and existing traces of utopia are 
needed in order to keep open the possibility of something different from the current societal 
whole, which is false.’455 Adorno's ‘conception of utopia as a reconciled condition in which the 
alien’ – the part of the artwork which Adorno considers non-identical, the proverbial wrench in 
the machine – ‘is not annexed, can be translated,’ according to Jürgen Habermas, ‘into the ideal 
of non-coercive communication.’456 Against this early reconciliation of utopia and language, 
Tiedemann argues that ‘such a translation overlooks Adorno's grounds for holding to the 
utopian idea of universal reconciliation.’457  Language in this sense is the ‘autonomous expression 
of that which cannot be communicated,’ not a tool for (human) communicative action as 
Habermas would argue. Adorno's ‘conception of utopia derives from the idea of a language in 
which word and thing unite without loss.’458 This conception of a language which is aware of its 
domination over the world of objects has its repercussions on philosophical language, 
considered by Benjamin and Adorno to be the language of concepts and conceptualizations.  
Adorno's negative dialectic acknowledges the abstraction built into the conceptual language of 
philosophy, even as he critiques such abstraction and confronts it with the idea of the non-conceptual 
– that which is fully concrete, nonidentical, and unintentional.459  
Tiedemann explains how Adorno avoids traditional forms of conceptualization – which 
subsumes the concrete under abstract, universal concepts – through the interpretation of images. 
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This is a crucial aspect of the text, as it sheds light on the emergence of the dialectical image in the 
work of Benjamin and Adorno. Tiedemann writes in this regard that it was in ‘conversation with 
Benjamin that Adorno developed a theory of dialectical images, according to which historical 
material can be made to produce a critical consciousness of capitalist society.’460 He paraphrases 
Benjamin’s own idea of the constellation as a form of bringing together elements which have hitherto 
not lined up or been associated with one another, but come together briefly and disappear as soon as 
they have appeared, when he writes that ‘in these kaleidoscopic constellations, the philosopher can 
grasp whatever escapes the net of conceptual abstraction. Such an approach allows for considerable 
fantasy and spontaneity.461  
For Tiedemann, the knowledge which can appear from such work is strongly linked with 
Benjamin and Adorno’s interest in art: ‘It does not hesitate to learn from artworks that mobilize 
a different potential for knowledge than that of ordinary language and systematic philosophy.’462 
He concludes that the reading of images grasps something more permanent (as knowledge) than 
the image’s transitoriness would suggest: ‘In a sense, the philosophical reader of dialectical 
images is a composer of concepts [my stress].’463 For Tiedemann, Adorno's philosophy-as-
interpretation can thus be seen as based on a ‘somewhat mystical view of language, inherited 
from Benjamin, according to which things possess their own language.’464  Adorno's philosophy 
tries to find an answer to this language of things and ‘conjuring a unity from the alienated and 
abstracted features of reified phenomena.’465 In contrast to Habermas's communicative action, 
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‘the communication Adorno sought would occur between object and subject, not simply among 
human beings.’466   
 
I will now consider issues specifically relating to Adorno’s aesthetics. This discussion will include  
(i)    the importance of Adorno’s later thinking on the experience of the artwork as temporal, 
in the light of Benjamin’s writings on experience (briefly, considering Kant’s Critique of 
Practical Reason, which deals with the transitoriness of experience and how it is made 
permanent in knowledge); I will then reconsider the implication of this for the musical 
artwork, as our experience of the musical artwork is very much bound up with its 
temporal unfolding.  
(ii)  Adorno’s later thinking proceeded from a general critique of the bourgeois notion of 
progress (as evidenced in an essay from Critical Models on progress) to a project of 
reconceptualization in which he sought to redeem totally reified concepts and categories, 
including the idea of artistic progress. 
 
However, I first turn to the problematical relation between temporality, as historical time and 
musical time, and the traditional notions of time; moreover, the implications for the concept of 
the work of art, of central importance to the work of Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno, are 
explicated by a study of key texts. One of the most important works written by Benjamin in this 
regard is without a doubt his Theses on the Concept of History,467 as they were later named, which  
proved very influential to a number of writers’ and commentators’ work, as well as for a number 
of Adorno’s own later writings, including Critical Models, Negative Dialectics, Aesthetic Theory, and the 
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467 Walter Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History,’ in Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, translated by Harry 
Zohn, and edited by Hannah Ahrendt, (New York, Schocken, 1968) 
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essays in Quasi una Fantasia. As such, they do not form a comprehensive theory of temporality, but 
present a critique of bourgeois theories of history, contemporary political praxis and theories of 
the artwork. I will return to these Theses, especially to the way Benjamin ordered them as images, 
and the relation of historical time and the time of the work of art.  
 
In this context, Rainer Rochlitz stressed that ‘from a systematic point of view, the centre of all 
this work of reflection is the question of the work of art.’468 He sees its place in Benjamin’s 
oeuvre as strategic, ‘where the theological situation of the contemporary age, the source of 
tradition and of memory, manifests itself;’469 however, more specifically the modern work of art is 
also ‘the stakes in multiple subversions that target the deceptiveness of art’s appearance, its 
illusory beauty, myth and ideology.’ 470 Rochlitz argues that a fundamental aporia exists in 
Benjamin’s thought, which is formed around the philosophical need for art, ‘formulated in the 
name of truth,’ and a need ‘to reduce the ambiguity and illusions that are linked to art in the 
name of that same truth.’471 This results is a dialectics of disenchantment – the Enlightenment 
process of demythologizing the world and its illusions – ‘combined with the recurrent image of a 
rescue operation.’472 This double process could be seen as sympathetic to that of modern art 
itself, characterized as a ‘self-destructive adventure, of which Benjamin has become, for that very 
reason, one of the exemplary theorists.’473 
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In the next part of this chapter, I consider Adorno’s and Benjamin’s conceptualization of time 
from the point of view of their philosophies of history and language, and how this study informs 
their respective aesthetics. Through a comparative reading of a number of key texts by both 
philosophers, as well as the work of a number of commentators, further methodological 
considerations can be outlined, based on the theoretical common ground between their theories 
of history and their aesthetics. This discussion aims to frame the development of Benjamin's 
theory of the dialectical image, as well as Adorno’s adoption of it in his own work. In their opinion, 
traditional philosophies of history and aesthetics are totalizing, systematic theories, which negate 
the often inconvenient, fragmented elements of history and subsume the complexities of reality 
under the hierarchy of philosophy as a language of concepts. Central to their critique is the concept 
of progress in its timeless and universal incarnation, which, however, is to be rescued in 
philosophical terms. This means that an understanding of this concept as static is not only 
untenable in the light of its own history as a changing category, but one that is ultimately still 
useful, not only in the aesthetic context of modernist works of art, including the notion of a 
musique informelle, but also as a conceptual tool that is able to bring together a number of elements 
relating to the notion of (musical) temporality. In their opinion, it is precisely through a study of 
the (material) objects themselves – which ‘speak’ in what Benjamin called the (mute) language of 
objects – that a dialectical historical method can be established. In this sense, concepts take on a 
functional role, no longer as traditional tools for naming and defining objects, but as inextricably 
linked to these phenomena. Benjamin’s method combines a materialist critique with the language 
of Jewish mystic theology, which is appropriated in a non-transcendental sense, as profane 
illumination. This approach does not simply produce newly ‘improved’ concepts – such as artistic 
progress – but arranges the fragmentary elements of the everyday in new constellations, which – 
when momentarily brought to a standstill – reveals something about the past forming what 
Benjamin called a dialectical image. The resulting moment, arresting the seemingly continuous 
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flow of time, brings together the object with its interpretation, an insight on which both 
Benjamin’s and Adorno’s entire aesthetic theories are built. From a philosophical point of view, 
this interpretational method is formulated in terms of a reading of objects, without necessarily 
attempting to fix them conceptually. According to Adorno, the task of the philosopher is 
precisely to arrange these elements in a constellation, allowing for them to momentarily reveal 
something he calls objectively true about the social and historical environment in which they were 
created. The resulting images, however, are not simply depictions of a past reality from which 
they have been distanced in time, but can (only) be read and interpreted from the vantage point 
of the present. In this regard, Benjamin’s writings themselves contain a number of these 
dialectical images, including the image of the ‘angel of history,’ which is based on a reading of 
Paul Klee’s painting Angelus novus. 
  
Central to this interpretative strategy or reading is the idea of the experience of time, which 
Benjamin formulated in relation to both Kant’s and Bergson’s respective philosophies. Both 
Benjamin and Adorno, as I have already shown, criticized Bergson’s dualist concept of time as 
temps durée, or lived time, and temps espace, or mechanical time. For Benjamin, Bergson’s experience 
of time as temps durée was put to the test by Marcel Proust, in his À la recherche du temps perdu,474 
which ‘may be regarded as an attempt to produce experience [...] in a synthetic way under today’s 
social conditions, for there is less and less hope that it will come into being in a natural way.’475 
The reason behind Benjamin’s investigation lies in the question about the relationship between 
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of the instrumental image, which will be studied later in this thesis. See also Aniruddha Chowdury, Memory, 
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the dialectical image and the artwork: works of art lay bare important truths about the time and 
society in which they were made, ‘even in the process of attempting to distance themselves from 
that reality.’476 Benjamin’s inquiry into a new theory of cognition and experience explicitly 
informed Adorno’s writings up to and including Aesthetic Theory. Finally, it is in this light that 
Adorno’s dialectical concepts, including musical material as temporally and spatially mediated, 
including in its appearance as musique informelle, can be situated. 
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On the concept of history, progress and the image 
In order to frame the question of how time and concepts of temporality in general and in 
musical terms have changed over time, it is necessary to turn to a particular aspect of this 
problem. The question here is how much Benjamin’s477 and Adorno’s478 theories of time rely on 
their critique of the nineteenth-century idealist concept of progress. It is interesting to see how, 
on the one hand, they both criticized this concept, and on the other hand, how Adorno rescues 
it in terms of his aesthetics. This re-formulated conception of aesthetic progress, then, becomes 
a key motif in his Aesthetic Theory and other late writings, such as ‘Vers une musique informelle,’ 
as discussed at length before in this thesis. Criticizing both dogmatically Marxist and messianic, 
theological interpretations of Benjamin’s ‘On the Concept of History,’ Rolf Tiedemann writes 
that ‘only criticism directed at their material – and “truth contents” – and not primarily at 
political applications – can benefit the interpretation of the theses.’479 Adorno, as we will see, 
seems to start the other way around, in his Progress essay, by drawing attention to Benjamin's 
linking of the idea of progress and humanity [Menschheit] 480  in his critique of the social-
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democratic politics of his day. The idea of humanity also returns in Adorno’s later work, 
especially in his Aesthetic Theory, in direct relation to what he calls the ‘redemption of 
appearance.’481 However, Benjamin's main argument consists of a critique of the status quo of 
traditional conceptions of history and their reliance on the bourgeois concept of total progress. 
In his opinion, it was no longer convincing that every historical event derives from another by 
necessity and that all events together constitute a progressive motion. The historicist school of 
thought especially draws his fire: 
Historicism rightly culminates in universal history. Materialistic historiography differs from it as to 
method more clearly than from any other kind. Universal history has no theoretical armature. Its 
method is additive; it musters a mass of data to fill the homogeneous, empty time.482 
Universalist histories such as Kant’s and Hegel’s, have what David Couzens-Hoy calls ‘an 
unconscious tendency [...] to assume that we are going into the future facing forward.’483 It is not 
only historical concepts Benjamin and Adorno criticize, but concepts themselves – when understood 
as universals and which extinguish the particularity of phenomena.484 
                                                                                                                                                  
E.B. Ashton (New York, Seabury Press, 1973), p. 258. Pickford concludes: ‘In this essay Menschheit is consistently 
translated as ‘humanity’ to preserve the doubleness. By contrast German Humanität, which also occurs in this 
essay, derives from the Latin humanitas, and signifies not the ontic human species but rather the ideal of humane 
refinement as a mark of civilisation; it is translated as “humanitarianism.”’ 
481 The German word Schein is variously translated as ‘illusion’ (see Lambert Zuidervaart, Adorno's Aesthetic theory: the 
redemption of illusion, op. cit.), ‘appearance’ (see Rainer Rochlitz, The disenchantment of art: the philosophy of Walter 
Benjamin, op. cit.) or even as ‘semblance’ (see Walter Benjamin, ‘On Semblance,’ in Selected Writings, Vol. 1, pp. 
223-225). Benjamin plays on the word ‘Schein’ and the verb ‘erscheinen’ throughout this essay, and as the 
translator notes, also in the essay on ‘Goethes Elective Affinities,’ pp. 297-360 
482 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, op. cit., p. 254 
483 David Couzens-Hoy, The Time of Our Lives: A Critical History of Temporality, (Cambridge Mass, The MIT Press, 
2009), p. 153 
484 H. Védrine notes that Hegel’s idealism manifests itself in ‘the paradox of all philosophies of history: to grasp the 
sense of development, one must find the focal point in which the events are abolished in their singularity and 
where they become meaningful according to a grid which allows their interpretation. In its totalization, the 
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Rather than trying to find underlying, elucidating concepts in Benjamin’s theses, Tiedemann 
argues that ‘at the center of his text is no discursive explanation, but an image instead.’485 This 
image appears in the ninth thesis, as ‘one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon 
wreckage,’ an enormous ‘pile of debris’ that ‘reaches up to the sky.’486 In fact, one of the first 
significant images, about a chess-playing automaton, is presented in the opening thesis: 
The story is told of an automaton constructed in such a way that it could play a winning game of chess, 
answering each move of an opponent with a countermove. A puppet in Turkish attire and with a 
hookah in its mouth sat before a chessboard placed on a large table. A system of mirrors created the 
illusion that this table was transparent from all sides. Actually, a little hunchback who was an expert 
chess player sat inside and guided the puppet’s hand by means of strings. This puppet, for Benjamin, 
stands for historical materialism, and is to win at all times. It can do this with no further ado against 
any opponent, so long as it employs the services of theology, which as everyone knows is small and 
ugly and must be kept out of sight.487  
As Marc Jimenez argues, this alliance was explicitly set up to counter Heidegger's ontology, 
which he described in a letter in 1931, while at the same time directed against the 'scientific 
idealist bourgeois activities.’ 488 However, as Marc Jimenez further points out, this fascination 
comes at a price489 as it is based on the myth of progress – the ‘distorting mirror’ [le miroir trompeur] 
which promises a better future, assured by the programme of emancipation of the workers and 
                                                                                                                                                  
system produces a concept [my stress] of its object in order for the object to become rational and to escape in this 
way the unexpected, and a temporality where chance could play its role.’ 
485 Tiedemann, op. cit., 
486 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, p. 249 
487 Benjamin, Illuminations, p. 245 
488 As quoted by Marc Jimenez, Adorno et la modernité, (Paris, Klincksieck), p. 199, translated into French: Walter 
Benjamin, Correspondance II, p. 43, letter to Max Rychner, 7 March 1931 
489 Marc Jimenez, op. cit., p. 197-198 
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the class struggle.’490 Against this belief, Benjamin argues that on the other hand, we can be 
certain that this ‘pseudo-progress constitutes a real obstacle to redemption.’491 According to 
Adorno, the problem of progress, in light of the Kantian conception of history, lies in its 
dependence on being part of a historical and social totality, developed as a bourgeois ideal. 492 An 
important aspect of progress for Benjamin is its adoption in political terms; Adorno understands 
Benjamin’s critique of his political contemporaries in the Progress essay from the perspective of 
the connection between progress and humanity: 
The concept of history, in which progress would have its place, is emphatic, the Kantian universal or 
cosmopolitan concept, not one of any particular sphere of life. But the dependence of progress on the 
totality comes back to bite progress. 
Furthermore, Adorno sees Benjamin’s essay as a critique of contemporary Social-Democratic 
politics, whose futile struggle against fascism furnished in turn an important impetus of the 
theses. In particular, Benjamin, according to Adorno, refutes their coupling of progress and 
humanity ‘held by those who are reckoned in a crudely political fashion as progressives: Progress 
as pictured in the minds of Social Democrats was, first of all, the progress of humanity itself (and 
not just advances in people's skills and knowledge).’493 The critique of the political understanding 
of progress, however, stands in contrast to the notion of progress in philosophical (aesthetic) 
reflection, which is ‘more a reproach [of the idea] that the Social Democrats confused progress 
of skills and knowledge with that of humanity, rather than that he wanted to eradicate progress 
                                                
490 Marc Jimenez, op. cit., p. 198 [‘d'un avenir meilleur assuré par le programme d'émancipation des travailleurs, et de 
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491 Ibid., p. 198 
492 Theodor W. Adorno, Progress, in Critical models, op. cit., p. 145 
493 As quoted by Adorno, in Walter Benjamin, Schriften, ed. Theodor W. Adorno and Gretel Adorno, with Friedrich 
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York, Schocken, 1968), p. 260 (Thesis 13) (translation modified). 
 173 
from philosophical reflection.’ 494  In Benjamin’s essay, progress obtains legitimation in the 
doctrine which claims that the idea of the happiness of unborn generations – without which one 
cannot speak of progress – inalienably includes the idea of redemption.495 Adorno writes that 
This confirms the concentration of progress on the survival of the species: no progress is to be 
assumed that would imply that humanity in general already existed and therefore could progress. 
Rather progress would be the very establishment of humanity in the first place, whose prospect opens 
up in the face of its extinction. This entails, as Benjamin further writes, that the concept of universal 
history cannot be saved; it is plausible only as long as one can believe in the illusion of an already 
existing humanity, coherent in itself and moving upward as a unity. If humanity remains entrapped by 
the totality it itself fashions, then, as Kafka said, no progress has taken place at all, while the mere 
totality nevertheless allows progress.496 
Here, Adorno points to the dangers of a ‘total’ definition of humanity, as that which excludes 
absolutely nothing.  
If humanity were a totality that no longer held within it any limiting principle, then it would also be 
free of the coercion that subjects all its members to such a principle and thereby would no longer be a 
totality: no forced unity.497  
                                                
494 Theodor W. Adorno, Progress, in op. cit., p 145 
495  Ibid. p. 494, translator's note: English, Ibid. 253-254 (Thesis 2). 
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497 Theodor W. Adorno, Progress, in op. cit., p 145 
 174 
It is significant that Adorno uses an excerpt from Schiller's Ode to Joy (and the way Beethoven set 
it in his Ninth Symphony) to underline this point, as it refers to the analogous idea of an all-
encompassing love:  
“And who never could, let him steal away/weeping from this league,” which in the name of all-
encompassing love banishes whoever has not been granted it, unintentionally admits the truth about 
the bourgeois, at once totalitarian and particular, concept of humanity.498  
For Adorno, in this verse, what the one who is unloved or incapable of love undergoes  
in the name of the idea of humanity unmasks this idea, no differently than the affirmative violence 
with which Beethoven's music hammers it home; it is hardly a coincidence that the poem with the 
word ‘steal’ in the humiliation of the one who is joyless, and to whom therefore joy is once again 
denied, evokes associations from the spheres of property and criminology.499  
In other words, progress in terms of humanity is not a simplistic progress of a technical nature, 
or one which defines totality as a zone of pure joy, against, as Brian O’Connor remarks, the 
‘overwhelming evidence […] that we are not yet in a position to think of the historical process as 
one marked by continuous progression, that is a process of “unspeakable suffering.”’500 For 
Adorno, grief and strife are to be an aspect of this totality, not a banished other which is to be 
excised. As Adorno dialectically continues: ‘Perpetual antagonism is integral to the concept of 
totality, as in the politically totalitarian systems; thus the evil mythical festivals in fairy tales are 
defined by those who are not invited. Only with the decomposition of the principle of totality 
that establishes limits, even if that principle were merely the commandment to resemble totality, 
would there be humanity and not its deceptive image.’501 As we will see, this attempt to penetrate 
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the illusory aspect or the appearance of the totality of the bourgeois ideal of progress as the 
striving (and arrival) to unfettered human happiness underlies other aspects of Adorno’s work; 
of particular relevance to the thesis at hand is its import for aesthetic progress. One commentator 
specifically linked the idea of progress with the musical avant-garde – the musicologist Carl 
Dahlhaus. In his essay Progress and the avant garde,502 he explains how the concept of progress, 
from the perspective of the eighteenth century, lead Adorno to show ‘how from a conventional 
point of view, society cannot do without progress, as it “would be completely empty”503 without 
it – if “all its elements are abstracted from society.”504 Progress in this sense finds its meaning in 
events, such as the liberation of slaves, the improvement of living conditions, etc. However, as 
Adorno points out, once attempts are made to keep it pure – “to spin it out of the essence of 
time,”505 progress loses its content. Dialectically put, Adorno states therefore that “the concept 
of progress is philosophical in that it articulates the movement of society while at the same time 
contradicting it.”506 This resistance, according to Adorno, could possibly be found in artworks. 
Adorno elaborates on his critique of the concept of progress from the perspective of the artwork 
in Aesthetic Theory. Progress in this sense refers to process of increasing rationalization through 
technique. Translated into musical terms, Adorno refers to the relation between supposed 
‘progress’ in the music of the postwar avant-garde; in fact he criticizes both the nostalgic 
position of those critics who want to see a return to the music of the 1920s (which in some 
regard includes his own preferences, for example Schoenberg’s Erwartung, whose free atonality is 
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presented in Vers une musique informelle as a model) 507 as ‘unquestionably grotesque’ as they would 
conveniently omit the intervening Third Reich-years. At the same time he criticizes those who 
believe ‘progress’ had been achieved in those years, as the tasks ‘bequeathed’ by Schoenberg’s 
generation remain unfulfilled. It is in this context that he criticizes the naive belief in 
technological innovation and rationalization: ‘The reproach that the critics have not understood 
the most recent compositions of unchecked rationalization can hardly be maintained because 
such musical reasoning wants only to be demonstrated mathematically, not understood.’ 508 
However, progress in terms of the musical work of art could be seen as standing in contrast to 
‘reaction’ – especially if the illusion that the new musical resources available to the composer of 
electro-acoustic music, who ‘invents’ his sonorous material, is separated from the actual musical 
works. This risk is unavoidable: 
It will hardly make sense today the fusion of material and work having already been achieved, that 
artistic means could first be mechanically invented then later find their proper employment, anymore 
than this possibility could be ruled out.509 
However, another aspect of the work of art in the age of increasing rationalization demands the 
attention at this point: its image-like character. For this, I turn to the work of Walter Benjamin, 
who approached the image not simply in its two-dimensional understanding, but as an alternative 
for a rigid description of the world and the theory of universal progress. At the core of this 
debate is time, a necessary element in the make-up of the concept of progress, as argued by 
Adorno. When connected to the idea of musical material – as increasingly rationalized in serialist 
technique, for example – the idea that ‘progress’ is still possible or even merely useful. In 
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contrast with a regression of the material to an earlier state of, for example, tonality, a better 
understanding is needed of Benjamin and Adorno’s conceptions of historical time as unfulfilled 
time.  
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Allegorical image and time in Benjamin’s Trauerspie l  essay 
Walter Benjamin’s conception of time can be seen through the lens of his work on the baroque 
Trauerspiel, which in his eyes expounded a different conception of historical time. As allegorical 
plays, Trauerspiele or mourning plays – with allegorical characters including Death – were 
conceived in temporal terms in a rather different way than the classic tragedy. The latter is 
known for its underlying notion of catharsis, where the hero of the tragedy is confronted with a 
choice, which he attempts to overcome in a process of learning. This is essentially a linear, 
teleological conception of time. Furthermore, the contrast between tragedy and Trauerspiel for 
Benjamin can be seen from the perspective of opposing conceptions of time. The time of the 
mourning play is one which also refers to the afterlife, which it represents through some of the 
characters on stage. Benjamin writes in this regard: 
The mourning play [Trauerspiel] is mathematically comparable to one branch of a hyperbola whose 
other branch lies in infinity. The law governing a higher life prevails in the restricted space of an 
earthly existence, and all play, until death puts an end to the same, so as to repeat the same game, 
albeit on a grander scale, in another world. It is this repetition on which the law of the mourning play 
is founded.510  
The form of the mourning play – its sequence of events – can be described as allegorical 
schemata, which Benjamin likens as ‘symbolic mirror-images of a different game,’ for him, ‘we 
are transported into that game by death.’511 In temporal terms, Benjamin argues that ‘the time of 
the mourning play is not fulfilled, but nevertheless it is finite. It is non-individual, but without 
historical universality. Its form is hybrid, and its conception of time is ‘spectral, not mythic,’ and 
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‘is related in its innermost core to the mirror-nature of games […],’ as it has ‘an even number of 
acts.’512 
 
For Benjamin, the resulting allegorical image presents the events in such a way that the tragic 
unfolding is arrested and consequently appears as static. As Rolf Tiedemann points out, these 
deeply allegorical images confront ‘[...] the observer [...] with the facies hippocratica of history as a 
petrified, primordial landscape.’513  
 
In an early text (1916)514 Benjamin describes tragedy and Trauerspiel in terms of historical time 
versus tragic time and specifically how they are related.  
At specific and crucial points in its trajectory, historical time passes over into tragic time; such points 
occur in the actions of great individuals. There is an essential connection between the ideas of 
greatness in history and those in tragedy – although the two are not identical.515 
He explains that in art, ‘historical greatness can assume the form only of tragedy.’516 ‘Historical 
time,’ he argues, ‘is infinite in every direction and unfulfilled at every moment.’517 He claims that 
it is impossible to ‘conceive of a single empirical event that bears a necessary relation to the time 
of its occurrence.’518 Importantly, for empirical events ‘time is nothing but a form, but, what is 
more important, as a form it is unfulfilled. The event does not fulfil the formal nature of the 
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time in which it takes place.’519 Time, then, should not be considered as ‘merely the measure that 
records the duration520 of a mechanical change.’521 Here, Benjamin explains there is a crucial 
difference between historical and mechanical time. Although mechanical time ‘is indeed a 
relatively empty form, to think of its being filled makes no sense. Historical time, however, 
differs from this mechanical time.’522 Historical time ‘determines much more than the possibility 
of spatial changes of a specific magnitude and regularity – that is to say, like the hands of a clock 
– simultaneously with spatial changes of a complex nature.’523 It is here that Benjamin presents 
the most intriguing observation of this passage: the idea that absolute determination of historical 
time’s essence is not possible – there is a degree of empirical indetermination – when he writes 
that  
without specifying what goes beyond this, what else determines historical time – in short, without 
defining how it differs from mechanical time – we may assert that the determining force of historical 
time cannot be fully grasped by, or wholly concentrated in, any empirical process.524 
On the other hand, if one takes the position of a ‘process that is perfect in historical terms, [it] is 
quite indeterminate empirically; it is in fact an idea.’525 In contrast to unfulfilled historical time, 
Benjamin posits the idea of fulfilled time, which ‘is the dominant historical idea of the Bible: it is 
the idea of messianic time. Moreover, the idea of a fulfilled historical time is never identical with 
the idea of an individual time.’526 Consequently, if one looks at the difference between this 
messianic time and tragic time, the former’s feature ‘changes the meaning of fulfilment 
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completely, and it is this that distinguishes tragic time from messianic time.’527 He concludes that 
‘tragic time is related to the latter in the same way that an individually fulfilled time relates to a 
divinely fulfilled one.’528 As a concrete example, Benjamin subsequently refers to Schlegel’s 
Alarcos (1802),529 a play which is ‘ennobled by the distance which everywhere separates image and 
mirror-image, the signifier and signified.’530  In this regard, another important aspect of the 
mourning play’s character is the idea of repetition in time. Benjamin notes that ‘the mourning play 
exhausts artistically the historical idea of repetition.’531 In the same sense that historical time 
could not be exhaustively determined empirically, repetition undermines the idea of a unified 
form.532 In the concluding paragraph of his essay, this leads to the following statement:  
The nature of repetition in time is such that no unified form can be based on it. And even if the 
relation of tragedy to art remains problematic, even if it may be both more and less than an art form it 
nevertheless remains formally unified. Its temporal character is exhaustively shaped in the form of 
drama. The mourning play, on the other hand, is inherently non-unified drama, and the idea of its 
resolution no longer dwells within the realm of drama itself.  
This crucial difference in the conception of time in the tragedy – as ultimately unified time, or 
time understood as teleological – versus the non-unified conception of time in the mourning 
play – where a series of tableaux marks a form which is not unified – refers to the idea that its 
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individual parts could be arranged in a different sequence. Benjamin’s conclusion is rather 
startling: 
And here, on the question of form, is the point where the crucial distinction between tragedy and 
mourning play emerges decisively. The remains of mourning plays are called music. Perhaps there is a 
parallel here: just as tragedy marks the transition from historical to dramatic time, the mourning play 
represents the transition from dramatic time to musical time.533  
This idea of time unfolding in a non-linear way in the mourning play is one which is very 
sympathetic to the way in which time is conceived in some of the modernist works presented 
here. Interestingly, the time of the mourning play is understood as musical by Benjamin, in direct  
opposition to the developmental idea of musical time in Adorno’s work. If Adorno saw musical 
time as exclusively unfolding unidirectionally, according to the idea that structural parts of the 
composition follow one another in a certain fashion and not another, this suggests the centrality 
of this idea of temporal unfolding for his theory of form with regard to nineteenth-century music.  
This is a concept of musical form, and concurrently musical temporality, which was heavily 
influenced by the theoretician Eduard Hanslick.534  
 
Benjamin’s critique of Bergsonian duration 
For Benjamin, the above passage ties in with his general critique of time as expounded in the 
work of Bergson, Kant and several German romantic poets.535 In this regard, and of great 
interest to the understanding of Benjamin’s concept of time in connection with the temporal 
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aspect of the work of art, I will briefly explain how Benjamin reads two poems by Friedrich 
Hölderlin, ‘The Poet’s Courage’ and ‘Timidity’:  
Quite in opposition to “fleeting time,” to the “ephemeral ones,” that which persists – duration [my 
emphasis] in the form of time and men –has been developed in the new version of these lines. The 
phrase “turning of time [Wende der Zeit, in the Hölderlin poem]” plainly captures the instant of 
persistence as well, the moment of inner plasticity is central can become entirely clear only later, like 
the central importance of other hitherto demonstrated phenomena.[...] The poem is about the plastic 
structure of thought in its intensity – the way the contemplatively fulfilled consciousness forms the 
ultimate basis of its structure. The same relation of identity which here leads, in an intensive sense, to 
the temporal plasticity of form, must lead in an extensive sense to an infinite configured form – to a 
plasticity which is, as it were, buried and in which form becomes identical with the formless.536  
Echoes of this approach to literature will return in Adorno’s later work, including his theorizing 
of the art work in ‘Vers une musique informelle’ and Aesthetic Theory.537 In terms of the work of 
Henri Bergson, Benjamin does not refer to Bergson by name – in this and other early writings538 
– he refers to his central concept of duration and further develops it in artistic terms. The literary 
theorist Peter Fenves remarks in this regard that Benjamin does not appropriate Bergson’s work, 
but discovers duration in ‘a passage that would otherwise be reserved from “intellectual” 
intuition.’539 In Fenves’ view, Benjamin’s analysis puts him at odds with Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason, where intellectual intuition is ‘unavailable to human beings and can be attributed only to 
divine understanding,’540 but follows in the footsteps of Fichte, Schelling and Hölderlin, who 
show that  
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philosophy or poetry has no greater task than showing how and when the intellect is itself intuitive – 
to which Bergson responds in his dissertation Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience (essay on the 
immediate data of consciousness)541 by denying that the qualities of time are in any way comparable to 
those of space.542  
For Bergson, time can appear under certain circumstances as divisible, like space, but this is an 
illusion. Time for Bergson is indivisible but malleable, not a sequence of isolated instances. 
Fenves sees this as a daring interpretation, referring to Georg Lukács’s famous book Theory of the 
Novel543:  
when it comes to capturing the duality of duration, [Lukács’s thesis on a] four-hundred-page novel 
appears to be in a far better position than a poem of some twenty-four lines. But this kind of 
calculation is based on a misconception, for, despite what the word suggests, duration is not a ‘long 
time’. [...] duration is time turned away from its spatialization.544 
Benjamin’s thesis on the relationship between form and the shaping of time in the mourning 
play are of interest here: time is formed or shaped, which is an eminent reference to Bergson’s 
idea of durée: in his Durée et simultanéité,545 Bergson writes in his chapter De la nature du temps (On the 
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Nature of Time) that that time and what he terms ‘the continuity of our inner life’546 do not 
become intertwined. In the next passage, he crucially explains what this continuity entails, and 
how it ultimately relates to duration: 
[Continuity] is that of a flow or a passage, but a flow and a passage which are self-sufficient, a flow 
which does not implicate a thing that flows and a passage which does not presuppose states that pass 
by: the thing and the state are only instants artificially put upon the transition; and this transition, it 
alone tested naturally, is the duration itself. 547 
Time, for Bergson, cannot be seen as an aggregation of individual instants. He continues by 
comparing duration with a form of memory.    
[Duration] is memory, but not personal memory, outside that which it retains, distinct from a past 
which it assures to conserve; it is a memory belonging to change itself, a memory which prolongs the 
before into the after and blocks them from being pure instants which appear and disappear in a 
present which would be reborn without end.548 
                                                                                                                                                  
Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity with Reference to Einstein’s Theory, translated by Leon Jacobson, (Indianapolis, 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) 
546 Ibid. 
547 Henri Bergson, Durée et simultanéité, Frédéric Worms (ed.), op. cit., p.  ‘Il n’est pas douteux que le temps ne se 
confonde d’abord pour nous avec la continuité de notre vie intérieure. Qu’est-ce que cette continuité? Celle d’un 
écoulement ou d’un passage, mais d’un écoulement et d’un passage qui se suffisent à eux-mêmes, écoulement 
n’impliquant pas une chose qui coule et le passage ne présupposant pas des états par lesquels one passe: la chose 
et l’état ne sont que des instantanés artificiellement pris sur la transition; et cette transition, seule naturellement 
expérimentée, e s t  la  durée  même .’ 
548 Henri Bergson, op. cit., ‘Elle est mémoire, mais non pas mémoire personelle, extérieure à ce qu’elle retient, 
distincte d’un passé dont elle assurerait la conservation; c’est une mémoire intérieure au changement lui-même, 
mémoire qui prolonge l’avant dans l’après et les empêche d’être de purs instantanés apparaissant et disparaissant 
dans un présent qui renaîtrait sans cesse. Une mélodie que nous écoutons les yeux fermés, en ne pensant qu’à 
elle, est tout près de ce temps qui est la fluidité même de notre vie intérieure; mais elle a encore trop de qualités, 
trop de détermination, et il faudrait effacer d’abord la différrence entre les sons, puis abolir les caractères 
distinctifs du son lui-même, n’en retenir que la continuation de ce qui précède dans ce qui suit et la transition 
ininterrompue, multiplicité sans divisibilité et succession sans séparation, pour retrouver enfin le temps 
fondamental. Telle est la durée immédiatement perçue, sans laquelle nous n’aurions aucune idée du temps.’ 
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Bergson continues his exploration of the concept of duration with a musical analogy: 
A melody which we hear with our eyes closed, thinking of nothing else, approaches [this concept of] 
time which is the fluidity itself of our interior life; but it still has too many qualities, too much 
determination, and it should for a start erase the difference between the sounds, then abolish the 
distinctive characters of sound itself, to retain but the continuation of that which precedes it in what 
follows and the uninterrupted transition, multiplied without divisibility and succession without 
separation, to eventually find the fundamental time. That is the immediately perceived duration, 
without which we would have no idea of time.    
Bergson argues how time as the flow of duration, ought to be understood like a melody, without 
the particular intervals and apart from the acoustic reality, simply to achieve a sort of unfolding 
of sound as time itself. This is obviously a transition from an acoustically present melody to an 
abstract one, which retains only its temporal quality, separated from its spatial characteristics, 
including rhythm (‘multiplied without divisibility’) and pauses (‘succession without separation’). 
This form of duration understood as interior, uninterrupted time (the continuous time of our 
lives) can be seen as separate from the time of things, and Bergson explains how: 
 How do we move from this interior time to the time of things? We perceive the material world and 
this perception seems to us, rightly or wrongly, to be both inside and outside of us: on the one hand, it 
is a state of mind; on the other, it is a superficial film of matter where the [faculty of] feeling and [what 
is] felt coincide. Each moment of our interior life corresponds in this way with a moment of our body 
and all the surrounding matter, with which it will be ‘simultaneous’: this matter seems then to 
participate in our conscious duration.  
For Bergson, this duration is then extended gradually to the whole of the material world which 
seems to form a complete whole; and what is in the immediate surrounding of our body has a 
duration which is sympathetic with our own duration, we think it must be the same ‘as that 
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which it surrounds, and so on infinitely.’549 Bergson explains that this is how the idea of a 
‘duration of the universe’ was born, ‘i.e. of an impersonal consciousness which would be the 
hyphen between all the individual consciousnesses, as that between these consciousnesses and 
the rest of nature.’550 Rather importantly, Bergson then posits the sum of all consciousnesses: 
This sort of consciousness would grasp within a single perception, instantaneous, multiple events 
situated at diverse points in space; the simultaneity would precisely be the possibility of one or more 
events to enter in a unique and instantaneous perception.551 
This way of constructing reality and interpreting it seems very close to Benjamin’s idea of a 
constellation, focusing on the construction of it, as well as the way in which seemingly separate 
events, ideas or ‘matters’ can be understood in relation to one another as one image.552 In such an 
                                                
549 Ibid. 
550 Ibid. 
551 Bergson, Évolution créatrice, Chapître 3: De la nature du temps, op. cit. : ‘Comment passons-nous de ce temps intérieur 
au temps des choses? Nous percevons le monde matériel, et cette perception nous paraît, à tort ou à raison, être 
à la fois en nous et hors de nous: par un côté, c’est un état de conscience; par un autre, c’est une pellicule 
superficielle de matière où coïncideraient le sentant et le senti. À chaque moment de notre vie intérieure 
correspond ainsi un moment de notre corps, et de toute la matière environnante, qui lui serait ‘simultané’: cette 
matière semble alors participer de notre durée consciente. Graduellemnt nous étendons cette durée à l’ensemble 
du monde matériel, parce que nous n’apercevons aucune raison de la limiter au voisinage immédiat de notre 
corps: l’univers nous paraît former un seul tout; et si la partie qui est autour de nous dure à notre manière, il doit 
en être de même, pensons-nous, de celle qui l’entoure elle-même, et ainsi encore indéfiniment. Ainsi naît l’idée 
d’une Durée de l’univers, c’est à dire d’une conscience impersonelle qui serait le trait d’union entre toutes les 
consciences individuelles, comme entre ces consciences et le rest de la nature. Une telle conscience saisirait 
dans une seule perception, instantanée, des événements multiples situés en des points divers de 
l’espace; la simultanéité serait précisément la possibilité pour deux ou plusieurs événements d’entrer 
dans une perception unique et instantanée.’ [my stress] 
552 The crux of the analogy, or in other words how the two ideas could be regarded as analogous, lies in the aspect 
of Bergson’s total concept of the sum of all consciousnesses, whereas in Benjamin, the idea of a collective 
understanding of consciousness rests on the individual perceptions. In Benjamin, the instantaneity of Bergson’s 
perception and insight are preserved at the cost of a transcendental understanding of what is understood. In my 
view, and in contrast to Adorno’s perspective, it seems that Benjamin’s critique does indeed mediate between the 
object and the interpretation. Consciousness comes into play, but not in a way Bergson would have understood 
it. 
 188 
image, multiple events would become part of one perception. However, the sum total of all 
consciousnesses as capable of grasping the totality of nature is a problematic one, which 
Benjamin criticized in his ‘On some Motifs in Baudelaire.’553 He particularly points to the mutual 
exclusiveness of consciousness and memory, criticizing Bergson for his abstraction of the 
historical determination of memory.554 Writing about Bergson’s Matière et mémoire,555 Benjamin 
argues that it attempts to ground itself in empirical research, with a particular orientation to 
biology. The title  already suggests, for Benjamin, ‘that it regards the structure of memory as 
decisive for the philosophical pattern of experience.’556 He says that experience ‘is indeed a 
matter of tradition, in collective existence as well as private life,’ but that it is less the ‘product of 
facts firmly anchored in memory than of a convergence in memory of accumulated and 
frequently unconscious data.’557 Benjamin suggest there is a strong reason for Bergson’s position, 
which mediates anxieties of his own time: 
It is, however, not at all Bergson’s intention to attach any specific historical label to memory.  On the 
contrary, he rejects any historical determination to memory. He thus manages to stay clear of that 
experience from which his own philosophy evolved or, rather, in reaction to which it arose.  It was the 
inhospitable, blinding age of big-scale industrialism.558   
                                                
553 Walter Benjamin, ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,’ in Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, edited by Hannah Arendt 
and translated by Harry Zohn, (New York, Schocken, 1968), p. 155-200. See also Walter Benjamin, ‘On Some 
Motifs in Baudelaire,’ in Selected Writings, Vol. 4, 1938-40 (Cambridge Mass., Belknap, 2003), p. 313-355 
554 Walter Benjamin, ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,’ in Illuminations, op. cit., p. 157. See also Walter Benjamin, ‘On 
Some Motifs in Baudelaire,’ in Selected Writings, Vol. 4, 1938-40 (Cambridge Mass., Belknap, 2003), p. 315 
555 For the most recent critical edition, see Henri Bergson and Camille Riquier, Matière et Mémoire. Essai sur la relation 
du corps à l'esprit, Frédéric Worms (ed.), (Quadrige Grands Textes) (Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 2008); 
translation in Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, translated by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer, (New 
York, Zone Books, 1988) 
556 Benjamin, ‘On Some Motifs,’ op. cit., p. 315 
557 Ibid. 
558 Benjamin, Illuminations, op. cit., p. 157 
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Bergson’s rejection of any historical determination to memory indicates how the historical 
conditions determining his own philosophy were eliminated or forgotten. Against this forgetting, 
Benjamin argues that the technical innovations of modernity, such as the camera and the 
photograph, had enormous impact on both memory and culture. He sees Bergson’s work, in 
analogy with the vocabulary of photography, as presenting a snapshot of his age:  
In shutting out this experience the eye perceives an experience of a complementary nature in the form 
of its spontaneous after-image, as it were. Bergson’s philosophy represents an attempt to give the 
details of this afterimage and to fix it as a permanent record.559   
In the same fashion as the photograph permanently fixes a transient moment, Bergson’s 
philosophy of time focuses on a contingent image of memory and makes it essential. In this way, 
the experience of the transitory has, perhaps, become blind to those conditions which underlie 
its possibility. As I will argue in the next chapters, Bergson figures not only as an object of 
critique in Benjamin’s and Adorno’s work, but was highly influential to Morton Feldman.560 
 
  
                                                
559 Ibid., p. 157 
560 See Sebastian Claren, Neither, op. cit., p. 119-120. See also later in this thesis, Chapter 6. Feldman spoke about the 
confusion of images and the conceptual, referring implicitly to Bergson, in his Darmstadt lecture of 1984. 
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The image as constellation 
In his book The Disenchantment of Art on Walter Benjamin’s writings on the philosophy of history, 
Rainer Rochlitz suggests that each of the moments of Benjamin’s criticism (he also calls them 
visions), should be considered as significant, as they are related to a virtual philosophical unity that 
was never formulated as such.561 He argues that the writers and artists Benjamin considers seem 
to be linked by an ‘intellectual solidarity, defined above all by their shared rejection of an order of 
the world symbolized by totalitarianism.’562 Notwithstanding the possibility of a more mundane 
reason for his choices, for Rochlitz Benjamin makes us believe there is such an ideal, which he 
revealed through the schemata of his interpretations: ‘he did not adequately distinguish between 
the principles of an aesthetics and the considerations of a criticism that, in each case, is indebted 
to a particular work of art and its context of reception.’563 The reason for this according to 
Rochlitz lies in the particular concept of truth, which ‘obliged him to decipher individual works 
of art and their context as unforeseeable indexes of doctrinal unity to come,’ as Benjamin’s 
theory ‘places truth in a dependent role in relation to historical events.’564 The ‘concept’ of 
history, and the critique of universalist theories of history and temporality, can be understood 
from a number of perspectives, representing aspects of Benjamin’s unique philosophical method.  
 
This approach combines historical-materialist theory565 with the language of a (secular) Jewish 
mysticism and messianism.566 Benjamin's Theses on the Concept of History in particular present an 
                                                
561 Rainer Rochlitz, The disenchantment of art : the philosophy of Walter Benjamin, (New York, Guilford Press, 1996), p. 260 
562 Ibid. 
563 Ibid. 
564 Ibid. 
565 Although outside the scope of this chapter, an important impetus to the formation of his Theses is Benjamin’s 
interest in the politics of his time. They combine the theoretical considerations of historiography with a critique 
of political praxis - as Tiedemann argues ‘it is necessary to have a certain conception of the present that allows 
one to 'generate' an 'interrelationship between historiography and politics.’ (1248). The concept of history was 
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alternative to continuous and homogenous notions of time, of causal relations between events, 
of the idea of historical necessity, and also of philosophy as the language of concepts. Concepts 
and conceptualizations are directly criticized both by Benjamin and Adorno for a number of 
reasons. They understand concepts as universals, and criticized them for absorbing the 
particularities of phenomena, substituting them with abstracted notions in the process. As an 
alternative,567 Benjamin proposes the idea of the constellation, outlined in his ‘Epistemo-Critical 
                                                                                                                                                  
therefore meant 'to improve our position in the struggle against fascism.' (697)  However, Benjamin criticizes the 
(social-democratic) politicians of his day who 'betrayed' this cause and historical materialism in the process, by 
developing a different political praxis, according to Tiedemann(p. 92). The first failure he distinguished in regard 
to fascism was that ‘in the name of progress its opponents treat it as a historical norm’ [697] and ‘which did not 
adhere to reality but made dogmatic claims’ (700). Benjamin's revision of the theory and practice of historical 
materialism begins therefore with ‘criticism of the concept of progress itself’ (701), one of the central tenets of 
nineteenth and twentieth century ideology – the universal, upward movement of ‘Spirit’ [Geist] to its fateful 
synthesis, in which all tensions in society and history would be resolved. 
566 Benjamin’s use of messianic theological language harkens back to his time with the Jewish youth movement, 
before WWI. According to Anson Rabinbach, there was a growing awareness and ‘recasting’ within the 
generation of 1914 of their Jewish identity, which rejected the assimilationist stance of their parents. These Jews 
within the youth movement combined an ‘esoteric’ intellectualism’ with ‘a certain kind of intellectuality as 
politics.’ See Anson Rabinbach, ‘Between Enlightenment and Apocalypse: Benjamin, Bloch, and Modern 
German Jewish messianism,’ in New German Critique, Vol. 34, (Winter 1985), p.80, 82, as quoted by John McCole, 
Walter Benjamin and the Antinomies of Tradition, (Cornell, Ithaca, 1993), p. 66-67. McCole also argues, in seeming 
agreement with Tiedemann, that the theological motifs in Benjamin’s work played an important role in his 
intellectual economy: ‘Messianic language provided him with a resistant and resilient idiom rather than an 
inventory of fixed concepts. In forging a new orientation he had no coherent body of specific doctrines to draw 
on; he was not simply shifting his allegiances to an alternative, given tradition. Instead the messianic idiom 
became one of the germs of what we might call an intellectual project or strategy – a radical but immanent 
critique of German idealism whose essential coordinates were already latent in his involvement in the youth 
movement. ‘ McCole, John, idem, p. 67. For more on his involvement and criticism of the youth movement, see 
J. McCole, ‘Benjamin and the Idea of Youth, in Walter Benjamin and the Antinomies of Tradition, (Ithaca, Cornell,  
1993), p. 35-70  
567 In an early essay titled ‘Das Leben der Studenten und Trauerspiel und Tragödie’ [The Life of Students and 
Mourning Play and Tragedy], Benjamin criticises precisely the presentation of the ‘endless task’ [unendliche 
Aufgabe] and with it the ideology of progress in the endlessness of time. In it he criticised what Werner 
Hamacher calls the ‘definition of the messianic realm as the metaphysical structure of history.’ Walter Benjamin, 
‘The Life of Students,’ in Selected Writings, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 37 
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Introduction’ of The Origin of German Tragic Drama.568 Adorno immediately saw the potential of 
this theory of philosophical truth for his own work. In ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’569 and ‘The 
Idea of Natural History,’ some of these ideas are further explored – ideas, here, are unlike 
concepts neither generalizations nor subjective reconstructions, but are the phenomena’s 
objective virtual arrangement, their objective interpretation.570 
 
To return to this idea of the constellation mentioned above, as a way of presenting and 
interpreting diverse elements in one plane, another aspect of temporality is explained by Richard 
Wolin in his essay ‘Benjamin, Adorno, Surrealism.’571 He argues that by regrouping material 
elements of phenomena – the objects of knowledge – in a philosophically informed constellation, 
Benjamin ‘sought the emergence of an ‘Idea’ through which the redemption of the phenomena 
would be effectuated – insofar as contact with the Idea would facilitate their elevation to the 
homeland of unconditioned truth.’572 Conceptual knowledge has a strictly limited role to play in 
this procedure, as Wolin argues: ‘its sole task is to facilitate the arrangement of the phenomena or 
material element in the constellation.’573 However, the ultimate goal of such an arrangement is 
not simply to conceive these phenomena together, but to interpret them. The ideas do not 
emerge by juxtaposing the material elements in a montage-like fashion alone. Strictly speaking, as 
Wolin avers, it is not a result achieved by ‘employing the traditional philosophical means of 
                                                
568 Walter Benjamin, and J. Osborne, The origin of German tragic drama, (London, NLB, 1977) 
569 Theodor W. Adorno, and B. O'Connor, The Adorno Reader, (Blackwell readers) (Oxford; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 
2000) 
570 Ibid., p. 4 
571 Richard Wolin, ‘Benjamin, Adorno, Surrealism,’ in Tom Huhn and Lambert Zuidervaart (eds.), The Semblance of 
Subjectivity, (Studies in contemporary German social thought), (Cambridge, Mass, The MIT Press, 1997), pp. 93-
122 
572 Ibid., p. 97 
573 Ibid.,  pp. 97-98 
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induction, deduction, or logical argumentation.’574 Benjamin’s method insists much more on a 
‘momentary epiphany, a sudden burst of insight,’575 which he later referred to as the dialectical 
image. 
 
The dialectical image: the fleeting moment arrested? 
What is this dialectical image precisely then? For Benjamin, 
The dialectical image is a flashing image. Thus, the past must be grasped as an image that flashes in the 
now of recognition. Redemption, which is accomplished in this way an only in this way, can be 
attained only as that which in the next instant is already irredeemably lost. 576 
The particular concept of temporality behind the dialectical image is the Jetztzeit, as Richard 
Wolin writes: 
As a Jetztzeit or ‘now-time,’ the constellation or dialectical image approximates the Neo-platonic-
theological notion of nunc stans. This is defined by Franz Rosenzweig in The Star of Redemption, a work 
which influenced Benjamin, and signifies that ‘mankind is redeemed from the transience of the 
moment,’ and the latter is ‘refashioned as the ever-persisting and thus the intransient, as eternity.577 
For Wolin, the central issue is the distinction between historical time, which is prone to decay 
and disintegration [Verfall] and the notion of messianic time, a time of permanent fulfilment. He 
traces its legacy in Benjamin’s work from the short essay mentioned above of 1916 ‘Trauerspiel 
und Tragödie,’ and the ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History,’ in which Benjamin speaks of the 
Jetztzeit as shot through with chips of Messianic time, in contraposition to the empty and 
degraded ‘homogeneous’ time of the historical era.578 If one keeps in mind that for Benjamin this 
                                                
574 Ibid. 
575 Ibid. 
576 Ibid. 
577 Ibid., p. 98 
578 Ibid. 
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is a philosophy, though interwoven with theological language. Wolin argues that this form of 
philosophical language, remains ‘unlike the Platonic doctrine, this-worldly in origin.’579  
This means that they emerge ‘spontaneously’ from the conceptually mediated arrangement of the 
phenomena themselves.580 Crucially, for Wolin, Benjamin’s theory denies ideas ‘an existence 
independent of phenomenal being.’ 581  The relationship between ideas and phenomena, is 
expressed in the following metaphor: ‘Ideas are to objects as constellations are to stars.’582 This is 
perhaps the most succinct way in which to express the central thesis of Benjamin’s philosophy. 
As Wolin avers, ‘neither ideas nor constellations exist independently of the materials elements 
that constitute them, but instead first emerge therefrom.583 
 
Benjamin’s analysis of the relationship between formal aspects of the dramatic forms, one fixed, 
closed and unified (tragedy) and one open, non-unified in its elements (Trauerspiel), relates these 
forms with their transformation of historical time into respectively dramatic time and musical 
time. In other words, for Benjamin these dramatic forms can be understood from the point of 
view of temporal unfolding, with on the one hand a unity of time and place versus a sequence of 
events more akin to dream time.  
 
A connection appears then, between formal/informel artworks and their particular unfolding of 
time, one which shows suggestive parallels with Adorno’s interpretation of Gustav Mahler’s 
music – especially in his essay on Mahler in Quasi una Fantasia – where he defends Mahler from 
                                                
579 Ibid. 
580 Ibid. 
581 Ibid. 
582 Walter Benjamin, Origin of the German Tragic Drama, op. cit., p. 34. Cited in Richard Wolin, op. cit., p. 99 
583 Ibid., p. 99 
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his contemporary detractors.584 Specifically, he points to the fact that Mahler’s ‘indifference to 
the norms of a fastidious musical culture, or rather rebellion against them, dominates both the 
form of the individual detail and the strategy of the entire work.’585 For Adorno, ‘traditional 
formulae’ still hold sway in Mahler’s music, but they ‘are disavowed by the concrete shape they 
are given. It is not merely that the proportions of the parts within the movements are 
incompatible with the traditional meaning of the overall scheme. The very fibre of the music 
contradicts the meaning of the formal categories.’586 
 
As with the structure of the Trauerspiel, whose constituent parts do not follow the traditional 
schema of the tragedy, ‘this means that the listener who is accustomed to listening for the 
prescribed formal patterns sometimes receives an impression of chaos.’ 587 It is here, in a 
reference to Mahler’s First Symphony, that the link with Benjamin’s concept of the non-unified 
form becomes clear: 
Against all art, its aim is to transform art into an arena for the invasion of an absolute. Mahler’s music 
shakes the foundations of a self-assured aesthetic order in which an infinity is enclosed within a finite 
totality. It knows moments of breakthrough, of collapse, of episodes which make themselves 
autonomous, and finally, of disintegration into centrifugal complexes.588 
                                                
584 Theodor W. Adorno, Mahler, in Quasi una Phantasia, op. cit., p. 81-110 
585 Ibid., p. 84 
586 Ibid., p. 84. Adorno also refers the ‘fibre’ of Mahler’s music later in the collection, when he contrasts Berg’s 
music with the banal in Mahler’s music: ‘The role of tonal complexes in Berg is comparable to the discontinuous 
characterizations of the banal in Mahler, with whom Berg has so much in common – both in tone, in the 
approach, in the very fibre of his utterances, as indeed in the conception of entire structures.’ See ‘Berg’s 
Discoveries in Compositional Practice,’ in Quasi una Phantasia, op. cit., p. 181 
587 Theodor W. Adorno, Mahler, op. cit., p 84 
588 Theodor W. Adorno, Quasi una Fantasia, op. cit., p. 85 
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In formal terms it is ‘recklessly advanced,’ though harmonically, melodically and colouristically 
‘downright conservative’589 in comparison to the music of composers like Richard Strauss or 
Max Reger. To Adorno, this points to an aesthetic of discontinuity – ‘the musical non-identity 
with whatever stands behind it.’590 He clearly distinguishes between Mahler’s approach and the 
‘tragic metaphysics’ of Richard Wagner when he writes that after the ‘Eighth Symphony the 
experience of metaphysical negativity entered Mahler’s consciousness.’591 This meant that music 
fails at confirming meaning in the ‘ways of the world,’ in the way Wagner’s music had attempted 
to create a ‘tragic’ metaphysics.592 What Adorno means is that Mahler’s attempt to grasp and 
unify the way in which reality is structured in music – in discontinuity – is no longer possible, 
even with Mahler’s attempt to integrate diverse material in terms of the symphony as a genre. 
For Adorno the normative aspect of the symphony as a genre operates analogously to the way in 
which concepts are used: they impose abstractions onto what is a very diverse material, be it 
musical material, or the world of objects. In order to comprehend this, I will now explore 
Benjamin and Adorno’s critique of philosophy as the language of concepts. The hardening of 
concepts, in the same way that musical forms are reified, is at the core of Adorno’s critique: 
Concepts, whose substrate is historically passed by, were thoroughly and penetratingly criticized even 
in the specifically philosophical area as dogmatic hypostases.593 
Adorno refers to the elimination of the concept’s historical origins and further transformations - 
certain concepts acquire different meanings throughout the ages - as well as the fact that they are 
ultimately dogmatic constructions and abstractions, which by default reduce reality to reified 
                                                
589 Ibid. 
590 Ibid. 
591 Ibid. 
592 Ibid. See also Theodor W. Adorno and Anthony Barone, ‘On the Score of “Parsifal”,’ in Music & Letters,  
Vol. 76, No. 3 (August 1995), pp. 385  
593 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton, translation altered. 
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concepts. For Adorno, in the process of defining a concept, something is lost – the non-
reducible or non-identical. This fits in with his critique of the reification of consciousness. In this 
view, conceptualization and the fetishization of concepts594  are steps in a process of the 
domination of nature.595 Adorno even speaks of the ‘disenchantment of the concept’596 in his 
introduction to Negative Dialectics. He pleads the case for the understanding of the concept as 
mediated by the non-conceptual, not only abstracted and reified: 
That the concept is a concept even when it deals with the existent, hardly changes the fact that it is for 
its part enmeshed in a non-conceptual whole against which it seals itself off solely through its 
reification, which indeed created it as a concept.597 
It is in opposition to this ongoing reduction, reification and exclusion of the non-identical that 
he situates the image. 
  
                                                
594 Adorno, warns for the dangers of what he calls the 'fetishism of concepts'. This fetishism refers to the notion 
that concepts tend to be used as abstractions, unaware of their inherently historical and social dimensions. See 
Rolf Tiedemann, op. cit., p. 73 
595 See Max Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music, op. cit., p. 15-16 
596 See ‘Disenchantment of the Concept,’ op. cit., p. 23-24 
597 Redmond's translation, Introduction 
 198 
The Image of the Angel of History 
The particular way in which Benjamin gives form to his critique of conceptual reification draws 
on the idea of the image. He famously proposed the image of the Angel of History as an 
example, referring to Paul Klee’s Angelus novus, a work Benjamin owned.598 For Benjamin the 
Angel represents history, ‘as an image that can only be stared at,’599 while the observer is forced 
to silence and can make out none of the details. According to Tiedemann, Benjamin referred to 
this horror [das Grauen] in a note probably written before 1920, in which he writes that with it 
language in the broadest sense would ‘fall away’ and ‘mankind would find itself dependent on 
“imitation,” on mimesis.’600 Particularly, philosophical language is criticized as the language of 
concepts, while images, unlike concepts, gain access to mimesis - which had been neglected by 
philosophy since Aristotle. As Tiedemann points out, it was Kant who  
was aware that as he worked to overcome the heterogeneity of pure concepts of understanding with 
“empirical intuitions, indeed sensible intuitions in general”601 through a schematism: the abstract 
language of conceptuality would virtually make amends through an abstraction at a higher level.602  
In its opposition to a conceptual way of understanding, however, the risk of working with 
images is their propensity for ambiguous interpretation. Benjamin's image of history here takes 
sides with the oppressed and the dead, who have been as helpless in history as they are unable to 
shape the future. This image is hidden behind the interpretation of the image mentioned above, 
                                                
598 See Gershom Scholem, and Rolf Tiedemann, Walter Benjamin und sein Engel. Vierzehn Aufsätze und kleine Beiträge, 
(Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1983); Massimo Cacciari and Paul Klee, L'angelo necessario. (Milano, Adelphi, 
1986); translated by Massimo Cacciari,The Necessary Angel, (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1994) 
599 Rolf Tiedemann, ‘Concept, Image, Name: On Adorno’s Utopia of Knowledge,’ in Tom Huhn and Lambert Zuidervaart, 
The Semblance of Subjectivity. Essay in Adorno’s Aesthetics, (Cambridge, Mass., The Mit Press, 1997), pp. 123-146 
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i.e. Klee’s painting called Angelus novus. In his interpretation of the painting, Benjamin forms an 
‘image’ in writing, quoting from a poem by his friend Gershom Scholem, Angelic Greetings:  
My wing is ready to fly  
I would rather turn back  
For had I stayed mortal time  
I would have had little luck. 
It is important to quote at length from this passage by Benjamin, as it contains both a number of 
ideas about the painting itself, as well as forming a model for the way in which other artworks 
may be read: 
There is a painting [Bild] by Klee called Angelus Novus. An angel is depicted as though he were about to 
distance himself from something which he is staring at. His eyes are opened wide, his mouth stands 
open and his wings are outstretched. The Angel of History must look just so. His face is turned 
towards the past. Where we see the appearance of a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe, 
which unceasingly piles rubble on top of rubble and hurls it before his feet. He would like to pause 
[verweilen: a reference to Goethe’s Faust] for a moment so fair, to awaken the dead and to piece 
together what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise, it has caught itself up in his 
wings and is so strong that the Angel can no longer close them. The storm drives him irresistibly into 
the future, to which his back is turned, while the rubble-heap before him grows sky-high. That which 
we call progress, is this storm.603 
Benjamin used interpretations of the painting as a composite for several ideas, ultimately 
presented as the Angel of History604 in the theses ‘On the Concept of History.’ According to 
Gershom Scholem, the Angel could be seen as representing the Biblical Mal'ach, one of the 
messengers from Paradise, who had the double duty to stand before the Lord and sing his praise, 
                                                
603 Translation by D. Redmond. 
604 Rolf Tiedemann, op. cit., p. 74 
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as well as messengers to mankind, ‘interpreting his face, so that they might understand it.’605 For 
Benjamin, the Angelus Novus fails in this mission to mankind. The Angel seems to be unable to 
avert his gaze from the wreckage of history piled up at his feet, but this is ‘how humanity 
experiences the horror of its own history.’606 ‘If anything still propels humanity onward, it is the 
memory of the lost Paradise. This utopian strength is an impulse which has not yet expired.’607 
According to Tiedemann, ‘religion has done much to preserve this, especially Judaism’ and this 
impulse ‘has found its way into philosophy in general and even lives on in the Marxian hope of 
an empire of freedom,’608 but only as impulse, a promise which does not fetishize what it 
promises. However, ‘the storm blowing from paradise’ becomes ‘what we call progress’, again a 
critique of any concept of progress that makes dogmatic or universalist claims. As the scholar 
Susan Buck-Morss adds, this is in the first place a direct critique of the view of history as 
continuous and accessible, a tradition represented by the German historian Leopold von Ranke, 
who famously claimed to write history ‘as it actually was.’609 
 
Seemingly inspired by Scholem’s verses preceding this thesis, the Angel’s back is turned towards 
the future, so that he cannot see anything. What has happened previously is positioned before 
                                                
605 Gershom Scholem 
606 Rolf Tiedemann, op. cit., p. 74 
607 Ibid. 
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609 See Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing. Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project, p. 79n and p. 218: ‘Benjamin 
described his method, which, it must be said, strained the traditional conceptions of both history and philosophy 
to the breaking point. It broke radically with the philosophical canon by searching for truth in the ‘garbage heap’ 
of modern history, the ‘rags, the trash,’ the ruins of commodity production, that were thoroughly tainted with 
the philosophically debased qualities of empirical specificity, shifting meanings, and above all, transciency: “A 
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reconstruction of the past, Benjamin’s method ran roughshod over von Ranke’s sacrosanct principle of showing 
the matter ‘as it actually was’: such history had been ‘the strongest narcotic of the nineteenth century.’ 
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the Angel’s eyes, an image which is rather similarly presented to that of the historian as a 
‘backwards turned prophet’, the subject of the seventh Thesis. As Kia Lindroos points out, 
however, ‘the question was about the identifying nature of historiography and its implications for 
the concept of History. Here the angel does not represent any appearance that can be identified 
with. On the contrary, it is an alienating figure, who does not perceive of history as following any 
course.’’610 According to Tiedemann, this fact refers simply to the ‘theological prohibition of 
images and, their profane adaptation: Marx’s refusal to describe communist society in detail.’611 
For all his passivity, Benjamin’s angel sees more than others do, and in greater detail: ‘Where we 
perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe’612 – from which he is about to move 
away. However, the debris goes along with the angel, whilst it keeps piling up at his feet – or in 
Couzens-Hoy’s words: ‘it does not contain the continuity and coherence of a narrative that 
would allow us to think of ourselves as approaching a telos.’613 As Lindroos further argues, this 
critique of progress – a storm which in a Christian, teleological sense is ‘intended to carry the 
Christian people to paradise’614 – achieves the opposite – and ‘drives people away from the 
promised land.’615 In a more prosaic sense, the ‘wind blows with the same force as the idea of 
progress that detaches people from their present and immediate experiences.’616 In other words, 
the concept of progress is just another alienating device in the arsenal of ideology, which, by 
definition confounds culture (here as history) and nature. Benjamin’s critique of progress 
                                                
610 Kia Lindroos, Now-time, image-space : temporalization of politics in Walter Benjamin's philosophy of history and art, (Jyva 
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specifies the catastrophe of history not as ‘waiting in front (bevorstehend)’, but as already given 
(jeweils gegeben)’617 which is further combined with August Strindberg’s conception of hell: ‘Hell is 
not what is to come, but [this] life here.’618 
 
Benjamin’s critique combines elements from Jewish thought – the idea of progress as catastrophe 
– with a critique of Marx’s utopianism and creates an image of the modern era, in which the 
continuous understanding of history and the persistent idea of progress merge together into the 
repetitive time of hell of the present: ‘The ‘modern’ [is] the time of hell.’619 For Couzens-Hoy the 
storm, or ‘[...] the wind is temporality as such. [...]’620 In this sense, one could speak of a 
directionless directionality of temporality: ‘Temporality, or time as experienced, is directional 
even if it has no particular direction or telos.’621 It could therefore be distinguished from, for 
instance, Heidegger’s account of ‘projection’ as ‘consciously and resolutely positing a telos.’622 In 
contrast to this view, Benjamin’s critique avers ‘that what we really see is not purpose and 
meaning in our lives, but contingency and confabulation.’ 623  Furthermore, according to 
Tiedemann, Benjamin’s theses ‘provide a clear enough contrast between the criticized 
representative of historicism and the historical materialist ‘who is schooled in Marx’ and who 
‘always has the class struggle [...] in view.’624 The critique of ‘false continuity only applies to the 
                                                
617 Ibid. 
618 ‘Die Hölle ist nichts, was uns bevorstunde sondern dieses Leben hier,’ Benjamin, GS VII.2, p. 676, see also GS I, 
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former,’ while for Benjamin, the Angel sees more ‘correctly’ than historicism: because his view is 
that of the historical materialist, as Benjamin understands it. 
 
In order to grasp fully how the Angel of History understands more correctly, it is necessary, 
according to Lieven De Cauter 625  to take into account Benjamin’s central notion of 
contemplation, 626 where it appears as observation [Beobachtung]; later it can be understood as 
reflection [Betrachtung, also Anschauung], attentiveness [Aufmerksamkeit], as vita contemplativa and 
especially as immersion, absorption [Versenkung]. Sometimes it is disguised in other terms such as 
idleness [Müßiggang] and study [Studium]. There seems to be a tension between rather passive and 
more active interpretations of this motif – observation versus actively grasping an idea. In thesis 
XVII, contemplation is described as follows: ‘Thinking involves not only the movement of 
thoughts but also their standstill [Stillstellung].’627 For De Cauter, contemplation is linked here 
with the notion of redemption. In their zero-hour or bringing to a standstill of thoughts (in 
English the expression ‘stop thinking’ is misleading, what is meant is a sort of grasping of a 
thought, while at the same time, as thoughts are volatile, they resist this ‘fixing’), a historical 
event crystallizes into a monad, which the historian can grasp as the  
sign of a messianic zero-hour [Stillstellung] of events, or put differently, a revolutionary chance in the 
struggle for the suppressed past. He perceives it, in order to explode a specific epoch out of the 
homogenous course of history; thus exploding a specific life out of the epoch, or a specific work out 
of the life-work.628 
 
                                                
625 Lieven De Cauter, De Dwerg in de Schaakautomaat. Benjamins Verborgen Leer, (Nijmegen, SUN, 1999), p. 190 
626 Lieven De Cauter, op. cit., p. 171-196. ‘Contemplation’ is the central motif in Benjamin's dissertation, ‘Der Begriff 
der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romantik’ 
627 Ibid. 
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Standstill, contemplation, language 
Benjamin’s ninth thesis on the philosophy of history presents an image in which time, 
traditionally understood as dynamic movement, comes to a standstill – the angel is caught in a 
state of ‘frozen restlessness’ [erstarrte Unruhe].629 In his Progress essay, Adorno presents many 
variations on this idea of the standstill of the whole and the progress within – which ultimately 
lead him to present his interpretation of the dialectical image:  
Everything within the whole progresses: only the whole itself to this day does not progress. [...] Only 
one nota bene could be added to the sum of its intuition: that this whole stands still in its movement, 
that it knows nothing beyond itself, for it is not the divine absolute, but rather its opposite rendered 
unfamiliar by thought.630  
Adorno ultimately tries to rescue progress from itself as a bourgeois ideological device. 
Analogously, Kia Lindroos reads Benjamin’s ninth Thesis as a form of redemption of progress for 
scientific ends. She argues that Benjamin’s critique of progress is not absolute, but that he creates a 
new ‘temporal space’631 in his examination of the idea. For her, Benjamin’s critique of the idea of 
progress, as we have seen before, criticizes the concept as moving linearly, towards eternity; in 
this regard, Benjamin explains that scientific progress may still be possible, if it ‘describes the 
first step towards a “better understanding” of any researched phenomena.’632 Lindroos explains 
that ‘better’ is not to be understood as an ‘evaluative concept based on cumulative knowledge of 
an object.’633 Crucially, she avers that instead ‘it signifies a change in perspective, or a new 
approach to the object.’634 Within the framework of a critical theory of history, the concept of 
progress, she argues, ‘should restrict itself to only interpreting the short time-span between an 
                                                
629 Kia Lindroos, op. cit., p. 82, quotes Benjamin, Passagenwerk, p. 414 
630Theodor W. Adorno, Progress, in Critical Models, op. cit., p. 149 
631 Kia Lindroos, op. cit., p. 82 
632 Ibid. 
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event and its occurrence, and the moments in which it opens a perspective towards something 
“new.”’635 In an implicit reference to Bergson, and Benjamin’s critique of the former’s theory of 
continuous time, she continues her argument by stating that ‘the possibility of distinguishing an 
historical event from the continuum of time and approaching it from a new perspective, is based 
on an understanding of events as existing independently from each other.’636 The image here can 
be seen as allowing a temporal interpretation, which ‘becomes the means of forming the way in 
which these events are seen as related to each other.’637 She concludes that  
the value of an event is not included in the progressive character of an event in relation to other 
events, but it is valued in itself, as purely singular. This modifies Leibniz’s idea of the monad, used in 
various parts of Benjamin’s work.’638 
 
To return to the idea of contemplation, Benjamin refers to a form of Jewish prayer called Tikkun, 
‘reversal,’ to stimulate the repair of the broken unity after the breakage of the cosmic vessels.639 
The relation between this form of contemplation-as-prayer, an attempt at bringing about this 
reversal, and history, is implicitly presented as ‘attentiveness’ in the ninth thesis: 
He would like to pause for a moment so fair, to awaken the dead and to piece together what has been 
smashed.640 
This pause [Verweilen], insists on its attention to the possibility of redemption - or as Benjamin 
calls it in an early, fragmentary text ‘Arten des Wissen,’ ‘redemptive knowing’641 This redemptive 
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knowing is a more active form of contemplation and is to be understood in opposition to 
knowledge of truth. Although the reference to the Tikkun is apparent – the ‘topoi’ of 
attentiveness as prayer and study function as a call for reversal, however, according to De Cauter, 
this knowing is affirmed as redemption. Redemptive knowing, then, exists as ‘the knowing 
[Wissen] with which redemption becomes conscious and is thus exacted through it.’642 However, 
at the same time as affirming this knowing as redemption, it is restricted as to its ‘magic power’: 
‘This exists not, however, as the type of knowing that brings redemption closer.’643 For De 
Cauter, the idea formulated in 1921 that redemption is exacted by ‘this dawning of 
consciousness,’ can further illuminate the later Theses in which Benjamin writes that 
the historian sees the sign of the standstill of history in the standstill of thought: redemption is not an 
event that lies in the future, but is time and time again generated by and in knowing itself, as a 
reviewing and rethinking of the past.644 
The historian mentioned in the image of the Angel of History in the ninth thesis is an allegory of 
history as ‘natural’ history,645 although the angel is a part of this image. He stands for the true 
historian, the historical materialist who has stripped himself of all illusions about human history. 
In order to use the ‘weak messianic power’ bestowed upon us ‘like every generation that precedes 
us,’646 we must perceive history as historical materialists - not in Marx’s sense, but in the sense of 
Benjamin's ninth thesis: history as a catastrophic pile of debris that continually ‘grows skyward.’ 
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For De Cauter, historical materialism understands – according to the previous thesis – the 
‘claim’647 implicit in accepting this power.  
It may well appear in the angel-thesis that this claim cannot be honoured. But to magically transform it 
into an ‘objective redeeming presence’648 almost amounts to mockery of the dead who make this claim. 
The angel in the ninth thesis by no means represents the Messiah. This is unmistakably audible in the 
sentence, “The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed.”649  
Especially in theses II and XVII, Benjamin cedes this motif – the truly messianic aspect of the 
Tikkun – to the historian for whom he means to pave the way in the Theses as a whole. This 
supports the conclusion that Benjamin indeed intended the angel to stand for the historical 
materialist.650 The ‘Messiah’ – immobilized in time651 – in Benjamin's Theses constitutes a model 
for philosophical thought, ‘capable of breaking the illusion of continuity, which founds the hope 
of seeing the proletariat, at the centre of the continuum of history of its repression, end this 
repression.’652 
 
  
                                                
647 Walter Benjamin, GS I, p. 694 
648 This is a criticism of Kaiser.  
649 Walter Benjamin, GSI, p. 697 [author's italics]. Cited in De Cauter, op cit., p. 76 
650 Ibid., p. 76 
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652 Ibid., p. 198 
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Conclusion 
It becomes clear from the debate about Benjamin’s conception of the image, that it constitutes a 
critical form of reading artworks, including literary texts, paintings and various other media. The 
pertinent question at this point is: how does the dialectical image as Benjamin conceived it (and 
Adorno adopted it) allow for the musical artwork? And secondly, is there such a thing as a 
musical image, potentially closing the loop of the non-conceptual of the work (as an image) with 
Benjamin’s dialectical image? Before answering these questions I introduce one author, Laurence 
D. Berman, who argues that it is possible to define a musical image. However, as I will argue his 
archetypal theorization of such a concept, falls dramatically short in comparison with the dialectics 
of Benjamin and Adorno’s aesthetics. In the next Chapter, I will explore these tensions, 
especially the idea of a non-archetypal understanding of the object, as well as a reading of objects 
as dialectical images.  
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[Coda]: The musical image and a theory of archetypes: a critique 
The American scholar and pianist Laurence D. Berman asks what we are to understand an image 
to be in the strictly musical sense:  
To begin to answer that question, we must first acknowledge the initial barrier certain readers have to 
cross in widening their hitherto exclusively visual idea of a concept to include the world of sound. 
Image ordinarily connotes something impinging on the eye. And – with specific reference to music – 
there is a hallowed Romantic tradition (still alive, moreover) which holds that music, having 
transcended the realm of words and pictures, is thus “non-imagistic art” par excellence. 653 
He argues that there are precedents, nevertheless, of applying the term ‘image’ to ‘sound 
experience’, referring to Ferdinand de Saussure’s ‘original designation of the signifier as ‘sound 
image,’ and the philosopher Susanne Langer’s use of the term in Philosophy in a New Key.654 
Berman contends that music, unlike the visual arts and literature ‘cannot describe or represent 
subject matter.’655 However, subject matters as such – stories of heroes in literature or Madonnas 
in painting – are images, not contents.’656 The musical image, then, is ‘a shape made out of tones 
and rhythms, just as a visual image like the Madonna is made out of line, colour, mass, and a 
literary image like the story of Oedipus is made out of words.’657 Berman argues against this 
identification of the image with what he calls units of musical syntax, such as motives, phrases, 
periods, sections, and the like. He states that ‘when the same musical shape takes on the status of 
an image, we think of it as ‘possessed of’ or expressing a content.’658 He argues that what has 
changed ‘is not the musical shape itself but our conception of it; if it seems to us to resonate 
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with the heightened significance – to carry an element of the world beyond pure form – we feel 
that it has become more than a motive or a phrase and we give it the name image.’659 
 
Theoretically, Berman bases his conception of the image on Herman Northrop Frye’s theory of 
the archetype, who in his Anatomy of Criticism660 holds the key he believes ‘to getting past this 
inexorable question of musical aesthetics:’661 how it is possible ‘to demonstrate in a genuinely 
rational way the existence of something that is merely (however strongly) felt?’  He reinterprets 
Frye’s literary method in musical terms, particularly drawing on the latter’s conception of the 
archetype: ‘The great appeal of archetypal thinking is in its ability to show how individual images, 
beyond the borders of a single artwork, relate to each other: a host of images from different 
artworks are seen to fall together into a class.’662  Frye’s conception of the archetype is set apart 
from Plato’s and Jung’s universalist conceptions, which, according to Berman, situated the 
archetype ‘before time’ or ‘belonging to all time.’663  
 
It is precisely against this operation of subsuming the particular work under categories, in this 
case the proto-universal category of the image (Frye and Berman) as possessing archetypal 
qualities, that Peter Bürger664  interprets Adorno’s sociology of music.665 It can be argued, with 
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Bürger and Adorno, that Berman’s approach fails to overcome the dichotomy of content and 
form. Instead of the opposition of form and content [Inhalt], Adorno argues instead ‘for an 
opposition between material and artistic practice, of objective predetermined [material] and 
subjective involvement with it.’666 What is needed is a theory of the image which allows for the 
specificity of the individual work’s image-like quality, their mediation of a specific material in 
their technique, and the rationalization of it as technique, in order to read them dialectically as 
images. 
 
However, in the development of such a theory, a further element of critique will now be 
discussed: the way in which history is written, especially in its nineteenth-century form of 
universal historiography. Benjamin and Adorno reject such a notion, which is based on the 
fundamental understanding of time as continuous, linear, progressive and teleological. These 
aspects of the critique of traditional historiography are mediated in Adorno’s aesthetics, which 
criticizes notions of unmediated continuity between the world and its representation in artworks, 
including musical ones.  
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Introduction 
In this chapter, I attempt to reconceptualise the sound-object in the light of Benjamin’s natural 
language of objects. In order to allow an expansion of the potential utility of the dialectical image to 
explicate the (in)formel musical artworks, a return to Benjamin’s conceptualization of the object is 
required. In particular, three elements in this theory are central to this inquiry: 
(i) the reconsideration of objects as not-fully-subjectivized;  
(ii) their potential for non-static, non-reified spatiality as objects-in-motion; and,  
(iii) the notion of montage of objects (as seen in surrealist technique).  
These issues have major implications for the temporal dimension of the avant-garde musical 
artwork, both at the level of the work and as experienced – especially as they have a direct 
bearing on our re-conceptualization of the sound-object. Together, they form a theoretical 
framework for the study of musical works, further drawing on the concept of the dialectical image. 
The argument unfolds in three parts. Firstly, I consider Benjamin’s conception of a language of 
objects, which he terms a natural language (as opposed to mere linguistic language).667 In order to 
grasp how Benjamin (and by extension, Adorno)668 understood the nature of the object, it is 
necessary to re-examine Benjamin’s concept of language, as it is fundamental to understanding the 
issue of content. Benjamin (and Adorno) critique the bourgeois conceptualization of linguistic 
language as reifying: the naïve belief that words are true representations of objects. As Benjamin 
                                                
667 The difference between the two is Benjamin’s own and may surprise the contemporary philosopher of language, 
who would understand linguistic language precisely as a natural language, as opposed to artificial languages such 
as computer languages.  
668 Adorno draws a distinction between ‘objects in art and objects in empirical reality.’ See Theodor W. Adorno, 
Aesthetic Theory, op. cit., p. 335. I will claim that to understand this difference, which is problematic, Benjamin’s 
theory of objects is a necessary step towards grasping Adorno’s position. 
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shows, this is not only illusory but also actively misleading. To avoid the pitfalls of this (naïve) 
‘naming’ of objects, Benjamin posits the idea of a language of objects in which ‘content’ (as 
Adorno would call it) is revealed. The critique of linguistic language (the language of ‘man’), in 
the sense that language reifies, which means that the link to the objects we name is lost – and 
hence language becomes totally reified. Crucially, Benjamin and Adorno plead for a dialectic 
between Erlebnis/Erfahrung (respectively the isolated, ephemeral experience of things, and long 
experience) and Erkenntnis (knowledge/cognition).669 As a countermeasure in the battle against 
the reifying tendency of language, Benjamin uses concepts and expressions borrowed from 
theology; as well as the notion of the dialectical image. I will argue that Lieven De Cauter makes 
a crucial observation: although Benjamin uses theological language (with roots in Jewish 
mysticism, as I have argued in Chapter 3),670 he does not employ these concepts in a theological 
framework: it remains materialist. 
 
In addition to the earlier conceptualization of the allegorical image, which attempts to crystallize 
historical moments in time in a new constellation, the individual moments are nonetheless 
rationalized in their presentation. Benjamin argues that ‘allegory,’ as seen from a naïve bourgeois 
point of view, signals the advent of modern subjectivity in the sense that they are no longer 
about magic or ritual functioning. An important new point in the interpreting the meaning of 
these objects, rather than merely naively naming them, is the claim that an alternative can be 
found in the concept of interpretation. As mentioned above, this entails reading the objects 
immanently—i.e. on their own terms. A second important concept, as I have already argued in 
                                                
669 Wlater Benjamin, ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,’ in Selected Writings, Vol. 4, p. 333; see also p. 183 and 198 
footnote 68 in the same volume. 
670 See also Walter Benjamin, ‘Theological-Political Fragment,’ in Selected Writings, Vol. 3, pp. 305-306 
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case of the dialectical image, is Benjamin’s concept of translation.671 To read immanently, then, 
means that the mute language of objects (as understood in its own terms) requires translation 
into the sonic: ‘linguistic language.’ This, as I will argue, translates the nameless into the name.672  
 
Adorno employs the concept of translation in the context of his consideration of traditional 
forms versus the modernist approach to form. He shows that although they are functional in 
their original traditional conceptualizations, they have become hardened schemata and, in the same 
sense of the bourgeois concept of language, they have become illusory.673 Adorno argues that 
new music rebels against this illusion; this rebellion would be active through their form. To 
properly understand the modernist work of art, one must approach it in the same way, through 
reading and interpretation (in Benjamin’s view, a form of contemplation), resulting in a translation. It 
is the task of the philosopher (and in our case, the musicologist) to translate the (non-
conceptual) ‘language’ of these musical works; crucially, a connection exists between the 
language of objects and the language of music. Shierry Nicholson, amongst others, points out in 
this regard that mimesis is active in the work of art. The work of art is mimetic because it imitates 
nature: art is a translation of nature into this language of the art object (and hence constitutes 
another aspect of the mediation).  
                                                
671 See the following two articles in particular Walter Benjamin, ‘The Task of the Translator,’ Selected Writings, Marcus 
Jennings (ed.), Vol. 1, (Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, 1996), pp. 253-263; and Walter Benjamin, ‘Translation 
– For and Against,’ in Selected Writings, Marcus Jennings (ed.), Vol. 3.,  (Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, 1996), 
pp. 249-252 
672 This line of inquiry has already been explored by, amongst others, Eric L. Krakauer, The Disposition of the Subject. 
Reading Adorno's Dialectic of Technology, (Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1998), p. 162  
673 Krakauer writes in this regard about one possible way of avoiding this type of naming: ‘To reach, or adequately 
name, means, for now, to refuse to try to reach or adequately name and thereby to insist on the impossibility of 
doing so. This insistence on alienation preserves, for Adorno, a negative hope that alienation might one day be 
truly overcome, and not just masked or technologically conjured away. Only such alienating naming reminds that 
no reconciliation is possible for now.’ Eric L. Krakauer, The Disposition of the Subject. Reading Adorno's Dialectic of 
Technology, (Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1998), p. 161 
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In a second part I consider the art object. For this part of the chapter, I have drawn on the work 
of Claudia Brodsky on the object in Benjamin and Adorno.674 Adorno conceives of the art object 
as not being static, but as becoming.675 To understand this, one is reminded of the ephemeral 
nature of experience, and the quest for knowledge: phenomena, for Benjamin, need to be 
mediated in ideas for them to endure. The idea in this understanding is much like a constellation 
bringing these stars into a configuration that at once groups them and yet holds them in suspense; 
this relationship – whilst still reifying to some extent – does not sever all links with the 
phenomena (to become the feared ‘hardened’ concept). This configuration or mediation of the 
phenomena in the work of art is sedimented historical and social phenomena,676 and can be seen 
as not only originating in Benjamin’s oeuvre, but constitutive in Adorno’s aesthetic writings as 
configurational form.677 Furthermore, for Adorno, whilst the art object imitates nature, nature itself 
is already mediated.678  
 
In the third part of this argument, I revisit the dialectical image, building on the work by authors 
including Susan Buck-Morss and Margaret Cohen, amongst others. They show the various facets 
                                                
674 Claudia Brodsky, ‘Framing the Sensuous: Objecthood and “Objectivity,”’ in J.M. Bernstein (ed.), Art and Aesthetics 
after Adorno, (The Townsend Papers in the Humanities, Vol. 3), (New York, Fordham University Press, 2012), pp. 
69-115 
675 ibid., p. 75 
676 See Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, op.cit., p. 335 for a succinct view of this matter: ‘‘It is false to arrive at 
aesthetic realism from the premise of philosophical materialism. Certainly, art, as a form of knowledge, implies 
knowledge of reality, and there is no reality that is not social. Thus truth content and social content are mediated, 
although art’s truth content transcends the knowledge of reality as what exists. Art becomes social knowledge by 
grasping the essence, not by endlessly talking about it, illustrating it, or somehow imitating it.’ 
677 See Shierry Weber Nicholsen, ‘Toward a More Adequate Reception of Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory: Configurational 
Form in Adorno’s Aesthetic Writings,’ in Cultural Critique, Vol. 18 (Spring, 1991), pp. 33-64  
678 For a book-length study on Adorno’s concept of nature, see Martin Seel, Eine Ästhetik der Natur, (Frankfurt am 
Main, Suhrkamp, 1991); whilst particular to Adorno, an affinity for a concept of nature as second nature can be 
found in Steven Vogel, Against Nature: The Concept of Nature in Critical Theory, (Albany, State University of New 
York Press, 1996) 
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of the dialectical image, respectively presenting its roots in Benjamin’s work on the nineteenth 
century, to the import of Freudian elements in his theory.  
 
In the last part of this chapter, I refer to Borio and his notion of the sound object, considering it as 
a special category of the object in the Benjaminian understanding of it, as on object-in-motion. It is 
my argument that the sound object can be reconsidered in this in order to establish a critical link 
with the music under consideration in the second part of this thesis. I will show how the flaw in 
musique informelle can be remedied if we consider the formal and temporal aspect of these 
compositions. The sound object will draw on this concept of object-in-motion, and the insights 
gleaned from Benjamin’s study of allegorical and dialectical images. Of great importance in this 
regard is to understand this as the establishment of a dialectical concept. This means that that it 
mediates between the theory of historical time and natural language on the one hand, and the 
repertoire under discussion on the other hand. It will become clear how the immanent reading of 
the object – given the difference in conceptions of compositional technical terminology – it is 
nonetheless necessary to keep these concerns of Benjamin and Adorno in mind. The sound-
object has the potential to be part of a process that includes a certain level of formalization as 
well as the use of the technique of montage – in the case of all three composers. At the same time 
the sound-object can retain the crucial element of temporal and philosophical motion (as 
‘becoming’). The object in this sense combines with the notion of the dialectical image, 
becoming a strategy for reading these musical artworks immanently. The dialectical image retains 
the dialectical tension between the object and the viewer and listener; but at the same time it 
bridges from ephemeral experience into knowledge. To achieve this, the dialectics are 
momentarily arrested. This is not simply an interpretative tool in a hermeneutic sense, but it 
potentially reveals something objectively, as the written account of this particular experience of 
musical temporality. The image can finally be understood as dialectical, as it maintains a relation 
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to the individual compositions. The temporal and spatial distance is then bridged momentarily: 
object and account come together in a non-reifying constellation as a dialectical image. This 
image of the modernist work of art in its (in)formel state reveals itself as a work barely able hold 
on to a unifying tendency, critically resolving the tension of its utter fragmentation by forming a 
negative whole. The work of Feldman, Xenakis and Varèse attempts to walk a fine line between 
what Adorno considered the fraught dialectic of the material, as increasingly reified and 
submitting to the spatialization of modern consciousness (Bergson), and the pull of the banality 
of the reified culture object.  
 
What does this immanent reading strategy mean in music-analytic terms? The analysis proposed 
is based on a formal analysis of the work, where form is redefined in terms of the changed nature 
of the material content of the work; in order for this to be feasible, the avant-garde artwork 
requires a re-conceived, textural analytic strategy which adopts a non-reified temporal and spatial 
strategy, based on the notion of the sound-object. This, in turn, will have implications for an aspect 
of the concept of musique informelle that extends its scope, in that the consequences drawn from 
the temporal-spatial reading may open up the possibility of a non-linear temporal organization as 
an alternative to Adorno’s motivic-thematic thinking, and thereby showing how these particular 
works present themselves as a different facet of the modernist artwork’s demands (via Wellmer).  
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Benjamin’s theory of a natural language 
Apart from the other systematic work on Benjamin’s conception of language, art and history, the 
extensive work by Lieven De Cauter679 is often overlooked. Crucially, it sheds a light on the links 
between different areas of Benjamin’s thought, especially the correspondences between language 
and art. Of particular interest are De Cauter’s comments on some of the (rare) references to 
music in Benjamin’s work, especially in conjunction with his theory of a natural language. Within 
the framework of this dissertation, the complex relationship of Benjamin with Adorno is 
contextualized through an account of their debates on a number of concepts, including the 
notion of progress (both in the writing of history and in aesthetics), language and the dialectical 
image. Apart from the reading of Benjamin’s work, in particular, Paris Capital of the Nineteenth 
Century680 – a further trajectory leads from Benjamin’s attempts to integrate Freud’s theory on the 
dream image, via Adorno’s critique of this original conception of the dialectical image,681 to its 
redemption in Adorno’s later work. Benjamin’s formulation at first was concerned with 
understanding nineteenth-century Paris, according to Margaret Cohen, positing ‘the dialectical 
image as the accurate reconstruction of the material forces producing the nineteenth-century 
                                                
679 Lieven De Cauter, De dwerg in de schaakautomaat: Benjamins verborgen leer, (Nijmegen SUN, 1999). This book is based 
on De Cauter’s doctoral dissertation, prepared at the University of Ghent, Belgium. Its thesis runs to a certain 
degree parallel to Rochlitz’s. See Rainer Rochlitz,  The disenchantment of art: the philosophy of Walter Benjamin. (New 
York, Guilford Press, 1996) 
680 Walter Benjamin,’ Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth Century,’ in Selected Writings, Vol.3; Walter Benjamin, et al., 
Gesammelte Schriften, (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1972) 
681 See amongst others, Jean-Michel Palmier’s work on the dialectical image. In his attempts at exhaustive analysis, 
Palmier returns to the notion of the dialectical image; concerning the discussions Benjamin and Adorno had in 
this regard he remarks: ‘quant à la structure même de l’image dialectique et qui révèlent leur differences de 
sensibilité et de méthode.’ Jean-Michel Palmier, J.-M., ‘Quelques remarques sur la notion et la fonction de 
l’image dalectique chez Walter Benjamin,’ in Jean-Michel Palmier and Florent Perrier, Walter Benjamin: Le 
chiffonnier, l'ange et le petit bossu. Esthétique et politique chez Walter Benjamin, (Collection d'esthétique, Vol. 68), (Paris, 
Klincksieck, 2006), pp. 777-787 
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world of dreams.’682 Undoubtedly the central text on Benjamin’s Paris Arcades,683 is Susan Buck-
Morss The Dialectics of Seeing. Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project.684 In this book, Buck-Morss 
not only traces the ‘spatial’ and ‘temporal’ origins685 of the unfinished project, through earlier 
works – especially his Trauerspiel and One Way Street, his friendships with Gershom Scholem, 
Adorno and his relationship with Asja Lacis,686 and places of interest.687 It is in the Paris Arcades, 
however, that Benjamin found his central image, as Susan Buck-Morss explains, in relation to 
                                                
682 Margaret Cohen, Profane illumination : Walter Benjamin and the Paris of surrealist revolution, (Weimar and now, Vol.  5),  
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993), p. 47 
683 Walter Benjamin, and Rolf Tiedemann, The arcades project. (Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, 1999). As Benjamin 
organized his notes contained in the Passagen-arbeit under broad thematic ‘Konvoluts’, concerning the concept 
of the dialectical image, see ‘Konvolut N’ in particular. 
684 Susan Buck-Morss, The dialectics of seeing : Walter Benjamin and the Arcades project, (Cambridge, Mass.; London, The 
MIT Press, 1989) 
685 Ibid., p. 8. She quotes Benjamin on the meaning of ‘origin’, not as an authentic beginning, but as a ‘rhythmic’ flow of 
becoming: ‘Origin [Ursprung], although a thoroughly historical category, nonetheless has nothing to do with 
beginnings[...]. The term origin does not mean the process of becoming of that which has emerged, but much 
more, that which emerges out of the process of becoming and disappearing. The origin stands in the flow of 
becoming as a whirlpool [...]; its rhythm is apparent only to a double insight.’ In Walter Benjamin, Das 
Passagenwerk, GS V, Rolf Tiedemann (ed.), (1982), p. 83. 
686 See Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, (Cambridge, MA and London, 
Harvard University Press, 2014). Benjamin also wrote and essay on Naples together with Lacis, see Walter 
Benjamin, ‘Naples,’ pp. 414-421 
687 Including Naples, Berlin (where he spent his childhood and youth), Moscow (where he visited A. Lascis, a 
communist activist, amongst others), Paris, and arcades of these respective cities. See for example his essay on 
Moscow: Walter Benjamin, ‘Moscow,’ in Selected Writings, Marcus Jennings (ed.), Vol. 2, (Cambridge, Mass., 
Belknap Press, 1996), pp. 22-46; ‘That nothing turns out as intended and expected – this banal expression of the 
reality of life here asserts itself in each individual case so inviolably and intensely that Russian fatalism becomes 
comprehensible. If civilising calculation slowly establishes itself in the collective, this will, in the first place 
complicate matters. […] A feeling for the value of time, nothwithstanding all “rationalization,” is not met with 
even in the capital of Russia.’ (p. 31) 
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Proust’s underlying notion of the mémoire involontaire, which he developed from a rather personal 
level of remembering, to one which could span collective memory (and tradition)688: 
he retained the notion that the Arcades project would present collective history as Proust had 
presented his own – neither ‘life as it was’, nor even life remembered, but life as it had been ‘forgotten.’ 
Like dream images, urban objects, relics of the last century, were hieroglyphic clues to a forgotten past. 
Benjamin’s goal was to interpret for his own generation these dream fetishes in which, in fossilized 
form, history’s traces had survived.689 
The work as a whole would be ‘concerned with the [historical] awakening from the nineteenth 
century’, in the same way that Proust’s life story begins with ‘awakening.’690 This reference to 
Proust bridges the gap between the material world of objects and human consciousness: 
The covered shopping arcades of the nineteenth century were Benjamin’s central image because they 
were a precise material replica of the internal consciousness – or rather, the unconsciousness of the 
dreaming collective. All of the errors of bourgeois consciousness could be found there (commodity 
fetishism, reification, the world as ‘inwardness’), as well as (in fashion, prostitution, gambling) all of its 
utopian dreams.691 
 
As a hallmark of the first international style of modern architecture, these arcades represented 
the ‘lived experience of a worldwide, metropolitan generation.’692 In this sense, the architectural 
style of the arcades would not only be a material object of study, but one which reaches into the 
realm of the psychological and sociological of nineteenth century capitalism. This form of 
                                                
688 For a book length study of this notion, see J. McCole, Walter Benjamin and the antinomies of tradition, (Ithaca, N.Y., 
Cornell University Press, 1993); see especially Chapter 6, ‘Benjamin and Proust: Remembering,’ pp. 253-279. It is 
concerned with Benjamin’s writings on Proust as well as the notion of mémoire involontaire (involuntary memory), the 
bridge between memory and dream, and the doctrine of memory in Benjamin’s later work 
689 Susan Buck-Morss, op. cit.,  p. 39 
690 Ibid. 
691 Ibid. 
692 Ibid. 
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interpretation would lead Benjamin precisely to a reading of these objects in terms of the images 
that spring forth from them. As Buck-Morss shows, it was Baudelaire’s Les Fleurs du Mal which 
influenced this interpretation of the material world-as-image, however problematic it seemed at 
first693: ‘All the visible universe is nothing but a shop of images and signs.’694 
 
Benjamin’s substantial 1939 essay ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’ 695  brings together an 
important number of strands in this debate, of central importance to our own argument. Of 
significance is the way in which they connect between the types of experience at work in this 
interpretative reading, not only of visual images, but also of works of art. Benjamin explicitly 
refers to Bergson’s dualist theory of temporality as expounded in Matière et Mémoire (Matter and 
Memory),696 leading to a critique of durée (duration, as experienced time) as essentially ahistorical. In a 
recent article, Claire Bencowe enumerates these issues,697 elucidating Benjamin’s search for an 
immanent experience of duration – one which is not based in a universal élan vital, but in the 
temporal experience of spatial objects themselves. In his essay, Benjamin argues that the 
experience of art (in this case, of lyric poetry) is contingent with the time in which it is 
experienced: 
                                                
693 Ibid. p. 178. Benjamin’s reading of Baudelaire discovered the allegorical character of his poems, in which the 
‘fusion of past and present [...] was highly problematic, precisely because of the discontinuity of experience to 
which his new aesthetic sensibility bore witness.’ 
694 cited by Benjamin, GS V, p. p. 313,. See Buck-Morss, op. cit., p. 177. 
695 Walter Benjamin, ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,’ in Selected writings, Vol. 4, (Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press., 
1996), pp. 313- 355 
696 Henri Bergson, F. Worms, and C. Riquier, Matière et mémoire. Essai sur la relation du corps à l'esprit, (Quadrige Grands 
textes), (Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 2008), pp. 14-521. For this dissertation the most recent edition of 
Bergson’s oeuvre was used, as newly introduced and edited by Frédéric Worms. The translation of Matière et 
Mémoire as Henri Bergson, Matter and memory, (New York, Zone Books, 1988) is based on the fifth edition of 
1908, necessitating a comparative lecture. 
697 Claire Blencowe, Destroying Duration. The Critical Situation of Bergsonism in Benjamin’s Analysis of Modern Experience, in 
Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2008), pp. 139-158 
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Since the end of the nineteenth century, philosophy has made a series of attempts to grasp ‘true’ 
experience as opposed to the kind that manifests itself in the standardized, denatured life of the 
masses. These efforts are usually classified under the rubric of ‘vitalism’. Their point of departure, 
understandable enough, has not been the individual’s life in society. Instead they have invoked poetry, 
or preferably nature – most recently, the age of myths. Dilthey’s book Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung 
represents one of the earliest efforts, which culminates with Klages and Jung, who made common 
cause with fascism.698 Towering above this literature is Bergson’s early monumental work, Matière et 
Mémoire.699 
In the following passage, Benjamin proposes his own concept of experience, in contrast to 
Bergson’s (biologically oriented) Matière et Mémoire700: 
As the title suggests, it regards the structure of memory [Gedächtnis] as decisive for the philosophical 
structure of experience [Erfahrung]. Experience is indeed a matter of tradition, in collective existence as 
well as private life. It is the product less of facts firmly anchored in memory [Erinnerung] than of 
accumulated and frequently unconscious data that flow together in memory [Gedächtnis].701 
Benjamin’s essay subsequently confronts Proust’s Remembrance of things Past with Bergson’s theory, 
especially in the correspondences of the former’s notions of mémoire volontaire and mémoire 
                                                
698 This critique of Klages and Jung never fully materialized in Benjamin’s work. As Rebecca Cormay argues in  this 
regard, ‘if the the much-trumpeted Auseinandersetzung (Benjamin, GS 5.2, p. 1160) with Jung Klages, and 
company never properly as such transpires (indeed it is tempting to blame Adorno himself as much as anyone 
for this deferral), it becomes clear that any image of Urgeschichte could point only to an ‘origin’ fractured by a 
retroactivity which would pre-empt all retrieval and thus equally every mutual illumination between past and 
present is typically characterized as both ‘flashlike’ (Benjamin, Arcades Project, Convolute N2a,3) and ‘explosive’ 
(ibid, O056), this is because what is ruptured here is both the immanence of every epoch and the immanence of 
subjectivity, whether of an individual or of a phantom collectivity hypostatized in Jungian garb.’ Comay, Rebecca, 
‘Materialist Mutations of the Bilderverbot,’ in Andrew Benjamin (ed.), Walter Benjamin and Art, (London, New York, 
Continuum, 2005), p. 55 
699 Walter Benjamin, op. cit., p. 314 
700 See Chapter 1: ‘Of The Selection of Images for Conscious Presentation. What our Body Means and Does,’ in 
Henri Bergson, Matter and memory (New York, Zone Books, 1988), pp. 17-177 
701 ibid., p. 314 
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involontaire. Where the voluntary memory is limited to the ‘promptings of a memory which 
obeyed the call of conscious attention,’ and thus discontinuous, the involuntary memory is 
triggered by chance – famously through the experience of (re-)tasting a madeleine biscuit, dipped 
in a cup of tea, recalling a moment from his youth.702 Benjamin is critical of the duality of these 
two separate types of memory and proposes a different understanding of them in light of collective, 
shared historical experiences: 
This concept bears the traces of the situation that engendered it; it is part of the inventory of the 
individual who is isolated in various ways. Where there is experience [Erfahrung] in the strict sense of 
the word, certain contents of the individual past combine in memory [Gedächtnis] with material from 
the collective past. Rituals, with their ceremonies and their festivals (probably nowhere recalled in 
Proust’s work), kept producing the amalgamation of these two elements of memory over and over 
again. They triggered recollection at certain times and remained available to memory throughout 
people’s lives. In this way, voluntary memory and involuntary recollection cease to be mutually 
exclusive.703 
In order to achieve the sort of experience which does not metastatize experiences into 
voluntarily recallable instances, Benjamin subsequently takes recourse to Freud’s work, especially 
with reference to the experience of shocks [Chockerlebnis]. At the same time, his work draws on 
                                                
702 In a letter to Adorno, Benjamin further explore this notion, including the forgetting and mémoire involontaire. He 
writes that ‘ I do not think that, to give a true account of forgetting one needs to call into question the notion of 
mémoire involontaire. The childhood experience of the taste of the madeleine, which returns involuntarily to 
Proust’s memory one day, was indeed unconscious. But his first bite of the madeleine would not have been. 
(Tasting is a conscious act.) Yet this act no doubt does become unconscious to the extent that a taste becomes 
more familiar. The “tasting again” by the grown man is, of course, conscious.’ Walter Benjamin, ‘Letter to 
Theodor W. Adorno on Baudelaire, George and Hofmannstahl,’ in Selected Writings, Vol. 4, pp. 413 
703 ibid., p. 316 
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examples from everyday life, film,704 and other authors’ work, including Paul Valéry, and, of 
course, Charles Baudelaire.705 
 
However, the image as an underlying theoretical notion, is further elaborated by the German 
philosopher Sigrid Weigel. Her groundbreaking Body- and Image-Space, Re-reading Walter Benjamin,706 
                                                
704 He refers to the perception of film as ‘perception conditioned by shock [chockförmige Wahrnehmung]’, Benjamin, op. 
cit., p. 328 
705 To this list other authors could easily be added. For example, an early review of a performance by Karl Kraus in 
1928 could furnish an example of such a shock, as presented in the reading by Kraus of work by Jacques 
Offenbach: ‘Kraus – intentionally, rightly – explodes the framework of the entire evening. Anarchically, he turns 
directly to the audience during an interval in a brief speech that applies to Berlin the refrain we have just heard: 
“I bring out the worst in every town.” And in so doing he affects his listeners directly, in the same way he does 
with the texts he reads – that is to say, he assaults them unexpectedly, destructively, disrupting the prepared 
“mood,” attacking the audience where they least anticipate it. In this respect he can only be compared to a 
puppeteer. It is here, not in the style of the operetta star, that his mimicry and his gestural language have their 
origin. For the soul of the marionette has entered his hands. None of Offenbach’s works fulfills the 
requirements of opera as completely as La vie parisienne; nothing in La vie parisienne is as Parisian as the 
transparent nature than of that nonsensical nightlife through which not the logical but certainly the moral order 
makes its appearance. Of course, it does not come to judge; it comes as protest and evasion, as cunning and as 
mollifying gesture: in a word, as music.’ Walter Benjamin, ‘Karl Kraus reads Offenbach,’ in Selected Writings, 
Marcus Jennings (ed.), Vol. 2,  (Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, 1996), p. 111 
706 Sigrid Weigel, Body-and image-space : re-reading Walter Benjamin, (London, Routledge, 1996). Benjamin uses the terms 
body space  and image  space  in the Surrealism essay, on interrupting the artist’s career (as a raconteur of jokes): 
‘The jokes he tells will be better for it. And he will tell them better. For in the joke, too, in invective, in 
misunderstanding, in all cases where an action puts forth its own image and exists, absorbing and consuming it, 
where nearness looks with its own eyes, the long-sought image space is opened, the world of universal and 
integral actualities, where the “best room” is missing – the space, in a word, in which political materialism and 
physical creatureliness share the inner man, the psyche, the individual, or whatever else we throw to them, with 
dialectical justice, so that no limb remains untorn. Nevertheless – indeed, precisely after such dialectical 
annihilation – this will still be an image  space  and, more concretely, a body space .[…] The collectice is a body, 
too. And the physis that is being organized for it in technology can, through all its political and factual reality, be 
produced only in that image space to which profane illumination initiates us. Only when in technology body and 
space so interpenetrate that all revolutionary tension becomes bodily collective innervation, and all the bodily 
innervations of the collective become revolutionary discharge, has really transcended itself to the extent 
demanded by the Communist Manifesto. For the moment, only Surrealists have understood its present commands.’ 
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focuses on the ‘specific way in which Benjamin thinks and the figurations in which that thinking 
takes on form.’ 707She stresses the importance of how his  
manner of thinking and the manner of writing cannot be seen as separate since they – beyond the 
dualistic opposition of content and form – come together in a third: namely, in the image, which 
Benjamin himself referred to as a ‘third’.[...] In an image, however, that in Benjamin’s thought does 
not have the status of a reproduction (Abbild), a ‘mental picture’, or the like, but rather that of a 
constellation, a heteronomous and heterogeneous similitude, in which figures of thought correlate 
with those of history or of experience and reality.708  
Her work, unlike many others, states the centrality of the image in clear terms, and distinguishes 
between the different meanings of the term, even in Benjamin’s own work.709 She also makes the 
link between his ‘thinking-in-images’ which goes beyond metaphor and the aforementioned 
theory of language clearer, a theory ‘in which magic, myth, and progressive instrumentalization 
are significantly arranged in relation to one another.’710  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                  
See Walter Benjamin, ‘Surrealism. The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia,’ in Selected Writings, Marcus 
Jennings (ed.), Vol. 2, (Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, 1996), p. 217-218 
707 idem, p. ix 
708 ibid. 
709 Benjamin uses the term ‘image’ [Bild] ‘in a whole range of different combinations and contexts, and ultimately his 
talk of graphic image (Schriftbild) and dream image (Traumbild), of the images of history (Bilder der Geschichte) and 
the mnemic image (Erinnerungsbild), of thought-images (Denkbilder) and dialectical images (Dialektische Bilder) has 
as its basis a concept of images which – aside from the controversy concerning the relation between ‘material 
and mental image’ – goes back to the original and literal sense of the word: image as likeness, similitude, or 
resemblance (Ähnlichkeit).’ See Sigrid Weigel, op. cit., p. 23, and Chapter 4 in this thesis.  
710 Sigrid Weigel, op. cit., p. 75 
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On the relationship between language and music 
Several important texts address the relationship between language and music, as on the one hand 
the language of musical works and on the other hand the language-character of music.711 Building on 
insights gleaned clearly from Benjamin’s work on language, in another unfinished draft outline of 
a theory on musical ‘reproduction’712 – or interpretation – Adorno develops key elements, 
including the concept of the musical image (as different from what Adorno calls the sign). 
Today, the relationship of language and music has become critical. In comparison to signifying 
language, music is a language of a completely different type. Therein lies music’s theological aspect. 
What music says is a proposition at once distinct and concealed. Its idea is the form [Gestalt] of God. 
It is demythologized prayer, freed from the magic of making anything happen, the human attempt, 
futile, as always, to name the name itself, not communicate meanings. [...] Music points to the true 
language as to a language in which the content itself is revealed, but for this it pays the price of 
unambiguousness, which has gone over to the signifying languages. 713 
The above quotation comes from Adorno’s essay on the relationship between music and 
language, in which he draws on a theory of language, as signifying language on the one hand, and a 
pure language of objects on the other. This theory is strongly inspired by the work of Walter 
Benjamin, specifically his theory of language, which differs from traditional linguistic theories. 
The relation between Benjamin’s notion of language and Adorno’s theory has not been fully 
                                                
711 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Musik, Sprache un ihr Verhältnis im gegenwärtigen Komponieren,’ in Jahresring 56/57 
(Stuttgart, 1956); GS 16 (1978), pp. 649-664; translated by Susan H. Gillespie, ‘Music, Language, and 
Composition,’ in Musical Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 401-414; republished in Richard Leppert, 
Essays on Music. Theodor W. Adorno, pp. 113-126  
712 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Draft,’ in Notes to Literature, Vol 2., translated by Shierry Weber-Nicholsen, edited by Rolf 
Tiedemann, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1992); see also Theodor W. Adorno, Zu einer Theorie der 
musikalischen Reproduktion, Henri Lonitz (ed.), (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2001) 
713 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Music, Language, and Composition,’ in Essays, op. cit., p. 114; for a different translation, see 
also: Adorno, ‘Music and language,’ in Quasi una Fantasia, p. 2 
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explored.714 However, in order to interpret music (and language) it is necessary to understand the 
latter’s theoretical work on the language of objects. In his essay, ‘On Language as Such and the 
Languages of Man’, Benjamin outlines a theory of language based on God’s creative word – a 
god who is, however, not located in a divine, transcendent realm outside of the material world. 
In this material sense, the God or Messiah in this theory gives precedence to the objects 
themselves. For Benjamin, God's name then is at the same time a necessary and absent term: 
The proper name is the communion of man with the creative word of God. (Not the only one, 
however, man knows a further linguistic communion with God’s word.) Through the word, man is 
bound to the language of things. The human word is the name of things. Hence, it is no longer 
conceivable, as the bourgeois view of language maintains, that the word has an accidental relation to 
its object, that it is a sign for things (or knowledge of them, as agreed by some convention). Language 
never gives mere signs.715 
As Lieven De Cauter observes in this connection: ‘Perhaps Benjamin’s alternative, mystic 
sounding theory is to be construed negatively, and is his use of theology an attempt to escape 
both extremes of, on the one hand naturality and on the other hand the conventionality of 
                                                
714 See for example Max Paddison’s work on the language-character of music. Paddison, whilst exploring the double 
notion of the language-character of music which acts through mimesis, i.e. musical artworks mimic on the one 
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consider the language-character of music and Adorno’s notion of the silent work (again, without mentioning 
Benjamin), see Max Paddison, ‘The language-character of music: some motifs in Adorno,’ in Journal of the Royal 
Musical Association, Vol. 116, No. 2, (1991), pp. 267-279 and ‘Performance and the Silent Work. Mediation and 
Critical Reflexion in Adorno’s Theory of Musical Reproduction,’ in Filigrane Musique, esthétique, sciences, société. 
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language.’716 Benjamin states that not only is the bourgeois conception of language mistaken 
when it bases meaning in coincidence or convention, but the mystical theory of language is 
equally wrong when it identifies words with the nature of objects. According to Benjamin, 
objects do not have ‘words’ – the language of things is a silent language – theology is then a sort 
of tertium (non) datur.'717 In the fully rationalized world of modern works of art, the ‘language of 
objects’ – or in Adorno’s words also ‘language of things’ and ‘immediate language’ – is  
suppressed by the advanced technification, as he argues in Aesthetic Theory: 
Technique is able to become the opponent of art insofar as art represents – at changing levels – the 
repressed unmakable. However, the technologization of art is not synonymous with feasibility either, 
as the superficiality of cultural conservatism would prefer. Technologization, the extended arm of 
nature-dominating subject, purges artworks of their immediate language [unmittelbare Sprache].718  
What Adorno means is that technology alienates – a Marxian trope – but he also refers, implicitly 
to the loss of what Benjamin termed the aura: 
Technological requirements drive out the contingency of the individual who produces the work. The 
same process that traditionalists scorn as the loss of soul is what makes the artwork in its greatest 
achievements eloquent rather than merely the testimony of something psychological or human, as the 
contemporary prattle goes.719  
In a further step in this argument, Adorno finally turns to Benjamin’s notion of the language of 
objects, and ties modern art – crucially for my argument – to the language of objects: 
                                                
716 De Cauter quotes Tiedemann, who claims Benjamin refutes both theses. Rolf Tiedemann, in Theodor W. 
Adorno (introduction) and Rolf Tiedemann (ed.)  ‘Studien zur Philosophie Walter Benjamins,’ (Frankfurt am 
Main, Suhrkamp, 1973), p. 48 
717 Lieven De Cauter, De Dwerg in de Schaakautomaat, (Nijmegen, Sun,), p. 117-118; see also Irving Wohlfarth, 
‘”Geheime Beziehungen.” Zur Deutsch-Jüdische Spannung bei Walter Benjamin,’ in Studi Germanici, Vol. 28, 
(1990), p. 252-255 
718 Theodor W. Adorno, Gretl E. Adorno, and Rolf Tiedemann, Ästhetische Theorie, (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 
1970 (1980)), p. 60 
719 Ibid. 
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Radicalized, what is called reification probes for the language of things [Sprache der Dinge]. It narrows 
the distance to the idea of that nature that extirpates the primacy of human meaning. Emphatically 
modern art breaks out of the sphere of the portrayal of emotions and is transformed into the 
expression of what no signifying language can achieve. Paul Klee’s work is probably the best evidence 
of this from the recent past, and he was a member of the technologically minded Bauhaus.720 
Paradoxically, Adorno suggests that it is precisely through increasing reification that objects find 
their own, wordless language once again. The artworks as objects are ascribed various meanings 
by human language, which they are unable to resist, and end up divorced from their own reality 
as objects. Benjamin wrote in this regard that ‘language communicates the linguistic being of 
things.’721 The answer to the question ‘what does language communicate?’ is therefore ‘all 
language communicates itself.’722 However, to Benjamin this is not a tautological proposition, 
because ‘that which in a mental entity is communicable is its language.’723 He continues with a 
first application of this language as the language of man:  
‘The linguistic being of things is their language; this proposition, applied to man, means: the linguistic 
being of man is his language. Which signifies: man communicates his own mental being in his 
language. However, the language of man speaks in words. Man therefore communicates his own 
mental being (insofar as it is communicable) by naming all other things.’724  
It is this naming which causes the split from the language of things. De Cauter glosses this point 
as follows: 
Name as the heritage of human language therefore vouches for the fact that language as such is the 
mental being of man; and only for this reason is the mental being of man, alone amongst all mental 
                                                
720 Ibid. 
721 Walter Benjamin, ‘On Language as Such and the Languages of Man (1916),’ in Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, 
1913-1926, M.W. Jennings (ed.), (Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press), p. 63 
722 Ibid. 
723 ibid. 
724 ibid. 
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entities, communicable without residue. On this is founded the difference between human language 
and the language of things.’725 
The absence of a ‘residue’ points to a theory of human language as a totalizing system once 
more; language, with ‘man’ as the namer of things then speaks for them, in what Benjamin 
precisely calls ‘the language of man’726– by default forcing all nature to speak subjective language. 
He can then say that  
language, and in it a mental entity in it, only expresses itself purely where it speaks in name – that is, in 
its universal naming. So in name culminate both the intensive totality of language, as the absolutely 
communicable mental entity, and the extensive totality of language, as the universally communicating 
(naming) entity.727 
Benjamin pleads for a conception of language which rejects both the bourgeois conception – the 
sign is not arbitrary, and words are bound to the world of things – and the mystical theory – 
where ‘the word is simply the essence of the thing.’728 The latter ‘is incorrect because the thing in 
itself has no word, being created from God’s word and known in its name by a human word.’729  
As De Cauter shows, Benjamin does not regress into a theological or mystical conception of 
language. However, language-as-convention is repudiated in as far as it is subjectivizing: 
‘language comes before the subject, and therefore also before intersubjectivity.’730 This is of 
crucial importance to understand Adorno’s philosophy, as it borrows several of these points. For 
                                                
725 ibid. 
726 ibid. 
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728 Ibid. 
729 De Cauter, op. cit., p. 69: ‘Misschien is Benjamins alternatieve, mystiek aandoende theorie vooral negatief op te 
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anderzijds conventionaliteit van de taal te ontkomen.’ 
730 Lieven De Cauter, op. cit., p. 118 ‘De taal komt voor het subject, en dus ook voor de intersubjectiviteit.’ See also 
Irving Wolfahrt, ‘Die Willkür der Zeichen. Zu einem sprachphilosophischen Motiv Walter Benjamins,’ in C. 
Türcke (ed.), Perspektiven kritischer Theorie. Festschrift für Hermann Schweppenhäuser, (Lüneburg, 1988), p. 135 
 234 
example the relation of allegory to modernity, constitutes a signature of modern subjectivity, and 
therefore a subjectivizing of the objects as described by Benjamin’ theory of language.731 Adorno 
writes in Aesthetic theory about this allegorical aspect of artworks, tying it once more to the work of 
the informel painter Wols: 
Artworks not only produce imagines as something that endures. They become artworks just as much 
through the destruction of their own imagerie; for this reason art is profoundly akin to explosion. [...] 
Not only are artworks allegories, they are the catastrophic fulfilment of allegories. The shocks inflicted 
by the most recent artworks are the explosion of their appearance. In them appearance, previously a 
self-evident apriori of art, dissolves in a catastrophe in which the essence of appearance is for the first 
time fully revealed: and nowhere perhaps more unequivocally than in Wols’ paintings.732 
In the next, central passage in Aesthetic Theory, Adorno further relates this theory to the artwork, 
especially when he expounds the transformation process of artwork to image; also, it is noteworthy 
that the sort of language-like aspects – for example, the eloquence of this objective language – 
refers to Benjamin’s silent language of objects: 
Aesthetic images are not fixed, archaic invariants: Artworks become images in that the processes that 
have congealed in them as objectivity become eloquent. Bourgeois art-religion of Diltheyan 
provenance confuses imagerie of art with its opposite: with the artist’s psychological repository of 
representations. But this repository is itself an element of the raw material forged into the artwork. 
The latent processes in artworks, which break through in the instant, are their inner historicity, 
sedimented external history. The binding character of their objectivization as well as the experiences 
from which they live are collective.733   
                                                
731 See, for example, Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 85-86 
732 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 84 The reference to Wols is obviously very interesting, and can be seen 
to link to his essay on musique informelle. See Chapter 1 and 2 of this thesis. 
733 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 85-86 
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Not only is this, for Adorno, the language of artworks, but he impresses upon its image-character 
and collective aspect (of objects having something in common, another implied reference to 
Benjamin): 
The language of artworks is, like every language, constituted by a collective undercurrent, especially in 
the case of those works popularly stigmatized as lonely and walled up in the ivory tower; the 
eloquence of their collective substance originates in their image character and not in the ‘testimony’ – 
as the cliché goes – that they supposedly wish to express directly to the collective.734 
Language contains the ‘wealth of tradition [overlevering], which Benjamin conceives of as 
revelation – a revelation which unfolds in this tradition, which means in history. It [history] is 
this wealth.’735 Another scholar, Irving Wohlfarth, however, argues that the conception of 
language as convention is, a ‘forgetting of the forgetting’ of language as origin.736 On the contrary, 
for Benjamin, intersubjectivity precedes language: prattle737, over-definition, arbitrariness, even 
allegory. De Cauter explains:  
Allegory, also, is a Fall into the arbitrariness of the sign [of Saussurian linguistics] and Benjamin links it 
with the advent of modern subjectivity.738 On the side of the objects, it reinforces reification, the 
devaluation of things (I, 318, 360), which [refers to] nothing other than the ‘turning away from 
things’739 [as presented in] the essay on language. The mythical narrative structure of the language essays 
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739 Walter Benjamin, op.cit., p. 72 
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are an attempt to evade the subject, which constitutes the world and endows it with meaning; but at 
the same time it offers a framework within which alienation in and through language – in Lukács' vein 
– can be interpreted: as signature of modernity.740 
Adorno hints at this in musical terms in the aforementioned essay on Mahler when he wrote: 
[...]by attributing to the traditional words and syntax of music intentions which they no longer 
possessed, he signalled his recognition of the rupture. The inauthenticity of the language of music 
becomes the expression of its substance. Mahler’s tonal chords, plain and unadorned, are the 
explosive expressions of the pain felt by the individual subject imprisoned in an alienated society. 
They are cryptograms of modernity [my stress], guardians of the absolute dissonance which after him 
became the very language of music.741 
  
                                                
740 Lieven De Cauter, op. cit., p. 118-119 
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Music and Language 
A further aspect of this dialectic of the material can be found in Adorno’s essay ‘Music, 
Language, and Composition,’742 which delves into the critical situation in which new music and 
language are engaged. He contends that both language and music require a different 
interpretative approach – although analogous – along the lines described above: 
To interpret language means to understand language; to interpret music means to make music. Music 
interpretation is the act of execution [performance] that holds fast to the similarity to language, as 
synthesis, while at the same time it erases every individual incidence of that similarity. Hence the idea 
of interpretation belongs to music essentially and is not incidental to it.743 
Adorno argues for a theory of interpretation which respects the object – the musical work – by 
reading it immanently – on its own terms. 
But to play music properly means, above all, to speak its language properly. This language demands 
works to be imitated, not decoded. It is only in mimetic practice–which may, of course, be sublimated 
into the unspoken imagination in the manner of reading to oneself–that music discloses itself, never 
considering the interpretation independent of the act of performance. If one wished to compare the 
signifying languages with the musical act, it would more likely be the transcription of the text than its 
comprehension as signification.744 
This transcription implies a reference to Benjamin’s notion of translation; the task of the 
translator, to paraphrase the title of one of his seminal essays,745 is in the case of music one given 
to the performer or the reader of the score. However, originally, for Benjamin, translation is so 
central that it should be founded in any theory of language ‘at the deepest level’,746 as ‘translation 
is removal from one language into another through a continuum of transformations. Translation 
                                                
742 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Music, Language and Composition,’ in Essays, pp. 113-133 
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passes through continuity of transformation, not abstract areas of identity and similarity.’747 
Translation of the (mute) language of things into the language of man is ‘not only a translation of 
the mute into the sonic; it is the translation of the nameless into the name.’748 
 
Significantly, this points to Benjamin's understanding of the relation between language and 
historical time. This means that for Benjamin (as De Cauter reads him, with Giorgio Agamben) 
language is not a convention between people, but ‘an inheritance, a gift.’749 In this sense, 
‘language is handed down from “pre-history,” it always already comes before history, as language 
is the origin of history: any historical record/handing-down is based in language. Man is 
historical because he speaks.’750 ‘History,’ Benjamin states in Die Bedeutung der Sprache in Trauerspiel 
und Tragödie, ‘arises at the same time with meaning in human language [Sprache des Menschen].’751 
For De Cauter, Benjamin chooses ‘the tradition of the language of the Bible in a critical sense – 
as a different paradigm from the conventional conceptions of language, but ultimately to find 
out what it says about language.’752 As De Cauter argues, that ultimately in Benjamin’s theory a 
language can be found which lacks signification,753 resulting in his idea of a pure language. This 
refers to the messianic, utopian perspective, ‘where language becomes thinkable as freed from its 
instrumentality, as language in itself, as pure medium [as opposed to language as a “means”].’754 
This pure language can be understood as music, in its form as natural sound. Natural sound here 
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751 Walter Benjamin, GS II, p. 139 
752 Lieven De Cauter, op. cit., p 119 
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refers to the language of things, where ‘the lament is the language of nature complaining about 
too much definition, naming and language as a communicative medium.’755 According to De 
Cauter music ‘can be identified with pure language, purified of all mimetic and communicative 
statement (in favour of the symbolic: language as language).’756  
 
In Adorno’s later writings, this conception of a pure language is represented by his musings on 
the language character of music. In the essay on the relation between music and language,757 as 
quoted above, this link with Benjamin’s theory is revealed. In the following passage, the 
connection between the increasing subjectivism and reification reflects Benjamin’s theory of 
(Adamic) naming of objects, which rationalizes them. Adorno developed the most important 
element of this theory in these later writings, based on the insights from Benjamin’s work and his 
own thinking on the subject of language, as a theory of musical form. Traditional forms were 
functional and ‘capable of entering into a particular context. They provided the space for musical 
specificity just as concepts do for a particular reality, and at the same time, as with language, their 
abstractness was redeemed by the [socio-historical] context in which they were located.’758 As I 
have already argued, this traditional logic of forms has become second nature. In other words, it 
has become established to the point that they are simple mechanical schemata – an ‘illusion’ in 
Adorno’s words, against which new music rebels.759 New music ‘rises up in rebellion against the 
illusion implicit in such a second nature. It dismisses as mechanical these congealed formulae 
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757 Theodor W. Adorno, op. cit., p. 113-134 
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759 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Music and Language: a Fragment’, in Theodor W. Adorno, Quasi una fantasia : essays on 
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and their function.’760 However, new music cannot completely avoid the (human) language – 
only ‘from its reified version which degrades the particular into a token, into the superannuated 
signifier of fossilized subjective meanings.’761 In this sense, Adorno presents his language of 
[new] music as analogous to Benjamin’s (silent) language of objects, in clear contrast to everyday 
language: 
Subjectivism and reification go together in the sphere of music as elsewhere. But their correlation does 
not define music’s similarity to language once and for all. In our day, the relationship between music 
and language has become critical. The language of music [my emphasis] is quite different from the 
language of intentionality.762 
However, Adorno specifically employs the term natural language [Natursprache],763 in ‘On the Social 
Situation of Music,’764 where it is used in relation the music of Anton Webern, which he terms 
dialectical lyricism.765  
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from society – conditioned in Schoenberg by the formal structure of his work – become thematic and are 
transformed into content: the declaration of the inexpressible and of total alienation is asserted by every sound 
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close to Webern – and speak of ‘dialectic lyricism.’ In Theodor W. Adorno, ‘On the Social Situation in Music,’ op. 
cit.; see also Sören Kierkegaard, Fear and trembling, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex; New York, N.Y., Penguin Books, 
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Adorno explains this new label’s meaning, in all its contradictoriness: 
For here, the most extremely individual differentiation, a dissolution of the material used which 
musically goes far beyond Schoenberg and expressively beyond Berg, is employed for no other 
purpose that this: for the liberation of a type of natural language of music [my stress], of pure sound, 
which Webern denied without fail in the regression to a natural material [Naturmaterial], to tonality and 
to the ‘natural’ overtone relations. To produce the image of nature within historical dialectics: that is 
the intention of Webern’s music and the riddle which it offers. This riddle will be solved [dechiffriert] 
much later.766 
Although Adorno specifies that the social interpretation of Webern’s work presents great 
difficulty767 before the above passage, Webern’s music is slotted into the polemical debate of the 
music of the Schoenberg circle as opposed to the objectivity of Stravinsky’s music.768 However, 
the salient issue here is the reference to a number of ideas presented elsewhere in Adorno’s 
writings, which make an implied reference to Benjamin’s philosophy of language, in particular 
the idea of language as ‘natural’ language. In this regard, the riddle-like character of artworks769 – 
like Webern’s generally brief, densely constructed compositions – can only be revealed if its 
                                                                                                                                                  
Viking Penguin, 1985), and Peter Fenves, ‘Image and Chatter: Adorno’s Construction of Kierkegaard,’ in 
Diacritics, Vol. 22 (Spring 1992), pp. 100-114; on the importance of what the author Robert Kaufman terms lyric 
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766 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘On The Social Situation of Music (1932),’ in Richard Leppert (ed.), Essays on music: Theodor 
W. Adorno, (Berkeley, Calif.; London, University of California Press), pp. 391-436, specifically pp. 402-403; This 
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Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, op. cit., p. 1 
767 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘On the Social Situation of Music,’ op. cit., p. 402 
768 For Adorno’s critique of Schoenberg and Stravinsky, see Max Paddison, Adorno's Aesthetics of Music, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 264-271. The polemic high point in Adorno’s work of the two 
composers came in Philosophie der neuen Musik (1949) [Philosophy of New Music]. 
769 The notion of the riddle, even before the artwork-as-riddle, was an early point of interest in Benjamin’s work. See 
Walter Benjamin, ‘Riddle and Mystery,’ in Selected Writings, Vol. 1, pp. 266-268 
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material and truth content is ‘solved’ if we recall Benjamin’s method, through critique and 
commentary (based in the particular form of contemplation he proposes). For example, in his essay 
on Goethe’s Elective Affinities,770 Benjamin remarks à propos of this point: 
Critique seeks the truth content of a work of art; commentary its material content. The relation 
between the two is determined by that basic law of literature according to which the more significant 
the work, the more inconspicuously and intimately its truth content is bound up with its material 
content. If therefore, the works that prove enduring are precisely those whose truth is most deeply 
sunken in their material content, then in the course of this duration, the concrete realities rise up 
before the eyes of the beholder all the more distinctly the more they die out in the world.771 
Benjamin’s insight into Goethe’s text underlies not only Adorno’s contemporaneous writings, 
but continues to echo throughout the latter’s late work, as is evident from the critique of 
Webern’s work mentioned above, and, above all, Aesthetic Theory.772 Benjamin’s text on Goethe 
continues with a further explanation of the relationship between the two types of content as 
different from a temporal point of view: 
With this, however, to judge by appearances, the material content and the truth content, united at the 
beginning of the work’s history, set themselves apart from each other in the course of its duration, 
because the truth content always remains to the same extent hidden as the material content comes to 
the fore. More and more, therefore, the interpretation of what is striking and curious – that is the 
material content – becomes a prerequisite for any later critic.773 
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Benjamin had with the work of Goethe, see especially the second part of the essay by Joanna Hodge, ‘The 
Timing of Elective Affinity: Walter Benjamin’s Strong Aesthetics,’ in Andrew Benjamin (ed.), Walter Benjamin and 
Art, (London, New York, Continuum, 2005), pp. 14-31. In it, Hodge not only relates Benjamin’s relation to 
Goethe, she illuminates their preoccupation with a category of expressionlessness, ‘retrieved from the writings of 
Spinoza,’ in light of Kant’s philosophy (p. 15) 
771 Walter Benjamin, ‘Goethes Elective Affinities,’ in Selected Writings, Vol. 1, p. 297 
772 For examples from Aesthetic Theory in support of this claim, see infra.  
773 Benjamin, op. cit., p. 297 
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Benjamin’s understanding of artworks as containing not only historically mediated material, but 
also an objective truth, is also powerfully present in Adorno’s conception of interpretation; 
interpretation as in a correct execution may intimate the material conditions of society. As an 
example of how interpretation, as critique and commentary might work, Benjamin talks about 
the role of the palaeographer, who sits in front of a parchment, on which a faded text  
is covered by the lineaments of a more powerful script which refers to that text. As the palaeographer 
would have to begin by reading the latter script, the critic would have to begin with commentary. And 
with one stroke, an invaluable criterion springs out for him; only now can he raise the basic question 
of whether the semblance/luster [Schein] of the truth content is due to the material content, or the life 
of the material to the truth content.774 
For Benjamin, these two set themselves apart from each other in the work, and as they do so 
‘they decide on its immortality. In this sense the history of works prepares for their critique, and 
thus historical distance increases their power.’775 Further developing this notion of the illusory 
and the object-ive in artworks, the relation between content and what Adorno calls the semblance 
character of artworks,  
is immanently mediated by their own objectivity. Once a text, a painting, a musical composition is 
fixed, the work is factually existent and merely feigns the becoming – the content – that it 
encompasses; even the most extreme developmental tensions in aesthetic time is to a degree 
indifferent to empirical time, which it neutralizes.776 
It is this dialectical tension, between the illusory becoming and the hardening of the work as an 
object which motivates Adorno’s aesthetics of music; the fruitful moment here lies in the 
                                                
774 Benjamin, op. cit., p. 298 
775 Benjamin, op. cit., p. 298 
776 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, op. cit., p. 107. This is part of a longer discussion of the work of art as ‘tour 
de force’, of ‘making the impossible possible’, or pretending that a work is not ‘made’, hiding what Adorno calls 
its ‘facture’. However, this illusory character or semblance paradoxically constitutes the content of the artwork, 
‘through the form of that semblance.’ 
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admission of the developmental as the problematic (and ultimately untenable) telos of his 
reasoning in this regard, which opens up the potential of a future (spatially aware) music. At the 
same time as the illusion portends to be a necessary element (to allow the artwork to exist at all), 
in the modernist musical artwork, it is precisely the aesthetic time of the music which attempts to 
make the listener forget about experiental time that constitutes the illusory element; Adorno 
criticizes it as a form of spatialization, which even his preferred developmental technique cannot 
escape.  
 
In fact, both Benjamin and Adorno are concerned with the enigmatic physiognomy of the work of 
art, or in the words of Shierry Weber Nicholson:  
the enigmatic face of the work of art, the enigmatic gaze it directs at us, that incites this philosophical 
reflection. The notion of art’s enigmatic quality – or its picture-puzzle or rebus-like quality, in an 
image more familiar from Benjamin’s work than Adorno’s – is crucial to Adorno’s concept of art and 
is inseparable from the notion of the work of art as mimetic and requiring or inciting mimetic 
behaviour in the viewer or listener.777  
In her opinion, it is enigmatic precisely because of its mimetic and ‘non-conceptual’ [conceptless] 
character, and because it cannot have a discursive meaning.778 It was Benjamin’s intention to 
understand works of art – as we have seen in the Goethe essay – by means of an interpretation 
which reflects on their riddle-like character, whilst at the same time taking a critical distance. 
However, as Nicholsen points out, this distance is absent if the work of art is experienced 
through ‘mimetic assimilation’ – as she quotes Adorno: ‘When one is inside works of art, re-
                                                
777 Shierry Weber-Nicholsen, Exact imagination, late work : on Adorno's Aesthetics, (Studies in contemporary German 
social thought), (Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1997), p. 150 
778 Ibid. Weber-Nicholsen finishes the paragraph by stating: ‘further, it is enigmatic because it lost its purpose when 
the mimetic migrated from ritual into art; art has become, in Kant’s phrase, purposive but without purpose. As 
Adorno says, art cannot answer the question, ‘What are you for?’ 
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enacting them, the enigmatic quality makes itself invisible’779 and ‘the musician who understands 
his score follows the most minute movements in it, but in a certain sense he does not know what 
he is playing.’780 
 
In the following passage, Adorno employs Benjamin’s concept, keeping the latter’s insistence on 
interpretation of the artwork as enigma in mind, as well the potential for revelation – of its 
historical material and truth content – and its ‘mute’ language of objects: 
If expression were merely a duplicate of subjective feelings, it would not amount to anything. [...] A 
better model for understanding expression is to think of it not in terms of subjective feelings, but in 
terms of ordinary things and situations in which historical processes have been sedimented, endowing 
them with the potential to speak.781 
It is revealing that works of art, often seen as eternal or universal in their appeal – Beethoven’s 
symphonies, for example – and the formation of a stable canon of great works is implicitly 
criticized here; it becomes clear that artworks not only live a life of their own – apart from their 
creator – but are also vulnerable: if, to paraphrase Benjamin, what is striking and curious in its 
material content loses its critical edge, then they simply may become mere banalities. 
 
 
  
                                                
779 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p 183 [176] as quoted by Nicholsen, op. cit., p. 150 
780 Ibid. In a similar manner, Max Paddison argues that expression can be understood as the tension within the 
larger context of the rationalization in artworks, which is ‘identified by Adorno with construction, as the activity 
of “shaping” or forming (Gestaltung) the material[...] Self-reflection is implied, as opposed to the “blindness” of 
expression; also technique, rationality (as ratio) and objectivity. Mimesis in this context is related to the miming of 
‘inner, subjective feelings in order to bring them to expression, as well as the “mimicking” of bodily gestures,’ 
whilst the latter a ‘also have ‘objective’, socio-cultural and historical significance.’ In Max Paddison, Adorno’s 
Aesthetics of Music, op. cit., p. 142 
781 Theodor W. Adorno, GS 7, p. 170, as quoted by Max Paddison, op. cit., p. 142 
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The art object 
In the following section, the question as to the art object is framed within Adorno’s work. The 
term is both critically used in his philosophy – based on Benjamin’s theory of the object – and 
has huge implications for his aesthetic considerations of music and musical time. Importantly, it 
allows Adorno to propose his concepts of becoming versus being, at the level of the object. I will 
further develop this notion of an object-in-motion in light of the sound-object. 
 
As Claudia Brodsky asks: ‘What is an art object? And how do we experience it?’782 She argues, 
somewhat unusually, that Adorno’s work forms a counterweight to what she terms the 
‘dissolution of music as a meaningful artistic form’783 by Hegel’s interpretation of romantic music, 
as, paradoxically, ‘first and foremost, affordable art.’ In her view it remains ‘no less powerfully 
unclear what in Adorno’s, opposed to Hegel’s, aesthetic theory defines [as] “object”.’784 The 
problem of defining the object in musical terms in this regard,  
is not merely because music, of all the arts may be the least likely exemplar of objecthood–transitory 
by nature, fixed only in its notation, inherently available to formal and performative variation–but 
because Adorno, writing on art in general, resists all exemplary definitions of what constitutes this 
theoretical object.785 
Benjamin and Adorno’s theories of experience attempt to understand the opposed character of 
our experiences as fleeting, and knowledge as more lasting. Importantly, this argument attempts 
to ‘frame the sensuous’786 and centres on what precisely it is that is experienced. The experience 
                                                
782 Claudia Brodsky, ‘Framing the Sensuous: Objecthood and “Objectivity,”’ in J.M. Bernstein (ed.), Art and Aesthetics 
after Adorno, (The Townsend Papers in the Humanities, Vol. 3), (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2010), p. 
74 
783 Ibid. 
784 Ibid. 
785 Ibid. 
786 Ibid., p. 69 
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of the artwork then, is an experience of an art object, which includes the experience of musical 
works. However, it becomes clear that traditional conceptualizations of the object – including 
artworks as static entities – do not suffice to define these complexly mediated objects, with an 
implied temporal (and spatial) dimension. For Adorno, artworks, as objects-in-movement can be 
negatively defined in opposition to reified objects, or ‘culture-objects’ (Kulturobjekte); the art 
object in this sense is composed of contradictory moments. 
 
Benjamin situated his early work on the philosophy of history as a critique of Kant's concept of 
the ephemeral nature of experience [Erfahrung]. In Über das Programm der kommenden Philosophie, he 
diagnosed a basic problem in not only Kant's, but any ‘great theory of knowledge’: 
The problem faced by Kantian epistemology, as with every great epistemology, has two sides, and 
Kant managed to give a valid explanation for only one of them. First of all, there was the question of 
the certainty of knowledge that is lasting, and, second, there was the question of the integrity of an 
experience that is transient. For universal philosophical interest is continually directed toward both the 
timeless validity of knowledge and the certainty of a temporal experience which is regarded as the 
immediate, if not the only object of that knowledge.787 
Benjamin searches for a theory of experience that includes both sides of the problem, the ‘lasting 
certainty of cognition’ [bleibenden Gewißheit der Erkenntnis] and the ‘integrity of transitory 
experiences’ [Dignität vergänglicher Erfahrung].788 The connection between these two is only possible 
                                                
787 Burkhardt Lindner, Thomas Küpper, and Timo Skrandies (eds.), Benjamin-Handbuch. Leben, Werk, Wirkung, 
(Stuttgart, J.B. Metzler, 2006), p. 175. Quoted from Gesammelte Schriften II, p. 158 
788 Benjamin’s prologue to the Trauerspiel bookfurther develops this idea. As Charles Davis writes: ‘In knowledge the 
subject constructs a world according to its own concepts; in experience the subject constitutes ‘ideas.’ These 
ideas have an objective structure that, as objective, is determined by the particular phenomena themselves. 
Despite that contrast between knowledge and experience, knowledge by breaking up reality into its elements 
does serve to mediate particular phenomena to the ideas. Phenomena do not enter whole into the ideas, but only 
as conceptually unravelled into their elements. All the same, experience is nonetheless the representation of ideas 
(Darstellung der Ideen) from out of empirical reality itself. See C. Davis, ‘Walter Benjamin, The Mystical Materialist,’ 
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if the ‘singularly temporal [singulär zeitlich]’789 structure also becomes the subject of philosophy 
from the lasting certainty and if the theory of cognition transforms itself into a philosophy of 
history. What is critical, then, is how both can form an alliance, which does not reduce the 
experience (including the experience of the unfolding of time) to a simple category or concept.790 
As Charles Davis contends, this occurs when ‘the particular phenomena themselves, though 
conceptually mediated, become the ideas.’791 As Benjamin himself argues, ‘Ideas are to objects as 
constellations are to stars. This means in the first place, that they are neither concepts nor their 
laws. They do not contribute to the knowledge of phenomena and in no way can the latter be 
criteria with which to judge the existence of ideas. The significance of phenomena for ideas is 
confined to their conceptual elements.’792 The phenomena, then, are ‘conceptually mediated, are 
taken up into the ideas’793 and thus redeemed (gerettet).794 Each idea ‘is self-contained as a monad. 
But every single monad contains all the others. As a monad, each idea contains the totality and is 
an image of the world. Nevertheless, each idea differs from every other idea. Ideas are thus 
discontinuous, each in its own way a complete whole as a monadic image.’795 Adorno elaborates 
on this notion of the object as containing congealed history in ‘Thing, Language, History’ in 
Negative Dialectics: 
The means employed in negative dialectics for the penetration of its hardened objects is possibility–the 
possibility of which their reality has cheated the objects and which is nonetheless visible in each one. 
                                                                                                                                                  
in Solomon Frank, et al., Truth and compassion : essays on Judaism and religion in memory of Rabbi Dr. Solomon Frank, (SR 
supplements, Vol. 12), (Waterloo, Ont., (Canada), Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1983), p. 79 
789 Ibid. 
790 Ibid. 
791 Ibid. 
792 Walter Benjamin and John Osborne, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, (London, NLB, 1977), p. 34, as quoted by 
Charles Davis, op. cit., p. 80 
793 Charles Davis, op.cit., p. 80 
794 intentionally a religious word, in Davis, p. 80 
795 Ibid. 
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But no matter how hard we try for a linguistic expression of such a history congealed in things, the 
words we use will remain concepts. Their precision substitutes for the thing itself, without quite 
bringing itself could to mind; there is a gap between words and the thing they conjure. Hence the 
residue of arbitrariness and relativity in the choice of words as well as in the presentation as a whole. 
Benjamin’s  concepts still tend to an authoritarian concealment of their conceptuality. Concepts alone 
can achieve what the concept prevents.796 
Although he criticises Benjamin for seemingly misunderstanding (and abandoning) concepts, he 
continues by affirming the method of the constellation: 
The determinable flaw in every concept makes it necessary to cite others; this is the font of the only 
constellations which inherited some of the hope of the name.  The language of philosophy approaches 
that name by denying it. The claim of immediate truth for which it chides the words is almost always 
the ideology of a positive, existent identity of word and thing. Insistence upon a single word and 
concept as the iron gate to be unlocked is also a mere moment, though an inalienable one. To be 
known, the inwardness to which cognition clings in expression always needs its own outwardness as 
well.797 
Art objects798 are not simply objectified for Adorno, although when they are perceived as such, 
as ‘culture-objects’, they succumb to ‘the fetish of the irrevocability of things in being.’799 Objects 
                                                
796 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, op. cit., pp. 52-53 
797 Ibid., p. 53 
798 On the difference between the different terms used by Adorno, see Claudia Brodsky, op. cit., pp. 75-77: ‘For, if 
“art” at present–or, at least, since Duchamp appears to designate an infinite and fragmented field of particulars, 
none of which can be excluded and a priori from, and few of which can rest secure a posteriori in, the name, the 
immediate difficulty in defining the object of art in Adorno is that “object” in Adorno goes by too many names. 
[...]  While “object” and thing in English obviously overlap with “Objekt” and “Ding” in German, Adorno can 
and does employ the alternatives to these terms available only in German: “Gegenstand” as well as “Objekt”, 
“Sache” as well as “Ding”.[...] Adorno uses them noninterchangeably. [...] If “object” (Gegenstand) is the word 
Adorno uses instead of “thing” (Ding) to imply the product of an act of objectification that is at once an act of 
reification [Verdinglichung], and if “object” (Objekt, used more frequently by Adorn, can convey, unlike “object” 
(Gegenstand)but like “thing” (but Ding, either positive or negative connotations, the derivative terms, “objective” 
(objektiv) and “objectivity” (Objektivität), gradually shed any such semantic ambivalence in the essay.’ 
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are not static or unchanging, then, but part of the historical dialectic, and temporal. As Adorno 
argues in Negative Dialectics, with a curious linguistic analogy: 
Their becoming fades and dwells within the things; it can no more be stabilised in their concepts than 
it can be split off from their own results and forgotten. Simi lar  to  th i s  be coming i s  t empora l  
exper i ence  [my stress]. It is when things in being read as a text of their becoming that idealistic and 
materialistic dialects touch. But while idealism sees in the inner history of immediacy its vindication as 
a stage of the concept, materialism makes that inner history the measure, not just the untruth of 
concepts, but even more of the immediacy in being.800 
If objects are not to be seen (exclusively) as reified monads, they can be seen as becoming rather 
static being. In terms of the artwork, Adorno sees them as historical, and therefore temporally 
mediated:  
The artwork in itself is not, as historicism would have it – as if its history accords simply with its 
position in real history – Being absolved from Becoming. Rather, as something that exists, the artwork 
has its own development. What appears in the artwork is its own inner time; the explosion of 
appearance blasts open the continuity of this inner temporality. The artwork is mediated to real history 
by its monadological nucleus. History is the content of artworks. To analyze artworks means no less 
than to become conscious of the history immanently sedimented in them.801  
From the music of Beethoven, Mahler and Berg to the future musique informelle, Adorno imbues 
them with the notion of a surpassing of the handed-down forms, via disintegration which is to be 
realized in the immanence of music itself. In surpassing these handed-down forms, the works of 
these composers not only indicate the way to a new music, but equally to a new way of 
understanding musical form in general. This points to the idea of a ‘material theory of form,’ as 
                                                                                                                                                  
799 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, op. cit. 
800 Ibid. 
801 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, op.cit., p. 118 
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we have seen Vers une musique informelle, Aesthetic Theory and the Mahler essay.802 Contrary to the 
traditional analysis of music, which never really understands the mediation of the whole by the 
part in any other way than in postulating a pre-established harmony where every part is abstractly 
designed as the detail tailored to the whole, the material theory of forms differs in its approach. It 
proposes to deduce all of its formal categories from their meaning in the context of immanent 
temporalization to the musical work. This theory also wants to assume certain traditional 
categories as far as they already imply a temporal character, were it not because they were 
determined by rules of succession, by reified categories of stylization, for example, the notion of the 
period with its constituent elements of antecedent and consequent. 
 
If the art object is composed of contradictory moments, Adorno’s goal is to establish an object-
immanent critique which, rather than remaining in ‘general knowledge of the servitude of the 
objective mind [...] seeks to transform this knowledge into the power of the consideration of the 
thing itself (die Sache selbst),803’ in such a way that, ‘where it comes across something that does not 
suffice, does not rapidly ascribe it to the individual and his psychology, the mere cover for failure, 
but seeks to derive it from the irreconcilable ability of the moments of the object.’804 To return 
to the comments made by Claudia Brodsky in this regard, 
That an “object” can be made of, can contain, “moments,” and that such “moments” rather than any 
specific content by what compose its “objectivity,” like that of “truth,” must render such an “object” 
non-objectifiable in the very manner Hegel rejected as non-aesthetic, that of an “object” that is always 
changing, and thus not “properly” an art object at all.805 
                                                
802 See also Max Paddison, op. cit., p. 149-183 
803 The translation here implies that it is not related to the thing in itself in a Kantian context, which would be das 
Ding an sich. 
804 Theodor W. Adorno, Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft I, in GS 10.1, (1977), p. 27 
805 Claudia Brodsky, op. cit., p. 80 
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Furthermore, it is the broken link between a metaphysics and the experience of objects which 
underpins Benjamin’s critique of Kant; a further problem with the latter’s theory is precisely its 
inability to open up this realm of metaphysics, 
because it contains within itself the primitive elements of an unproductive metaphysics which excludes 
all others. In epistemology every metaphysical element is the germ of a disease that expresses itself in 
the separation of knowledge from the realm of experience in its full freedom and depth.[...] There is – 
and here lies the historical seed of the approaching philosophy – a most intimate connection between 
that experience, the deeper exploration of which could never lead to metaphysical truths, and that 
theory of knowledge, which was not yet able to determine sufficiently the logical place of metaphysical 
research.806 
Benjamin searches for a ‘non-metaphysical metaphysics,’807 which tries ‘to make the phenomenal 
world yield noumenal experience.’808 His interpretative skills as a literary critic – concerned with 
particular texts – can be understood as fundamental for his non-conceptual, anti-idealist reading. 
This approach, as I have shown, culminates in the notion of the dialectical image, in which the 
interpretation of (mundane) objects,809 as well as works of art, lead to the rearrangement of their 
contradictory elements in constellations, aimed at releasing new meanings. 
 
However, before I turn to a consideration the nature of the images of artworks themselves (and 
indeed, the experience of artworks as images), a final consideration of the dialectical tension 
between cognition [Erkenntnis] and experience in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory and his writings on 
                                                
806 Walter Benjamin, et al., Selected writings, (Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press., 1996), p. 103 
807 Susan Buck-Morss, The origin of negative dialectics : Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt Institute, (New 
York, Free Press, 1977), p. 93, as quoted by Charles Davis, op. cit., p. 80; For a study of Benjamin’s approach to 
metaphysics, see Eric Jacobson, Metaphysics of the Profane: The Political Theology of Walter Benjamin and Gershom 
Scholem, (New York, Columbia University Press, 2003) 
808 Charles Davis, ibid.  
809 For examples of these images, Benjamin’s Paris Capital of the Nineteenth Century studies everything from the scraps 
gathered by the ragman to the advertisements in the windows of the Paris arcades. 
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music is required – in order to understand the connection with Benjamin’s work in this regard. 
Especially in the draft introduction to Aesthetic Theory, Adorno draws attention to the mutually 
necessary relationship between knowing and experiencing: 
Lived experiences are indispensable, but they are no final court of aesthetic knowledge. Precisely those 
elements of art that cannot be taken immediately in possession and are not reducible to the subject 
require consciousness and therefore philosophy. It inheres in all aesthetic experience to the extent that 
it is not barbarically alien to art. Art awaits its own explanation. It is achieved methodically through 
the confrontation of historical categories and elements of aesthetic theory with artistic experience, 
which correct one another reciprocally.810 
For Adorno, what is important is not a solid canon of great works – to be preserved a-
historically as a perfect set of monuments – whilst at the same time not to be discarded ‘in favour 
of the putative immediacy of artistic experience.’811 In other words, for Adorno, philosophy – 
understood here as the consciousness of art – is implicitly already present in artistic experience. 
Or in an even clearer incarnation: art does not simply exist as experienced by people, but it 
comes with its own language. It is this language which corresponds closely to the ‘language of 
objects’ Benjamin referred to in On Language as such and on the Language of Man.812 
 
In conclusion, Adorno’s conceptualization of the artwork is not simply focused on artworks-as-
objects, albeit objects-in-movement, but also to the experience of them. Following Benjamin, 
Adorno’s theory of experience attempts to grasp the fleetingness of the moments of experience, 
and gaining knowledge from these experiences, without reducing the objects to reified things. In 
other words, against a transcendental or pragmatist theory of experience, the experience Adorno 
                                                
810 Ibid. 
811 Ibid. 
812 Walter Benjamin, ‘On Language as Such and on the Language of Man,’ in Selected Writings, op. cit., Vol. 1 
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and Benjamin are interested in keeps the relation between object and observer ‘open.’ It is in this 
regard that Claudia Brodsky observes: 
Adorno's aesthetic theory, while related by the dialectic to objects, unlike Kant's, alters, no less than 
does Kant's critical analytic of aesthetic “judgement,” how it is we conceive the aesthetic object we 
spontaneously perceive. For Adorno such an object is conceived “objectively,” not as it is but in its 
“moments,” moments perceptible only by “the mind,” itself in “movement.” Yet for this to happen–
for an object to be perceived as “moments” of the object–the immediate sensory reality of the 
aesthetic must be separated from its object identification: this, and not the destruction of the sensory, 
is the real violence of “theory.”813 
As I have shown, Adorno’s theory draws heavily on Benjamin’s critique of Kant and the ‘naming’ 
of the object which in Benjamin’s eyes was akin to a subjectivization of them, whilst for Adorno 
this naming does not condemn the named object entirely. At the same time Adorno’s aesthetics 
articulates the dangers of reification, both of the object (as ‘culture-object’) and the mind (as 
reified consciousness). Brodsky implicitly refers to these influences – respectively of Benjamin 
and Bergson – when she writes: 
Finally for perceived moments to be further perceived as the “movement” of the object rather than 
the mind alone, the sensory must be maintained while being perceived to change, given no objective 
identity but the identity of objecthood, of being and remaining some “thing” outside the subject. The 
sensory must be perceived “objectively” received at each “moment” as never before, for it to appear 
to move independently of the subject, to move as if “through” the mind of its own, and the basis for 
such a perception of the senseless–not in itself, as if such perception were possible, or in its identity as 
an object (both equal grist for ideology)–is not sensuousness itself but abstraction.814 
The object-immanent critique is therefore a necessary analysis of this interaction, which is 
temporarily brought to a standstill in the moment Benjamin calls a dialectical image. The 
                                                
813 Claudia Brodsky, ibid. 
814 Ibid., p. 82 
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dialectical image therefore can be understood as precisely a theoretical attempt at linking 
Erkenntnis and Erlebnis/Erfahrung: understanding the fleeting experience of the artwork whilst 
conceiving of this as knowledge without destroying the original object as a mere static thing. 
  
 256 
The dialectical image: history, interpretation and further considerations 
I have argued, with a number of scholars, including Susan Buck Morss, Shierry Weber Nicholson, 
Rolf Tiedemann, Lieven De Cauter and many others, that the complex relationship of Benjamin 
and Adorno, both personal and in their work, can be contextualized through an account of their 
debates on a number of concepts, including the notion of progress (both in the writing of history 
and in aesthetics) and language. However, another key concept in this extraordinary exchange of 
ideas consists of Benjamin’s concept of the dialectical image. Apart from the reading of Benjamin’s 
work, in particular, Paris Capital of the Nineteenth Century815 – a trajectory leads from Benjamin’s 
attempts to integrate Freud’s theory’s on the dream image, via Adorno’s critique of this original 
conception of the dialectical image,816 to its redemption in Adorno’s later work. Benjamin’s 
formulation at first was concerned with understanding nineteenth century Paris, according to 
Margaret Cohen, positing ‘the dialectical image as the accurate reconstruction of the material 
forces producing the nineteenth-century world of dreams.’817 Undoubtedly the central text on the 
Benjamin’s Paris Arcades,818 is Susan Buck-Morss The Dialectics of Seeing. Walter Benjamin and the 
Arcades Project.819 In this book, Buck-Morss not only traces the ‘spatial’ and ‘temporal’ origins820 of 
                                                
815 Walter Benjamin The Arcades Project, (Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, 1999); Walter Benjamin, et al., Das 
Passagenwerk, Rolf Tiedemann (ed.), Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 5 (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1982) 
816 Jean-Michel Palmier, in all his attempts at exhaustive analysis, returns to the notion of the dialectical image, and 
the discussions Benjamin and Adorno had, ‘quant à la structure même de l’image dialectique et qui révèlent leur 
differences de sensibilité et de méthode.’ Palmier, J.-M., ‘Quelques remarques sur la notion et la fonction de 
l’image dalectique chez Walter Benjamin,’ in op. cit., p. 777-787 
817 Margaret Cohen, Profane illumination : Walter Benjamin and the Paris of surrealist revolution, (Weimar and now, Vol.  5), 
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993), p. 47 
818 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, (Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, 1999). Benjamin organized his notes 
contained in the Arcades Project under broad thematic headings named ‘Convolutes’, concerning the concept of 
the dialectical image, see ‘Convolute N’ in particular. 
819 Susan Buck-Morss, The dialectics of seeing : Walter Benjamin and the Arcades project, (Cambridge, Mass.; London, MIT 
Press, 1989) 
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the unfinished project, through earlier works – especially his Trauerspiel and One Way Street – his 
friendships with Gershom Scholem,821 Adorno and his relationship with A. Lascis,822 and places 
of interest.823 It is in the Paris Arcades, however, that Benjamin found his central image, as Buck-
Morss explains, in relation to Proust’s underlying notion of the mémoire involontaire, which he 
developed from a rather personal level of remembering, to one which could span collective 
memory (and tradition).824 As Susan Buck-Morss explains, Benjamin 
[...] retained the notion that the Arcades project would present collective history as Proust had 
presented his own – not ‘life as it was’, nor even life remembered, but life as it had been ‘forgotten.’ 
Like dream images, urban objects, relics of the last century, were hieroglyphic clues to a forgotten past. 
Benjamin’s goal was to interpret for his own generation these dream fetishes in which, in fossilized 
form, history’s traces had survived.825 
                                                                                                                                                  
820 Ibid., p. 8. She quotes Benjamin on the meaning of ‘origin’, not as an authentic beginning, but as a ‘rhythmic’ 
flow of becoming: ‘Origin [Ursprung], although a thoroughly historical category, nonetheless has nothing to do 
with beginnings [...]. The term origin does not mean the process of becoming of that which has emerged, but 
much more, that which emerges out of the process of becoming and disappearing. The origin stands in the flow 
of becoming as a whirlpool [...]; its rhythm is apparent only to a double insight.’ In Waltr Benjamin, GS V: Das 
Passagenwerk ed. R. Tiedemann, 1982, p. 83 
821 Gershom Scholem, Walter Benjamin. Die Geschichte einer Freundschaft. (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1975); 
translated by Harry Zohn, Walter Benjamin. The Story of a Friendship, (Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society of 
America, 1981) 
822 His friendships with Theodor W. Adorno, G. Scholem and relationship with A. Lascis are of note. See Susan 
Buck-Morss, ibid. and Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, (Cambridge, MA 
and London, Harvard University Press, 2014) 
823 Including Naples, Berlin (where he spent his childhood and youth), Moscow (where he visited A. Lascis, a 
communist activist), Paris, and arcades of these respective cities. 
824 For a book-length study of this notion, see J. McCole, Walter Benjamin and the antinomies of tradition, (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1993), especially Chapter 6, ‘Benjamin and Proust: Remembering’ is concerned with 
Benjamin’s writings on Proust as well as the notion of involuntary memory, the ‘bridge’ between memory and 
dream, and the ‘doctrine of memory in Benjamin’s later work, see p. 253-279 
825 Susan Buck-Morss, op. cit., p. 39 
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Buck-Morss interprets Benjamin’s work on Baudelaire as a case in point of such an interpretative 
act of discovery. Especially Baudelaire’s attempt to positioning his work in an ever-expanding 
literary market is crucial: 
Baudelaire turned this inner psychological characteristic into a market advantage. In his attempt to 
compete in the literary marketplace [...] he had to distinguish his own work from that of other poets.826 
Baudelaire’s obsession, his ‘specialty’ (indeed, his trademark), was the ‘sensation of the new.’827  
Benjamin speaks of the ‘inestimable value for Baudelaire of the nouveauté. The new cannot be 
interpreted, or compared. It becomes the ultimate retrenchment of art.’828  Making novelty ‘the 
highest value’ was the strategy of l’art pour l’art, the aesthetic position Baudelaire adopted in 1852. 
As non-conformism, it was in ‘rebellion against the surrender of art to the market.’829  Ironically, 
however, this ‘last line of resistance of art’ converged with the commodity form that threatened 
it: Novelty is ‘the quintessence of false consciousness, the tireless agent of which is fashion.’830  It 
is the ‘appearance of the new [that] is reflected like one mirror in another in the appearance of 
the always-the-same.’831  The same dialectic of temporality lies concealed in Baudelaire’s own 
sensibility. Baudelaire ‘did not know nostalgia.’ 832At the same time, he renounced progress: 
It is very significant that ‘the new’ in Baudelaire in no way makes a contribution to progress. [...] It is 
above all the ‘belief in progress’ that he persecutes with hate, as a heresy, a false doctrine, not merely a 
simple error.833 
                                                
826 Susan Buck-Morss, op. cit., p. 194 
827 Ibid., p. 195 
828 Ibid.  
829 Ibid.  
830 Ibid.  
831 Ibid.  
832 Ibid. 
833 Ibid. 
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Progress here relates to the idea of universal progress, as I have argued elsewhere. The object of 
Baudelaire’s destructive attack, according to Buck-Morss, is against the phantasmagoria of his 
age; it 
included the “harmonious façade” of continuous historical progress. In its place, expressed in his 
poems is (in Proust’s words) “a strange sectioning of time,” shock-like segments of ‘empty time,’  each 
of which is like a ‘“warning signal.”’  His spleen places a century between the present moment and the 
one that has just been lived.834 
Buck-Morss continues her investigation of the dialectical image by explaining that Benjamin ‘was 
at least convinced of one thing: what was needed was a visual, not a linear logic: The concepts 
were to be imagistically constructed, according to the cognitive principles of montage.’ 835  
Benjamin’s interest in the nineteenth century and its objects meant that he saw them in their 
relation to and lasting impact on the present. They were ‘to be made visible as the origin of the 
present, at the same time that every assumption of progress was to be scrupulously rejected.’836 
Counter-intuitively, ‘in order for a piece of the past to be touched by present actuality, there 
must exist no continuity between them.’837  She explains that when Benjamin noted that 
construction presupposes destruction, what he meant is for historical objects to be constituted 
by being ‘blasted’ out of the historical continuum.838 Their structure is monadological, into which 
                                                
834 Ibid. 
835 Susan Buck-Morss, op. cit., p. 218 
836 Ibid. 
837 Ibid. 
838 Ibid. Note the notion of explosion here – which is a recurrent idea in both Benjamin’s theory of the dialectical 
image and the the These on the Philosophy of History, as well as Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory. See ‘Preface: On Apparition,’ 
in Bernard Hoeckner, Apparitions: Essays on Adorno and Twentieth-Century Music, (New York; Abingdon, Routledge, 
2006), p. ix 
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‘all the forces and interests of history enter on a reduced scale.’839 Finally, to uncover this 
structure is for truth to appear: 
Truth [...] is bound to a temporal nucleus which is lodged in both the known and the knower.’  In a 
tension-filled constellation with the present, this ‘temporal nucleus’ becomes politically charged, 
polarized dialectically,’ as ‘a force field, in which the conflict between its fore- and after-history plays 
itself out.840 
These objects ‘are prototypes, ur-phenomena that can be recognized as precursors of the present, 
no matter how distant or estranged they now appear.’841 This fore-history of the object reveals in 
certain cases a possibility, including what Benjamin terms its utopian potential, whilst its after-
history ‘is that which, as an object of natural history, it has in fact become.842 Buck-Morss 
underlines that both are ‘legible within the “monadological structure” of the historical object that 
has been ‘blasted free’ of history’s continuum.’843  In the traces left by the object’s after-history, 
‘the conditions of its decay and the manner of its cultural transmission, the utopian images of 
past objects can be read in the present as truth.’844 Interestingly, it is the ‘forceful confrontation 
of the fore- and after-life of the object that makes it ‘actual’ in the political sense – as presence of 
mind’ (Geistesgegenwart)  – and it is not progress but ‘actualization’ in which ur-history 
culminates.’845 As Benjamin wrote in the Arcades Project, ‘the dialectical image is an image that 
emerges suddenly, in a flash. What has been is to be held fast – as an image flashing up in the 
now of its recognisability [im Jetzt der Erkennbarkeit].’846  Benjamin was counting on the shock of 
                                                
839 Susan Buck-Morss, op. cit., p. 218 
840 Ibid. 
841 Ibid. 
842 Ibid. 
843 Ibid. 
844 Ibid. 
845 Ibid. 
846 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, p. 473 
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this recognition to jolt the dreaming collective into a political awakening. The presentation of the 
historical object within a charged force field of past and present, which produces political 
electricity in a lightning flash of truth, is the dialectical image. Unlike Hegel’s logic, it is dialectics 
at a standstill.847 
 
However, when it comes to the work of art, the idea of progress is once again redeemable: 
In every true work of art there is a place where, for one who resides there, it blows cool like the wind 
of a coming dawn. From this it follows that art, which has often been considered refractory to every 
relation with progress, can provide its true definition. Progress has its seat not in the continuity of 
elapsing time but in its interferences – where the truly new makes itself felt for the first time, with the 
sobriety of dawn.848  
For Buck-Morss, the moment when thought ‘comes to a standstill in a constellation saturated 
with tensions, there appears the dialectical image. It is the caesura in the movement of 
thought.’849 The image’s positioning, she argues, is in no way arbitrary. According to her 
it is to be sought at the point where the tension between the dialectical opposition is the greatest. The 
dialectical image [...] is identical to the historical object; it justifies blasting the latter out of the 
continuum of history’s course.850 
 
I now turn briefly to a literary example of such a dialectical image, which takes it beyond the 
nineteenth century, and to Benjamin’s critique of Surrealism,851 which he later included in the 
                                                
847 Ibid. 
848 Walter Benjamin, op. cit., p. 474 [Convolute N9a, 8] 
849 Buck-Morss, op. cit., p. 218 
850 Ibid. However, I would argue that the object and its interpretation coming together in a dialectical image – which 
is what Benjamin argues – is not quite the identity between dialectical image and historical object Buck-Morss 
refers to. The latter, if understood as an object-in-historical-time, is not the same as the moment its appears in the 
now of its recognizability.  
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famous essay on ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its Reproducibility.’852 It concerns the 
interpretation of one of the most well-known Surrealist texts, André Breton’s novel Nadja.853 
Although quite critical of the French Surrealists, including Breton, who  
declared his intention of breaking with a praxis that presents the public with the literary precipitate of 
a certain form of existence while withholding that existence itself. Stated more briefly and dialectically, 
this means that the sphere of poetry was here exploded from within by a closely knit circle of people 
pushing the “poetic life” to the utmost limits of possibility.854  
For Buck-Morss, this work’s ‘meditative objects’ constitute ‘objects of the “new” nature: a 
woman’s glove, a cigarette lying in an ashtray, the luminous sign advertising Mazda lightbulbs on 
the boulevard. Yet that which distinguished the theological symbol, the ‘unity of sensory and 
supersensory object,’ is precisely what Benjamin found in these Surrealist texts.855 As Buck-
Morss shows, in the same way he had considered the Trauerspiel allegoricists, Benjamin thought 
of the Surrealists’ ‘revelatory vision of historically transient objects’ as establishing a 
‘philosophical position rather than an aesthetic technique.’856  In other words, for Benjamin it 
                                                                                                                                                  
851 See Walter Benjamin, ‘Surrealism. The Last Snapshot of th European Intelligentsia,’ in Selected Writings, Marcus 
Jennings (ed.), 4 vols.,  (Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, 1996), pp. 207-221 
852 See especially foonotes 27 and 31 in ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility: Second 
Version,’ p. 301 and 131.  
853 Nadja, published in 1928, opens with the question ‘Who am I?,’ and is an autobiographical novel based on 
Breton’s relationship with a woman, Léona Delcourt, who used to be a patient of the psychoanalyst Pierre Janet. 
The book has a non-linear structure and refers to other Parisian surrealists. It does not consist of an 
introspective or psychological analysis, but relates seemingly unimportant anecdotes and impressions, arguing 
against the illusory aspect of other, contemporaneous novelists’ styles. André Breton, Nadja, (Paris, NRF, 1928); 
André Breton, Nadja, in Œuvres completes, Vol. 1, (Bibliothèque de La Pléiade), (Paris, Gallimard,  1988), pp. 643-
753. See Jean-Paul Clébert, Dictionnaire du Surréalisme, (Chamalières, Éditions du Seuil & A.T.P., 1996), pp. 403ff.  
854 Walter Benjamin, ‘Surrealism,’ op. cit., pp. 207-208 
855 Susan Buck-Morss, op. cit., p. 238 
856 Ibid., p. 238 
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was more about the profane illumination – of a ‘material, anthropological inspiration.’857 As 
Benjamin wrote that for the Surrealists 
Life seemed worth living only where the threshold between waking and sleeping was worn away in 
everyone as by the steps of multitudinous images flooding back and forth; language seemed itself only 
where sound and image, image and sound, interpenetrated with automatic precision and such felicity 
that no chink was left for the penny-in-the-slot called “meaning”858 
 
She argues that the cognitive experience ‘which the Surrealist images provided, while related to that 
of the mystics, was “dialectical” rather than “mysterious,” and in fact more difficult to attain.’859 
Benjamin called it the true, creative overcoming of religious illumination, for which religious 
experience (as well as hashish or falling in love) was merely the ‘introductory lesson.’860 
The dialectics of intoxication are indeed curious. Is not perhaps all ecstasy in one world humiliating 
sobriety in the world complementary to it? What is it that courtly Minne seeks (and it, not love, binds 
Breton to the telepathic girl), if not to make chastity, too, a transport? Into a world that borders not 
only on tombs of the Sacred Heart or altars to the Virgin, but also on the morning before a battle or 
after a victory.861  
                                                
857 Ibid. 
858 Walter Benjamin, ‘Surrealism,’ p. 208 
859 Ibid. 
860 Benjamin, ‘Surrealism,’ p. 209 
861 Ibid., p. 210 
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The dialectical image in Benjamin and Adorno 
 ‘The dialectical image is an image that emerges suddenly, in a flash. What has been is to be held fast – 
as an image flashing up in the now of its recognizability. The rescue that is carried out by these means 
– and only these – can operate solely for the sake of what in the next moment is already irretrievably 
lost. 862 
This theory’s genealogy is rather complex, as it was substantially developed in conversations 
between Adorno and Benjamin, with Horkheimer occasionally joining them in the discussions.863 
As Rolf Tiedemann observes, Benjamin himself never found his way to a more exhaustive 
explication of the category of the dialectical image; the term never once appears in the texts 
published during his lifetime.’864 It did reach the public when Adorno published his Habilitation 
thesis in 1933. Adorno writes that in such images ‘the dialectic comes to a standstill,’ citing that 
‘the mythical in the historically most recent as the distant past: nature as proto-history.’865 
According to Tiedemann, these conversations ‘traced the entwining of myth and the new, of the 
ever-same (das Immergleichen) and history, back to the commodity fetishism analyzed by Marx.’866 
This strong similarity between the workings of the commodity and the artwork are as significant 
as they are illusive; in The Arcades Project Benjamin recorded a reference to Otto Rühle’s 
biography of Karl Marx, who argued that the commodity receives a price tag and enters the market 
                                                
862 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, [N9,7] 
863 Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 5, p. 1117; Walter Benjamin, Gershom Gerhard Scholem, and 
Theodor W. Adorno, The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, 1910-1940, (Chicago; London, University of Chicago 
Press, 1994), p. 489. See also Rolf Tiedemann, ‘Concept, Image, Name’, in Tom Huhn and Lambert Zuidervaart 
(eds.), The Semblance of Subjectivity. Essays in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, (MIT, Cambridge (Mass.), 1997), p. 133 
864 Rolf Tiedemann, op. cit., p. 133 
865 Ibid., p.133. Tiedemann cites Adorno, GS 2, p. 80, who refers to his Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, 
translated and edited by Robert Hullot-Kentor, (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 54 
866 Ibid., p. 133 
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place.867 He argues that if its ‘substantive quality and individuality create the incentive to buy,’ 
this has no relevance for the ‘social evaluation of its worth.’868 In other words, the ‘commodity 
has become an abstraction’ and ‘once it has escaped from the hand of its producers and is freed 
from its real particularity,’869 At this point the product is no longer controlled by human beings. 
In this sense, it has taken on a ‘ghost-like objectivity,’870 and leads its own life. However, whilst a 
‘commodity appears at first glance a self-sufficient, trivial thing,’ its analysis shows that it is a 
‘bewildering thing, full of metaphysical subtleties and theological capers.’871 Benjamin notes that 
Marx spoke of the commodity’s fetish character, which has ‘its origins in the peculiar character 
of the labour that produces commodities […] It is only the particular social relation between 
people that here assumes, in the yes of these people, the phantasmagorical form of a relation 
between things.’872  It seems to share this with the (modernist) artwork. 
 
In a 1935 letter to Max Horkheimer about the first draft of the Passagenwerk, Adorno first wrote 
about Benjamin’s project – as ‘an attempt to disclose the nineteenth century as ‘style’ through 
                                                
867 This refers to Benjamin’s quotation of Otto Rühle, Karl Marx. Leben und Werk, (Hellerau bei Dresden, Avalun-
Verlag, 1928), pp. 384-385; translated as Otto Rühle, Karl Marx: His Life and Works, (New York, The Viking 
Press, 1929) in Benjamin, The Arcades Project, op. cit., p. 181-182, [Convolute G 5, 1]: ‘With price tag affixed, the 
commodity comes on the market. Its material quality and individuality are merely an incentive for buying and 
selling; for the social measure of its value, such quality is of no importance whatsoever. The commodity has 
become an abstraction. Once escaped from the hand of the producer and divested of its real particularity, it 
ceases to be a product and to be ruled over by human beings. It has acquired a ghostly objectivity’ and leads a 
life of its own.’  
868 Ibid. 
869 Ibid. 
870 Ibid. 
871 Otto Rühle, Karl Marx. Leben und Werk, (Hellerau bei Dresden, Avalun-Verlag, 1928); translated as Otto Rühle, 
Karl Marx: His Life and Works, (New York, The Viking Press, 1929) cited in Benjamin GS V, p. 245; See also The 
Arcades Project, p. 181-182 
872 Ibid. 
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the category of the commodity as a dialectical image.’ 873  Susan Buck-Morss suggests that 
Benjamin was thinking in coordinates: his ‘unfolding of concepts in their ‘extremes’ can be 
visualized as antithetical polarities of axes that cross each other, revealing a ‘dialectical image’ at 
the null point (the commodity), with its contradictory ‘moments’ as axial fields. [...] Each field of 
the coordinates can then be said to describe one aspect of the physiognomic appearance of the 
commodity, showing its contradictory ‘faces’; fetish and fossil; wish image and ruin.’874 
 
Moreover, some authors, such as Pierre Missac, note that the image in itself predates Benjamin’s 
encounters with dialectics as such (and thus confront image with dialectic).875 He argues that the 
encounter between the two notions that make up the dialectical image ‘is all the more striking – 
Adorno would say paradoxical – in that they are both fundamental for Benjamin.’876 Missac avers 
that ‘one cannot repeat too often that the image is one of the first and original sources of 
Benjamin’s mode of thought, and the dialectic, which comes later on, underlies many aspects of 
his mode of proceeding.’877 In Convolute N of The Arcades Project, Benjamin himself explains 
what he understands to be a dialectical image when he argues for an understanding of the 
temporal relation between the present and the past and the dialectics of what-has-been and the now. 
That the latter relation is a dialectical one implies that neither of these terms can be understood 
in or by itself alone: 
                                                
873 There is an important contrast between Adornoian and Benjaminian notions of the dialectical image, when 
confronting Pierre Missac (and Haverkamp) with Rolf Tiedemann (concept, image, name). The first two argue 
about how dialectical the dialectical image is (and how applicable it is), whilst the latter is interested in its 
epistemological aspects.  
874 Susan Buck-Morss, Susan, The Dialectics of Seeing, op. cit., p. 210 
875 Missac, Pierre, Passages de Walter Benjamin, (Paris, Sevil, 1987); translated as Pierre Missac, Walter Benjamin's Passages, 
(Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought), (Cambridge, Mass.; London, MIT Press, 1995) 
876 Missac, op. cit. 
877 Pierre Missac, Walter Benjamin’s Passages,transl. by S.Weber Nicholsen, MIT, Cambridge (Mass.), p. 111 
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‘It is not that what is past [which] casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light on what 
is past; rather, [the] image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to 
form a constellation. In other words: image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the 
present to the past is purely temporal, the relation of what-has-been to the now is dialectical: not 
temporal in nature, but figural [bildlich]. Only dialectical images are genuinely historical – that is, not 
archaic – images. The image that is read – which is to say, the image in the now of its recognizability – 
bears to the highest degree the imprint of the perilous critical moment on which all reading is 
founded.’878 
What Benjamin explains is that the construction of the relation between what has been and the 
now is important to keep in mind; not only is this constellation not to be reified, it is there only 
momentarily. Whilst the reader grasps its meaning, it disappears immediately. Archaic images, in 
contrast, cannot be historical in the sense of a discontinuity between what has been and the now 
– the moment in which something from the past is understood. Importantly, this understanding 
has as a consequence that what it brings together is no longer separated in time and thus 
temporal. What is static in this form of reading is only so very briefly. The relation of past and 
present on the other hand should then be understood as temporal, as well as dialectical. This 
could be translated (in terms of the work of art) by pointing to the attempt of some works to 
arrest the flow of time, or the illusion of this temporality, as a construction or composition,879 in the 
                                                
878 Walter Benjamin, Arcades, [N3,1] 
879 Tiedemann, ‘Concept, Image, Name,’ p. 137 Tiedemann refers to an essay by Heinz-Klaus Metzger, ‘Mit den 
Ohren Denken. Zu einigen musikphilosphischen Motiven bei Adorno,’ in Rolf Tiedemann (ed.), Adorno Noten, 
(Berlin, 1984), pp. 21-22. Metzger ‘defends the staggering thesis that the concepts of knowledge and 
composition are basically synonymous in Adorno.’ He refers to Adorno’s reliance on Max Weber, when Adorno 
former wrote what is essential is ‘that to which Weber gives the name of “composing,” a name which orthodox 
scientivists would find unacceptable. He is indeed looking only at the subjective side, at cognitive procedure; but 
the “compositions” in question are apt to follow similar rules as their nalogue, the  musi ca l  compos i t ions  [my 
stress]. These are subjectively produced, but they work only where the subjective production is submerged in 
them. The subjectively created context – the “constellation” – becomes readable as a sign of an objectivity: of 
the spiritual substance. What resembles writing in such constellations is the conversion into objectivity, by way 
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same sense as a constellation of what has been and is now. This could be read as an image880 
which – in the sense of the figural mentioned above – comes to bear upon this relation. In other 
words, the artwork carries in itself the precarious moment of understanding Benjamin refers to, 
if it is to be read dialectically.  
 
Thus, the important difference with earlier conceptualizations of the image is the dialectical 
image’s readability. Furthermore, the dialectical image is to be found in the moment of 
interpretation (or, as Benjamin calls it ‘the now of its recognizability’), where what has been and 
the now briefly meet. Importantly, this meeting point is not simply a subjective experience in the 
temporally, fleeting sense (it passes), but one which is understood as an image (like a snapshot). 
Benjamin here brings what belonged to the domain of space and – what Missac calls the 
‘phantasmagoria of space, where it masters the effects of closeness and distance’881 – into the 
realm of time.  
‘The dialectical image is an image that emerges suddenly, in a flash. What has been is to be held fast – 
as an image flashing up in the now of its recognizability. The rescue that is carried out by these means 
– and only these – can operate solely for the sake of what in the next moment is already irretrievably 
lost.’882 
Another aspect of the dialectical image lies in its moment of awakening. In this moment of 
awakening or profane illumination (to use Benjamin’s own terminology), the present ‘absorbs time 
                                                                                                                                                  
of language, of what has been subjectively thought and assembled.’ [Theodor W. Adorno, GS 6, pp. 167-68, 
Negative Dialectics, p. 165]  Tiedemann unpacks the structure and syntax of the last three phrases, where 
composition refers to both musical composition and Weberian sociology; the latter only being treated ‘in the 
final sentence.’ Ibid., p. 137  
880 See also Rolf Tiedemann, op. cit., p. 137 
881 Pierre Missac, op. cit., p. 110 
882 Ibid. 
 269 
and turns it into an eternal present, author of the most astonishing interpretations.’883 For Missac, 
this refers to Paul Valéry, who said: ‘The present transforms itself into the future by means of 
the past.’884 
 
For Benjamin, the dialectical image awakes from the collective of dreams, which is an explicit 
reference to Freud. Freud’s importance for Benjamin’s own interpretative approach, with regard 
understanding the exploits of Surrealism has been a topic of research with a history of its own. 885 
The scholar Margaret Cohen argues in this regard that Benjamin’s dialectical image resembles the 
construction of analysis in ‘the curious objectivity that Benjamin attributes to it.’ 886 Cohen 
argues that Benjamin’s use of ‘psychoanalytic language, notably dream language, has been 
considered the place where he substitutes the smoke and mirrors of writerly technique for critical 
analysis.’887 In contrast to a number of writers, she sees Benjamin’s conclusion to ‘Paris, the 
Capital of the Nineteenth Century’888 as seemingly positing the dialectical image as an accurate 
reconstruction of the material forces producing the nineteenth-century world of dreams. She 
argues that when Benjamin wrote that  
                                                
883 Pierre Missac, op. cit., p. 111 
884 Paul Valéry, Cahiers, Vol. 1, p. 1328. Cited by Pierre Missac, op. cit., p.111 
885 See Ernst Bloch, ‘Revue Form in Philosophy,’ in Heritage of Our Times; Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Benjamins 
“Einbahnstraße,”’ in Über Walter Benjamin, op. cit.; Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, op. cit. and 
The Dialectis of Seeing, op. cit., Elizabeth Lenk and Rita Bischof, ‘L’Intrication surréelle du rêve et de l’histoire dans 
les Passages de Benjamin,’ in Walter Benjamin et Paris, Heinz Wismann (ed.), (Paris, Éditions du Cerf, 1986), pp. 
179-199 
886 Margaret Cohen, Profane Illumination: Walter Benjamin and the Paris of Surrealist Revolution, (Weimar and Now 5) 
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993), p. 47. She argues that analytic constructions have an objectivity 
far from that of ‘objective constellations in which the social situation represents itself.’ 
887 Ibid., p. 8 
888 Walter Benjamin, ‘Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth Century,’ in Selected Writings, Vol. 2  op. cit., 
 270 
Balzac was the first to speak of the ruins of the bourgeoisie. But only Surrealism exposed them to 
view. The development of the forces of production reduced the wish symbols of the previous century 
to rubble even before the monuments representing them had crumbled.889  
Benjamin further suggests his ‘interest as that of an archeologist confronting the ruins of a time 
gone by.’890 She points to the difference between critical construction and reconstruction, as 
Benjamin ‘places his dialectical image in an oddly utopian realm.’891 She cites Benjamin, who 
asserts that ‘ambiguity is the imagistic appearance of dialectics, the law of dialectics at a standstill. 
This standstill is utopia.’892 Cohen explains that for Benjamin, ‘terming the place where dialectics 
appear as a non-place, utopia,’ he ‘both associates it with an alternative to the place where these 
dialectical processes work and a place saturated with wishful affect: utopia is not only a non-
place but a non-place where wishes are fulfilled.’893 She compares this with psychoanalytic 
analysis which ‘too places its construction in an oddly utopian realm, whose peculiar non-place 
can once more be designated in passing with a suggestive passage from Freud.’894 Cohen refers 
here to Freud’s writings on manifestations of transference, which according to Freud ‘do us 
inestimable service of making the patient’s hidden and forgotten erotic impulses immediate and 
manifest. For when all is said and done, it is impossible to destroy anyone in absentia or in 
effigie.’895 The (non) site of this impossible activity – which Cohen explains can be read as the 
literal reality of the imaginary transference, which simultaneously denies ‘the very power to act in 
absentia that he in fact has just shown it to have’896 – can be found in language. As we have seen 
                                                
889 Ibid. 
890 Ibid., p. 161. Cited by Margaret Cohen, op. cit., p. 47 
891 Ibid. 
892 Ibid., p. 48. She does not give a specific reference to Benjamin’s work. 
893 Ibid. 
894 Ibid. 
895 Ibid. 
896 Ibid. 
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Benjamin argue, the dialectical image is not an archaic image, but a ‘genuine’ one, ‘and the place 
one meets them is language.’897 For Cohen, the boundary between linguistic and visual media 
disappears ultimately, both in psychoanalytic terms and in Benjamin’s dialectical image:  
the two media signify an unconscious content in a fashion that is neither linguistically nor visually 
specific and in designating this form of representation an image (Bild), Benjamin chooses a term 
central to Freud’s discussion of that other form of representation as well, notably in The Interpretation of 
Dreams.898 
Dream image, wish image and dialectical image, then, are not the same, because the dream would 
be less a mirror image [Abbild] than consciousness, as it reacts with images of desire and fear. 
These are not to be confused with subjective instants of consciousness [Bewusstseinseinhalte], but 
are objective constellations through which their societal position realizes itself. In other words, 
Benjamin proposes the concept of the dialectical image as an objective category of thought, in 
which experience (often seen as purely personal and subjective) and knowledge (accessible to a 
collective) meet. To be sure, this is not a religious experience – in the sense of a revelation 
[Offenbahrung] – but a moment of profane (materialist) illumination. 
 
What constitutes this moment of profane illumination? In order to answer this question, I turn 
to the work of Anselm Haverkamp, who is interested in how ‘deconstructive’ the dialectical 
image is as a reading strategy.899 As Haverkamp writes, the more mystical connotations of the now 
are often overestimated, whilst the ‘implications of the word readability have been systematically 
played down.’900 For him this readability, ‘gives to reading a flair of ‘profane illumination,’ is 
                                                
897 Walter Benjamin, Arcades, op. cit., Convolute N 2a, p. 3 
898 Margaret Cohen, op. cit., p. 48 
899 Anselm Haverkamp, ‘Notes on the “dialectical Image” (How Deconstructive is it?)’, in Diacritics, Vol. 22, No. 3/4 
commemorating Walter Benjamin (Autumn-Winter, 1992), p. 69-80 
900 Ibid. 
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certainly no ecstatic access to some recognition scene, or immediate vision,’ although he sees 
Benjamin’s references to platonic and mystical language and traditions as attempts to ironize 
these motifs ‘in order to reuse from ‘ideas,’ as outlined in the ‘Epistemological Prologue,’ that 
which lends itself to new ‘configurations’ and falls into place within a new ‘constellation.’901. 
Convolute N resumes part of this design (of Darstellung), including the insistence on the specific 
temporality of reading created in and through allegory. There is, no doubt, reading involved, and 
this reading's temporal structure is no longer (as it, in fact, never was) that of a mere flow of time 
towards figural fulfillment (in terms of figura and implementum).902 
 
  
                                                
901 Walter Benjamin, Trauerspiel, , p. 214-181; cited in Anselm Haverkamp, op. cit., p. 74 
902 Anselm Haverkamp, op cit., p. 74 
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On Reading and Readability 
The temporal structure of the image converts seeing into reading, image into text. If what is essential 
about the image is that it is ‘not seen before being remembered.’903 
 
An important point Benjamin stresses, is that images are eminently historical, in that they offer 
us a glimpse of past moments in time but only become intelligible or ‘recognizable’ at a certain 
time. He confronts this historical position of the reader with a historicist approach of 
Heidegger,904 which proposes universal (ahistorical) categories, concepts and essences: 
What distinguishes images from the ‘essences’ of phenomenology is their historical index. Heidegger 
seeks in vain to rescue history for phenomenology abstractly through ‘historicity’. These images are to 
be thought of entirely apart from the categories of the ‘human sciences,’ from so-called habitus, from 
style and the like. For the historical index of the images not only says that they belong to a particular 
time; it says, above all, that they attain to legibility only at a particular time. And, indeed, this acceding 
‘to legibility’ constitutes a specific critical point in the movement at their interior. Every present day is 
determined by the images that are synchronic with it: each ‘now’ is the now of a particular 
recognizability. In it, truth is charged to the bursting point with time.905 
Benjamin contrasts the dialectical image with what he sees as rigidified and reified myth. The 
paradigm of the dialectical image is the allegory, which is posited against myth and archetype. 
Adorno, added to the rejection of the archetypal criticism, as Haverkamp argues, by adding 
‘reflections not only on the historicality of the ‘imagistic’ [das Bildliche] in general, but also on the 
relationship between dialectic, myth, and image: for nature does not prevail forever alive and 
                                                
903 Rebecca Comay, ‘Materialist Mutations of the Bilderverbot,’ in Andrew Benjamin (ed.), Walter Benjamin and Art, 
(London, New York, Continuum, 2005), p. 56; she cites Walter Benjamin, GS 1.3, p. 1064 
904 For a comparative critique of Benjamin’s and Heideggers (as well as John Dewey’s and Jean-Paul Sartre’s), see 
Beatrice Hanssen, ‘Benjamin or Heidegger: Aesthetics and Politics in an Age of Technology,’ in Andrew 
Benjamin (ed.), Walter Benjamin and Art, (London, New York, Continuum, 2005), pp. 73-92 and Arne Melberg, 
‘The Work of Art in The Age of Ontological Speculation: Walter Benjamin Revisited,’ pp. 93-107  
905 Walter Benjamin, Arcades Project, op. cit., Convolute N, 3.1, p. 462-463 
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present in the dialectic. Dialectic comes to a halt in the image and in the historically latest it cites 
myth as the long past and gone: nature as primeval history [Urgeschichte].’ 906 In this passage from 
his Kierkegaard book, Adorno refers to the idea of citing, of the citation as a cliché; according to 
Haverkamp, ‘that dialectics “cites” is its “halt” in the image. What it reveals is sort of 
‘antediluvian fossil.’ As a fossil, ‘the image in question is anything but a métaphore vive; it is rather, 
in the reemerging theory of tropes, catachresis.907 For Haverkamp, Adorno reads the dialectical 
moment, when history ‘reveals its mythical nature in allegory, as the moment when dialectics 
surfaces and becomes manifest as ‘image’ or ‘figure.’908 Crucially, as Haverkamp points out, 
Benjamin’s dialectical image in Adorno’s hands, demands a generalization. He argues that  
the dialectical image is this generalization, although Benjamin’s application has to struggle in the effort 
of adapting the model of allegory to and translating its lexicon for that purpose into the version called 
‘commodity’, or it could be argued, as the work of art.909    
 
In contrast to some authors (like Susan Buck-Morss),910 I understand the dialectic image as a 
dynamic concept, not a static one.911 It is not the image of a moment that is pure and free, 
                                                
906 Theodor W. Adorno, Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Ästetischen, in GS 2, p. 100; in translation by Robert Hullot-
Kentor, Kierkegaard. Construction of the Aesthetic, (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 54. Cited in 
Haverkamp, ‘Notes on the “Dialectical Image” (How Deconstructive is it?),’ in Diacritics, Vol. 22, No. ¾ 
Commemorating Walter Benjamin (Autumn-Winter, 1992), p. 73; see also Peter Fenves, ‘Image and Chatter: 
Adorno’s Construction of Kierkegaard,’ in Diacritics, Vol. 22 (Spring 1992), pp. 100-114 
907 Haverkamp, op. cit., p. 73. Catachresis, from the Greek κατάχρησις, ‘abuse,’ means semantic misuse or error. It 
also refers to the crossing of categorical boundaries with words. It was often used in Baroque literature, for 
example in the Trauerspiele to express extreme emotions or affects, as well as figuring in Surrealist and Dadaist 
lierature. Benjamin is interested in this rhetorical device for these different reasons. 
908 Ibid. 
909 In his Convolute N titled ‘Epistemology’ in the Passagenwerk, Benjamin does not explore this paradigm switch, 
however, but the historicity of a certain ‘Now’ of readability. See Haverkamp, op. cit., p. 73-74 
910 Susan Buck-Morss, op. cit., p. 210 
911 I would like to refer to the opening quotation of this section by Rebecca Comay, who shows this movement in 
her interpretation of the reading the dialectical image provides as a temporal aspect of its structure. 
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without past or future, but burdened ‘beyond its capacities and taking on the designs of 
history’.912 This is, as argued above, in contrast with approaches to understandings of the image 
in archaic terms, or as archetypal musical images. As we will shortly see, compositions such as 
Feldman’s On Time and the Instrumental Factor, stress the vertical dimension of music, and not the 
developmental, horizontal dimension. It is crucial to understand how closely the instrumental 
images presented resemble these flashes mentioned above, and how they are both spatial in 
nature, but also temporal. This temporality is not to be conceived in a traditional way, as in a 
continuous conception of time; they appear as broken fragments. However, the connections 
between these seemingly unrelated motifs, or sound objects, contradict a conception which 
would do away with any form of coherence. In other words, the three composers I will discuss 
apply varying technical means to establish this renewed sense of form. To conclude this I like 
refer to Benjamin’s definition of the dialectical image as one which wishes to be read, in the now 
of its recognizability, bearing  
to the highest degree the imprint of the perilous critical moment on which all reading is founded. [It] 
emerges suddenly, in a flash. What has been is to be held fast – as an image flashing up in the now of 
its recognizability. The rescue that is carried out by these means – and only these – can operate solely 
for the sake of what in the next moment is already irretrievably lost.913  
It is this idea of moments strung together in a way that allows for aesthetic insight in their origin 
and construction, as well as for the experience of them in a temporally transient way, accepting 
the possibility that their spatial (acoustic and graphic) element is not fully reified in the sense 
Adorno found in the music of Wagner or Stravinsky, for example. In other words, does the 
musical work of art in its post-war avant-garde manifestation establish a non-identical relation 
between its spatial aspect and the extramusical world? I argue that this is not the case, and that 
                                                
912 Pierre Missac, op. cit., p. 111 
913 Walter Benjamin, Arcades, op. cit., [N9,7] 
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Adorno’s fears are mediated in ways by which the image-like aspects have sufficiently critical 
facets, which do not allow for any constellation to petrify or be reified. This conception of 
objects as objects-in-motion could then supply the necessary critical space for a discussion of 
musical temporality and the spatialization as evident in the work of a number of composers, 
unlike the hardened objects and concepts criticized by Adorno as clichés.914 
  
                                                
914 See Anselm Haverkamp, op. cit., p. 73, especially on Adorno’s Kierkegaard book (as referenced above) 
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The sound-bject re-conceptualized: immanent critique and analysis in light of the 
dialectical  image 
 
In order to develop a theory which can grasp the reality of the new music – as composed by the 
three composers studied in this thesis – a concrete understanding of how time and space interact 
in their work must be grounded in a study of their compositional technique. As this is the object 
of inquiry in the later chapters of this thesis, it suffices here to include that which their particular 
approaches have in common, specifically regarding the relation between the horizontal and 
vertical dimensions of music. This includes the insight that for a composer like Edgard Varèse, 
who can be regarded as the inventor of a different type of new music (in which the ‘new’ itself is 
central),915 these two aspects of music are seen as intertwined. According to the German 
musicologist Helga de la Motte-Haber, who wrote a seminal work on his music, Varèse shares 
this approach with other composers of his generation, including Olivier Messiaen and Henri 
Cowell.916 She writes that however different ‘the methods of the composers may have been, they 
are still concerned with a thinking which assumes an identity of the vertical with the horizontal 
dimension of music.’917 For example, this ‘applies to Henri Cowell’s 1930 proposal (expressed in 
New Musical Resources),918 to represent the proportions of a chord structure as a temporal sequence. 
                                                
915 Helga de la Motte-Haber, Die Musik Von Edgard Varèse: Studien Zu Seinen Nach 1918 Entstandenen Werken, 
(Hofheim, Wolke Verlag, 1993) 
916 Ibid., p. 140 
917 Ibid. ‘Wie unterschiedlich die Verfahren der Komponisten auch waren, so gehen sie doch immer mit einem 
Denken einher, das von einer Identität der vertikalen mit der horizontalen Dimension der Musik ausgeht.’ 
918 Henry Cowell, New Musical Resources, annotated, with an accompanying essay, by David Nicholls, (Cambridge, 
New York, and Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, 1996 [1930]) 
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This was an important stimulus for later attempts to organize the pitches [in the way of 
Karlheinz Stockhausen’s] “how time passes.”’919 
 
De la Motte suggests a reference to Stockhausen’s famous essay on the topic of musical time; 
however, the crucial element in her argument is concerned with the changed attitude to how 
music unfolds, especially in light of the loss of tonal harmony. As she explains with regard to the 
second movement of Octandre, Varèse works with different techniques, which effectuate this 
identity between line and sound: 
However, since compression is one of his most important principles for the verticalization of 
melodies, they should first be illuminated in a music-historical context. With the dissolution of tonality 
composers no longer had the opportunity to traverse space by overcoming harmonic distances. Since 
there were no longer tonally determined distances, differences between the harmonies were levelled 
and thus the logic of progression was no longer mandatory. The verticalization of lines is a technique 
various composers used, a technique with a double intention, namely to possibly achieve a tight 
connection and yet to maintain similarities and differences between the harmonies, including nearness 
and distance.920 
To fully understand the idea of verticalization, an aspect of the spatialization of musical 
temporality, I will now turn to a final crucial element for the development of a theory of the 
                                                
919 Helga de la Motte, op. cit., p. 140. ‘Dies gilt auch für den 1930 von Henri Cowell (in den New Musical Resources) 
geäußerten Vorschlag, die Proportionen eines Akkordaufbaus als zeitliche abfolge darzustellen. Dies war eine 
wichtige Anregung für spätere versuche, die Tonhöhen so zu organisieren “wie die Zeit vergeht”.’ 
920 Ibid., p. 139. ‘Da die Stauchung jedoch zu einem seiner wichtigsten Prinzipien der Vertikalisierung von Melodien 
gehört, sei sie zunächst einmal in einem musikgeschichtlichen Kontext beleuchtet. Mit der Auflösung der 
Tonalität verfügten Komponisten nicht mehr über die Moglichkeit, Räume zu durchmessen, indem sie 
harmonische Entfernungen überwanden. Indem es keine tonartlich bestimmten Distanzen mehr gab, waren 
Unterschiede zwischen den Harmonien eingeebnet und damit die Logik des Fortschreitens nicht mehr zwingend. 
Die Vertikalisierung von Linien ist ein Mittel, dessen sich verschiedene Komponisten bedienten, wobei zweierlei 
damit intendiert war, nämlich einen möglichst dichten Zusammenhang zu erreichen und dennoch Ähnlichkeiten 
und Unterschiede, damit auch Nähe und Entfernung, zwischen den Zusammenklängen zu erhalten.’ 
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(in)formel, drawing on Benjamin’s theory of the object, and the dialectical image. This will lead to a 
reconceptualization of the sound object, in order to approach the music of Varèse, Feldman and 
Xenakis in a new light. 
 
Just as these composers chose sound itself to generate compositional strategies – respecting 
sound-in-itself as an object which should not simply be organized according to traditional forms 
– Adorno’s aesthetics builds on Walter Benjamin’s writings, whose theory of a natural language of 
the objects is highly influential to his own conceptualization of the artwork and, accordingly, is 
also to be considered here. Through an understanding of the affinities and references to this 
theory – which considers the world as dominated by our systematic, reductive naming of objects 
– Adorno's own aesthetics appears in a new light: a non-normative, open theory which resists 
any form of definition, including Adorno's own preoccupation with a seemingly limited, 
exclusive canon of musical works. In this theory, the object – traditionally considered a static 
entity – appears as becoming, in other words, in movement.921 The theory of language proposed by 
Benjamin is based on the idea that ‘naming is what human beings do as human beings, yet 
language alone speaks in the name. In other words, the spiritual aspects of human beings is 
‘language pure and simple.’ 922 Benjamin’s ‘enigmatic, theological theory of language clearly 
provoked Adorno’s theory of cognition as a naming. [...]all things communicate themselves in 
the name alone [...]; it can be described as the ‘language of language.’ Furthermore, ‘all nature 
communicates itself in language, and all languages communicate themselves ultimately in the 
name,’ in a so-called ‘pure language’. According to Krakauer, ‘for Benjamin as well [as for 
                                                
921 Claudia Brodsky, “Framing the Sensuous: Objecthood and “Objectivity” in Art after Adorno, Bernstein, J.M., 
Art and aesthetics after Adorno. 2010, Berkeley: Townsend Center for the Humanities, University of California., pp. 
69-115; see supra 
922 Walter Benjamin, GS, II, 1, p. 144, as quoted by E.L., Krakauer, The disposition of the subject : reading Adorno's dialectic 
of technology. (Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1998), p. 168 
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Adorno], word and Sache [object] unite in the name [...].’ Crucially, the name is ‘the translation of 
the language of things into that of human beings.’ This implies the thought that the ‘apparently 
dialectical relation of the human subject to the objective world is essentially a linguistic relation, 
one between incommensurable languages. And the work of human beings at changing and 
perfecting the world is ‘essentially’ the work of translation.’ Finally, it is the ‘work of cognition, 
understood as the reading or interpreting of one language which transforms that text into 
another.’ 
 
The recent literature on Benjamin’s and Adorno’s aesthetics on the one hand, and the 
musicological studies of the music of the composers discussed here on the other hand, not only 
show strong affinities: they help to clarify important issues in the interpretation of Adorno’s 
aesthetics. In the sense that these musical works reveal something objectively true about the time 
and society in which they were created, artworks come together with their interpretation and 
critique in what Benjamin and Adorno called dialectical images – images that can be read. It is by 
means of this key idea of the image, formed when dialectics comes to a standstill, that the music 
of these composers momentarily illuminates the aesthetic writings of these philosophers.  
 
Objects (and especially art objects), for Adorno, can be negatively defined as not-yet-reified monads: 
otherwise they would revert to being what he terms culture objects. Philosophically, the search for 
that which is not fully reified points to a becoming at the core of the art object, rather than a static 
being: this, for Adorno, is a crucial criterion for the artwork to be validly modernist. As I have 
already argued, musique informelle presents the most developed and utopian concept of the 
modernist artwork; and later, more generally in Aesthetic Theory he further investigates this notion. 
It is at this point that a controversial reading of Adorno’s thinking on the form/content dialectic 
of new music, the notion of progress regarding the musical material, and the unshakeable identity 
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of the dynamic of becoming in philosophical terms with a particular pitch-based compositional 
technique could be seen as the central problem of his aesthetics of music; namely, the identity 
between this becoming and the regression to motivic-thematic thinking as an ideal of motion at the 
core of the artwork (as I have already shown in Borio’s critique). This seems to be inconsistent 
not only with Benjamin’s theory, but with Adorno’s own philosophy; this systematic blind spot 
lies in precisely the standstill he critiqued in Benjamin’s work as not dialectical enough,923 whilst 
making an historical jump back to artworks of the atonal period, where to some extent thematic-
motivic thinking was given its last critical spin. It was not a naïve copying of tradition (in the 
sense of applying tired formulae), but these traditional forms (which are mediated in a truthful 
way in the atonal artwork) have become untenable. This is the case since historical and social 
conditions have changed, and, moreover, there has also been the rupture of World War II, which 
was also a further barbaric step, as theorised in the Dialectic of Enlightenment. This is a flaw in 
Adorno’s theorization of the modernist artwork as presented in the musique informelle essay. 
It is at this point that I would like to quote a passage from Albrecht Wellmer’s essay on the 
potential alternative historiography of the modernist musical artwork. In Endgames. The Irreconcilable 
Nature of Modernity, Wellmer draws a parallel between Samuel Beckett’s plays and what he terms a 
second line in the history of ‘modern music’, that  
when speaking of the black comedies of Beckett, Adorno says that the sublime and the playful 
converge in the aesthetic construction of meaninglessness; but this could be understood in a different 
sense than what Adorno has in mind. It could mean that art makes manifest the play of the world that 
it converts the realm of history back into a natural realm, and thereby makes it possible to experience 
                                                
923 Theodor W. Adorno, Henri Lonitz, and Walter Benjamin, The Complete Correspondence, 1928-1940, (Cambridge, 
Polity Press, 1999), especially the letters concerning Adorno’s critique of Benjamin’s essay on ‘Paris, Capital of 
the Nineteenth Century.’ See also ‘Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth Century,’ and ‘Exchange with Theodor W. 
Adorno on ‘Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth Century’ in Walter Benjamin, et.al., Selected Writings, Vol. 3, pp.3-
92; pp. 99-115 
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the ungroundedness of linguistic meaning not only in its negativity, but also in its productive 
potential.924 
For Wellmer, the experience of such art ‘could take the ecstatic form of experiencing a 
transgression of meaning: this would be an art as an imitation of natural beauty.’ He 
subsequently avers that a music-historical connection exists, or ‘line of development,’ which 
‘links Debussy with Stravinsky, Messiaen and Ligeti.’925 This music is characterized by a lack of 
the Hegelian ‘sphere of subjective inwardness’ which ‘externalises itself in sound.’ In contrast,  in 
this music, 
things themselves are given acoustic expression, that the world is transformed into a realm of sound. 
By contrast with the finality of a subject-centred temporality, the colour, rhythmic complexity, and 
spatiality of music are foregrounded in an object-like form that is no longer final; the natural space of 
history becomes audible, and this is music moving toward the imitation of natural beauty, even if it be 
a mathematically generated, and thus artificial “natural beauty”, like that of fractals in the case of 
Ligeti.926 
 For him the crucial element is that this music would still satisfy ‘all the criteria of modernity in 
Adorno’s sense.’ In this regard he points out that ‘in its language and its technical procedures it is 
to a high degree constructive and individuated; and it has opened up new layers of material and 
experience for music, notably from non-European cultures.’ Finally, Wellmer argues that the 
notion of art imitating natural beauty ‘is Adorno’s own.’ Wellmer is speculating when he suggest 
that  
                                                
924 Albrecht Wellmer, Endspiele. Die unversöhnliche Moderne. Essays und Vorträge, (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1993); 
translated by John Cumming, Endgames. The Irreconcilable Nature of Modernity. Essays and Lectures, (Studies in 
Contemporary German Social Thought),  (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1998), p. 179 
925 Ibid. 
926 Ibid. 
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one might be tempted to say that all the elements of a post-metaphysical aesthetics of modernity are 
present in Adorno’s work, but that the manner in which they are organized is distorted by the 
perspective of a philosophy of reconciliation.927  
As I have suggested before, this critique of Adorno implies a reading against the grain of his 
arguments. Furthermore, I argue that the research into the music of the post-war avant-garde 
around 1960, as it is concerned with a number of questions of both (aesthetic) philosophical and 
music-analytic nature, it clearly requires a different, double strategy. Firstly, a form of reading the 
artwork as outlined above; and secondly, a method for analyzing particular compositions by a 
number of composers which does justice to the works themselves, whilst at the same time 
individuating the philosophical-theoretical framework through this practical method. The latter 
departs from traditional analysis, which is focused on the parameters, structures and forms of 
musical works. As I have argued, Adorno himself made the crisis of the traditional work-concept 
one of the central issues in Philosophy of New Music;928 whilst Borio929 and others930 understood this 
crisis to be necessitating the proposition of an analytic strategy, which draws on the 
(morphological)931 analysis of textures, as the transformation of global as well as local sound 
                                                
927 Ibid. 
928 Theodor W. Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, op. cit., p. 34: “Today, however, this movement has turned against 
the closed work and everything that it implies. The sickness that has befallen the idea of the work may stem 
from the social condition that does not offer what would be binding and confirming enough to guarantee the 
harmony of the self-sufficient work. The prohibitive difficulties of the work, however, are revealed not in 
reflection on them but in the dark interior of the work itself.” 
929 Gianmario Borio, Musikalische Avantgarde um 1960 : Entwurf einer Theorie der informellen Musik, (Laaber, Laaber-
Verlag, 1993), p. 77; Borio also cites Carl Dahlhaus, Plädoyer für eine romantische Kategorie: Der Begriff des Kunstwerks in 
der neuesten Musik, in Neue Zeitschrift für Musik, Vol. 130, No. 1 (1969), pp. 18-22, Carl Dahlhaus, Schoenberg and the 
new music: essays, (Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press, 1987). See Chapter 1 and 2 of this thesis 
930 In this regard, the work of Xenakis scholars such as Mihu Iliescu, Makis Solomos, Benoît Gibson and Horacio 
Vaggione, amongst others, on the ‘morphology,’ self-borrowing, montage and compositional technique in 
Xenakis’ music will also be considered. 
931 See Mihu Iliescu, Musical et extramusical. Eléments de pensée spatiale dans l'oeuvre de Iannis Xenakis, (Paris, Université de 
Paris I,  1996), p. 393
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complexes over time.932 Textures in this sense are no longer defined by their place within the 
fixed totality of the work as before, but by the transformations they undergo. This method933 is 
therefore not a reductive one (of temporal essences to which all elements of the work can be 
reduced or linked); rather, it accepts the insights into the changed character of the works 
themselves, as (often) open-ended. Structure in this sense ‘consists of a constellation of elements, 
which correlate in different ways,’934 a reference to the open work, which in Borio’s view 
necessitated the formation of a new aesthetic of the (in)formelle.935 Crucial to the understanding of 
                                                
932 Borio, op. cit. 
933 Experiental and phenomenological approaches to the analysis of compositions, as proposed by Evan Jones  for the 
music of Iannis Xenakis, Evan A. Jones, An Experiental Account of Musical Form in Xenakis's String Quartets, in 
Intimate Voices: Shostakovich to the avant-garde. Dmitri Shostakovich: the string quartets, Evan A. Jones (ed.) (Rochester, 
NY, University Rochester Press, 2009), pp.138-156. based on Gilles Naud method, who ‘considers the 
composer’s own segmentation to comprise only the ‘poietic’ level of an analysis’, whilst of great importance, 
ignore the importance of the notational aspect of Xenakis’ (and Feldman’s) work, which in the former’s view can 
be reduced to simple ‘machinery’ (p. 139). It is precisely the ‘nuts and bolts’ that are revealed in an analysis that 
builds on a study of the score as well as its purely phenomenological aspect as ‘sound-in-space.’ In Jones’ 
analysis, it becomes clear that his own method is untenable, as it quickly regresses into a ‘dramatic’ type of 
listening, based on a list of pre-conceived ‘sonic variables’. This addresses precisely the issue of the imposition of 
categories and concepts (as universals or invariants), as ‘an ‘esthesic’ understanding based on the preferences of 
experimental subjects’ precisely subjectivises the musical object, instilling it with meaning once again. This 
approach – the ‘resulting array of articulations and transformations rewards the listener with a complex, 
multileveled impression of ‘figures’ and ‘grounds,’ of ongoing drama along multiple musical avenues’ – is 
precisely what Adorno and Benjamin’s approach criticizes. This reification of musical reception, as solipsism, is 
therefore the opposite of an dialectical reading of the musical object, as mediation between object and subject. 
See Evans, ibid., p. 139. For a phenomenolgical approach, on the other hand, see Rudolf Frisius, ‘Musik und 
Technik: Veränderungen des Hörens, Veränderungen im Musikleben’ in Helga De la Motte-Haber, and Rudolf 
Frisius (ed.), Musik und Technik : fünf Kongressbeiträge und vier Seminarberichte. Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für 
Neue Musik und Musikerziehung Darmstadt, ( Mainz ; New York: Schott, 1996) 
934 The quote is taken from Umberto Eco, L'informale come opera aperta, in Il Verri, Vol. 3, (1961), pp. 98-127, as cited 
by Gianmario Borio, Musikalische Avantgarde um 1960 : Entwurf einer Theorie der informellen Musik, (Laaber, Laaber-
Verlag), p. 89 
935 Borio, op. cit., p. 80. Whilst the composers Borio studies can be grouped together as proponents of his aesthetic 
of musique informelle, others, like Xenakis precisely formalized their compositional approaches. However, the 
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this constellational method is its analogy to the cosmological constellation: our eyes, incapable of 
seeing the difference between the furthest and the closest stars, galaxies, etc. reduce them to a 
two-dimensional space, much like a painting. On the one hand, it shares the simultaneity of the 
elements presented in that painting – as if they all appear at the same time, as in Late Medieval 
paintings, where different stages of Christ’s life appear in the same plane – whilst on the other, 
the constellation is forever shifting, its centre chosen in a necessarily arbitrary manner, 
condemned never to present the same image twice. As Adorno936 himself wrote, with regard to 
artworks: 
Art has its concept in the historically changing constellations of elements. Its essence is not deducible 
from its origin.937 
Furthermore, the spatial metaphor of the constellation is conceptual only insofar as it creates a 
temporary image of the elements under scrutiny: as soon as this relationship ends, the 
constellation itself is of no use; it does not become a universal tool for analysis, but rather 
functions like a prism, refracting light into its constituent colours. Its function, then, consists of 
showing that which was obscured and invisible. In the same sense, a concept cannot be seen to 
be isolated from the world of objects which it tries to understand, but reorganizes them in such a 
way that they become intelligible. As I have argued, this way of thinking was possible precisely 
by taking recourse to ‘thinking-in-images’, as distinct from the conceptual thinking of traditional 
philosophy. To sum up this point, Sigrid Weigel argues that 
this representation in terms of a thought-image of a constellation that is difficult to apprehend 
conceptually should not be confused with poetic writing, nor is it a supplementary quality of 
                                                                                                                                                  
transformations of sound complexes, from a global perspective of masses of sounds, is one they share. See 
Chapter 2 
936 H.-J. Hinrichsen, Produktive Konstellation: Beethoven und Schubert in der Musikästhetik Theodor W. Adornos, in Schubert: 
Perspektiven, Vol. 4, No.1, (2004), pp. 86-102. 
937 Theodor W. Adorno, Asthetische Theorie, in Rolf Tiedemann (ed.), Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 7,  (Frankfurt am Main, 
Suhrkamp, 1972), p. 154 
 286 
Benjamin’s philosophical discourse. Rather, it indicates a mode of philosophizing, which invalidates 
philosophical discourse as meta-discourse. Benjamin’s image-space is not about metaphor – so called 
figurative or even ‘non-literal’ (uneigentlich) speech – in which an image takes the place of a concept or 
thought that could also be expressed otherwise.938 
In Adorno’s own words – taken from the inaugural lecture at Frankfurt University in 1931 – 
philosophy’s task is concerned with, on the one hand, interpretation: to momentarily bring 
together the object it studies with its meaning, in an interpretative, transient act, which can be 
understood as a changing (as opposed to a fixed) constellation. As I have argued, this form of 
interpretation as reading the works, is a dual strategy: on the one hand it is very close to the task 
Adorno sets for philosophy, whilst at the same time allowing for a reading of these same works 
in (music-)technical terms. In the following passage, Adorno refers to this as riddle-solving – the 
riddle at the heart of the objects (including the artwork) to be read: 
Authentic philosophic interpretation [echte philosophische Deutung] does not engage with a fixed meaning 
already lying behind the question, but lights it up suddenly and momentarily, and consumes it at the 
same time. Just as riddle-solving is constituted, in that singular and dispersed elements of the question 
are brought into various groupings long enough for them to close together in a figure out of which the 
solution springs forth, while the question disappears – so philosophy has to bring its elements, which 
it receives from the sciences, into changing constellations, or, to say it with less astrological and 
scientifically more current expression, into changing experimental setups (Versuchsanordnungen), until 
they fall into a figure which can be read as an answer, while at the same time the question 
disappears.939 
On the other hand, philosophy is not completely the same as riddle-solving, however: 
                                                
938 Sigrid Weigel, Body-and image-space : re-reading Walter Benjamin., (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 10 
939 ‘The Actuality of Philosophy,’ in Adorno, T.W. and B. O'Connor, The Adorno reader. (Blackwell Readers), (Oxford, 
UK; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2000), p. 32-33 
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The task of philosophy is not to search for concealed and manifest intentions of reality, but to 
interpret unintentional reality, in that, by the power of constructing figures, or images (Bilder), out of 
the isolated elements of reality it sublates (aufhebt) questions, the exact articulation of which is the task 
of science, a task to which philosophy always remains bound, because its power of illumination is not 
able to catch fire otherwise than on these solid questions.940 
 
It remains therefore the task of the musicologist to find the particular reading strategy for each 
of these works as they present themselves. The dialectics between the works studied in the next 
chapters and their interpretation can only be revealed in situ, and at the time of their analysis. At 
the level of the works, an image-like aspect of their composition, and their interpretation in the 
form of an image, can be seen as both a critical reading, but at the same time the distance to the 
object under scrutiny must be kept open. The reading of the works in terms of images must also 
avoid dismissing elements incongruent to this reading, e.g. the other mediations at work. To 
discover these aspects of their form and eventually their temporal structure, the radical shift to a 
study of textures could reveal reifications in the facets of these compositions. For example, I will 
argue that Xenakis often generates textures by means of stochastic procedures; however, as 
presented in the score of Duel, a work entirely based on self-borrowed material originating from 
these stochastic procedures, this does not result in a static, ever-same work. In that sense, the 
required analytic openness of the reading must take into account an expanded notion of the object, 
as constituted locally (as a composed texture) and globally, as an element in a changing 
constellations of these textures. This means that Borio’s idea of a sound-object could be 
expanded, as the work of composers he qualifies as informel, and composers like Xenakis, draw 
on this notion. As I will argue momentarily, on the one hand, Feldman’s artistic programme 
described in Between Categories, and on the other, Xenakis’ philosophy of music, both form part of 
                                                
940 Ibid., p. 33 
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a dialectic of the material beyond the pitch-centred conceptualization of Adorno’s aesthetics. 
However, in light of the theory of language of objects, and the reading of the works as dialectical 
images, a new insight in both the temporality of music and its spatialization in these works will 
reveal a different facet of the history of modernist music. 
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Introduction 
This chapter explores the compositional approach and the music of Edgard Varèse, whose 
compositions can be fruitfully read by employing the strategy proposed in the previous chapter. 
Varèse was known to Adorno941 and his wider influence on the two other composers discussed 
in the thesis, Morton Feldman and Iannis Xenakis, cannot be underestimated. More generally, 
Edgard Varèse has been regarded as one of the most influential pioneers of ‘spatialized’ music – 
music which not only takes into account the space in which it is performed, but integrates this 
notion of musical space into the fabric of the composition. In order to explicate his aesthetics, I 
principally draw on the work of three eminent scholars, including Jonathan W. Bernard,942 Helga 
de la Motte-Haber943 and Thimothée Horodyski.944 Their individual work illuminates certain 
aspects of the work of Varèse; however, it is only by bringing together these readings with the 
works themselves, in light of the theoretical considerations in the previous chapters, that the 
actual content can be revealed. One of the central works which illuminates the question of the 
image-like aspect of musical works of art, where the temporal and spatial aspects are not only 
interwoven but take centre stage, is undoubtedly Varèse’s Intégrales (1923-1925) for woodwinds, 
                                                
941 In fact, Adorno writes in generally positive terms of Varèse démarche, as a composer who, as a trained engineer, 
was able to import ‘technological elements into his compositions not in order to make them some kind of 
childish science, but to make room for the expression of just those kinds of tension that the aged New Music 
forfeits. He uses technology for effects of panic that go far beyond run-of-the-mill musical resources.’ Theodor 
W. Adorno, ‘The Ageing of New Music,’ in Essays, p. 194. 
942 Jonathan W. Bernard, The Music of Edgard Varèse, (Composers of the Twentieth Century) (New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1987) 
943 Helga de la Motte-Haber, Die Musik von Edgard Varèse: Studien zu seinen nach 1918 entstandenen Werke, (Hofheim, 
Wolke, 1993) 
944 Timothée Horodyski, Varèse. Héritage et confluences. Les masses sonores, l'espace du son, la spatialisation, (Villeneuve 
d'Ascq, Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 2000) and Timothée Horodyski, Philippe Lalitte, and Musicologie 
et créations musicales Equipe d'accueil Esthétiques, Edgard Varèse. Du son organisé aux arts audio. [Actes Du Colloque, 
Paris, Université Paris 8, 30-31 Mars 2006], (Arts 8) (Paris, l'Harmattan, 2007) 
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brass, and percussion.945 It plays a rather important role in the development of new approaches 
to musical composition,946 by linking tendencies in the work of earlier composers – such as 
Richard Strauss, specifically his Salome947 – and the future works, amongst others,948 of the 
composers named above. This discussion will consists of a number of analytic remarks on 
Intégrales, as seen against the background of Varèse’s wider oeuvre and compositional 
considerations, both of a technical and aesthetic nature. Apart from Intégrales, the project of the 
Philips Pavilion, for which Varèse composed his Poème électronique, will also be highlighted, 
especially the collaboration949 with Iannis Xenakis,950 who designed the Pavilion951 and composed 
                                                
945 Other important works of similar importance include Ionisation (1931). See Chou Wen-Chung, ‘Ionisation: The 
Function of Timbre in its Formal and Temporal Organization,’ in Sherman Van Solkema (ed.) The New Worlds of 
Edgard Varèse. A Symposium, (I.S.A.M. Monographs: No 11), (Brooklyn, 1979), p. 27-74 
946 Other than the three scholars mentioned above, the French theorists François-Bernard Mâche and Gilles 
Tremblay have published an analysis: ‘Analyse d’Intégralespar François-Bernard Mâche et par Gilles Tremblay’, in 
Varèse, vingt ans après..., La Revue musicale, triple number 383-384-385 (December 1985), p. 111-123  
947 For a discussion of this connection, see Helga de la Motte-Haber, ‘Blurred Traces: Varèse’s Years in Berlin,’ in 
Edgard Varèse. Composer, Sound Sculptor, Visionary, F.M.a.H. Zimmermann (ed.), The Boydell Press: Woodbridge, 
2006, p. 40-43 
948 Other composers influenced by Intégrales include Olivier Messiaen, see below. 
949 In the same Revue musicale mentioned above, Xenakis sheds light on the practical spect as well as some personal 
matters regarding this work. ‘Varèse et Xenakis,’ in La Revue musicale, triple number 383-384-385 (December 
1985), p. 221-224; see also Bart Lootsma, ‘Een ode van Philips aan de vooruitgang,’ inWonen TABK, No. 2, 
(1984), p. 10-17; German translation in ‘Poème électronique: Le Corbusier, Xenakis, Varèse,’ in T.Kesseler, 
A.Vowinckel (eds.), Le Corbusier Synthèse des Arts, Aspekte des Spätwerks 1945-1965, (Karlsruhe, Bad. Kunstverein, 
1986), pp. 111-147 
950 On the relationship between Varèse and Xenakis, see Olivia Mattis, Edgard Varèse and the Visual Arts, (PhD 
Thesis, Stanford University, 1992), pp. 247-255; see also Konrad Boehmer, 'Welle und Klippe. Xenakis und 
Varèse,’ in 1991 Wittener Tage für Neue Kammermusik, 1991, pp. 89-101 
951 See Iannis Xenakis, ‘Genèse de l'architecture du Pavillon,’ in Revue Technique Philips, Vol. 20, No. 1, (1958-59), pp. 
1-11; ‘L'architecture du Pavillon,’ in Charles Edouard Le Corbusier, Le poème électronique, (Paris, Minuit, 1958); 
Iannis Xenakis, ‘The architectural design of Le Corbusier and Xenakis,’ in Philips Technical Review, Vol. 20, No. 1, 
(1958-59), pp. 2-8 
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an electroacoustic work of his own for it, Concret PH.952 The aim of this inquiry is to develop a 
practical method, based on the one hand on the technical insights in the score, and on the other 
hand an aesthetic consideration of Varèse’s technique in light of the category of the dialectical 
image. Concretely, this means that a constellation of elements of a practical and a theoretical 
level may appear, allowing for an aesthetic exploration along Benjaminian and Adornian lines of 
this particular branch of modernism.  
 
  
                                                
952 Iannis Xenakis, ‘Le Corbusiers Elektronisches Gedicht / Le Corbusier's Electronic Poem —the Philips Pavilion,’ in 
Gravesaner Blätter n°9, 1957, p. 43-50/51-54; partially reprinted in Iannis Xenakis Musique. Architecture, (Tournai, 
Casterman, 1971), pp. 123-142 
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Spatialization in Intégrales 
As Jonathan Bernard argues, the defining characteristics of Western music, space and time, may 
seem self-evident; they were taken for granted by the turn of the twentieth century.953 When 
Western music began to change  
more rapidly and violently than it had ever done before, one thing that became clear almost 
immediately was that the effects of these changes would be first and most strongly felt in the domains 
of space and time [...].954  
He avers that ‘there can be no doubt that Edgard Varèse played a leading role in this revision, 
from the 1920s right through his last works ca. 1960.’955 In the above passage, building on his 
ground-breaking book-length study of Varèse’s music,956 Jonathan Bernard points out that the 
meaning of ‘space’ in a musical context is to most musicians ‘first and foremost, performance 
space: a concert hall of widely varying dimensions, which may be used conventionally or in any 
number of unconventional ways.’957 However, for Varèse this ‘was not the principal sense in 
which his music was spatial’; this other meaning of spatiality ‘resides in the inner workings of the 
pieces he wrote for conventional instruments.’958 Although he rationalizes the commission of 
Poème électronique as ‘unique’ in that it was composed for a particular space – the  Philips Pavilion 
at the 1958 World Exhibition in Brussels – he nonetheless argues that other works display an 
internal space.959 In the case of Intégrales (1925), Varèse composed the work according to the 
                                                
953 Jonathan W. Bernard, Varèse's Space, Varèse's Time, in Edgard Varèse. Composer, Sound Sculptor, Visionary, F.M. a. H. 
Zimmermann (ed.), (The Boydell Press, Woodbridge, 2006), p. 149 
954 Ibid. 
955 Ibid. 
956 Jonathan W. Bernard, 1987 
957 Ibid. For this literal aspect of acoustic space, Bernard refers to Henry Brant, ‘Space as an essential Aspect of 
Musical Composition,’ in Contemporary Composers on Contemporary Music, ed. Elliott Schwarts and Barney Childs 
(New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967), p. 223-243 
958 Jonathan Bernard, op. cit., p. 149-150  
959 Ibid. 
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conception of a ‘changing projection of a geometrical figure on a plane, with both figure and 
plane moving in space, but each with its own arbitrary and varying speeds of translation and 
rotation.’960 
 
For another scholar who devoted a considerable book-length study to Varèse’s work, Helga de la 
Motte-Haber, the spatial dimension in Varèse’s music is not only a crucial dimension, it is also 
innovative: 
The ways in which Varèse imagines musical space are closely connected with his new thinking about 
sound. From the outside, this statement always implies, simultaneously, the liberation of sound and 
the idea of spatial music, which are addressed in his theoretical texts. [...] In a lecture of 1959 dedicated 
in the narrow sense to spatial music, Varèse at least indirectly addressed what he regarded as an 
important anti-systematic connection of his sounds.961 
What de la Motte-Haber refers to in the above quotation is the idea that no overarching system 
of composition in the sense of a spatial music, is crucial for Varèse. 
 
In Varèse’s Intégrales, the traditional musical fabric is transformed from a linear sequence of 
motifs, melodies, harmony and rhythm played by a number of instruments, to a three-
dimensional spatial projection of sounds. Space in Varèse’s ‘sound world is primarily a matter of 
vertical compass, of the highest and lowest pitches heard at any given time, and of fluctuating 
                                                
960 Edgard Varèse, ‘Mind over Music,’ radio interview with Fred Grunfeld, WQXR (New York), 13 November 1953, 
as cited by Frederic Waldman, ‘Edgar Varèse: an Appreciation,’ Julliard Review 1/3, (Fall 1954), p. 3-10 and 
Jonathan Bernard, op. cit., p. 150 
961 De la Motte, op. cit., p. 111. Heinz-Klaus Metzger and Rainer Riehn (eds.), Edgard Varèse. Rückblick auf die Zukunft. 
Musik-Konzepte 6, Munich, 1978: ‘Die musikalischen Raumvorstellungen von Varèse sind mit seinem neuartigen 
Klangdenken eng verbunden. Rein äußerlich tut sich dies darin kund, daß in seinen theoretischen Texten immer 
zugleich die Befreiung des Klangs und die Idee der spatialen musik angesprochen werden. [...] In der im engeren 
Sinn der Spatialen Musik 1959 gewidmeten Vorlesung hielt es Varèse für wichtig, wenigstens ‘nebenbei’ auf die 
nicht-systemliche Bindung seiner Klänge einzugehen.’ 
 300 
density of the instrumental parts operating within these boundaries.’962 Helga de la Motte-Haber, 
writes in ‘Blurred Traces: Varèse’s Years in Berlin’ how precisely Varèse achieved his spatial 
compositional goal. She considers that ‘the impression of distance and proximity, echo and 
lontano effects, can easily be achieved in music by means of dynamics.’ Furthermore, ‘crescendos 
and decrescendos in contrary motion – an effect often found in Varèse’s music – even make it 
possible to create a space intrinsic to the music itself, in which sounds seem to protrude into the 
foreground or recede into the background by becoming louder or softer at different times. This 
device is also found in the scores of Richard Strauss.’963 Varèse’s approach can indeed be seen to 
have been inspired by composers like Strauss, as well as Claude Debussy. In their music, 
however, ‘dynamic processes in contrary motion, besides causing a colouristic effect, usually 
serve to make the musical fabric more fluid.’964 This is achieved by generating a ‘sensation of 
interweaving that transcends the metrical pulse,’ and indeed Varèse, too, in addition to the 
intended spatial effects, ‘used contrapuntal dynamics in this way in order to impart shape to time.’ 
In Ionisation (1929-1931),965 for example, the ‘predominant 4/4 meter of the notation merely 
serves as a scaffold to contain what is happening.’966 
 
This ‘imparting of shape to time’ is a revealing comment, if understood from a philosophical 
point as an attempt to reveal the connection between space and time, or to paraphrase Bergson, 
to mould the moments and stretch them out (in a sense creating a continuity between instants). 
From a dialectical point of view, the temporal universal is here subtly undermined and gradually 
                                                
962 Jonathan W. Bernard, op. cit. 
963 Helga de la Motte-Haber, ‘Varèse’s Years in Berlin,’ in op. cit., p. 40 
964 Ibid. 
965 See Jean-Charles François, ‘Organization of Scattered Timbral Qualities: A Look at Edgard Varèse's Ionisation,’ in 
Perspectives of New Music, Vol. 29, No. 1, (Winter 1991), p. 48–79 
966 Ibid. 
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integrated with the spatial element. De la Motte-Haber explains this in her book on Varèse in 
more detail (see the ‘haptic dimension’ of his music).967 For her a third, spatial dimension is 
present in Varèse’s work, already fixed ‘to tones because of their tactile quality.’968 This describes 
what de la Motte terms the plastic elements of the experience of sounds, which traditionally are 
not seen as central characteristics of sounds. Other central notions, such as the interval, acquire 
new meanings: 
The interval content of a sound [Klang] no longer uses the systemic, abstract properties of a tone, but 
its immediate physical qualities which arise from both narrower and wider proportions, as well as from 
the degrees to which they blend. The two fifths, on which the last sound of Intégrales sits (f-c-g), 
anchor the end on a rounded, voluminous foundation.969 
According to de la Motte, to qualify further this third dimension, the use of metaphoric language 
pertaining to the visual, is required: ‘Brightness, roughness, density and volume are metaphors 
from the visual field that are not just the description of the corporeal nature of the sound, but 
can also be used to characterize its colour.’ 970  What this seemingly obvious descriptive 
terminology sets it apart from mere banality, lies precisely in the fact that the richness of colour 
is traditionally reduced to a single salient feature.971 Varèse’s music is hard to qualify in the sense 
of (linear) harmonic progressions, which are adaptable for describing or analyzing the way in 
                                                
967 Helga de la Motte-Haber, Varèse, p. 122 
968 Ibid.: ‘Bereits an Tönen haftet durch ihre haptische Qualität eine dritte räumliche Dimension.’ 
969 Ibid.: ‘Der Intervallaufbau eines Klangs benutzt nicht mehr die systemlichen abstrakten Eigenschaften eines 
Tones, sondern seine unmittelbaren sinnlichen Qualitäten, die sich sowohl aus engeren und weiteren 
Verhältnissen ergeben als auch aus ihren Verschmelzungsgraden.. Die beiden Quinten, auf denen der letzte 
Klang von Intégrales ruht (f-c-g), verankern den Schluß in einem abgerundeten voluminösen Fundament.’ 
970 Ibid.: ‘Helligkeit, Rauhigkeit, Dichte und Volumen sind Metaphern aus dem visuellen Bereich, die nicht nur der 
Beschreibung der Körperlichen Beschaffenheit des Klanges, sondern auch zur Charakterisierung seiner Farbe 
benutzt werden können.’ 
971 Ibid.: ‘Die traditionelle Musiktheorie filtert aus diesem bunten Spektrum ein lineares eindimensionales Merkmal 
heraus, die Rauhigkeit, um mit der Harmonielehre Fortschreitungsregeln für Klänge formulieren zu können. 
Dagegen spielt sich die musik von Varèse in vielen Dimensionen ab, in die sich Klänge bewegen können.’ 
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which his sounds move in many dimensions. The way in which this haptic dimension evokes a 
third dimension – with impressions of nearness and at distance – is through respectively low and 
high pitches and dynamics of loud and soft. Again, this is not so different from the traditional 
use of dynamics, however, its function is rather different. According to de la Motte, for actual 
spatial effects Varèse drew inspiration above all from the scores of Gustav Mahler; at the same 
time, however, ‘for all their similarity of technique, the two composers pursued quite different 
aesthetic ends.’972 De la Motte suggests that there are further similarities, specifically the last 
scene of Salome and the opening of Intégrales 973 especially from a dynamic point of view. 
Moreover, Varèse usually avoided stylistic allusions when recasting traditional building-blocks. 
The similarity of these two passages is suggested by the relation of line to sound, as dynamics 
shaped within the temporal process, and by the fact that the sound seems to distend when it gets 
louder and to shrink when it gets softer, as ‘even the repetitions reinforce the feeling of 
similarity.’974  
                                                
972 Helga De la Motte, ‘Varèse’s Years in Berlin,’ p. 42 
973 See Helga de la Motte-Haber, p. 42: ‘Varèse’s admiration of the conclusion of Salome tends to suggest that he may 
also have been directly influenced by Strauss’ treatment of dynamics. However, this was creatively redefined in 
the process of assimilation. Shortly before the ‘exhausted’ (ermattet) Salome sings ‘Ah, ich habe Deinen Mund 
geküßt, Jochanaan’ (2mm. before no. 355), we sense at first hearing a striking similarity to the introduction of 
Intégrales, not least in the handling of the dynamics. The considerable difference in shrillness of timbre is not a 
consideration, in view of the rapid development of New Music in the fifteen years that separate these two pieces.’ 
974 Ibid. 
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Figure 11: Edgard Varèse, Intégra l e s  (1925), p. 1 
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Furthermore, according to de la Motte, however, the two composers had different aims.975 On 
the one hand, Strauss embeds a fragment of a melody in a ‘darker’ texture which appears to 
‘inflate’976: 
 Line and sound form a single continuous process, mediated by the first flute and the clarinet: the 
alien-sounding melody lends linguistic significance to the following sonority as it emerges from layers 
of darkness.977  
In this context, whilst the spatial effects may have been conceived as integral to the composition, 
they remain mere ‘physical effects’ as they are played on an organ, off-stage. For de la Motte, in 
this regard 
The elongation of line into sonority is a motif that permeates the entire opera and is meant to be 
viewed as a distinct entity. This is shown with greater clarity in several earlier passages, where the 
libretto speaks of dark caverns or mentions Jochanaan’s curse (rehearsal nos. 77 and 150).978 
Varèse, too, frequently uses this device of equating the horizontal and the vertical by splitting the 
music into high and low registers. In Intégrales, the pressure on the figure d 2 - a♭2 -	 b♭2 in the 
Eb clarinet is raised to such a degree at its second occurrence that it generates the pitches e ♭- a 
- b as an enveloping nimbus that vanishes in the quivering b ♭. Set apart from this loud process 
in the foreground we hear the trombones, at first softly, then in crescendo, forcing their way into 
the foreground, and then receding once again into the background. Both their dynamic 
progression and their register (C - c ♯as opposed to a1-b2) keep them separate from the figure 
in the Eb clarinet.  
                                                
975 Ibid., p. 42 
976 Ibid. 
977 Ibid. 
978 ibid. 
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Figure 12:  Edgard Varèse, Intégra l e s , p. 1, b. 4-6979 
 
In an interview with Fred Grunfeld, Varèse spoke of two functions entering a mutual relation. 
He told the listeners to 
Visualize the changing projection of a geometrical figure on a plane, with both plane and figure 
moving in space, but each with its own arbitrary and varying speeds of translation and rotation. The 
instantaneous form of the projection is determined by the relative orientation between the figure and 
the plane at the moment.980  
 
Before I turn to the different functions of the use of dynamics, it can be argued that Intégrales 
contains a process similar to the one in Salome; as de la Motte writes it is a ‘horizontal 
progression deflected into the vertical dimension.’981 Within the context of an expanding sonority, 
however, the original idea of ‘the continuous prolongation of a figure is turned into its 
opposite.’982 In other words, the figure which appears in this architecture of sonority, the 
dynamics – the ‘crescendo-plus-decrescendo shape’ – articulates the temporal unfolding of the 
                                                
979 For a discussion of this passage, see also Timothée Horodysky, op. cit., p. 160 
980 Interview with Fred Grunfeld, Radio WQXR on 13 December 1953, as cited in Jonathan Bernard, The Music of 
Edgard Varèse, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1987), p. 7 
981 Ibid. 
982 Ibid. 
 306 
sounds, and achieves a spatial effect at the same time. In spatial terms, the movement of a plane, 
which de la Motte sees as being furnished by the trombones, is contrasted with a ‘figure’ that 
‘moves forwards, upwards, and downwards,’983 resulting in a tension which underpins the entire 
piece. There is no longer a sense that anything is being expressed, what occurs are ‘sound 
processes that create an awareness of structures in tonal space.’ 984  This ‘physically multi-
dimensional expression’ might be termed, to borrow a phrase from Dieter Schnebel, a ‘language 
of vibrant air.’985  De la Motte concludes that upon closer inspection, the initial similarities of 
Intégrales to Salome are deceptive, but nevertheless have a raison d’être. She questions whether 
Varèse was even ‘particularly capable of perceiving the idiosyncrasies of Strauss’ music.’986 
However, the references to earlier music, via the borrowing of certain technical procedures, have 
another function: Varèse makes abstraction from their specific context in order to re-assemble 
the constituent parametric ideas (such as dynamics) in different ways. Their goal is the 
reorientation of these musical means towards the idea that music should be understood more as 
a spatial art, and no longer an art whose content unfolds solely in time. The play between the 
sound masses conveys a different sort of movement, one which is no longer based on the 
manipulation of melodies, or even pitches, but through a variation of the dynamic, movement is 
created in a different way. 
 
Another interesting aspect of Varèse’s music is the way in which he borrows from his own work, 
something we will also encounter in the music of Iannis Xenakis. For example, in Amériques and 
Arcana, Varèse borrowed material from Offrandes. However, Varèse did not treat such borrowings 
                                                
983 Ibid. 
984 Ibid. 
985 Dieter Schnebel, ‘Der körperliche Klang: zu Edgard Varèse und seiner Musik,’ in Metzger and Riehn, Varèse, p. 
10 
986 Ibid. 
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as objets trouvés to place them in new contexts. 987 What counted for Varèse was how borrowings 
were treated, as musical material, regardless of its extramusical origins. The sonorous qualities 
were paramount, whilst the structural function they could play was of equal importance. In order 
to achieve this structural role, they had to be generalized. In other words, the modernist 
technique of alienating materials from their origins, including traditional instrumentation, 
became one of Varèse’s well-known innovations – think for example of the use of the siren in 
Amériques. The historical element encoded in the use of the siren as a device to warn or signal, 
can be seen to have lost its immediate function. However, it reappears transformed in the music 
as another sound source or sound object. Consequently, this could be understood as the 
highlighting of the mediation of the artwork with history and society, in a way other orchestral 
instruments are no longer capable of achieving this degree of tension.988  
  
                                                
987 Helga de la Motte-Haber, ‘Varèse’s Years in Berlin,’ op. cit., p. 43 
988 The inclusion of new instruments into the orchestra – as an institution – was often criticized. See John Spitzer 
and Neal Zaslaw, The Birth of the Orchestra. History of an Institution, 1650-1815, (Oxford; New York, OUP, 2004) 
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Intégrales: analytic remarks 
As John Strawn points out in his analysis of Intégrales,989 it is no longer relevant to approach a 
musical composition with an inherently pitch-based search for fundamental motifs and their 
varied presentation and repetition, but to integrate such varied elements as timbre, spacing and 
projection of sound within the ensemble of eleven wind instruments and percussion. Although 
superficial relations between ‘masses’ – loosely defined as ‘groups of sound’ – can be found,990 it 
becomes clear that this material is in fact part of an ever-changing image of what Strawn (with 
Varèse) calls a ‘process of crystallization.’ 991 The idea of ‘masses’ here is somewhat misleading – 
especially with Iannis Xenakis’ use of more global sound masses in mind – as these consist of 
small groups of instruments which, together, make up the fabric of the music at any given 
moment. The individual ‘masses’ represent strictly distinguished pitched and non-pitched 
sounds; in that sense, it is their precise juxtaposition that leads to a particular ‘integral’ or global 
sound (which resemble the idea of the sound-object). To take Varèse’s metaphor of the block of 
granite further, its texture is therefore ‘grained,’ a combination of different-sized crystals.992 
Strawn describes the first ‘mass’ as follows:  
-measures 1-25 :  clarinet I 
-m. 10-11:   trumpet II 
-m. 12-13, 19:  oboe 
-m. 18-21:  trumpet I 
However, Mass 1 is juxtaposed with Mass 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6: 
                                                
989 John Strawn, ‘The Intégrales of Edgard Varèse Space, Mass, Element, and Form,’ in Perspectives of New Music, Vol. 
17 No. 1, (1978), pp. 138-160 
990 See John Strawn’s two Tables, the first of which distinguishes between 110 unique ‘masses,’ the second shows 13 
‘superficially’ related groups of ‘masses.’ (p. 147) 
991 John Strawn, op. cit., p. 155 
992 The word granite comes from the Latin granum, a grain, which refers to the coarse-grained structure of this type of 
crystalline rock. 
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-m. 4-23:   gong, tam-tam, triangle, crash cymbal, cymbals (except m. 8) 
-m. 16-20:  suspended cymbal 
-m. 16-17  bass drum 
As Varèse himself explained regarding the formation of crystals as a process, this is the realization 
in musical terms of an idea, the basis of an internal structure expanded and split into different 
shapes or groups of sound constantly changing in shape, direction, and speed, attracted and 
repulsed by various forces. The form of the work is the consequence of this interaction.993 
 
As Jonathan Bernard argues, Varèse uses analogies with physical objects or processes, not merely 
because explanations in visual terms are often easier to grasp:  
His appropriation of a mineralogist’s definition of crystallization to illustrate the general way in which 
his pieces took shape (‘the consequence of the interaction of attractive and repulsive forces and the 
ordered packing of the atom’)994 or his evocation of ‘opposing planes and volumes’ to characterize the 
progressive effect of Déserts (1949-50) seems calculated to further our understanding of what is going 
on in this music at a very basic level.995 
The sound masses are modified, as Strawn shows in his comparative Table II, ‘every time it 
penetrates into the listener’s field of hearing, by a process in which various elements are added or 
removed, this being the manner in which elements contribute to the process of form.’996 The 
elements themselves are not brought together in an arbitrary fashion, but through a principle of 
‘chromatic expansion’ of the pitch content of a certain element. This occasionally builds to an 
                                                
993 Edgard Varèse, ‘The Liberation of Sound’, in E. Schwartz and B. Childs, p. 203 
994 Edgard Varèse, ‘The Liberation of Sound’, op. cit., p. 201-204. According to Bernard, this passage is taken from a 
lecture Varèse gave at Princeton University on 4 September 1959, entitled ‘Autobiographical Remarks’; In 
Schwarts and Childs this lecture received a new title: ‘Rhythm, Form and Content.’ Jonathan Bernard, op. cit., p. 
150 
995 Jonathan Bernard, op. cit., p. 150 
996 Ibid., p. 155 
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aggregate comprising almost all 12 notes of the chromatic scale, as for example in m. 28, where 
eleven different pitches sound in the eleven instruments. 
 
While the ear is shown to synthesize the changes in timbre – certain sounds are passed between 
instruments in a way that their transition comes close to a momentary fusing or blending of their 
individual timbres – the sound is also made to travel around, creating the illusion of distance via 
a differentiation of the dynamics (as I have already argued following Helga de la Motte). 
However, Varèse deliberately avoids any homogeneity of sound, which would be too reminiscent 
of nineteenth-century approaches to the handling of sonority and texture, with frequent 
doublings in different instruments. As Jonathan Bernard explains, Varèse favoured ensembles 
that allowed him to use ‘as much of the audible sound spectrum to work with as possible: 
piccolos in their highest register, double basses and low brass in their lowest.’997 In Varèse’s work 
ensemble writing was ‘confined almost entirely to wind instruments and percussion [...], for the 
sake of promoting clarity and focus of sound in the extreme registers [...] yielding a more definite 
impression of music filling and traversing vast spaces.’998 Sounds can be passed not only to other 
wind instruments, but also to the percussion instruments, where their pitch content is 
momentarily suspended and weighed against their rhythmic functioning. In other words, the 
rotation of sounds between the instruments is rather based on their sonorous qualities than on 
the completion of a (dodecaphonic) series of pitches. Analyses that do not take into account the 
role of the percussion instruments999 and simply focus on whether or not Varèse completes the 
chromatic scale, obviously disregard the sharing of material between the instruments, including 
non-pitched percussion. 
                                                
997 Jonathan Bernard, op. cit. p. 150 
998 Ibid. 
999 Larry Stempel, ‘Varèse's “Awkwardness” and the Symmetry in the “Frame of 12 Tones”: An Analytic Approach,’ 
in The Musical Quarterly, Vol. 65, No. 2, (1979), p. 148-166 
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With regard to Adorno’s critical theory of the modernist artwork, and in light of an aesthetics of  
musique informelle, certain tendencies in Varèse’s compositional approach in Intégrales can be 
considered to be crucial. In particular, Varèse’s alternative to reified compositional technique – 
which could be termed anti-systematic – is paramount in this perspective. In two different ways, 
Varèse avoided replacing one system with another: neither would the traditional tonal space be 
refilled with an atonal system, nor would the blending of timbres be fitted to measure a series of 
timbres (as in the future integral serialism). In terms of the non-homogeneous treatment of 
timbre, Varèse would attempt to achieve the highest degree of ‘non-blending’ of the instruments 
as he called it, establishing ‘zones of intensities’ in his instrumentation and, according to Bernard, 
‘thus using timbre as an agent of differentiation.1000 Bernard argues that to Varèse both can be 
seen as  
characterized by an intellectual orderliness which boxes itself in through the internal symmetry of its 
parts. It precludes leaving any space for that ‘awkwardness,’ that untidy openness which Varèse prized 
in a work of art. I think the caveat on the codification of closed systems is Varèse at his most 
genuine.1001 
  
Varèse’s interest in the architectonic qualities of blocks of granite is instrumental to the 
understanding of his conception of these works based on the use of sound masses, as well as 
how they contribute to the construction of musical form. In this regard, Varèse had a unique 
perspective on both rhythm and musical form:   
                                                
1000 Jonathan Bernard, op. cit., p. 150. Bernard quotes from Varèse, ‘The Liberation of Sound’, op. cit., p. 196-198. The 
above passage is from a lecture given at Mary Austin House, Santa Fe, 23 August 1936, entitled ‘Music and 
Times’; in Schwartz and Childs it is given the new title ‘New Instruments and New Music.’  
1001 Ibid.,  p. 154. Without recourse to simplification or conceptual reduction, Adorno’s criticism of totalizing 
systems, which ultimately take their own existence and functioning for granted, runs parallel to Varèse’s 
reluctance of precisely this particular modernist credo of ‘total’ system-building. 
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Rhythm is too often confused with metrics [...] In my own works, for instance, rhythm derives from 
the simultaneous interplay of unrelated elements that intervene at calculated, but not regular, time-
lapses [...] Form is a result – the result of a process. Each of my works discovers its own form.1002 
Form in this respect is a result of the combination of these masses and elements – created from 
the bottom up. In that sense, form as such is not a tool, scheme or method to be applied to a 
chaotic source of sounds, but a concept which brings the individual elements, the groups of 
sounds or masses, to bear on the global conception of the work. 
 
The work of Horodyski on Varèse appears to support an important aspect of the reading 
strategy of modernist artowrks in the way I have proposed. Her critique, as I will show, reveals 
the inadequacy of former analytic approaches to his work, by either reductive approaches 
(Bernard), or fragmentary ones (Strawn). In this sense, a reading of this work in light of the 
dialectical image, where the aspects of the composition hitherto relegated, abstracted, or reduced 
appear anew, can be found in her work. It is concerned with the complex relation of 
spatialization (as de la Motte also argues) and the issue of time. In this sense, an important aspect 
of Intégrales is revealed in Horodyski’s analysis. The first  question she asks is ‘how Varèse 
occupies and divides space?’1003 This question reveals on the one hand the notion of the outer 
limits of the individual masses (their intervallic range); on the other, it is important to look at the 
internal organization of the details – the study of intervallic content, which constitutes in her view 
‘one of the access points to the material, especially since the composer asserts it himself, and the 
form results from the specific density of [these] contents.’1004  
 
                                                
1002 John Strawn, op. cit., p. 202-203 
1003 Timothée Horodyski, op. cit., p. 113: ‘L’étude du contenu  intervallique constitue donc une des portes d’accès au 
matériau, d’autant plus que le compositeur  l’affirme lui-même, la forme résulte de la densité du contenu.’ 
1004 Ibid. 
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In her inquiry, Horodyski explores the limitations of the analytic approach of Jonathan Bernard. 
Although this work carries the approval of Chou Wen-Chung, an important conductor and 
scholar of Varèse’s work,1005 Horodyski finds Bernard’s work on the contrary to be occasionally 
arbitrary in its method. In its reliance on pitch-set class analysis – as developed by Allen Forte 
and Milton Babbitt – the criterium of the relative importance of certain intervals which achieve 
structural relevance, it is purely based on the measurement of how frequently they appear. 
Secondly, this analysis is limited as it is based on grouping and analyzing configurations of three 
pitches. For Bernard, the basic configuration of g♯– b – g ♮ is essential to understanding the 
whole composition. 
 
Figure 13: Intégra l e s , structural chords (Bernard), set classes [3] and [8]1006 
Whilst permitting the definition of spatial configurations based on intervallic pairs, it exclusively 
studies these relations between the three pitches.  
 
Figure 14: Edgard Varèse, Intégra l e s , intervallic pairs (Bernard)1007 
In Horodyski’s estimations, it is here that Bernard’s analysis falls short, as he ‘analyses relations 
of configurations of three pitches which we consider not to have appropriate significance.’1008 
                                                
1005 Chou Wen-chung, ‘Ionisation: The Function of Timbre in Its Formal and Temporal Organization,’ in The New 
Worlds of Edgard Varèse, Sherman Van Solkema (ed.), (Brooklyn, Institute for Studies in American Music, 1979), 
pp. 26-74 
1006 See Jonathan Bernard, op. cit., p. 74 
1007 Ibid., p. 74 
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The choice of basic configurations of three notes, one constituting a model, with two variations, 
one an expansion and one a contraction, is therefore arbitrary.  
 
Figure 15: Edgard Varèse, Intégra l e s , basic configuration, expansions and contraction (Horodyski)1009 
In a section of her book on Varèse, Form as a resultant of a process, Horodyski understands Intégrales 
as a key work for the understanding of his technique. Referring to the influence of cubist artistic 
technique on his work, especially on the conception of form, another important notion is 
revealed in the confrontation with a definition of music by Hoene Wronskyas ‘the embodiment 
of consciousness in the sounds [themselves]’ 1010 ‘Thanks to this fundamental idea, Varèse 
declared that ‘I started to conceive of music as being spatial, like moving sonorous bodies in 
space, a conception I developed gradually and made my own.1011 The test case [oeuvre laboratoire] 
for this theory of musical spatiality is generally understood to be Intégrales, as shown in the work 
of  several generations of analysts, each understanding the work from a different perspective, 
using their own concepts and categories. As Horodyski argues, these include analyses focusing 
on the segmentation of the work.1012 These opt for a view of the work as instantaneous and 
immobile, and are presented in ‘contradiction with the notion of evolution and the temporal 
                                                                                                                                                  
1008 ‘Il arrive que Bernard analyse des rapports de configurations de trois sons dont nous estimons qu’elles n’ont pas 
de signification pertinente.’ p. 113-114 
1009 Horodyski, op. cit., p. 116 
1010 Ibid.. ‘corporification de l’intelligence qui est dans les sons.’ 
1011 ‘Grâce à elle, je commençai à concevoir la musique comme étant spatiale, comme de mouvants corps sonores 
dans l’espace, conception que je développai graduellement et fis mienne.’ In Edgard Varèse, Écrits, op. cit., 1983, 
p. 153 
1012 Harry Halbreich and Georges Charbonnier, Entretiens avec Edgard Varèse, (Collection Entretiens) (Paris: P. 
Belfond, 1970), pp. 136-138; Marc Wilkinson, ‘Edgard Varèse, Pioneer and Prophet,’ in Melos, 28 (April 1961), p. 
68-76 
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process.’ 1013  Other approaches include François-Bernard Mâche’s structural analysis, which 
proceeds according to the analytic principle of distribution of discrete units on the one hand 
(which, interestingly he terms ‘objects’), and variants and transformations on the other hand. 
Horodyski criticizes these various approaches: ‘Once again, proving the recurrence of units 
which return in analogous positions in different contexts annihilates the kinetic play of the figure 
and the plane in a spatializing formal process.’1014 Furthermore, American analysts are interested, 
according to Horodyski, in the play of the sound masses in space: for example, Chou-Wen-
chung briefly considers the interaction of the different sound masses;  Robert Erickson insists in 
this regard on the fusion of these masses.1015 As I have already argued, John Strawn considers the 
work to consist of 110 three-dimensional entities or masses in the score, as well as their 
interaction. Only Helga de la Motte’s partial analysis carries Horodyski’s favour for mentioning a 
rotation of 180° in bar 29, and mentions other cases of rotation.  
 
Figure 16: Edgard Varèse, Intégra l e s , chordal rotation 
Horodyski then proposes an analysis along the lines of Varèse’s own statements in terms of the 
spatial projections in Intégrales: 
                                                
1013 Timothée Horodyski, op. cit., p. 158 
1014 Ibid., ‘Là encore, la mise en evidence de la recurrence d’unités qui reviennent à des positions analogues dans des 
contexts différents, annihile le jeu cinétique de la figure et du plan, dans un processus formel spatialisant.’ 
1015 Robert Erickson, Sound Structure in Music, (Berkeley; Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1975). See also 
the review by Richard Swift, ‘Sound Structure in Music by Robert Erickson,’ in Perspectives of New Music, Vol. 14, 
No.1 (Autumn-Winter, 1975), pp. 148-158 
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Intégrales was conceived for spatial projection. I planned it for certain acoustical media that were not 
then in existence, but that I knew could be built and would be available sooner or later [...] Let us 
transfer this conception to the optical field and visualize the changing projection of a geometrical 
figure on a plane, with both figure and plane moving in space, but each with its own arbitrary and 
varying speeds of translation and rotation.1016 
Although she criticizes and discusses the work of Jonathan Bernard elsewhere, as we have seen, 
Horodyski seems to have overlooked the former’s correct understanding of how Varèse shapes his 
formal organization. The idea of crystallization – the process of becoming crystal – is  explicated 
in his article on the relation between pitch and register. The idea that cell-like structure are not 
static but ever-changing is one of Bernard’s key points. He quotes Varèse in direct contrast to 
the use of cell-like structuring devices in the work of George Perle1017 and others:  
There’s an idea, the basis of an internal structure, expanded or split into different shapes or groups of 
sound constantly changing in shape, direction, and speed, attracted and repulsed by various forces. 
The form of the work is the consequence of this interaction.1018  
  
                                                
1016 Edgard Varèse, as quoted in Frederic Waldman, ‘Edgard Varèse: An Appreciation,’ in Juilliard Review (Fall, 1954), 
p. 9 
1017 George Perle, Serial Composition and Atonality, fourth edition, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977) 
1018 Edgard Varèse, ‘The Liberation of Sound,’ op. cit., p. 203, quoted by Jonathan Bernard, ‘Pitch/Register in the 
Music of Edgard Varèse,’ in Music Theory Spectrum, Vol. 3 (Spring, 1981), p. 4 
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Intégrales: temporal considerations 
An aspect of Edgard Varèse’s compositional technique and his aesthetics considers musical time, 
in light of the spatial aspects and the spatialization discussed above. Like Morton Feldman much 
later, Varèse was influenced by the philosophy of Henri Bergson.1019 In comparison to other 
modernist music composed in the first half of the twentieth century, Varèse’s treatment of 
musical time can be considered as highly unconventional, even more so than his spatial 
understanding outlined above. In particular, elements of traditional musical composition, such as 
melody and counterpoint were entirely replaced or fundamentally changed: for Varèse melody 
was no longer to be understood horizontally, but had become vertical, in reference to what he 
himself termed ‘the movement of sound-masses, of shifting planes’ – intended under ideal 
circumstances to take the place of ‘linear counterpoint.’1020 As Jonathan Bernard argues in this 
regard, the temporal dimension had almost ‘lost its capacity for predictable regulation.’1021 The 
new temporal unfolding in the works of Varèse refused the usual continuity and linearity as 
mentioned before; one of the most most important types of such a new temporality can be 
described, according Jonathan Bernard, as ‘frozen music,’ which he defines as ‘pitch collections 
consisting of short phrases, or one or more chords, or a combination of the two, repeated in 
varying rhythms, sometimes a great many times before abruptly reverting to something new.’1022   
                                                
1019 See Roy Kotynek and John Cohassey, American Cultural Rebels. Avant-Garde and Bohemian Artists, Writers and 
Musicians from the 1850s through the 1960s, (Jefferson, NC, McFarland, 2008), p. 81 
1020 Edgard Varèse, c.1923, cited in Louise Varèse, Varèse: A Looking-Glass Diary, New York, W.W. Norton, 1972, p. 
211, and Edgard Varèse, ‘The Liberation of Sound’ (‘New Instruments and New Music) 
1021 Jonathan Bernard, op. cit., p. 150 
1022 Ibid. See also Jonathan Barnard, The Music of Edgard Varèse, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1987), Chapter 4, pp. 134-152. Bernard writes that ‘the fact that Goethe once referred to architecture as ‘frozen 
music’ (erstarrte Musik) was a definite, if unconscious influence on my adoption of this characterization: it is also 
entirely apposite, since Varèse himself made abundant use of architectural metaphors in describing his 
compositional approach from the earliest stages of his development – for instance, in his discussion of the 
‘architectonic’ inspiration provided him by Romanesque churches such as the one at Tournus, familiar to him 
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The opening of Intégrales is supposedly characteristic in this respect: one brief melodic figure, 
minimally varied and elaborated over the first twenty-five measures, alternating with two chords 
– one in the high woodwinds, the other in the trombones, absolutely fixed with respect to both 
pitch content and registral disposition – and ‘accompanied’ (though hardly in any traditional 
sense) by an ever-changing, intricate interplay in the percussion section. As I have argued, all of 
these components occupy distinctly different spaces, both registrally and timbrally; consequently, 
it is quite accurate to assert that space here is being developed through time. In that sense, 
Bernard notion of ‘frozen’ music is hardly tenable. At the same time, the temporal aspect of this 
music is being developed through space. In other words, the traditional experience of time is 
challenged by a number of subtle changes to the material, showing precisely a shift away from a 
pitch-based to a textural approach. As I have shown, this is not a naïve painting by instrumental 
colours, but a finely attuned and dynamically graded music of difference – in other words, 
bringing the experience of musical time to the fore via the projection of musical space. However, 
as Horodyski and de la Motte have shown, Varèse is a composer who was firmly rooted in his 
time and who drew conclusions from his knowledge of earlier music, and other arts.  
 
This reciprocity stems not only from the generally strong visual attributes of Varèse’s musical 
thought, but even more crucially from the affinities it bears to the visual art of early modernism, 
particularly (in this case) cubist painting and sculpture. In cubism, multiple views of the same 
object, represented in sequence or in superimposition, were often featured.1023 In such work, 
artists sought to incorporate a kind of temporality, which up to that point in history would not 
have been generally considered available to an art that – unlike, say, music or dance – does not 
                                                                                                                                                  
from his boyhood. See Gunther Schuller, ‘Conversation with Varèse,’ Perspectives of New Music, Vol. 3, No. 2, 
(Spring-Summer 1965), p. 32-37 
1023 See Jonathan Bernard, The music of Edgard Varèse, op. cit., Chapter 1, p. 6-23 
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literally develop through time.1024 My reading of the work attempted to specifically show the 
dialectic of the spatialization of time, and the temporal in the spatial, as it is presented in this 
work. Varèse precisely knows how to proceed in the sense that the musical fabric of his work 
creates an ever-changing kaleidoscopic vision of instrumental colour. This foreshadows the work 
of the two composers considered in the next two chapters, who in their reception of Varèse’s 
work, went even further in the development of a musical alternative to the grand narrative of 
increasing rationalization of the musical material. In one sense, Varèse’s music can be considered 
in this light of the future musique informelle, however, presenting an image of technological reason 
by critically arresting time in subtle ways to form temporal images. 
 
  
                                                
1024 Bernard, ibid., p. 8. ‘It was a stroke of Varèse’s peculiar genius to have conceived of a way to complete the 
circuit, as it were, bringing ideas of time that arose in response to the inherent limitations of an ostensibly 
atemporal medium back into music. In doing so, he effectively mounted a challenge to some of the more 
ingrained habits of temporal structure in Western music, in the process revising rhythm and duration on all 
levels, from their surface manifestations to their large-scale effects.’ 
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CHAPTER 6: Morton Feldman, the Instrumental Image, and Words and 
Music  
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Introduction 
This chapter evolves the issues raised in the previous chapters, and attempts to demonstrate how 
the notion of the image in its different philosophical and compositional meanings can be seen to 
have inspired the American composer Morton Feldman. I draw on the work of Sebastian Claren, 
who wrote a seminal book on the composer.1025 The chapter consists of two parts, the first of 
which explores Feldman’s notion of the instrumental image. A second part focuses on the 
allegorical work Words and Music, a radio play by Samuel Beckett for which Feldman composed a 
score, which can be fruitfully read in light of the reading strategy I propose. Feldman’s affinity in 
this sense for the allegorical in this work by Beckett resonates strongly with the idea of the 
allegorical image in Benjamin’s work. Furthermore, it adds a crucial practical perspective to 
theoretical elements I propose in terms of an aesthetics of the musical informel. A number of the 
issues in the work of Varèse, including the importance of musical space, return in the work of 
Feldman. 
 
In this regard, an important contribution to the twentieth-century history of ideas, specifically in 
relation to musical temporality and spatialization are represented in Feldman’s writings. In these 
various articles, interviews and essays, Feldman often refers to his views on musical time and 
space. He confronts the centrality of ‘construction’ (or technique) of traditional compositional 
practices, as reducing musical time to something that can be ‘handled’, or ‘counted out in 
seconds’ (in his phrase, ‘music-in-time’), whilst proposing a new understanding of ‘music-as-
time.’ In this sense, music’s linear, chronological progression through time, where the music was 
identified with its chronological position within a work, came undone. This approach appeared 
for the first time in his In Search of an Orchestration —one of the crucial scores to be considered in 
                                                
1025 Claren, Sebastian, Neither. Die Musik Morton Feldmans, (Hofheim, Wolke, 2000). Although it was published in 
2000, it remains untranslated. 
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this study. By refusing to subsume his music to ‘the horizontal continuity’ of the traditional 
conception of musical temporality, the vertical aspect of music – through the ‘juxtaposition of 
registers’ – could then be developed. Rather than constructing sequences of pitches, rhythms and 
harmonies, Feldman’s music, like the work of Varèse and Xenakis, attempts to develop a 
compositional approach governing a sequence of textures; thereby, the functionality of earlier 
formal approaches, where one element of a sequence has a functional relationship to the 
previous, is abandoned. 
 
Especially in his late work, Feldman’s music aims to undermine what he calls the ‘illusory’ 
character of music by playing on the capacity of human memory, finally revealing it to be 
incapable of remembering correctly, further undermining the linear chronology of traditional 
musico-temporal expectations. In this regard, the comments Morton Feldman made on the 
music of Edgard Varèse are of some note, as they show how important the temporal aspect of 
Varèse’s music was for his work, as well as the huge influence some of the ideas had in general. 
Between mid-1966 and early 1967, John Cage and Morton Feldman conversed about a number 
of different topics, relating to philosophy, literature and music in what they titled ‘Radio 
Happenings.’ Although John Cage is generally heard asking questions, in one of these dialogues 
Feldman explains the import of Varèse on his conception of time in the following terms, which I 
would like to quote here at length: 
MF: Again I must go back to Varèse. I think that there is that, you know, that marvellous, stationary 
almost, grandeur of Varèse. I think it has to do with the fact that, we began to hear closer in time and 
especially we began to hear without the necessity of relationships. 
JC: [...] I guess I’ll use your term, I think of a vertical structure. This is what you’re talking about – it is 
a vertical structure. It then takes on the aspect of the rejection of time, doesn’t it? 
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MF: Yes, well, you know, one of the difficulties that Varèse does present us is, say, the reality of the 
material that we hear, these messages.[...] In other words, that, I feel, is the reality, or the material.[...] 
The material is something else. There is this dichotomy between the material and yet this other reality 
that we hear.[...] I hear that direct impact of the sound not becoming a symbol. [...] and this element of 
continuity, to me, is not just counting time.[...] I can actually say that he changed my mind in the real 
sense of the word. 1026 
 
From the simple pattern to the overall form, Feldman positions his music ‘between categories’, 
denying precisely the conceptualization and objectification of the sonorous material that Adorno 
noted in the totally objectified music of the post-war avant-garde. In fact, this music – which lies 
outside what is often considered to be the traditional scope of Adorno’s work – forces us not 
simply to reconsider Adorno’s late writings – including Aesthetic Theory and essays such as Vers 
une musique informelle – but they reveal their current critical potential when read ‘against the grain’, 
especially in the light of Walter Benjamin’s understanding of temporality and his notion of the 
dialectical image. 
 
  
                                                
1026 Morton Feldman and John Cage, ‘Radio Happenings,’ (Cologne, MusikTexte, 1993), p 111 
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Analytic remarks and critique of On Time and the Instrumental Factor 
In On Time and the Instrumental Factor (1971) the succession of systems presents a crucial basis for 
the complete composition, which creates a mostly homogeneous sound, interrupted by several 
long rests. The compositional method of structuring his works according to the length of a 
system occurs for the first time in Durations 4 (1961), in which one unit consists of 17 beats, or 
one system, which also conforms to the space on a single page. It is of note that this conforms 
to Feldman’s graphic method, in which compositional structure can be identified with their 
graphical ordering. This transfer of his graphic method towards his conventionally notated work 
also includes the use of what he calls his ‘free durational notation’ and accepts momentarily the 
regularity of the system as a given structuring of the music. 
 
Feldman treats the individual systems, here each lasting seven bars, as fixed instrumental images, 
which he repeats in total or splits up in several parts and combines them into new images. The 
first image (p. 1) can be described as a series of tones spread out over the various instruments, 
interspersed by rests, creating an overall homogeneous sound, with small colour changes. Often, 
chromatic neighbouring tones are juxtaposed in different instruments, which has a diffusive 
effect, as in an unfocused photograph.  
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Figure 17: Morton Feldman, On Time and the  Ins trumenta l  Factor , (1971), p. 1 
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The next three images are more ‘focused’ – their orchestration and tonal content are more clear, 
less chromatically dense. The texture seems to be one of more open sounds. Page 4 will return, 
almost unchanged, as page 6. The fifth image once again takes up the denser texture, as a 
juxtaposition of the second and third images, before the open textures return.  
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Figure 18: On Time and the  Ins trumenta l  Factor , p. 2 
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Figure 19: On Time and the  Ins trumenta l  Factor , p. 3 
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Figure 20: On Time and the  Ins trumenta l  Factor , p. 5 
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On page 8, longer durations appear, creating a general stasis, although interrupted in bar 54. 
From page 9 onwards we see a growing disintegration of the images into specks of colour, with 
more and more frequent rests. A variant of the last two bars of page 5 form the respective bars 
of page 11. In addition, bars 1-6 of page 12 are formed by a combination of variants of bars 5-7 
of page 1 and bars 2-4 of page 8, and the first two bars of page 9 refer to the last two of page 13, 
presenting a denser orchestral texture. On the last page, a clear ending is lacking. 
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Figure 21: On Time and the  Ins trumenta l  Factor , p. 15 
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Firstly, Feldman’s approach to musical time and duration is one which spatializes time rather 
prosaically. This means that time is stretched, and the individual moments or images are seen not 
only in time but are treated as snippets of a musical canvas, to be ripped up and recomposed. 
This is a marked difference from the developmental method of traditional compositional 
technique. In this case it is more exact to speak of variants, as no development is taking place. 
Secondly, it is important to note how the individual images are structured following the physical 
space of a page of music paper. Significant as it may be in terms of compositional procedure, it 
also illuminates a further point: the always broken transfer of a graphic, visual idea in sound.1027 
In other words, the resulting sound is not a simple mirror image [Abbild] as in a dream. The 
boundary of a single page is not an aural one in the same way. The sound will always present an 
illusion, whereas the seeming subjugation of the composer to something as urbane as a sheet of 
music paper reveals the technical qualities of what is created. These open traces of the creative 
process – Feldman was known to hang up his music or graph paper on the wall, and work on 
them as a painter on a canvas, or set of canvases – are the wounds of Feldman’s process of 
submitting an idea to the technical demands of the compositional process. This more 
fundamental, interrupted transfer is therefore still recognizable, albeit less so in aural terms. This 
                                                
1027 This idea of transfer and the mediation of music and painting, as well as the use of ‘moments’ was also taken up 
by other composers, including Hugues Dufourt. See for example his Le Philosophe selon Rembrandt (1991), of 
which he writes; ‘Invoquant Rembrandt, j’ai tenté de me réapproprier par ‘art du timbre’ la prodigieuse palette 
du peintre en construisant un espace sonore inspiré par l’analogie de son espèce plastique. Le temps, la forme, 
les enchaînements harmoniques, la repartition de registres et des tessitures, l’ensemble meme de l’orchestration 
se composent selon la loi du clair-obscur pour produire une mediation incessante de moments differrenciés.’ In Pierre 
Albert Castanet, Hugues Dufourt, 25 ans de musique contemporaine, (Paris, Michel de Maule, 1995), p. 147; cited in 
Célestin Deliège, Cinquante ans de modernité musicale: de Darmstadt à l'IRCAM. Contribution historiographique à une 
musicologie critique, (Sprimont, Mardaga, 2003), p. 914. As Deliège points out in this regard, these moments 
‘constitute in effect de fundamental substance of the work; they succeed one another during the duration of the 
whole piece according to a formula of variations against a backdrop of invariants which denote an exceptional 
obsession of the same projected onto [that which is] different, defying any maximalism as much as any 
minimalism.’ 
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dialectic situates the now of recognizability between the score and its performance. However, 
these two poles also constitute a critique of more traditional approaches to composition, where 
the illusion of continuity is continued on the page, with the score as an almost insubstantial tool, 
not to be confused with the actual music. Conductors who pride themselves in knowing the music 
conduct without a score, idem for tests of memory for pianists and other musicians at some 
conservatoires.  
 
Feldman and the New York School 
This different compositional approach reflects Feldman’s affinity with painters such as Willem 
De Kooning, a Dutchman working in New York at the time. In an interview conducted by 
Sebastian Claren with Brain O’Doherty, who knew Feldman in the 1960s, O’Doherty claims 
Feldman often spoke of creating ‘seamless collages,’ in which the individual parts of a 
composition could be swapped, without the ‘cuts’ being audible.1028 De Kooning presented the 
different stadia of the development process of a painting next to one another, or pasted together 
fragments from one ore more sketches; in one case, he even cut up a large painting into squares 
and put them back together. Relating this approach to his own work, in one of the Radio 
Happenings mentioned above with John Cage,1029 Feldman explains how his approach to time 
changed: 
Morton Feldman: It’s a piece for orchestra called “In Search of an Orchestration,” where it is very 
loosely controlled, in terms of register, in terms of the way the timbre lines up vertically, and [it] allows 
for great divergence (laughs) [...] 
John Cage: How does the notation go? 
                                                
1028 Sebastian Claren, interview with Brian O’Doherty, New York City, 11 October 1993,  in Sebastian Claren, 
Neither, op. cit., p. 141 
1029 John Cage, Morton Feldman, and Christian Wolff, Radio Happenings I-V: Recorded at Wbai, New York City, July 
1966-January 1967, (Cologne, MusikTexte, 1993), p. 144 
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MF: It’s graphic […] It’s got numbers 
JC: But not high, middle and low? 
MF: Not high, middle and low. 
JC: Just the numbers? 
MF: Just the numbers. Occasionally I would have an arrow point high, or low. […] And it’s for a very 
big orchestra. 
JC: What about the dynamics? 
MF: Well, the dynamics are still soft. 
JC: Not that loud at all, ever? 
MF: Not loud at all.1030 
The conversation turns to the reason why Feldman did no longer find it expedient to use any 
louder dynamics: 
JC: You remember, years ago, there were sporadic loud sounds. What made them disappear? 
MF: I think they existed as some form of punctuation. 
JC: Did you feel they were no longer necessary? 
MF: I was still involved, I don’t remember, but I think I was still involved with some element of 
differentiation. 
JC: They’d be, though, wouldn’t they, the opposite of punctuation, since by being louder they would 
stand out? 
MF: Exclamation points (laugh). I don’t know what happened, John. Maybe I heard too much of its 
attack, maybe I have some notion about the purity of the sound itself being lost in the loudness of the 
attack. 
JC: At any rate, did it appear to you as unnecessary to the rest of the music? 
MF: Yes. It also, in a sense, created a certain amount of energy that I felt I had to use. They became 
an interference of some kind. Do you remember my earlier ‘graph pieces’ where, say, the woodwinds, 
                                                
1030 Ibid. 
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would be given a long period of time in which to make their entrance, but they would make it to some 
degree chronologically in time? In this new piece, they begin any place within the structure, not in the 
beginning, in other words he doesn’t begin on the beat or off the beat, he’d begin at the very end of 
the structure, which was quite different for me, because I was still filling out some type of 
chronological information.1031 
Feldman refers to chronological information as a type of notation consisting of a linear passage of 
time. As Sebastian Claren noted, ‘whilst the free entries of the Intersections [the series of the early 
‘graph pieces’ Feldman refers to in the above quotation] must always happen within a single beat 
and therefore their sequence is generally fixed, the instruments in In Search of an Orchestration have 
up to seven beats time to execute a single (grace) note.’1032 
 
The texture of this work is in this case controlled at a global level, whilst some of the individual 
aspects of the timbre, like register, are left free to decide, some other aspects are precisely 
notated, for example the way of playing and the movement of the pitches. The resulting sound 
of the notational fields is altogether actually precisely balanced. Both In Search  and The Straits of 
Magellan, have the tempo marking 88 mm throughout and very soft to extremely soft as dynamic 
markings. Claren writes that, ‘in any case, as Feldman clearly became aware of the conventional 
conception of the passage of time, which was still implied in his early works Projections and 
Intersections; he attempted to break this mold of linear succession of events at all costs’1033  
He argues that those early works were still conceived as a horizontal series of events, in which 
‘time was treated literally conventionally.’1034 In his estimation, as long as you ‘work with a 
horizontal continuity, you are still dependent, roughly put, on differentiation – in my case the 
                                                
1031 Ibid. 
1032 Sebastian Claren, op. cit., p. 85 
1033 Ibid., p. 85 
1034 Ibid. 
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juxtaposition of registers.’1035 However, if on the other hand ‘you attempt to imagine the sound 
in total space, you always end up with a continually sub-divided space.’1036 Crucially, he argues 
that ‘things not essential to the sound itself, place themselves incessantly in the way. The sound 
has become more elastic, but is not yet plastic. The next step would be to research the sound in 
depth, i.e. vertically.’1037 The influence of Varèse as well as Bergson are palpable here, if on the 
one hand the idea of the haptic dimension (as Helga de la Motte argues) and on the other hand 
the Bergsonian idea of the continuity between regimes of time, the duration of the individual and 
the duration of the universe. These are here sought at the level of the composition; in other 
words, the continuity is to be found in the vertical space, no longer simply in the horizontal 
dimension of music. This allows for a reconceptualization of the usual opposition of 
continuous/discontinuous notions of temporal unfolding. Time is not simply spatialized, it is 
discontinuous in the way it is constructed – and therefore no longer a given, or taken for granted 
– and at the same time, contained in the idea of the experience of duration, which Adorno 
stresses is a lesson from Bergson one cannot forget.1038 He wrote that  
the objective time-factor in all parameters and the living experiential time of the phenomenon are by 
no means identical. Duration and pitch belong to different musical realms, even if in acoustics they 
come under the same heading. In the controversy on this point the concept of time is used equivocally. 
It covers both temps espace and temps durée, physically measurable, quasi-spatial time and experiential 
time. Bergson’s insight into their incompatibility cannot be erased.1039   
                                                
1035 Ibid. 
1036 Ibid. 
1037 Ibid. 
1038 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Vers une musique informelle,’ in Quasi una Fantasia, op. cit., p. 312 
1039 Ibid. 
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Figure 22: Morton Feldman, In Search o f  an Orches t ra t ion , p. 5 
 
To Feldman, the weakness of these early graph pieces consisted not only in the reproduction of 
historical clichés by the performers, but in holding on to conventional musical thought, 
(something John Cage also noted, especially with the use of indeterminate notation in his Piano 
Concerto, amongst others),1040 establishing the musical progression/succession [Verlauf] on the 
basis of a series of sound elements [Klangereignisse] and thereby closely related to conventional 
musical gestures: 
                                                
1040 For a discussion of this performance issue, as well as the use of indeterminate notational problems, including the 
relation between the category of the work of art and the crisis of identity through these procedures, see James 
Pritchett, The Development of Chance Techniques in the Music of John Cage, 1950-1956, (PhD Thesis, New York, New 
York University, 1988); The Music of John Cage, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993). For specific 
issues concerning the Concert for Piano and Orchestra (1958), see Johanne Rivest, Johanne, Le Concert for Piano and 
Orchestra de John Cage ou les limites de l'indétermination, (Montreal, Université de Montreal, Canada, 1996), pp. 112-
124. Pritchett states that ‘the ambiguous projection of points, lines and curves into musical space is the primary 
means by which indeterminacy is arrived at in the notation of the Solo for Piano, but it is certainly not the only 
one.’ 
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After several years of writing graph music, I began to discover its most important flaw. I was not only 
allowing the sounds to be free – I was also liberating the performer. I had never thought of the graph 
as an art of improvisation but more as a totally abstract sonic adventure. This realization was 
important because I now understood that if the performers sounded bad it was less because of their 
lapses of taste than because I was still involved with passages and continuity that allowed their 
presence to be felt. 1041 
As long as musical time is treated as a chronological succession, in which sound must be 
articulated through horizontal differentiation, the performers and listeners alike establish causal 
links between the successive sounds, even when the succession of the individual events is 
established through chance operations, which is not the case with Feldman. This lets sound itself 
fade into the background; this remark prompted Christian Wolff to remark, after a performance 
of Cage’s Music for Piano, that “eventually everything becomes melody”1042 
 
In reference to Christian Wolff, Feldman further explains in Vertical Thoughts that he ‘once 
remarked that eventually everything becomes melody. This is true. Time does untangle 
complexity. We are eventually left with the one-dimensional – with the face of the clock rather 
than the workings of its inner parts. Time in relation to sound is not unlike a sundial whose 
enigmatic hand travels imperceptibly throughout its journey.’1043 
 
Finally, Benjamin’s category of the dialectical image as an image that appears in a flashlike 
instance, is here pushed to an extreme. Feldman’s attempt to create these (instrumental) images 
                                                
1041 Morton Feldman, ‘Autobiography: Morton Feldman,’ in Walter Zimmermann (ed.), op. cit., (1985), p. 38 
1042 Morton Feldman, ‘Vertikale Gedanken (Vertical Thoughts),’ in Walter Zimmermann (ed.), Essays,  p. 46 
[German translation], originally in Morton Feldman, ‘Vertical Thoughts,’ in Kulchur, Vol. 3, No. 11 (Autumn), p. 
37 
1043 Ibid. 
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recognizes the technical aspect of the limitation of its capturing device (the single page) in an 
allegorical way: musical images or moments could perfectly last longer than a page, but Feldman 
chooses to fix an ‘instrumental image’ on the page, much like Benjamin’s attempts to capture 
images of the nineteenth century to dialectically ‘settle’, before they can be read. 1044  The 
instrumental images appear as an abstract, complex texture, with a lifespan of a page, to reappear 
later in combination with another image. Its interior space is not static, but fluid, and creates a 
sense of inner tension. 
 
Feldman’s work On time and the instrumental Factor shows affinities with the methods used in the 
visual arts (the idea of montage and collage), but also markedly differs from them, in its 
insistence on the temporal dimension, without falling in the trap of developmental ideologies – 
which Feldman openly critiqued both in his writings and in his music – or organic coherence. In 
this sense, the visual approach to composition presents an extra way of destroying this coherence, 
both on a surface level and in its form. It is as if too many resolutions and affirmative cadences 
have imploded and condensed into static moments, rather than progressions of individual 
chords. In this sense, sound has come to a standstill. To paraphrase Beckett’s Unnameable (1953), 
however, ‘it can’t go on, it will go on.’1045 However, this is not to say that this composition 
presents a new approach which solves yet another compositional problem. As Benjamin said: 
‘The concept of progress has to be grounded in the idea of catastrophe. That things continue to 
‘go on’ is the catastrophe. It is not something that is impending in the future, but something that 
                                                
1044 In a sense, this musical textures in this work are repeated and layered through the technique of montage, or even 
collage. For a discussion of the broader aspect and relation between space and history in this sense, see Brigid 
Doherty, ‘The “Colportage Phenomenon of Space” and the Place of Montage in The Arcades Project, in The 
Germanic Review: Literature, Culture, Theory, Vol. 81, No. 1, pp. 37-64 
1045 Samuel Beckett, The Unnameable,  
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is always given.’1046 Or, as Hanselm Haverkamp remarks: ‘There is no redemption except for the 
‘image’ quoted, a ‘fossil’ whose archaic index indicates not the survival of the fittest, but 
‘catastrophe’ as the possibility of criticism in reading.’1047 In terms of reading Feldman’s music in 
this regard, the musicologist Dalibor Davidovic1048 distinguishes between two types: the reading 
of Feldman as ‘modernist,’ and a reading in terms of his ‘Americanness’ 1049  – the latter 
represented by John Zorn, who insists upon the Jewish element in Feldman’s thinking. 
Davidovic places Feldman’s music outside history1050 and finds the foundation of an abstract 
rule: the longer the works, the less material is used. None of these approaches seem to really 
appreciate the contradiction in terms of an a-historical, and a historically and socially mediated 
music at the same time. 
 
In conclusion, it can be said that Morton Feldman’s work, On time and the instrumental Factor, 
presents us with a set of instrumental images, which are both transitory and static, presented as 
moments in time; this process operates in a way which is similar way to the commodity’s 
position between the petrified nature of the fossil and the transitory nature of the ruin in 
Benjamin’s Passagenwerk. This local history, as presented in this composition can be seen as a 
sonic montage of a number of sound-objects. The present and the presence of the image shows 
this dialectics of a material at a standstill. Benjamin’s fragmentary theory of the dialectic image 
                                                
1046 Walter Benjamin, Arcades, op. cit., Convolute ‘N’ 9a.11 
1047 Anselm Haverkamp, ‘Notes on the “Dialectical Image” How Deconstructive is it?),’ op. cit., p. 76 
1048 Dalibor Davidović, ‘Das Aufgeschobene Ende. Versuch Über Die Musik Morton Feldmans,’ in Musik & 
Ästhetik, Vol. 10, No. 38 (2006), pp. 58-66 
1049 Ibid., p. 61 
1050 ibid., p. 60: ‘Die Musik läuft ohne einen vorbestimmten Weg, und daher der Eindruck, daß sich eigentlich nichts 
bewegt oder daß es sich zumindest um ein nomadisches, zielloses Wandern handelt. In einer bestimmten 
Hinsicht läßt sich bei Feldman aber doch von einem vorbe- stimmten Weg sprechen: Sein Werk kreist wie 
besessen um ein Zentrum, das sich nicht erreichen läßt. Es ist fixiert auf dieses abwesende Zentrum, auf das 
nicht präsentierbare Stück, das unendlich ist und sich außerhalb des Historischen befindet.’ 
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calls for a renewed way of reading, one which is sympathetic to the demarche of a composer 
such as Feldman. 
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Feldman’s concept of the instrumental image and Bergson’s philosophy of time 
Morton Feldman’s aesthetics can be described as a complex combination of compositional 
intuitions and techniques, based on a conceptual basis of knowledge of the other arts and 
philosophy more generally. On the one hand, his interest in the visual and plastic arts, in 
particular the work of the Abstract Expressionists as well as antique Anatolian carpets (with their 
abstract patterns), led him to rethink the chronological flow of time in traditional music. He 
achieved this not through a reduction of the temporal aspect of music to a simple spatial plane, 
but by recognizing – via Bergson’s dualistic theory of temps espace (clock time or literally 
‘spatialized time’) and temps durée (or lived, experienced time) – how the manipulation of the 
regular sequence of motivic-thematic composition could be renewed by uncoupling the motifs 
(or patterns) from this chronological line-up. In other words, music’s temporal ‘essence’ is freed 
from what he saw as this ‘forced’ unfolding, by recognizing its spatial aspect: a score is then only 
one representation of this. On the other hand, a critique of the conceptual aspect of traditional 
music theory and composition lies at the foundation of Feldman’s approach. In this chapter, 
Feldman’s compositional approach is seen in light of these theories; in particular the concept of 
the instrumental image, which brings together the temporality of music together with its spatial 
aspect as sound-in-space.  
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Between Categor ies : a critique of traditional compositional categories and concepts 
Feldman’s aesthetics can not only be understood by analyzing his compositions, but also by a 
reading of his essays, interviews and other writings. Conceptually, Feldman outlined his position 
in Between Categories,1051 amongst other texts. This text is arguably influenced by his contact with 
the members of a Club on Eighth Street, whose members included Philip Pavia, Willem de 
Kooning, Franz Kline, Philip Guston and included conversations with composers including 
Edgard Varèse,  and John Cage, with evening performances of the Feldman’s music.1052 In it, he 
discusses a number of topics, including the relationship between painting and music, especially 
from the composer’s point of view: 
Oscar Wilde tells us that a painting can be interpreted in two ways – by its subject or by its surface. He 
goes on to warn us, however, that if we pursue the painting’s meaning in its subject, we do so at our 
peril. Conversely, if we seek the meaning of the painting in its surface – we do this also at our peril. I 
will not be as ominous as Oscar Wilde, though this problem does exist when we separate one integral 
part from another.1053 
Feldman continues by pointing out that music too has a subject and a surface. The subject of 
music to him ‘from [Guillaume de] Machaut to [Pierre] Boulez, has always been its 
construction.’1054 He explains that melodies or 12-tone rows ‘just don’t happen,’1055 but ‘must be 
constructed.’ The same goes for rhythms or to ‘demonstrate any formal idea in music, whether 
structure or stricture, is a matter of construction, in which the methodology is the controlling 
                                                
1051 Morton Feldman, ‘Between Categories,’ in Give My Regards to Eighth Street, Collected Writings of Morton Feldman, B.H. 
Friedman (ed.), (Cambridge, MA, Exact Change, 1969), pp. 83-89 
1052 Natalie Edgar, Club without Walls: Selections from the Journals of Philip Pavia, (New York: Midmarch Arts, 2007)  
1053 Morton Feldman, ‘Between Categories,’ in Give My Regards to Eighth Street, Collected Writings of Morton Feldman, B.H. 
Friedman (ed.), (Cambridge, MA, Exact Change, 1969), p. 83 
1054 Ibid. 
1055 Ibid. 
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metaphor of the composition.’1056 However, describing the surface of a musical composition is 
much more problematic. To do so, Feldman refers to two painters: Piero della Francesca1057 and 
Paul Cézanne, the construction and surface of their paintings lead him to conceptualize the ‘aural 
plane’ in music.1058 Feldman argues that technique, in the form of perspective, changed painting 
not only in a visible way, but conceptually: 
Piero della Francesca is compounded with mysteries. Like Bach, his construction is his genius. We are 
looking into a world whose spatial relationships have adopted the newly discovered principles of 
Perspective. 1059 
Perspective for Feldman is an instrument of measurement, but one Piero Della Francesca hid in 
plain sight, achieving a sense of timelessness, what he terms as eternity. Della Francesca’s painting, 
he argues, ‘seems to recede into eternity – into some kind of Jungian collective memory of the 
beginning of the Christian ethos.’1060 This idea of a timeless essence as illusory, is the main idea 
of the next section of Feldman’s argument. Piero created an illusory surface, beneath which lies a 
space we engage with as viewers, as ‘the surface seems to be just a door we enter to experience the 
painting as a whole.’1061 For Feldman, the construction of this illusion is so strong – drawing on 
the technique of perspective achieves depth in a flat surface – that the surface of the picture 
itself seems to disappear. Crucially, this technique ‘separates the painter’s objects in order to 
                                                
1056 Ibid. 
1057 See the discussion between Philip Pavia, Willem de Kooning and John Graham’s; the latter mentions Piero della 
Francesca in a discussion about Picasso’s cubist painting:  
Philip Pavia: ‘You must admit that Uccello’s perspective points helped make the Guernica a great mural.’ 
Willem de Kooning: ‘The Guernica does spin around one or two perspective points...’ 
John Graham: ‘You have it all wrong. It’s not the perspective points that make the Guernica a revolutionary 
painting. It’s the flat areas with their sensitive edges. And he stole those from Piero della Francesca.’ See Natalie 
Edgar, Club without Walls: Selections from the Journals of Philip Pavia, (New York: Midmarch Arts, 2007), p. 32 
1058 Morton Feldman, ‘Between Categories,’ op. cit., p. 83 
1059 Ibid. 
1060 Ibid. 
1061 Ibid. 
 347 
accomplish the synthesis that brings them into relationship with each other.’1062 Feldman argues, 
in an almost Adornoian way, that in this sort of artwork, synthesis presents a false reconciliation 
of the parts as the whole – ‘because this synthesis is illusionistic, we are able to contain both this 
separation and unity as a simultaneous image.’1063 The resulting image, for Feldman is a form of 
hallucination, generalizable to such an extent that he claims that ‘all attempts at utilizing an 
organizational principle, either in painting or music, have an aspect of hallucination.’1064 To 
counter this hallucinatory form of art, he presents the contrasting approach of Paul Cézanne, 
whose influence on the Abstract Expressionists he highlights: 
Cézanne, on the other hand, does not recede into an arcane time world. The construction of the 
painting, which might begin as a pictorial idea, disappears, leaving little trace of a unifying 
organizational principle. Rather than taking us into a world of memory, we are pushed into something 
more immediate in its insistence on the picture plane. The search for the surface has become the 
obsessive theme of the painting.1065 
Feldman raises here a number of important points:  
1. The idea that a form of archaic time is at work in perspectival painting, one based on  
2. The creation of illusory, three-dimensional space ignoring  
3. The material reality of the image’s two-dimensional surface1066  
4. The fact that although an organizational plan may have existed, it is rather dependent on 
the actual elements, which are parts of the plane itself.  
Feldman had already written on the transformative influence of these painters. In 1961 he argued 
that the new abstract expressionist painting made him ‘desirous of a sound world more direct, 
                                                
1062 Ibid. 
1063 Ibid. 
1064 Morton Feldman, op. cit. , p. 83 
1065 Ibid. 
1066 Not that this should needs an explanatory note, but two-dimensional means in the same plane, or in other words, flat. 
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more immediate, more physical than anything that had existed heretofore.’1067 As argued before, 
it was elements of Varèse’s compositional technique which influenced him. In addition, Anton 
von Webern also brought some of these elements to the fore. Feldman argues that this ‘new 
structure required a concentration more demanding than if the technique were that of still 
photography, which for me is what precise notation has come to imply.’1068 For Feldman, this 
required as much a change in notation as a new compositional approach.  
To return to the essay Between Categories, he specifies: 
The Abstract Expressionist painters carried Cézanne’s surging surface another step forward into what 
Philip Pavia characterised as “raw space”.1069 Rothko discovered further that the surface did not have to 
be activated by the rhythmic vitality of a Pollock to be kept alive... that it could exist as a strange, vast, 
monolythic sundial, as it were, with the exterior world reflecting upon it still another meaning – 
another breathing.1070 
This almost mystical description, including the idea of raw space, seems to refer to the circle, or 
‘club’ on New York’s Eighth Street originally started in 1948,1071 where members mentioned 
above would meet to discuss new ideas in the arts. With regard to the idea of raw space, for 
example, Philip Pavia explained the influence of the theosophists, especially Anne Besant, who 
‘described the birth of the world as an egg-shape, and human beings—in fact all living 
creatures—were born in an egg form. The raw space surrounding us reaches out and 
communicates with the outer cosmos. Space is called communication essence.’1072 However, 
Feldman does not seem to lose himself in further mystification in Between Categories, but returns 
                                                
1067 Morton Feldman, ‘Autobiography,’ in Walter Zimmermann (ed.), Morton Feldman Essays, op. cit., p. 38 
1068 Ibid. 
1069 See Natalie Edgar, Club without Walls: Selections from the Journals of Philip Pavia, (New York: Midmarch Arts, 2007), 
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to the central tenets of his theory about the centrality of construction in both music and painting, 
a parallel he observes between the two artforms until the early years of the twentieth century. He 
avers that ‘music also introduced illusionistic elements during the early Renaissance by way of 
inaugurating passages of both soft and loud sounds,’1073 which he found to be of particular 
interest in the ‘miraculous blending or fusing of the registers into a homogeneous entity, as in 
the choral music of Josquin.’1074 He subsequently notes the importance of philosophy in music, 
or better the ‘spectre of Hegel’s dialectic,’ in the nineteenth century, leading to what he terms the 
‘last significant organizational idea in both painting and music:’1075 Picasso’s ‘analytical cubism, 
and a decade later, Schoenberg’s principle of composing with the 12 tones.’1076 Interestingly he 
adds that ‘Webern is even more related to Cubism in its formal fragmentation.’1077  
In the following passage, Feldman attempts to shift to a different idea: how form in painting and 
music is historical, and how some of the artists, like Picasso, extend the history of their artform 
through a critical analysis of the way in which form has arrived at a certain point:  
But just as Picasso in Cubism was summing up – an analysis of the history of formal ideas in painting 
that extended his own future – this tendency also characterised the great names at that time. 
Schoenberg, Webern, Stravinsky – are more the history of music than an extension of musical 
history.1078 
In that last turn of phrase, it appears that Feldman counts these respective composers as 
historical, in that their compositional approach had come at the end of a long historical era. This 
critique lead him to what I consider to be the idea of central importance of the entire essay: the 
way in which artists conceive of objects and their temporal aspect. Feldman continues by 
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criticizing Picasso, ‘who found Cubism in Cézanne, developed from this system,’ but ‘failed to 
see Cézanne’s more far reaching contribution.’1079 This contribution does not consist in how to 
make an object –  i.e. ‘how [t]his object exists by way of Time, in Time or about Time’ – but 
‘how this object exists as Time.’1080 Importantly, Feldman then refers to both Proust’s oeuvre as 
‘time regained,’1081 and Aristotle’s ‘time as an image.’1082  
 
Feldman refers to two distinct theories, both of which refer implicitly to the idea that time, or 
better our perception of time, is linked with memory: Proust’s famous notion of mémoire 
involontaire1083 on the one hand and Aristotle’s concept of phantasia on the other.1084 For Walter 
Benjamin, the idea of voluntary memory, is one of an empty continuum, which is to be redeemed in 
the instant of recognition, similarly to Proust’s involuntary memory. As the Benjamin scholar 
Aniruddha Chowdhury has argued in this regard, this ‘time of involuntary memory is convoluted, 
intertwined time,’ and is opposed to the boundless time of historicism.1085 Aristotle, then, 
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explains in De Memoria that phantasia is that ‘which produces something before the eye, just like 
the image-making (eidōlopoiountes) that occurs in memory.’1086 As the scholar Krisanna M. Scheiter 
explains, for Aristotle ‘memory involves recognizing images as things that we have experienced 
in the past. In other words, memory is an image that is accompanied by the perception of time. 
But not all images involve the perception of time; specifically, images involved in thought, 
dreaming, and perception will not require the perception of time.’1087  
 
In brief, Feldman’s essay is concerned with the idea of experiental time and critiques the notion of 
‘clocktime’ as Bergson postulated (as temps espace or spatialized time). This empty, mechanical 
time stands against the abstract experience which – counter-intuitively, perhaps – Feldman found in 
the work of the abstract expressionist painters. It refers to the quality of a painting which seeks 
to conceive of the temporal as an indelible aspect of the actual object. He writes precisely that 
‘this is the area which the visual arts later began to explore. This is the area which music, deluded 
that it was counting out the seconds, has neglected.’1088 As I have argued, Benjamin’s critique of 
universalist and historicist’s conception of time – the additive method of the ‘mass of data to fill 
the homogeneous, empty time’1089 – is crucial to this understanding.   
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Experience itself is structured by this lag.’ In the reference to the “the inhospitable, blinding age of big-scale 
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“we the masters” “never (have) time to live,”’ which ‘become experience only in the instant of spontaneous 
remembrance. This is the domain of Proustean involuntary memory.’ 
1086 Ibid., p. 269 
1087 Ibid., p. 269 
1088 Morton Feldman, ‘Between Categories,’ op. cit., p. 83-89 
1089 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, op. cit., p. 254. See On the  concep t  o f  h i s tory , progres s , […] in this thesis 
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Feldman illustrates this approach by referring to a conversation he had with Karlheinz 
Stockhausen, who remarked that ‘You know Morty – we don’t live in Heaven but down here on 
Earth;’1090 clearly a reference to his idea of a physicist, purely chronological conception of time 
(‘earth time’), which ironically is opposed to heavenly, ideal time. Obviously, he misunderstood 
Feldman’s conception of time as both an essential element in the musical work of art – its 
temporality – as well its relation to the idea of an image, as an image-in-time. However, Feldman 
continues his anecdote with the following: 
 [Stockhausen] began beating on the table and said: “A sound exists here – or here – or here.” He was 
convinced that he was demonstrating reality to me. That the beat, and the possible placement of 
sounds in relation to it, was the only thing the composer could realistically hold on to. 1091 
For Feldman, it is the reduction of the temporal into ‘so much [as] a square foot,’ which made 
Stockhausen ‘think Time was something he could handle and even parcel out pretty much as he 
pleased.’1092 This absolute view of time as a matter to be manipulated, obviously makes an 
abstraction of the experience of time, or rather, eliminates it altogether. In that case, it could be 
argued along respectively Bergsonian and even Benjaminian lines, firstly, that time has been 
spatialized to an absolute level, at least at the conceptualized level of the compositional technique, 
and secondly, as incapable of reaching the listener in more than a shock-like fashion 
(Chocklerlebnis) and thus never allowing for the transitioning to a level of knowledge (Erkenntnis). 
For Stockhausen, at least in the light of Feldman’s critique, time is simply this shapeless time of 
the clock. Feldman condemns this approach as ‘frankly boring.’ He states that 
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I am not a clockmaker. I am interested in getting Time in its unstructured existence. That is, I am 
interested in how this wild beast lives in the jungle – not in the zoo. I am interested in how Time 
exists before we put our paws on it – our minds our imaginations, into it.1093 
The idea of controlling time at all, as part of a traditional conceptual framework of the 
composer’s craft, is anathema to Feldman. In fact, the above critique can be seen as a parallel 
with the critique of Benjamin and Adorno of a universal theory of temporality, as outlined above. 
In order to let time unfold in an un-systematized way – or more precisely, in a non-dramatic or 
non-linear fashion – Feldman insists on the notion of surface: 
My obsession with surface is the subject of my music. In that sense, my compositions are really not 
‘compositions’ at all. One might call them time canvases in which I more or less prime the canvas with 
an overall hue of the music. I have learned that the more one composes or constructs, the more one 
prevents Time Undisturbed from becoming the controlling metaphor of the music.1094 
For Feldman, in other words, compositional method is to be deconstructed into an art where the 
experience of time is to be valued above the pure structuring of traditional conceptions of 
technique. This means that his argument does not go against the temporal essence (in Adorno’s 
words) of music, but against an essentially physicalist understanding of time. Although the above 
notion of a ‘time canvas’ may be misleading, it is possible that the crux of the argument lies in 
the following: Feldman strives towards a music where the objects form themselves as it were, in 
the space he has set up – an idea which goes back to his early composition such as the Intersections 
– where a certain sound-object could be seen to emerge between the categorical (subjective) act of 
composition-as-construction (or giving form to the material to paraphrase Adorno) and the 
objects themselves. In other words, Feldman advocates a utopian approach, at least in theory, of 
letting these sound-objects (as per the individual instrumental images) exist as objects-amongst-
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objects in the Benjaminian sense.1095 This is obviously located on the side of the composer’s 
intention and is therefore subjective; however, as an aesthetic position it is remarkably close to a 
reconceptualised idea of musique informelle. This is to be understood in the sense of Borio’s 
argument in favour of an aesthetics of the informel, precisely permitting the dialectical bottom-up 
approach to the creation of form. This means that an overarching, reified form is not imposed 
on the material. In other words, a ‘spatialized’ music is critically possible through the mediation 
of the parts and the whole (in Adorno’s terms), in the process allowing for a certain degree of 
unification in the work (as works of art are wont to – they present themselves as such to us). The 
tension of the resistance to totalization on the one hand, and fragmentariness on the other, are 
translated here by Feldman in terms of the constructive element of musical technique on the one 
hand, and what he terms surface on the other: 
Both these terms – Space, Time – have come to be used in music and the visual arts as well as in 
mathematics, literature, philosophy and science. But, though music and the visual arts may be 
dependent on these other fields for their terminology – the research and results involved are very 
different. For example, when I first invented a music that allowed various choices to the performer, 
those who were knowledgeable in mathematical theory decried the term ‘indeterminate’ or ‘random’ in 
relation to these musical ideas. Composers, however, insisted that what I was doing had nothing to do 
with music. 1096 
Feldman sees himself, importantly, as walking this thin line between these categories: 
What then was it? What is it still? I prefer to think of my work as between categories. Between Time and 
Space. Between painting and music. Between the music’s construction and its surface.1097 
For Feldman, the ‘medium, whether it be the sounds of John Cage or the clay of Giacometti, can 
be […] incomprehensible.’1098 If understood as (musical) material and how to ‘handle’ it – the 
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question as to the condition of the modernist artwork – reminds of the questions Adorno asked 
in ‘Vers une musique informelle,’ specifically with regard to technique and the future of form in 
music. As Feldman continues, it becomes clear how close his position is to this critique:  
Technique can only structure it [the medium]. This is the mistake we make. It is this structure and only 
this structure, that becomes comprehensible to us. By putting the ‘wild beast’ in a cage, all we preserve 
is a specimen whose life we can now completely control. So much of what we call art is made in the 
same way – as one collects exotic animals for a zoo.1099 
Finally, Feldman compares the artwork, as a historical entity – something which has lived 
through various periods of the history of art – with the status of the artist (in this case, Paul 
Cézanne). 
What do we see when looking at Cézanne? Well – we see how Art has survived – we also see how the 
artist has survived. If our interest lies in discovering how Art has survived, we are on safe ground. If 
our interest lies in how Cézanne, the artist survived, then we’re in trouble – which is where we should 
be.1100 
It seems that the question as to how art has survived to the modern day is still of central 
importance to Feldman. For him there exists a tension between the two levels, of surface and 
construction. Or in other words, in the illusion and the technique on which it is based (and 
behind which it hides). Whilst it is possible to analyse the artwork from this perspective, 
Feldman concludes that 
I have a theory. The artist reveals himself in his surface. His escape into History is his construction. 
Cézanne wanted it both ways. If we ask him, “Are you Cézanne or are you History?” His answer is, “Choose 
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either one at your peril.” His ambivalence between being Cézanne and being History has become a 
symbol of our own dilemma.1101 
The question then remains: how to survive as an artist through one’s constructions – seen here to 
constitute the artwork – or being historical through one’s works. Perhaps, as Sebastian Claren 
reads this, Feldman considers construction to be an escape into history, whilst the surface refers 
to the acoustic reality.1102 The answer lies in a technique and an aesthetics which refuse to be 
called either surface (illusion) or pure construction. Feldman himself considered the music of 
Varèse and his own as examples of a music which attempted to let the construction and surface 
elements disappear in one another, in contrast to traditional conceptions of music.1103 This 
conception of musical technique constitutes a rather unique artistic programme, one which is 
self-consciously aware of the pressures of the rationalization, trauma and artistic phantasmagoria. 
In other words, the musical breaks through the pretensions of the need for the obvious shocks, 
the absurdist mask which hides the inept, the failed, the detritus and retains something of what 
Benjamin and Adorno found to act as an agent in their philosophies of historical time. The 
insistence on remaining critical of, on the one hand, mundane revelation of the composer-as-artiste 
(the grand gesture of the commentary as justification, or better, mystification), in itself a romantic 
throwback, and on the other hand composition as a way to control the destiny of one’s 
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reputation, are crucial to the understanding of Feldman’s aesthetics. Within the framework of 
this thesis’s main argument, this stance can be seen to avoid the philosophical conceptualizations 
Benjamin and Adorno criticized. Moreover, this points to the realization that a work leads a life 
of its own; as an object it is a message in a bottle, in the sense that its journey is not 
predetermined, and that message might not be received until later, or, in another place. Finally, 
the  modernist work of art as it reveals its truth content here, speaks an abstract language; one 
which is not music in the traditional sense (of motivic-thematicism) nor is it the dreaded music-
as-pseudo-painting. What it says is simply that the historically necessary state of the musical 
material is not always clear and cannot be easily determined from the narrative structure of 
chronological unfoldings. In other words, the causal, historicist perspective is undone – evolving 
a music which explicitly resists this by freeing the temporal from the expectations of a linear 
process.  
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Conceptualization and perception: naming and the real 
As I will currently show, Feldman’s thinking was influenced by a number of authors, some in 
quite fundamental ways. Furthermore, these ideas he acquired and developed allowed him to 
express the relationship between what he understood as reality and the way in which human 
beings, artists, composers, listeners conceive of the works presented. One particular element of 
this interaction, as I have show in earlier chapters, is concerned with the role of such concepts 
and conceptualizations, and Benjamin’s thinking in images. It is precisely this aspect of 
Feldman’s thinking which is the focus here. His  aesthetics are strongly concerned with the 
tension between conceptual and perceptual thinking. In his Darmstadt Lecture (1984),1104 Feldman 
describes in a substantial passage the difference between what he calls a conceptual way of 
thinking versus a perceptual way of thinking in images. It seems to have been as crucial as 
Benjamin’s own way of allowing for a conceptualization of a certain type, one which does not 
control its material or its objects in a such a way as to reduce them to an a-historic and neutral 
sort of raw material. In fact, he explicitly refers to Henri Bergson, specifically his theory of 
perception. Referring to his recently performed composition, Feldman explains that it is 
‘involved with two aspects which I feel are less conceptual and more realistic. I’m interested in 
realistic things, actually. We’ll talk about concepts.’ 1105  For him, as for Benjamin, 
conceptualizations begin with naming things, which he strongly tries to avoid: ‘So I try not to give 
something a name. That’s very, very important to me.’1106  
He then turns to the younger composers and explains that since antiquity a split between 
conceptual and perceptual ways of thinking has existed. However, he then refers to Bergson: 
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But if we take Henri Bergson seriously, he reminds us essentially of two ways of expressing ourselves; 
one is conceptually, and the other by way of images.1107  
Explicitly referring to Einstein as well as implying that the discoverer of the double helix in 
DNA, James Watson, needed an image before they would describe it mathematically. Feldman 
claims that this is essentially how he works. However, for Feldman ‘there’s a confusion between 
the conceptual and the images.’1108 He situates this confusion in the mistaken idea that an image 
is to be made, in programmatic terms – which he sees as the reason for a large percentage of the 
world’s music being ‘programmatic.’1109 
 You can’t just say, ‘I’m going to make an image, an instrumental image.’ Try and think of the history 
of contemporary music. At the beginning of the twentieth century, how many instrumental images do 
you find? Do we ever get together what an instrumental image is?1110  
After pointing towards the slow movement of Stravinsky’s Violin Concerto for an example of an 
instrumental image, he refers to the work of Samuel Beckett. The idea of Beckett’s working with 
images is now well established.1111 
There are many, many people who work this way, but in other fields. Samuel Beckett, not in 
everything he does, but in a lot of things he does. He would write something in English, translate it 
into French, than translate that thought back into the English that conveys that thought. 1112 And I 
know he keeps on doing it.1113  
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Feldman refers to the text of the opera Neither, which  
He wrote something for me in 1977, and I got it. I’m reading it. There’s something particular. I can’t 
catch it. Finally I see that every line is really the same thought said in another way. And yet the 
continuity acts as if something else is happening. Nothing else is happening. What you’re doing in an 
almost Proustian way is getting deeper and deeper saturated into the thought.1114 
This description of his compositional praxis is rather intuitive, but underneath the translation of 
an idea into music, Feldman carefully chooses to avoid calling it a musical idea: 
What I do then is, I translate, say something, into a pitchy situation. And then I do it where it’s more 
intervallic, and I take the suggestions of that back into another kind of pitchiness – not the original 
pitchiness, and so forth, and so on. Always retranslating and then saying, now let’s do it with another 
kind of focus.1115 
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Feldman and Bergson: influences and interpretations 
Feldman’s contrasting of conceptual and perceptual thought seems to be related to Henri 
Bergson’s two most important works: Mémoire et matière (1896) and L’évolution créatrice (1907). In 
Memory and Matter. Essay on the relation of body and spirit, Bergson developed a theory of cognition in 
which external perception is only possible through reliance on internal images. It was written in 
reaction to a work by Théodule Ribot, The Maladies of Memory (1881), who claimed that 
neuroscience had proven that memory can be located within the brain and is therefore of a 
purely material, static nature. Bergson presented an anti-reductionist stance, and presents a 
theory of cognition which is based on the interaction of perception and memory. Two types of 
memory are of importance: habitual, practical memory, and pure memory. The latter registers the 
past in the remembrance of images, which represents and recognizes the past as past. This 
memory is contemplative and in Bergson’s opinion fundamentally spiritual. With L’évolution 
créatrice (Creative evolution) Bergson attempted to write a philosophical natural history (an idea 
Benjamin also took up, as I have shown in Chapter 3 and 4). Language in this view is the great 
mediator between consciousness and the outside world. As Bergson specifies: 
An intelligence which reflects is one that originally had a surplus of energy to spend, over and above 
practically useful efforts. It is a consciousness that has virtually reconquered itself. But still the virtual 
has to become actual. Without language, intelligence would probably have remained riveted to the 
material objects which it was interested in considering.1116  
For Bergson, the distinction between ‘intelligence’ and the material world is filtered by language. 
Bergson describes the process from the perception of an object, to its naming, via the image: 
Language has greatly contributed to its liberation. The word, made to pass from one thing to another, 
is, in fact, by nature transferable and free. It can therefore be extended, not only from one perceived 
thing to another, but even from a perceived thing to a recollection of that thing, from the precise 
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recollection to a more fleeting image, and finally from an image fleeting, though still pictured 
[representée], to the picturing [représentation] of the act by which the image is pictured [representée], 
that is to say, to the idea.1117  
He concludes that  
Thus is revealed to the intelligence, hitherto always turned outwards, a whole internal world—the 
spectacle of its own workings.1118 
Next, Bergson states that intelligence or intellect must, in order  
to think itself clearly and distinctly, perceive itself under the form of discontinuity. Concepts, in fact, 
are outside each other, like objects in space; and they have the same stability as such objects, on which 
they have been modeled. Taken together, they constitute an "intelligible world,” that resembles the 
world of solids in its essential characters, but whose elements are lighter, more diaphanous, easier for 
the intellect to deal with than the image of concrete things: they are not, indeed, the perception itself 
of things, but the representation of the act by which the intellect is fixed on them. They are, therefore, 
not images, but symbols.1119 
In the fourth Chapter of his Evolution créatrice, Bergson presents the ‘cinematographical 
mechanism of thought’ 
But, preoccupied before everything with the necessities of action, the intellect, like the senses, is 
limited to taking, at intervals, views that are instantaneous and by that very fact immobile of the 
becoming of matter. Consciousness, being in its turn formed on the intellect, sees clearly of the inner 
life what is already made, and only feels confusedly the making. Thus, we pluck out of duration those 
moments that interest us, and that we have gathered along its course. These alone we retain. And we 
are right in so doing, while action only is in question. But when, in speculating on the nature of the 
real, we go on regarding it as our practical interest requires us to regard it, we become unable to 
perceive the true evolution, the radical becoming. Of becoming we perceive only states, of duration 
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only instants, and even when we speak of duration and of becoming, it is of another thing that we are 
thinking. Such is the most striking of the two illusions we wish to examine. It consists in supposing 
that we can think the unstable by means of the stable, the moving by means of the immobile.1120 
Sebastian Claren proposes an understanding of the analogies and the differences between 
Bergson’s and Feldman’s theories, as it would lead too far  
to translate Bergson’s theory in terms of Feldman’s understanding of the instrumental image, as the 
image to Bergson himself played only the subordinate role of a mediator between reality and 
perception. Much closer would be a to accept that Feldman, as well as Bergson, Einstein and James D. 
Watson, the researcher of DNA, proposes above all as a confirmation of it, that the image is 
considered as immediate perception or immediate representation not only in the arts, but is also used 
in philosophy and in the natural sciences as the necessary point of departure for complex thought 
processes, which lead to an exact outcome.1121 
This seems to stand in direct opposition to the modernist modes of perception, as 
technologically mediated ‘seeing’. Examples abound, but one is the emergence of truly 
mechanical ways of seeing: X-ray technology, electronic microscopes, cinema. Proust presents 
another aspect of this new perception, in À la recherche du temps perdu.1122 In Claren’s opinion the 
instrumental image stands for the approach, 
which starts from the assumption of the perception as immediate, given material and only later 
progresses towards the concept, in order to elaborate this perception in detail, in contrast to an 
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approach which starts from models as concepts fixed in advance and inserts the material only 
afterwards as immediate appearance into this construction.1123  
According to Claren, Feldman – with reference to the Darmstadt Lecture above – tries ‘not to 
give something a name, which seems to refer to his adversity to conceptualising the image, 
instead opting for a fusion between concept and image.1124 In that sense, plans or models as 
concepts do not precede the image – which, if it did exist, would lead to a straightforward 
execution of this plan. In Feldman’s view, further according to Claren, the instrumental image is 
devoid of conceptual calculations and finds itself in disagreement with any form of 
programmatic meaning whilst presenting itself as ‘immediate perception’ [unmittelbare 
Wahrnehmung]. 1125 
 
In this reading of Feldman’s text, I would argue that Claren misrepresents Feldman’s position, 
especially in light of his pleading in favour of a struggle against both the conceptual and the 
perceptual modes of thought; he also says there is a confusion between the two. I would speak 
of a dialectic, in the same sense as his earlier argument as to his position between categories. If an 
instrumental image is at all possible, it surely is conceived of in a way in which intuition and 
compositional technique are brought together. This does claim to be neither pure intuition, nor 
mechanical, automatic technique. 
 
  
                                                
1123 Sebastian Claren, op. cit., p. 121 
1124 Ibid. 
1125 Ibid. 
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Instrumental image and the visual arts 
The notion of the instrumental image itself warrants a further inquiry. According to Claren, 
Feldman considers the instrumental image as a self-contained unit, which is formed out of 
homogenous material and which does not have a connection to the surrounding elements of the 
composition. In the following quotation, Claren explains the deceptive nature of Feldman’s own 
memory of just such an image: 
Important for Feldman, the image has to impress its potential energy of memory immediately, whilst 
he concludes by referring to the Stravinsky’s Violin Concerto as an example. His memory of this 
image seems to be selective, as the Concerto opens with a violin trio, which opens every new 
movement of the Concerto (against the rest of the orchestra). The Flute plays the same melody as the 
first violin, the trumpet doubles in the octave. However, this motif returns four times almost 
unchanged and without development; it comes and goes as a unit, which Feldman proposes as an 
example of the instrumental image.1126 
An important aspect of the image, as demonstrated in terms of memory on the one hand, can be 
found, on the other hand, in the inspiration Feldman found elsewhere. His work was strongly 
influenced by his friendship with the painters of the ‘New York School.’1127 In answer to a 
question at Middelburg in 1987, he referred to them in terms of the role of the image in their 
respective work.1128 In his work he himself was looking for an ‘unchanging image,’ which seems 
                                                
1126 Sebastian Claren, op. cit. 
1127 See Dieter Gutknecht, ‘Aural Eyeness, Unti Die Contratto Tra Musica E Arte Figurativa Nell'espressionismo 
Astratto E Nella New York School, Ii, Sulla Concesione Della Musica Cosidetta New York School,’ in 
Musica/Realta November 18 (1996), pp. 54-65; Steven Johnson, New York Schools of Music and Art, (New York, 
Routledge, 2001); Suzanne Josek, The New York School. Earle Brown, John Cage, Morton Feldman, Christian Wolff, 
(Saarbrücken, Pfau, 1998); Amy C. Beal, ‘"Time Canvasses", Morton Feldman and the Painters of the New York 
School,’ in James Leggio (ed.), Music and Modern Art, (Garland Reference Library of the Humanities, Border 
Crossings), (New York, Routledge, 2002), pp. 227-246  
1128 Feldman, Morton, and Raoul Mörchen, Morton Feldman in Middelburg. Words on Music - Lectures and Conversations = 
Worte Über Musik - Vorträge und Gespräche,Gisela Grönemeyer, and Reinhard Oehlschlägel (eds.) 2 Vols. (Cologne, 
Musiktexte, 2008) 
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to move, but actually only has ‘the energy to keep it self up’.1129 In relation to this, Feldman 
referred to Jackson Pollock, from whom he learnt ‘how to keep the motion going, at the same 
time understanding the notion of stasis’, and from Mark Rothko, how to keep the stasis intact 
and still find the energy for motion.’1130 Pollock and Rothko were for Feldman opposites in a 
dialectical way: ‘The one is motion/movement in the stasis/standstill, the other stasis/standstill 
in movement.’1131 In Jasper John’s work, he discovered ‘the possibility of an image’, whilst Philip 
Guston ‘had an image, without having an image’.1132 He even asked the question ‘is it by nature 
that you have an image?’1133 Alternatively, Feldman asked if he is looking for an image, or if he 
lets it happen, or more fundamentally, does one need one at all? In any case, he says, there will 
be an image, if he thinks about it or not, if he looks for it or not. 
My Projections and Intersections is a weight either reminiscent or discovered. Weight for me does not have 
its source in the realm of dynamics or tensions, but rather reciting from a visual-aural response to 
sound as an image [my stress] gone inward creating a general synthesis. Weight involves the finding of 
a pulse which allows for a natural fluidity. Discovered weight implies discovered balance. Discovered 
balance implies discovered movement from this pulse. The notation is presented graphically where 
each box is a clock time duration. What is desired in the execution is a pure non-vibrating tone.1134 
As I have argued before, Feldman would change his conception of time considerably in later 
works. 
                                                
1129 Ibid. 
1130 Ibid. 
1131 Ibid. 
1132 Ibid. 
1133 Ibid. 
1134 Everett Helm, ‘Current Chronicle,’ in The Musical Quarterly, Vol. 38), p. 138 
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Figure 23: Morton Feldman, Interse c t ion I  (1962) 
 
Feldman seems to understand the sound as and internal/inward image which forms the basis for 
a synthesis – a balance of the weight of individual sounds in relation to the natural flow of the 
pulse. Claren compares this to paintings by Piet Mondriaan, whose coloured rectangular and 
square shapes are divided by thick black lines, whose ‘weight’ is characterised not only by their 
size, but also their colour and form. In other words, a tension is created between these fields of 
colour and the black lines. In the same way, sounds are not only fixed in relation to the flow or 
pulses, but also through their timbre, number of notes and register. In the same sense that 
Mondriaan is searching for a balance in his paintings, whose individual parts are imbalanced if 
observed by themselves, Feldman’s syntheses seems to be related to the whole work, in which 
the individual weight of the different sounds is suspended in the balance between them. This 
balance, however, has nothing to do with conventional musical gestures, but instead is related only 
to the acoustic characteristics of the sounds as weights within a regular flow of time as a ‘pulse.’ 
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Image versus motif 
Moreover, Feldman’s concern with images can also be seen in his treatment of individual chords 
and chord pairs as images, (see comments on Piece for Four Pianos (1957)),1135 which are repeated 
up to five times. These repetitions are situated in a closed field, with rhythmical shifts between 
the four pianos. Feldman doesn’t, however, seem to treat his compositions as overall closed 
objects, which begins at a particular point and ends at a particular point, but instead begins as if 
the repeated chords had already been there beforehand and are simply ‘recognised.’ In the same 
way the ‘weights’ in Projections and Intersections were reminisced or discovered. In this sense, the 
beginning of the piece lacks an opening gesture, but produces a pair of chords, which potentially 
sound as if they had been repeated a number of times before the piece has started, in the same 
way as at the end, where the rhythmical shifts of the four pianos would often be as complex as 
possible, whilst here, a flageolet in the piano seems to merge into silence. In terms of the sparcity 
of a work like this, Feldman argues in his Darmstadt lecture:  
I find that as the piece gets longer, there has to be less material. That the piece itself, strangely enough 
cannot take it. [...] I don’t have a psychological situation[...] I don’t have any anxiety that I’ve got to 
stop. But there’s less going into it, so I think the piece dies a natural death. It dies of old age. Like a 
cousin of mine said to his daughter, “Sweetie, pull out the tube.”1136 
In Durations 3 for violin, tuba and piano (1961), Feldman explains that ‘with the tuba, the weight 
of the three instruments has made me treat them as one. I wrote all sounds simultaneously  
because I knew that none of the instruments ought to be ahead or behind. Through thinning and 
thickening my sounds I kept the image intact.’1137 
                                                
1135 Morton Feldman, Morton Feldman Says: Selected Interviews and Lectures 1964-1987, op. cit., p. 88 
1136 ‘Darmstadt Lecture,’ in Morton Feldman Essays, Walter Zimmermann (ed.), (Kerpen, Beginner Press, 1985), pp. 
181-213 
1137 Morton Feldman, Brown/Feldman, liner notes (New York, Time Records, No. 58007) 
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It seems that Feldman understood the four short movements of Durations as individual, distinct 
images: 
In the first movement the violin part has numerous repeated notes, the tuba sections of ascending 
chromatic scales and the piano dense chords, which follow one another uninterruptedly and only 
sometimes resolve in single notes or two-note chords. 
The second movement is characterised by the interruptions in all three parts. The violin frequently 
repeats the f# and g# in different registers, with single a, b and bflat notes as complementing tones, as 
well as two e flats. The tuba : large intervals and shifted unisono and octave passages as well as 
chromatic frictions with the two other parts, with more frequent pauses by the end of the piece.1138  
It is hard to see how these images are kept together through the thinning and thickening, 
because it is obvious that not only the number of notes that are played simultaneously or in 
sequence, but also the ‘weight’ of the instruments and their register. It seems that the voices are 
treated in the an organ-like fashion, much like the building of a so-called plenum, with all the 
stops, from foundation stops to higher stops and mixtures. A similar representation of the image 
can be seen in the graphically notated scores of the 1950s, in the way that he treats whole 
movements and compositions as single complex images, while in Durations the individual 
movements differ in the details, which is not the case in the earlier works. 
 
Another aspect of the image is that it is, according to Feldman in his ‘Darmstadt Lecture’ 
mentioned above, something that is remembered, or memorable. The instrumental image in 
Feldman opinion is not a simple composition-technical concept, but the description of a general 
quality, which is constituted through intensity of the development of the sound, which can only 
be obtained through a ‘strong belief in the material’,1139 in such a way that it leaves a lasting 
                                                
1138 Ibid. 
1139 ‘Darmstadt Lecture,’ in Morton Feldman Essays, op. cit., pp. 181-213 
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impression into one’s memory. Expansion in time, then, seems necessary in order for the 
common material in its different instalments, respectively in the repetition in all parts of the 
image. 
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Words and Music – allegorical image and time 
As I have argued in Chapters 4, Walter Benjamin and Adorno’s philosophies are concerned with 
language, from the former’s language of objects to the latter’s considerations of music’s 
language-like aspect. Moreover, as I have shown in the work of Benjamin, the seventeenth-
century allegorical Trauerspiel reveals characteristics that are thoroughly modern. In the sense that 
these mourning plays are distinct in their formal conception as well as the way in which they 
announce modern subjectivity, they are crucial in Benjamin’s later work on the Surrealists. The 
affinities of this work in Adorno’s aesthetics are now seen as central to the understanding of the 
late turn in his work. As I have also argued elsewhere, one of the other important aspects of this 
development came with Adorno’s reading of the work of Samuel Beckett. The notions of 
meaning, language, and the role modernist music plays in this regard, proved further testament 
to the role of the particular artworks in the deepening of Adorno’s aesthetic considerations, no 
matter how late in the day they may seem to have come. Combining the reading of these 
allegorical images with the insights of Benjamin and Adorno’s later notion of the dialectical 
image, new aspects are revealed in the work of Beckett and, moreover, Feldman’s music. 
 
By closely considering the music Feldman composed for Samuel Beckett’s Words and Music, a 
critique can be formulated of how, traditionally, meaning is constructed as a harmonious totality 
– as text and music. Beckett himself had a long-standing interest in conceptualizations1140 of the 
image, in particular with regard to Henri Bergson.1141 As to the concept of the allegory, it is 
exemplified and problematized both as an interaction between characters who present 1142 
                                                
1140 See Andrea Oppo, Philosophical Aesthetics and Samuel Beckett, (Bern, Peter Lang, 2008)  
1141 See Anthony Ullman, ‘Beckett, Berkeley, Bergson, Film: the intuition image,’ in Samuel Beckett and the Philosophical Image, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 114-128 
1142 For a discussion of the difference between presentation and representation in the work of Beckett, see Anthony 
Uhlmann, Samuel Beckett and the philosophical image, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 48: ‘A 
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‘universal’ themes, such as Sloth, Love, Age and (a loved one’s) Face, but also as allegorical 
representations of language (Words) and music (Music).1143 In other words, for Beckett, these 
themes cannot be simply subsumed under these general headings; neither does Feldman accept 
the idea of simply illustrating these words with incidental music. The creation of an image 
combining words and sounds in a radio-studio (and as listened to on the radio), finally, can be 
seen as a composed, heterogeneous work pointing to a non-linear temporal space. Temporality 
in this context is like the constructed Age of which the text speaks, a fragmentary notion of time, 
not a straightforward, natural unfolding. 
 
Beckett’s interest in the image is now the subject of a book-length study by Anthony Uhlman,1144 
who explains that for Beckett, Bergson’s dual concept of the image was a great influence on his 
own thinking. Towards the end of his life, Morton Feldman wrote several works inspired by 
Samuel Beckett, including his opera Neither, the orchestral work For Samuel Beckett and Words and 
Music. In fact, before composing For Samuel Beckett Feldman finished the music for the radioplay 
Words and Music. When the New York University Radio Station ‘Voices International’ prepared 
for a Beckett Festival, it wanted new performances of all of Beckett’s radio plays. Although 
Beckett was reluctant to give his permission, the music his cousin John Beckett had composed in 
1962 did no longer strike him as satisfactory. He suggested to the interviewer, Everett Frost, that 
                                                                                                                                                  
representation works through the relation of one thing to another: in this sense it is recognised and easily 
understood. The presentation, on the other hand, is that which has not yet been understood, is that which remains 
to be interpreted and whose meaning resists being fixed.’ 
1143 As Uhlmann writes, ‘for Beckett, over time, the point of focus moves from what is represented (and this does, 
indeed, remain an important point of focus at least until Malone dies) to what is presented to us. Asked what the late 
play What Where means, Beckett is reputed to have answered, ‘I don’t know what it means, don’t ask me what it 
means, it’s an object.’ These comments are cited on the DVD for the Beckett on Film production of  What Where. 
Beckett on Film, 19 Films by 19 Directors, produced by Michael Colgan and Alan Moloney (Dublin: Blue Angels Films, 
2001). Uhlmann, op. cit., p. 49 
1144 Anthony Uhlmann, Samuel Beckett and the Philosophical Image, op. cit., p. 48 
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Feldman should compose a new score. Feldman gratefully accepted, even calling it a ‘labour of 
love’ and ‘almost a tribute.’1145 He added that he did not think he ‘would have spent the time and 
the concerns on anybody else, actually.’ 1146 
 
Samuel Beckett, Words and Music, as Feldman entitles his score presents like his opera Neither an 
example of the possible relations between text and music, their expressive possibilities and, more 
importantly, their limitations. As I have already argued, the work can be understood as a 
modernist play on (allegorical) images. At the beginning of Words and Music, the characters 
‘Words’ – named ‘Joe’ – and ‘Music’ – named ‘Bob’ – are waiting for their master, Croak. In the 
meantime, ‘Music’ tunes its ‘small orchestra’ and ‘Words’ tries to rattle off a couple of definitions 
about the theme of ‘Sloth’. When Croak eventually shows up he orders them to comment on the 
theme of ‘Love’, which leads to Words interrupting the contributions of Music with 
protestations. For the next theme, ‘Age’, Croak forces both characters to collaborate, but Words 
objects until Music plays some melodies. Words develops a poem, ‘Age is when to a man’, which 
grows into a song. Music constantly has to correct Words. After their performance of the song, 
Croak gives them the theme of ‘The Face’. Music responds with a ‘warmly sentimental’ piece of 
about one minute long. Words describes a woman’s face, who obviously played an important 
role in the life of Croak. After an ‘irrepressible burst of spreading and subsiding music’, Words 
and Music begin a second song which begins with ‘ Then down a little way’, which is composed 
and learned in the same fashion as ‘Age is when to a man’ (in installments). Croak shuffles away 
without a word. Words orders Music to play something, and to repeat it. The play ends with a 
deep sigh of Words. 
                                                
1145 Everett Frost,‘The Note Man on the Word Man, Morton Feldman on Composing the Music for Samuel 
Beckett's Words and Musicin Beckett Festival of Radio Plays,’ in Mary Bryden (ed.), Samuel Beckett and Music, (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 47-56, also in musikTexte, Vol. 66 (November 1996), p. 44  
1146 ibid., p. 49 
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Beckett’s contrasting of Words and Music seems to have had its origins in his text about Proust’s 
A la recherche du temps perdu from 1931, in which he stresses the influence of Schopenhauer on the 
meaning of music in the work of Proust: 
Schopenhauer rejects the Leibnizian view of music as ‘occult arithmetic’ and distinguishes it in his 
aesthetic from the other arts.1147 
After this summary of Schopenhauer’s aesthetic, Beckett continues with a critique of opera –
particularly its seemingly random forcing together of text and music. Beckett argued that by 
definition, 
opera is a hideous corruption of this most immaterial of all the arts: the words of a libretto are to the 
musical phrase that they particularize what the Vendôme Column, for example, is to the idea 
perpendicular. From this point of view opera is less complete than vaudeville, which at least 
inaugurates the comedy of an exhaustive enumeration. These considerations explain the beautiful 
invention of the ‘da capo’ as a testimony to the intimate and ineffable nature of an art that is perfectly 
intelligible and perfectly inexplicable. Music is the catalytic element in the work of Proust.1148 
This problematic relationship is central to Words and Music in that the association between the 
two is not a fait accompli, but it has to be forged in the metaphorical, or more precisely 
allegorical playing and singing of individual melodies and verses. 
Another question is if Words can have any conceptual meaning altogether, as a character with the 
same tasks to fulfill as Words; a question not really answered by the various themes Croak proposes, 
although they are particularly emphasized. In this context, Music seems to have a special function 
which could be deduced from Schopenhauer’s aesthetic in the general opposition of Music as the 
language of feeling and passion, and words as the language of reason.1149 
                                                
1147 Samuel Beckett, Proust, (London, Chatto and Windus, 1931), p. 92 
1148 Ibid. 
1149 Ibid. 
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This opposition of reason and feeling becomes clear when words can only rattle off dry 
definitions and can find a more lyrical style if forced, while Music immediately begins with ‘great 
expression’; Words coldly responds. 
 
Words and music, self and other 
Sebastian Claren argues that when Words and Music  
embody new metaphors in the long series of Beckett’s representations of human consciousness, Words 
and Music would suggest that the voices Beckett’s characters hear are just one area, while ‘Feelings and 
Passions’ are a second area, which is not connected to concepts, but can under certain circumstances 
be brought into contact with them. In any case, the dramatic persons ‘Neither’ from the opera Neither 
as a non-definable point between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ and Croak as Master of Words and Music two 
metaphors for the same thing, which in relation to two different problems – its subjective material 
(‘Words’ and ‘Music’) and its objective possibilities (‘Self’ and ‘Other’) – is examined and represents 
Beckett’s ‘unique theme’.’ 1150 
 
Feldman called the Words and Music project ‘the happiest of all the things that I have done,’1151 
because he did not have to set a fixed text to music, but had only indications to contend with 
such as ‘Age,’ ‘Music of Love and Soul’ etc.. The actual problem with Words and Music for 
Feldman was what Beckett mentions at the end of his Proust essay: that in contrast to Literature, 
‘there’s no universals in music unless you want to adapt to the language that came before you, as 
role models’, so ‘it’s incongruous the minute you get away from cliché type of responses.’1152 
 
                                                
1150 Sebastian Claren, p. 505 
1151 Everett Frost, ‘The Note Man and the Word Man,’ op. cit., p. 50 
1152 Ibid. 
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In relation to other compositions on texts by Beckett, Feldman argued that they are ‘histrionic’ 
for their treatment of Beckett as an existential hero instead of a tragic one and their 
‘conventional word painting’ and ‘your memory’s going to go into this composer, into that 
composer, and it’ll just be a cliché ridden score.’1153 Feldman himself said ‘you just couldn’t go 
looking for a score’ with which he could translate Beckett’s directions into music but wanted to 
meet Beckett halfway by keeping a distance. He also avoided to define the counterparts to 
Beckett’s directions, but instead engaged with the structural and technical problems of the 
composition: 
See, it’s a – I can’t disentangle the technical way of arriving at it and what it is, because it’s both – it’s a 
technical metaphor, and a technical metaphor then brings forth – hopefully – the psychological or the 
emotional or the dramatic situation.1154 
This bringing forth through technical means is a powerful image in itself, and could be seen as 
Feldman’s reading of Beckett’s text in poeietic terms.1155 
For this reason, Feldman has also tried to work with instrumental images, in order to create 
contrast between the sections, ‘so one remembers this against this, this against that.’1156 From this 
material the ‘atmosphere’ of the radio play should develop almost by itself. Instead of a 
                                                
1153 It is noteworthy in this regard that Feldman refers here to the vagaries of one’s memory – a topic of interest to 
Beckett, for example in Krapp’s Last Tape, where a man remembers his birthdays of the past via a number of 
recordings of himself at an earlier age.  
1154 Everett Frost, ‘The Note Man on the Word Man, Morton Feldman on Composing the Music for Samuel 
Beckett's Words and Musicin Beckett Festival of Radio Plays,’ in Mary Bryden (ed.), Samuel Beckett and Music, (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 49 
1155 It reminds of the Heideggerian notion of technè in the essay concerning technology. If we continue to pursue the 
question of the essence of technology, Heidegger argues, we will come to see that technology is a kind of poeisis, 
a way of bringing forth or revealing (p.34) – and, as such, is ‘the realm of truth’ and ‘if we understand technology 
as deriving from this concept of techne, Heidegger continues, then we will see that its essence lies not in the 
instrumental production of goods or manipulation of materials, but in ‘revealing.’ Martin Heidegger, The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, transl. and intro. by William Lovitt, (New York and London, Garland, 
1977) 
1156 Morton Feldman, Morton Feldman Says, op. cit., p. 236 
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conventional interpretation of the directions, as John Beckett had done, Feldman started 
working from within his own musical language, which he however adapted to the situation. 
Normally, he says, ‘I give myself a lot of time,’ but here the prefixed course of the text didn’t 
give him any time, forcing him to ‘choose metaphors’: 
after just five seconds I am in the world: there’s no set up, there’s no preparation, you have to begin in 
the world of the – of that (snapping his fingers) response.1157 
 
Furthermore, Feldman remarks that in contrast with his own Beckett-music and the other 
settings, ‘someone has to have had a language of their own in order to give it up.’1158 
Feldman’s music consists of 36 sections, which correspond with the directions of Beckett’s 
scenario. The first three sections are not notated, as the small orchestra consisting of two flutes, 
vibraphone and string trio tunes its instruments. For the first time since his student 
compositions before 1950, the score is not set in pianissimo but in mezzo piano, the first indication 
of a concession to the dramaturgic demands of the text; Beckett’s fortissimo outbursts of ‘Music’ 
are reduced in any case to mezzo forte. As Claren notes,1159 the specific basic material of the 
individual sections consists of three elements: a minor seventh divided over two parts and mostly 
repeated within one part, which appears for the first time in the “Here I am” (Nr. 4); secondly, a 
three-note motif consisting of the notes b2, a2 and g2, accompanied by its “shadow” a1, g1 and 
f1, which appears for the first time in Music of Love and Soul (nr. 10)  
                                                
1157 Ibid. 
1158 Ibid. 
1159 Claren, op. cit., p. 505 
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Figure 24: Morton Feldman, Words and Musi c , (No. 10), p. 3 
Thirdly, there are ascending and descending diatonic scales with different notes, which are used 
for the music to the ‘Age is when to a man’ and ‘Then down a little way.’ Other elements are too 
general to be counted as basic material. 
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Figure 25: Morton Feldman, Words and Musi c , (Nos. 19-22), p. 6 
However, the question as to what constitutes the basic material is highly problematic and not 
always fruitful, especially since Feldman thinks in terms of orchestration/timbre rather than 
purely pitch related. In this regard, neither for the practicing of the texts of both songs (as 
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indicated by Beckett), nor for the complete performance did Feldman indicate a precise setting 
of text to music, but notated a series of scales in different orchestrations. They only vaguely 
articulate the proportions of the text. As Feldman explained, 
No, I didn’t measure it to the text, but I created a composite line of the first line to my scale, which 
was essentially my, my air. A-I-R. And then, musically, I tried to work with it, it’s symmetries or 
asymmetries, but not that directly. It was only the first line that gave me his rhythm and pacing. And 
then, hopefully, I felt that I would have a sense of proportion that he does. And I was right actually. 
[…] Again, it was like working in the dark and, and I got there [earlier comment about Zen and he art 
of Archery in the dark; German practiced with lights on, Buddhists broke his bow…]. You couldn’t 
structure. I had no idea what was gonna come on in terms of his pacing. I said to myself, I hope he 
doesn’t fight my pacing. I hope he doesn’t , I hope he – I felt it was Beckett’s pacing. I felt it was my 
pacing also at the same time it wasn’t my pacing; it was faster.1160 
In the New York production David Warrilow, the actor who played ‘Words,’ used a rubato-
rhythm to adapt the text to the musical structures. He sings the full text ‘Age is when to a man’ 
in No. 5 and 6 without accompaniment, although Feldman didn’t include a pause at this point. 
  
If Beckett had indicated that the whole melody should be played by Music alone and Words 
would only join in during the repetition, Feldman does not take up the repetition, but sets 
individual scales within a continual process between repeat signs. In this way, Feldman made 
sure that the intro for Words, who must start his text at the moment when the melody is 
repeated, has been left undetermined and such a way that the text could be timed together with 
the musical structure. As Claren argues, in the same way Feldman transposes the series in which 
the scales are ordered for the studying of the song ‘Age is when to a man’ (Nos. 16-24, see 
above) in the final rendition (No. 24), where he uses the contributions of music for ‘Then down 
                                                
1160 Morton Feldman, Morton Feldman Says, op. cit., p. 236 
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a little way.’ This includes a scale which begins on d ♯1 (Nos. 30-31) as well as the three-note 
motif of the flutes. Their accompaniment is transformed into a♭1-g1-f1 (No. 32), while he 
simply uses the diatonic scale as an upbeat to the complete song (No. 33) and has the text sung 
against the minor sevenths (shifted against one another) of the first flute. 
 
Figure 26: Morton Feldman, Words and Musi c , (Nos. 31-33), p. 12 
 
In several instances, Feldman ignores the directions of Beckett, for example when he doesn’t 
repeat the “Here I am” [adsum] but varies it in nr. 4-7and later on completely changes it (No. 11) 
and when during the studying of the song ‘Age is when to a man’ Music’s suggestions (nr. 19) is 
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not repeated, but developed (No. 20) and then, as indicated, only the end of the last suggestion is 
repeated (which has now two parts) (No. 21); immediately after he follows up with a new scale 
instead of improving the last suggestion as Beckett indicates (No. 22). In this way, Feldman’s 
music runs it own course; while following Beckett’s directions in se very consciensciously, the 
distance from Beckett’s text has been increased by the non-chronological way in which Feldman 
has inserted them into the radioplay. As Feldman explains, ‘I started at the end, I started in 
different places,’ since ‘the whole idea of beginning, middle and end which was very apparent 
would not help as an emotional structure.’1161 In this sense, Feldman started at the end, which 
means that the minor sevenths of the beginning are not the start of the compositional process, but 
the sevenths of already used themes of the first section. The last section then has the reverse 
function of an overture, since it was composed first, but played in last instance; traditionally 
overtures are composed last and played first. 
 
Because of this underlying distance between text and music, which does not cause any overt 
conflict, and also because of the departure from Beckett’s directions and the avoidance of 
musical clichés the characters ‘Age,’ ‘Love’ and ‘The Face’ in Beckett’s text are presented 
allegorically, which in Feldman’s eyes expresses music’s ‘remoteness, its unattainableness.’ He 
specifically distances his work here from the compositional praxis of Richard Wagner: 
 
It’s not Wagnerian in terms of layering of the word into the structure and the body of music. It’s more 
distant. It’s going along. I wanted its presence and its remoteness, its unattainableness. An 
unattainableness and yet a marvelous presence which is music.1162  
                                                
1161 Morton Feldman, op. cit., p. 236 
1162 Ibid. 
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He concludes that ‘the closer you get, the more tragic it becomes, and the more compelling it 
becomes.’1163 So, rather than presenting the bond between words and music as a fait accompli, or a 
given, Feldman reads Beckett’s text as a musical un-nameable, to paraphrase Beckett. As I have 
argued above, music’s unattainableness is highlighted by Feldman’s insistence on the fact that he 
refuses to name anything (or in another formulation, “I don’t try to articulate what I am looking 
for”). For every naming is already a possessing by means of a (reifying) concept.  
 
  
                                                
1163 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 7: Iannis Xenakis’s Music in Light of his Philosophy of Space 
and Time 
 
 
 
  
 386 
  
 387 
Introduction 
‘It is not the ear, but the intelligence that hears.’1164 
 
‘One beauty of the mathematical form was its fluid development into a three-dimensional volume 
from a two-dimensional shape, thereby implying a movement or unfolding over time.’1165 
 
This chapter is concerned with the conception of musical time and space in the work of Iannis 
Xenakis, both from a theoretical and compositional-practical point of view. Xenakis had a dual 
concept of time, on the one hand the static, virtual ‘outside-time’ of modelling duration, and on 
the other hand the ‘in-time’ – time unfolding in the composition itself, both in the score and as 
performed. Another important element in his conceptualisation of these domains, is his 
treatment of sound, as material – shaped according to theoretical considerations, designed 
graphically, given structure and form in novel ways, and borrowed within his own oeuvre.1166 
Especially the concept of montage – as adopted by Xenakis – is of interest, yielding a new insight 
into the relation between theory and compositional praxis, and challenging the view of the 
mathematical over-determination of his music. Although he was very much informed by 
scientific methods, Xenakis argued that it is experience which ‘makes or breaks theories’, not 
eternal criteria or objective laws, governing art’s truth or validity.1167 He states that neither the 
                                                
1164 ‘L’oreille n’entend pas, c’est l’intelligence qui entend.’ Iannis Xenakis, as cited by Helena Maria Da Silva Santana, 
L’Orchestration chez Iannis Xenakis: l’espace et le rythme, fonctions du timbre, Ph.D. Thesis (Université de Paris-Sorbonne 
(Paris IV), 1998), (reprinted, Paris, Septentrion, 2003) 
1165 Marc Treib, Space calculated in Seconds: The Philips Pavilion, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 235. 
Cited by Sven Sterken, ‘À la recherché de l’espace paramétrisé. Les surfaces réglés comme theme dans l’oeuvre 
de Iannis Xenakis,’ in Makis Solomos, Présences de Iannis Xenakis, (Paris, CDMC, 2001), p. 217   
1166 The aspect of this borrowing has been studied in depth by Benoît Gibson, The instrumental music of Iannis Xenakis: 
theory, practice, self-borrowing, (Hillsdale, N.Y., Pendragon Press, 2011) 
1167 Iannis Xenakis, Arts/Sciences.Alloys, (Hillsdale, N.Y., Pendragon, 1985), p. 4-5 
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inference/deductive or the experimental ‘modes’ govern art – art ‘lives’ in a third mode, of 
‘immediate revelation.’ 1168 
 
  
                                                
1168 Ibid. 
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Theoretical and philosophical issues in Xenakis’s work 
In this section, an overview of Xenakis’s compositional technique is presented, from the point of 
view of the time/space continuity, as set out in three theoretical works: the chapter ‘Concerning 
Space, Time and Music,’ from Musique formelles (Formalized Music); and Musique. Architecture and 
‘Sur le temps’ (‘On Time’) from Kéleütha. In these texts, Xenakis presents an overview of his 
ideas and theories as he had developed over a number of years, with roots in ancient Greek 
philosophy, as well as historical and contemporary mathematics, and illustrations from his own 
oeuvre. This is generally considered to be both a major contribution to the history of musical 
composition and presents a unique insight into Xenakis’s aesthetics. Although often seen as 
extremely complex, authors such as Mihu Iliescu,1169 Makis Solomos,1170 Benoît Gibson,1171 
Helena Maria Da Silva Santana1172 and Boris Hoffmann,1173 amongst others, have analyzed and 
commented upon this theoretical work, as well placing it in the larger context of both his oeuvre 
and the study of musical form and formalization. On the one hand, it presents an image of a 
carefully reasoned approach to the praxis of composition, by highlighting that which all 
compositional strategies share, whilst on the other hand, this oeuvre always implies a need for an 
                                                
1169 Mihu Iliescu, Musical et extramusical: éléments de pensée spatiale dans l’oeuvre de Iannis Xenakis, Doctoral Thesis 
(Université de Lille III, 1996) 
1170 Makis Solomos cannot sufficiently be referenced here, as his research on Xenakis is arguably unrivalled in both 
the number of aspects of Xenakis’s oeuvre he has covered, as well as the depth of his insight. See my bibliography 
for more information. 
1171 Benoît Gibson,The Instrumental Music of Iannis Xenakis. Theory, Practice, Self-Borrowing, (Sharon Kanach (ed.), Iannis 
Xenakis Series), (Hillsdale, NY, Pendragon Press, 2011) 
1172 Helena Maria Da Silva Santana, L’Orchestration chez Iannis Xenakis: l’espace et le rythme, fonctions du timbre, Ph.D. 
Thesis (Université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV), 1998), (reprinted, Paris, Septentrion, 2003)  
1173 Boris Hoffmann, ‘Aspects spatiaux dans les œuvres instrumentales de Xenakis,’ in Anastasia Georgaki, and 
Makis Solomos (eds.), Proceedings of the International Symposium Iannis Xenakis, (Athens, University of 
Athens, 2005), pp. 192-201 and ‘Exploring the Sound Tapestry – The Role of Space in Nomos Gamma,’ in 
Dimitri Exarchos (ed.), Proceedings of the Xenakis International Symposium, London 1-3 April 2011 
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intuitive and practical use of the musical ear. Referring to the opening quotation, the ear’s 
‘hearing’ is mediated by the mind. The following overview is therefore crucial in understanding 
the basic concepts in Xenakis’s compositional technique and philosophy.  
 
In Vers une métamusique, 1174  Xenakis explains his view on the history of music from a 
mathematical and logical systematic point of view. From the start, he takes a critical view of two 
opposing tendencies in contemporary music: on the one hand he criticizes the blind follower of 
information technology, which preaches a communication model of music, with composers as 
transmitters and audiences as receptors. At the other end of the spectrum, he distinguishes the 
intuitionists, composers who follow two trends: 
(i) ‘graphists’ who posit the graphic symbol above music and sound and fetishize this. They ignore the fact 
that graphic writing is symbolic (as in traditional solfège), geometric or numerical, and is an image, 
faithful as much as possible to the instructions transmitted by the composer to the orchestra or the 
machine.  
(ii) Composers who add theatrical, extramusical actions accompanying the musical performance. These are 
influenced by the ‘happenings’ and express the disarray of certain artists, seeking refuge in gestures 
and disparate events, which betray their confidence in absolute music. 
For Xenakis, both groups have a romantic attitude in common. They believe in immediate action 
and are much less worried about the control offered by thought. Reflection then is needed for 
musical action to occur. He continues by stating that a ‘correct middle’ means a compromise; on 
the contrary, he proposes critical thinking. He argues that a focus on action, reflection and the 
                                                
1174 Iannis Xenakis, ‘Vers une métamusique,’ in La Nef, No. 29, (1967); Reprinted in Musique. Architecture, (Tournai, 
Casterman, 1971), pp. 38-70. I will be referring to the version in Musique. Architecture. 
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self-transformation of the sounds alone is needed. For music, scientific and mathematical 
thinking should be amalgamated dialectically with intuition.1175  
Xenakis explains that traditional linear musical thinking is subsumed as a special case within his 
more general theory of stochastics. He proposes a theory which uses logic, abstract 
constructions 1176  and which can be both valid in time (for what he calls ‘transversal 
musicology’1177) and in space (as ‘comparative musicology’1178). In order to achieve this practically, 
he proposes a musical architecture which is qualified by and governed according to three 
categories: firstly, the category of outside-time, secondly, the category of in-time and finally the 
temporal category. The first includes ‘durations and constructions (relations and operations) 
relating to the elements (points, distances, functions, etc.) belonging to and which can express 
themselves on the time axis.’1179 Another example of the first is the musical scale; the musical 
event in which it occurs is considered to belong to the temporal category; ‘the temporal thus 
being reserved for instant creation.’1180 Thirdly, a melody or chord on a given scale relates the 
category of outside-time with the temporal. They put outside-time constructions in the in-time.  
 
Xenakis continues with an analysis of Byzantine modes, and argues that the tonal system is 
reductive in that it insists upon the temporal category defining the in-time hierarchies of its 
                                                
1175 Iannis Xenakis, ‘Intuition ou rationalisme dans les techniques compositionnelles de la musique contemporaine, 
/ Intuition oder Rationalismus in der Kompositionstechnik der zeitgenössischen Musik / Intuition or 
Rationalism in the Techniques of Contemporary Musical Composition,’ in Künstler in Berlin: Berlin Confrontation, 
(Berlin, Ford Foundation Berlin / Presse- und Informationsamt des Landes Berlin, 1965), pp. 15-18 
1176 Vers une métamusique, op. cit., p. 42 
1177 ibid., p. 42 
1178 ibid. p. 42 
1179 ‘Dans la catégorie hors-temps sont incluses les durées et les constructions (relations et operations) qui ont trait 
aux elements (points, distances, fonctions, etc.) qui appartiennent à et qui peuvent s’exprimer sur l’axe du temps.’ 
In Vers une philosophie de la musique, op. cit., p. 81 
1180 ‘Le temporel étant donc reservé à la creation instantanée.’ Vers une philosophie, op. cit., p. 81 
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harmonic functions. In terms of outside-time, he avers that the idea of the scale reduces the 
harmonic richness of the modal system to a single octave scale (with ‘two tonics, a and c).1181 
This leads Xenakis to plead for a reintroduction of outside-time structures of greater interest 
than the current musical system. 
 
His philosophy of music traces its steps to the pre-Christian era of Greek antiquity, of thinkers 
such as Pythagoras, Parmenides, Plato and Heraclites. Rather than an iconoclast, Xenakis 
considered himself as an outsider, according to Mihu Iliescu.1182 His work presents an alternative 
to traditional musical thinking, even in terms of the musical avant-garde music of Boulez or 
Stockhausen. Xenakis mentions Varèse’s work, whose aesthetics he largely shared1183: Xenakis’s 
approach can thus be seen as a reflection on space and time.1184 Iliescu claims that for Xenakis 
the musical is borne from a spatial imagination and is contained within a space, in the same way 
the in-time is contained in the outside-time. Xenakis’s treatment of time and space in music is, 
however, complex. In this regard, Xenakis himself wonders in his essay ‘Sur le temps’: ‘Is time 
not simply a notion – epiphenomenon of a deeper reality?’1185  For him, space is a more 
substantial phenomenon, ‘freed from the guardianship of time.’1186 
 
                                                
1181 Ibid., p. 58 
1182 Mihu Iliescu, Musical et extramusical: Élements de pensée spatiale dans l’oeuvre de Iannis Xenakis, Doctoral Thesis, 
University of Paris I, 1996, p. 4: ‘À défaut d’une filiation musicale – Xenakis nie même celle de Varèse, dont il 
partage pourtant largement l’esthétique – il n’est peut-être pas déplacé d’interpreter sa démarche comme étant 
issue d’une réflexion sur l’espace et sur le temps.’  
1183 Makis Solomos, ‘Xenakis-Varèse et la question de la filiation,’ in Timothée Horodyski, and Philippe Lalitte (ed.), 
Edgar Varèse. Du son organisé aux arts audio, (Paris, L'Harmattan, 2008), pp. 139-170 
1184 Ibid., p. 5 
1185 Iannis Xenakis, ‘Sur le temps,’ in A. Galliari (ed.), Kéleütha. Écrits, preface and notes by Benoît Gibson, (Paris, 
L’Arche, 1994), p. 94 ‘Le temps n’est-il pas simplement une notion – épiphénomène d’une réalité plus profonde?’ 
1186 Xenakis, ‘Sur le temps,’ p. 96 : ‘[...]affranchi de la tutelle du temps.’ 
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In order to further elucidate Xenakis’s position, I now turn to a discussion of the chapter 
‘Concerning Space, Time and Music’ from Formalized Music,1187 in which Iannis Xenakis outlines a 
theory of musical time, based on scientific theories. However, this theory is itself not a scientific 
theory, but aims to establish an aesthetics of time and space, as understood from the position of 
the composer. He precisely opens with the question:  
 
WHAT IS A COMPOSER? - A thinker and plastic artist who expresses himself through sound beings. 
These two realms probably cover his entire being. 
 
Already, it is clear from this definition that Xenakis attempts to carve out a position for the 
composer in radically different terms to traditional ones, however, at the same time it implies 
that aspect of the role of a composer which is connected to earlier, historical, philosophical and 
musical referents. As he explains here and elsewhere, these include Greek thinkers (in particular 
Parmenides, Pythagoras and Heraclites) and modern physicists (such as Boltzmann,1188 Lorentz 
and Fitzgerald 1189  and Einstein); at a music-historical level, and although he rejected this 
affiliation, the influence of Edgard Varèse will become more apparent at the start of the first 
‘point.’ Indeed, Xenakis proposes here a number of these points, relating scientific insights to a 
musical aesthetics of his own: firstly, the notion of a stochastic music; secondly, a theory of the 
macroscopic level of composition, based on the work of Lorentz and Fitzgerald, and Einstein. 
                                                
1187 Iannis Xenakis, Formalized music : thought and mathematics in composition, (Bloomington ; London, Indiana University 
Press, 1971) 
1188 Ludwig Eduard Boltzmann (1844–1906); See Stephen G. Brush, ‘Boltzmann,’ in Charles Coulston Gillispie (ed.), 
Dictionary of Scientific Biography, (New York, Scribner, 1970) and William R. Everdell, ‘The Problem of Continuity 
and the Origins of Modernism: 1870–1913,’ in History of European Ideas, Vol. 9, No. 5, (1988), pp. 531–552 
1189 Hendrik Antoon Lorentz (1853–1928), the Dutch physicist, and George Francis FitzGerald (1851–1901), the 
Irish philosopher of natural and experimental philosophy. They are known together for the formulation of the 
Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction, which formed an integral part of Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity.  
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Thirdly, a critique of construction in music, with a proposal for a new theory of musical 
composition (‘new laws’ and rules). 
 
Xenakis opens his argument by stating that in 1954, he introduced ‘probability theory and 
calculus in musical composition in order to control sound masses both in their invention and in 
their evolution,’ which ‘inaugurated an entirely new path in music, more global than polyphony, 
serialism or, in general, “discrete” music. From hence came stochastic music.’1190 The idea of 
sound masses refers, as I have shown in Chapter 5, to the terminology proposed and used by 
Edgard Varèse. However, Xenakis adapts it to his reading of some of the classics of physics. In 
particular, he founds this stochastic theory of music in the ‘notion of entropy, as formulated by 
Boltzmann or Shannon.1191’ In an attempt to further define, or at least describe his or her role, 
Xenakis compares the composer to a god, who ‘may create the reversibility of the phenomena of 
masses, and apparently, invert Eddington’s1192 “arrow of time.”’1193 He explains that he applies 
probability distributions both in computer generated sound synthesis on a micro- or 
macroscopic scale, and in instrumental compositions. It is at this point in his interpretation of 
physics and the sciences that he makes explicit their interaction, a crucial philosophical point, 
                                                
1190 Xenakis, Formalized Music Thought and Mathematics in Composition, op. cit., p. 255 
1191 Xenakis refers to the American engineer, mathematician and cryptographer Claude Elwood Shannon (1916–
2001) who was instrumental in establishing information theory. He cites Claude E. Shannon and W. Weaver, The 
Mathematical Theory of Communication, (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1949); see also Erico Marui Guizzo,  
‘The Essential Message: Claude Shannon and the Making of Information Theory,’ (M.S. Thesis, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Dept. of Humanities, Program in Writing and Humanistic Studies, 2003) 
1192 Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington (1882-1944), the British astronomer, physicist, and mathematician. See Arthur S. 
Eddington, Space, Time and Gravitation: An Outline of the General Relativity Theory, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1920) and Charles de Koninck, ‘The Philosophy of Sir Arthur Eddington and the Problem of 
Indeterminism,’ in The Writings of Charles de Koninck, (Notre Dame, Ind.,  University of Notre Dame Press, 2008) 
1193 Peter Coveney, and Roger Highfield, The Arrow of Time: A voyage through science to solve time's greatest mystery, (London, 
W.H. Allen, 1990). The arrow of time is a concept developed by Eddington in 1927, which states the one-way 
direction and asymmetry of time. 
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‘[…] the laws of probability that I use are often nested and vary with time which creates a 
stochastic dynamics which is aesthetically interesting.’1194 It is the latter part of this phrase which 
illuminates Xenakis’s aesthetic position – whilst conscious of the physics of time and space as 
formulated by these scientists, mathematicians, (astro)physicists and engineers, it is their 
implication for musical temporality, as it is considered from the perspective of outside-time, inside-
time and temporal unfolding. The relation extends into the (analytic) procedures of 
mathematicians such as Liouville’s1195 and Ilya Prigogine1196  from which he concludes that it 
‘implies the irreversibility of the system to the equilibrium state; that is, it implies the 
irreversibility of time.’1197 It is this focus on the one-directional flow of time which occupies a 
central position in Xenakis’s theory of musical time. 
 
A second point in this chapter on space, time and music, is concerned with the Lorentz-
Fitzgerald contraction and Einstein’s theory of relativity, relating them to formations in the 
macroscopic composition of music. In relation to these theories, Xenakis states that it is well-
known that their equations link space and time, based on the finite velocity of light, and that 
‘from this it follows that time is not absolute.’1198 He continues with a gloss on the relativity of 
time: 
Yet time is always there. It “takes time” to go from one point to another in space, even if that time 
depends on moving reference frames relative to the observer. There is no instantaneous jump from 
                                                
1194 Iannis Xenakis, Formalized Music, op. cit., p. 256 
1195 Joseph Liouville (1809-1882) was a French mathematician, who proposed a theorem used in complex analysis. 
See Benjamin Fine and Gerhard Rosenberger, The Fundamental Theorem of Algebra (Springer Science & Business 
Media, 1997) 
1196 Xenakis cites Ilya Prigogyne, Physique Temps et Devenir, (Paris, Masson, 1982)  
1197 Iannis Xenakis, Formalized Music, p. 256 
1198 Ibid. 
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one point to another in space, much less “spatial ubiquity”—that is, simultaneous presence of an 
event or an object in two sites in space. 1199 
This particular comment implies in nuce a reference to Xenakis’s own compositional ideal of 
continuity (per the glissando) and the diachronicity of musical beings. In other words, the theory 
of relativity functions as a theoretical framework for an aesthetics of compositional technique, 
grounding some of Xenakis’s procedures. This theory, however, is not entirely one-sided. 
Xenakis continues by positing (again in scientific terms) the opposite term, the notion of 
displacement: 
Within a local reference frame, what then does displacement signify? If the notion of displacement 
were more fundamental than that of time, one could undoubtedly reduce all macro and microcosmic 
transformations to extremely short chains of displacement. Consequently (and this is an hypothesis 
that I freely advance), if we were to adhere to quantum mechanics and its implications accepted now 
for decades, we would perhaps be forced to admit the notion of quantified space and its corollary, 
quantified time. But then, what could a quantified time and space signify, a time and space in which 
contiguity would be abolished? What would the pavement of the universe be if there were gaps 
between the paving stones, inaccessible and filled with nothing?1200  
In the above quotation, it becomes even clearer how the idea of contiguity, ‘the state of bordering 
or being in direct contact with something’ a word with origins in the 16th century from the Latin 
contiguitas, itself from the Latin contiguous ‘touching’1201 – is central to the understanding of 
Xenakis’s philosophy of music. In this case, Xenakis imagines the opposite idea, that space and 
                                                
1199 Ibid., p. 256 
1200 Ibid. 
1201 Judy Pearsall and Patrick Hanks (eds.), The New Oxford Dictionary of English, (Oxford; New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p. 396 
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time can be discontinuous, another key idea. It reverberates throughout his work, as several 
Xenakis scholars have pointed out.1202 
 
In the next section, Xenakis considers the experiential dimension of time as duration. Here, he 
refers to the experimental demonstrations of the scientists C. N. Yang and T. D. Lee,1203 where 
he draws the attention to symmetries at the particle level, where a certain theorem (CPT)  
still holds for the symmetries of the electron (C) and of time (T), symmetries that have not yet been 
completely annulled. This remains so even if the “arrow of time” appears to be non-reversible in 
certain weak interactions of particles. […] Let us also not forget the theory of retrograde time found in 
Plato's Politicos—or in the future contraction of the universe. Extraordinary visions!1204 
In other words, Xenakis is looking to overcome the traditional theories of time which hold the 
view that time is absolutely irreversible – at least there is a certain desire for physics to discover 
the possibility of reversible time. In fact, he describes the basics of quantum physics, by pointing 
to its specificity, and the importance of observation in the determination of the state of a photon 
as either corpuscular or a wave. It is, however, the interpretation Xenakis gives this theoretical 
consideration of physics which is crucial: 
These explanations hint at the idea of an “intervention of the present into the past,” contrary to the 
fact that causality in quantum mechanics cannot be inverted. For, if the conditions of observation are 
established to detect the particle, then one obtains the corpuscular state and never the wave state, and 
                                                
1202 For example, the work of Mihu Iliescu, cited above, focuses on these opposites, continuity/discontinuity. See 
Mihu Iliescu, Musical et extramusical: Élements de pensée spatiale dans l’oeuvre de Iannis Xenakis, (Doctoral Thesis, 
University of Paris I, 1996) 
1203 Xenakis refers here to the theorem named after the Chinese-born American physicists T. D. Lang (°1926) and C. 
N. Yang (°1922) in statistical mechanics; See Lee, T. D.; Yang, C. N. ‘Statistical Theory of Equations of State 
and Phase Transitions. II. Lattice Gas and Ising Model,’ in Physical Review, Vol. 87 (1952), pp. 410–419 
1204 Iannis Xenakis, Formalized Music, p. 257 
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vice versa. A similar discussion on non-temporality and the irreversibility of the notion of causality 
was undertaken some time ago by Hans Reichenbach.1205 
In other words, Xenakis seems to hold the view that, although causality cannot be inverted, a 
relationship between particles could potentially be seen in relation to one another which upends 
the absolutes of strict quantum-mechanical view. It is this idea of a sympathetic relation between 
particles (and I would go as far as to propose that Xenakis is referring other sorts of elements, 
even in a musical sense as tones or sound beings). In that sense, Xenakis explicitly refers to a 
temporal relation between particles, which is conducive to his theory of music; I would term this 
as the historical in his theory. In the following part of this text, Xenakis attempts to establish 
another characteristic of the relation between particles, in this case a spatial one: 
Another fundamental experiment has to do with the correlation of the movement of two photons 
emitted in opposite directions by a single atom. How can one explain that both either pass through 
two polarizing films, or that both are blocked? It is as if each photon “knew” what the other was 
doing and instantaneously so, which is contrary to the special theory of relativity.1206 
At this point, Xenakis concludes with an aesthetic statement of intent: 
Now, this experiment, could be a starting point for the investigation of more deeply seated properties 
of space, freed from the tutelage of time. In this case, could the “nonlocality” of quantum mechanics 
perhaps be explained not by the hypothesis of “hidden variables” in which time still intervenes, but 
rather by the unsuspected and extravagent properties of nontemporal space, such as “spatial ubiquity,” 
for example? […] In fact, let us consider the movement of a photon. Movement means displacement. 
Now, could this displacement be considered an autogenesis of the photon by itself at each step of its 
trajectory (continuous or quantized)? This continuous auto-creation of the photon, could it not, in fact, 
be space? 
                                                
1205 Xenakis, Formalized Music, op. cit., p. 257 
1206 Ibid. 
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Xenakis is not only concerned with the relationship between particles, elements, structures, but 
also to the creation of them, in other words their emergence. It is highly interesting how he 
conceived of this in aesthetic terms in the third part of this part of Formalized Music. He 
approaches this from the point of view of the composer (which he established at the beginning 
of this text). If considering the question of how to create something from nothing, 
In musical composition, construction must stem from originality which can be defined in extreme 
(perhaps inhuman) cases as the creation of new rules or laws, as far as that is possible; as far as 
possible meaning original, not yet known or even foreseeable. Construct laws therefore from nothing, 
since without any causality.1207 
Although the ‘original’ in Xenakis is a complex issue in itself, it could be seen here to be present 
at a number of levels: this implies a theory of not simply individual particles or musical elements, 
but one which constructs a framework for a certain interrelation (even correlation) between 
these elements. Xenakis immediately sees a problem with this original creation. It would require a 
complex number of rules: 
But a construction from nothing, therefore totally engendered, totally original, would necessarily call 
upon an infinite mass of rules duly entangled. Such a mass would have to cover the laws of a universe 
different from our own. For example: rules for a tonal composition have been constructed. Such a 
composition therefore includes, a priori, the “tonal functions.”1208  
The historical element in this theory, which stresses the spatial, entails a further elaboration in 
musical terms. The link with the sound-beings or ‘entitities’ etc., are grounded both in reality (as 
acoustic sounds) and in the virtual, the realm of abstraction. 
It also includes a combinatory conception since it acts on entities, sounds, as defined by the 
instruments. In order to go beyond this slight degree of originality, other functions would have to be 
invented, or no functions should exist at all. One is therefore obliged to conceive of forms from thoughts bearing no 
                                                
1207 Ibid, p. 258 
1208 Iannis Xenakis, op. cit., p. 259 
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relation to the proceeding ones,1209 thoughts without limits of shapes and without end. Here, we are obliged 
to progressively weave an unlimited web of entangled rules—and that alone in the combinatory realm 
which itself excludes, by definition, any possible continuums of sound.1210  
A dialectic exists between these two poles: on the one hand Xenakis proposes a theory which, 
whilst taking into account the sonorous, i.e. instrumental sounds; on the other hand he avers that 
the notion of the continuum is to be found not in this world of sound, but in the web of rules. 
He argues that technology in the form of computers could contribute to the material realization 
of this theory; however, this technology is limited in philosophical terms as a mere 
epiphenomenon of thought. In this sense, he reverses the Bergsonian notion of rationalized 
consciousness to an almost superhuman level of control over the tools at the disposal of, in this 
case, the composer:   
However, the insertion of continuity will consequently augment the spread of this web and its 
compacity. Furthermore, if one cared to engender the unengenderable in the realm of sound, then it 
would be necessary to provide rules other than those for sound machines such as pipes, strings, skins, 
etc. which is possible today thanks to computers and corresponding technologies. But technology is both 
but a semblance of thought and its materialisation.1211 It is therefore but an epiphenomenon in this discussion. 
Actually, rules of sound synthesis such as those stemming from Fourier series should not be used any 
more as the basis of construction. Others, different ones, must be formulated.1212 
Rather than accept the scientific as the basis of a theory of music, Xenakis clearly argues for a 
theory of music which, whilst taking into account the world as it is seen by physicists, musical 
composition must create a set of rules of its own. The dialectic of rationality and the imagination 
                                                
1209 My stress 
1210 Iannis Xenakis, Formalized Music, op. cit., p. 259 
1211 My stress 
1212 Iannis Xenakis, Formalized Music, p. 258 
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(in Xenakis’s terms that which is original) ought to lead to a set of rules which is not simply a 
composer’s individual toolbox. It implies a shared musical material (to paraphrase Adorno):  
Another perspective: We have seen how construction stems from an originality which is defined by 
the creation of rules and laws outside of an individual’s or even the human species’ memory.1213  
It is only here that Xenakis defines what he understands as a rule or a law: 
A rule or law signifies a finite or infinite procedure, always the same, applied to continuous or 
“discrete” elements. This definition implies the notion of repetition, of recurrence in time, or 
symmetry in realms outside time (hors temps). Therefore, in order for a rule to exist, it must be 
applicable several times in eternity's space and time. If a rule were to exist but once, it would be 
swallowed up in this immensity and reduced to a single point, therefore unobservable. In order for it 
to be observable, it must be repeatable an infinite number of times.1214 
The crucial element in this definition is how Xenakis always ties in the definition to the temporal 
and spatial dimensions of reality. This grounds his thinking in a sense, not simply from a 
scientific point as I have shown, but from a philosophical one. In other words, Xenakis avoids 
theoretical speculation for the sake of speculation.  
In a final section, Xenakis turns to the idea of repetition. He once more refers to the well-known 
Greek thinkers: 
Can one repeat a phenomenon? (cf. Heraclites: “It is impossible to step twice into the same river,” and 
Kratylos: "not even once.") 
But the fact remains that the universe: 
a) seems, for the time being, to be made up of rules-procedures; 
b) that these rules-procedures are recurrent 
A further element of this dialectic is implied here: the static of Parmenidian Being versus the 
Heraclitian idea of the ever-changing nature of Being: 
                                                
1213 Ibid., p. 259 
1214 Ibid. 
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It is as though the Being (in disagreement with Parmenides), in order to continue existing, is obliged 
to die; and once dead, is obliged to start his cycle again. Existence, therefore, is a dotted line.1215 
This leads Xenakis to seek a minimal form of emergence : 
Can one, at last, imagine an infinitesimal microscopic rule that is engendered from nothing? Even if 
physics has yet to discover anything resembling this, despite “Lamb's shift” (which sees each point in 
space in our universe as seething in virtual pairs of particles and anti-particles), we can imagine such an 
eventuality which would, by the way, be of the same nature as the fact or pure chance, detached from 
any causality.1216 
This anti-causal thinking would allow for an expansion of the virtual, and ultimately, a change in 
the way composition can be effected; in other words, Xenakis finds common cause with the 
scientific world, but from a radically artistic perspective: 
It is necessary to depend on such a conclusion of a Universe open to the unprecedented which 
relentlessly would be formed or would disappear in a truly creative whirlwind, beginning from 
nothingness and disappearing into nothing. The same goes for the basis of art as well as for man's 
destiny.1217 
This philosophy is obviously best served not by a simple form of technological rationality, but 
through a creative process which is based in the original, and a continued striving for renewal, 
both artistic and political. 
  
Musique/Architecture: a philosophy of (dis)continuity 
From his propositions, Iliescu concludes that the concept of musical space corresponds to the 
different identities of their author: Xenakis as musician, architect, mathematician, engineer, 
                                                
1215 Ibid. 
1216 Ibid. 
1217 Iannis Xenakis, Formalized Music, op. cit., p. 259 
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theorist of physics and metaphysics, philosopher and [resistance] fighter. 1218  This concept 
therefore contains ambiguities and contradictions. For example, Xenakis affirms the primacy of 
an abstract space, purely psychological, of which music and architecture would be incarnations 
and in a way equivalent; this theory coexists with Xenakis’s preoccupation with a concrete space 
and with a concrete sound material, to be treated in the manner of an artisan.1219 Iliescu sums up 
this antagonistic relation of spatialization and temporal unfolding as follows: 
Xenakis’s attempt to spatialize time and thus to conceive its reversibility, which links back to 
Parmenidian [static] ontology, does not exclude the recognition, in a Heraclitian [dynamic] spirit, of 
the objective existence of a irreversible temporal flux.1220   
 
A parallel exists for Xenakis, then, between a morphology of sound and a visual morphology, 
based in his understanding of the contemporaneity of Greek philosophy. This means that he 
draws on a number of philosophers, as mentioned above. On the one hand, the ‘Pythagorean-
Parmenidian field,’ which he sees as an indication for a road towards the reconstruction, as much 
as possible ex nihilo, of the basics of musical composition.1221 As Iliescu writes,1222 Xenakis’s 
‘formalized musics’ [musiques formelles] inscribes itself in this philosophical tradition, which 
attempts to reduce the diversity of the physical world to a purely logical level. However, Xenakis 
interprets this in a double fashion, as on the one hand consisting of ‘the so-called idealist way of 
thinking’1223, and on the other hand ‘as the first absolute and total materialism.’1224 Iliescu calls 
                                                
1218 Mihu Iliescu, Musical et extramusical, op. cit., p. 6 
1219 ibid., p. 6 
1220 ibid., p. 6: ‘l’effort xenakien de spatialiser le temps et de concevoir ainsi sa réversibilité, effort qui renvoie à 
l’ontologie parménidienne, n’exclut pas la reconnaissance, dans un esprit héraclitéen, de l’existence objective 
d’un flux temporel irréversible.’ 
1221 See Vers une philosophie de la musique, in Musique/Architecture, p. 71-92 
1222 Ibid., p.35 
1223 ibid. p. 35. Xenakis, ‘Conférence de Varsovie’, p. 61: ‘la soi-disant voie idéaliste de pensée’ 
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this position an ‘ontology of sound.’1225 According to the musicologist Fred Goldbeck, Xenakis’s 
composition Eonta is a ‘pronunciamento in favour of a music-as-sound which is in opposition to a 
music-as-motif which is developmental.1226 As the scholar Makis Solomos explains, it is therefore 
no longer a question of a ‘“being” [être] which is identified with a note and concretized in terms 
of “being” [étant] by the unimportant choice of a timbre.’1227 Xenakis himself speaks in this 
regard of ‘sound being’ [être sonore].1228 In Musique architecture, for example, he asks if you ‘can 
construct sonorous beings gifted with discontinuity or a maximum of continuity. The answer is 
yes.’1229 As I will argue shortly, Xenakis gives an example of this crossover between architecture 
and music: his Metastaseis (1953-1954 and created in 1955) for orchestra served as an inspiration 
for the design of the Philips Pavilion at the 1958 World Exhibition in Brussels, a collaborative 
project with Le Corbusier and Edgard Varèse. Particularly the idea of the continuous line, 
represented in the buildings structural elements, found its musical equivalent in the glissando. 
 
Parmenides’s concept of being and Xenakis’s notion of the sound being 
In this regard, Iliescu distinguishes three characteristics of the Parmenidian being which Xenakis 
used: intemporality, contiguity and immobility.1230 The first excludes any notion of past, present 
or future, and rests fully in the Now, whilst also finding an equivalence between a Parmenidian 
being and the category outside-time. He also imagines Xenakis’ ‘sound beings’ as possessing 
                                                                                                                                                  
1224 ibid., p 35. Xenakis, Musique/Architecture, op. cit., p. 74: ‘le premier matérialisme absolu et total’ 
1225 Mihu Iiescu, op. cit., p. 7 
1226 Fred Goldbeck, p. 169 as cited by Mihu Ilescu, op. cit., p. 36 
1227 Makis Solomos, 1993, p. 448 
1228 Iannis Xenakis, Musiques formelles, op. cit., p. 28; Musiques architecture, op. cit., p. 21 and 36 
1229 Xenakis, Musiques architecture, op. cit., p. 21:‘Peut-on construire des êtres sonores doués de discontinuité ou de 
continuité maximum? La réponse est oui.’ 
1230 Iliescu, op. cit., p. 37- 39 
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Characteristics which are not temporal and which can be ordered, given the structure of a group and 
which consequently can form a vectored space.1231 
Xenakis uses the example of the melodic interval as independent from time – a fifth is always a 
fifth; the two notes can sound as a chord or as a melody. A sonorous being, then, has three 
irreducible characteristics: pitch, intensity, and duration and can moreover be considered as a 
logical function, in the sense of group theory or symbolic logic, as an ensemble of vectors.1232 He 
considers a musical composition from three angles: firstly, as fundamental relations and 
operations independent of time (which he terms logical or algebraic structure outside-time); a second 
temporal point of view shows sound beings on the time axis, as durations which form a group 
with a given structure. This group is structured by using temporal algebra independent of the 
outside-time algebra. The third way of analyzing a composition could consider its outside-time algebra 
and its temporal algebra. This would then lead to a third fundamental structure – the algebraic 
structure in-time.1233 
 
As Le Corbusier’s assistant, Iannis Xenakis collaborated on the project to build the Philips 
Pavilion1234 for the 1958 World Exhibition in Brussels; not only did he design the building, based 
on a very simple sketch from Le Corbusier. As the architect and scholar Sven Sterken pointed 
out in his essay on Xenakis’s architectural work1235 – an implicit critique of an essay by Robert 
                                                
1231 Xenakis, Musique architecture, p. 36. Also cited by Iliescu, op. cit., p. 37 
1232 ibid., p. 36 
1233 ibid., p. 36-37 
1234 Bart Lootsma, ‘Een ode van Philips aan de vooruitgang,’ in Wonen TABK, No. 2, (1984), p. 10-17; German 
translation in ‘Poème électronique: Le Corbusier, Xenakis, Varèse,’ in T.Kesseler, A. Vowinckel (eds.), Le Corbusier 
Synthèse des Arts, Aspekte des Spätwerks 1945-1965, (Karlsruhe, Bad. Kunstverein, 1986), pp. 111-147; Marc Treib, 
Space Calculated in Seconds - The Philips Pavilion, Le Corbusier, Edgard Varèse (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1996);  
1235 Sven Sterken, ‘À la recherché de l’espace paramétrisé. Les surfaces réglés comme theme dans l’oeuvre de Iannis 
Xenakis,’ in Makis Solomos, Présences de Iannis Xenakis, (Paris, CDMC, 2001), pp. 217-224; see also Sven Sterken, 
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Trevisiol1236 – a number of aspects of Xenakis’s conceptualizations of architectural technique 
were inspired by the constructivists of the 1920s and 1930s. This means that, like the architects 
Naum Gabo, Antoine Pevsner and Lazlo Maholy-Nagy, Xenakis is interested in finding the most 
rational form, and in following the second quotation at the top of this chapter, time was 
considered as a formal element of their architecture.1237 Furthermore, in contrast to Le Corbusier, 
for whom he worked whilst designing the Philips Pavilion, this meant an integration of scientific 
and mathematical theories, as explained above. For Le Corbusier, the search for a rational 
architecture meant the search for a mathematical purity in terms of form, focussing on simple 
geometric shapes like the square and the rectangle. These, however, whilst becoming more 
complex in his later oeuvre, were leading to a justification of sorts in mathematical terms a 
posteriori. In other words, Le Corbusier legimitized his designs – translated in terms of 
proportions, numbers and geometric figures, ‘gaining the advantage of objectivity,’ and using 
them for their ‘symbolic meaning and not for their economic or structural value.’1238 Xenakis, 
then, opposed this instrumental use of mathematics by asking ‘what is the geometric form which 
the cover needs to have for the quantity of material of which this cover is constituted to be 
minimal?’1239 According to Xenakis, this question had inspired the ‘abstract and material research 
                                                                                                                                                  
Iannis Xenakis, ingénieur et architecte. Une analyse thématique de l’œuvre, suivie d’un inventaire critique de la collaboration avec 
Le Corbusier, des projets architecturaux et des installations réalisées dans le domaine du multimédia, (PhD Thesis, 
Rijksuniversiteit Gent, 2004) 
1236 Trevisiol, Robert, ‘Le Pavillon Philips de Le Corbusier et Xenakis,’ in Le Corbusier et Belgique, (Paris; Brussels, 
FLC, 1997); https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/86294/1/philips.doc The passage of Sterken’s 
essay on the Philips Pavilion is clearly related to the essay by Trevisiol, whom he cites once, as they both cite the 
same passages, from Le Corbusier’s work, and subsequently from Xenakis’s.  
1237 Sven Sterken, ‘À la recherché de l’espace paramétrisé,’ op. cit., p. 217 
1238 Sven Sterken, ibid., p. 218 
1239 Trevisiol quotes Xenakis, Poème électronique, p. 127: ‘Quelle est la forme géométrique que doit avoir la couverture 
pour que la quantité de matière qui constitue cette couverture soit minima [sic]?’ a different, non-attributed 
version of this same quote is to be found in Sterken, op. cit., p. 219:  ‘Quelle est la forme architecturale qui doit 
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of a generation of technicians and mathematicians.’1240 It was in this case reinforced concrete, 
whose ‘essence is continuity,’ which according to Xenakis allows for this new architecture.1241 
This ultimately led him to work with a minimum amount of material, particularly in the Polytopes 
series, which used light as an integral part of the construction.1242 A certain contradiction, of 
using a minimum of materials, leads one theorist, Robert Trevisiol, to state that ‘for Xenakis, 
therefore, thickness, the constraints of the material must be reduced to a minimum, in order to 
interfere as little as possible with the perfection of the idea and the geometry. In the end, the 
materiality is a hindrance to perfection.’1243 He goes on to claim that Le Corbusier’s art was one 
which accepted contrasts, ‘assemblages, with which the artist proceeds after a first selection, to 
introduce subsequently, with an empirical sensibility, a harmony which brings out the 
expressivity of the material.’1244 On the other hand, Sterken impresses upon the notion of 
Xenakis’s main architectural innovation, namely the use of regulated surfaces,1245 in which 
concrete elements, each different from every other, were put together to form a free and 
continuous surface. Following a logical (rather than a poetic) chain of thought Xenakis proposed 
an architecture, ‘which was imposed by this rigorous logic and which runs parallel with the 
                                                                                                                                                  
être trouvée afin que la couverture soit réduite au minimum?’; the use of the term ‘cover’ is meant to 
differentiate it from the more traditional notion of the roof. 
1240 Xenakis in Poème électronique, p. 127: ‘C’est la question qui a façonné directement l’orientation des recherches 
abstraites et matérielles de techniciens et de mathématiciens depuis plus d’une generation.’ 
1241 Ibid., p. 127 ‘Le béton armé, qui a l’origine avait copié l’ossature de bois ou de pierre, devait par son essence 
meme server de véhicule à ces preoccupations. So essence est la continuité.’  
1242 Ibid., p. 219. For example, the Diatope was an inflatable structure. The Polytope de Montréal was even more 
immaterial, as it consisted of a number of lights, suspended from wires. 
1243 ‘Pour Xenakis, donc, l'épaisseur, les contraintes de la matière doivent être réduites au minimum, pour interférer 
le moins possible avec la perfection de l'idée et de la géométrie. À la limite, la matérialité est une entrave à la 
perfection.’ In Trevisiol, op. cit. 
1244 Ibid. 
1245 Peter Kolman, ‘Der Weg zur Flachenkomposition,’ in Melos, No. 37, (1970), pp. 8-12 
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technologically innovative character of this project.’1246 For Sterken, Xenakis ‘wants to minimise 
the personal aesthetic intuitions.’1247 Instead of an a posteriori justification of form as he criticizes 
in Le Corbusier’s approach,1248 Xenakis develops the Pavilion from the regulated surfaces up, to 
‘master the free form’1249 in this way. Xenakis’s architecture is not limited by the traditional 
concept of an architecture ‘of columns and beams,’ but has freed itself thanks to the new 
technology of the reinforced concrete. It is an architecture, ‘based on the geometry and the 
characteristics of the material.’1250 In other words, the form is developed from the ground up, 
based in an interplay of the individual elements of the regulated surfaces (the concrete elements 
were fabricated off-site and then assembled in situ), which together formed the mathematical 
approximation of a continuous surface, without corners or straight lines. Xenakis himself argued 
this in his text ‘Le Pavillon Philips à l’aube d’une architecture,’1251 where he criticizes traditional 
architecture: ‘Since antiquity, architecture is not a really spatial manifestation. It is essentially 
                                                
1246 Iannis Xenakis, ‘Genèse de l'architecture du Pavillon,’ in Revue Technique Philips, Vol. 20, No. 1, (1958-59), pp. 1-
11; ‘L'architecture du Pavillon,’ in Charles Edouard Le Corbusier, Le poème électronique, (Paris, Minuit, 1958); 
Sterken also refers in this regard to Iannis Xenakis, ‘Le Pavillon Philips à l’aube d’une nouvelle architecture,’ in 
Iannis Xenakis, Musique/Architecture, (Tournai, Casterman, 1971), p. 125. Sterken, op. cit., p. 219 
1247 Sven Sterken, op. cit., p. 219  
1248 This same sort of mathematical legitimization as a form of mystification, can be seen in the work of composers 
with little mathematical knowledge, who nevertheless hint at the importance of the use of pseudo-mathematical 
devices as being fundamental to their technique.  
1249 Sterken uses the term a priori, to contrast it with the a posteriori justification he ascribes to Le Corbusier: ‘Il 
développe a priori la forme à partir de surfaces réglées et non pas après, pour maîtriser une forme libre. Ce 
renversement de la démarche met en opposition l’approche artistique libre de Le Corbusier et l’esprit d’ingénieur 
de Xenakis: chez Le Corbusier, on perçoit en quelque sorte un usage instrumentalde la rationalité: elle est un 
‘outil’ pour organizer ses intuitions et expliquer sad émarhe a posteriori. En revanche, pour Xenakis, l’acte creative 
est l’explication d’une demarche méthodique et rationaelle; la rigueur de son application determine la beauté du 
résultat.’ This clearly is not an a priori methodology, as the idea of form is not one set out before the actual 
architectural design, but based in the regulated surface as a material. His concern seems to be with how these 
surfaces together, from the ground up, can form a larger, continuous surface, not a manifestation of an a priori 
form.  
1250 Sterken, ibid., p. 219 
1251 Iannis Xenakis, Musique/Architecture, op. cit., pp. 123-142 
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based in two dimensions; it is essentially flat,’1252 dividing the types of architecture in two groups: 
one rectilinear subgroup and a second, circular subgroup of translation. The first can be found in 
temple architecture, based on the notions of the straight line, the plane, and the right angle, and 
leads up to the modern day; and the second in the ‘Neolithic houses, archaic tombs, rotunda,’ 
fused with ‘techniques from the near-east,’1253 resulting in the building of domed structures. It is 
with the second subgroup that Xenakis finds common cause, seeing a theoretical development in 
terms of elasticity, and the resistance of materials. In contrast to the use of beams and other 
supports, Xenakis places the essence of continuity central, to be found in the new material, 
reinforced concrete. It is on this point that Trevisiol contrasts Le Corbusier (the artist) with Xenakis 
(the engineer), by first stating that Le Corbusier acted as an artist, ‘who knows the effect he 
wants to achieve, and who judges as relatively secondary the technical modalities which will allow 
him to obtain the wanted result.’1254 On the other hand,  
for an engineer, a mathematician like Xenakis, in the end it is not even legitimate to dream of the 
resulting form, before the absolute certainty of the applied method: it is only from there that a 
coherent solution can be born, and especially such a solution that all the elements of the project must 
found themselves in one single absolute form.1255  
                                                
1252 Ibid., p. 123: ‘Depuis la plus haute antiquité, l’architecture n’est pas une manifestation vraiment spatiale. 
Elle est essentiellement fondée sur deux dimensions, elle est essentiellement plane.’ 
1253 Trevisiol, Robert, ‘Le Pavillon Philips de Le Corbusier et Xenakis,’ in Le Corbusier et Belgique, (Paris; Brussels, 
FLC, 1997) 
1254 Ibid. 
1255 In Trevisiol, op. cit.: ‘Le Corbusier agit comme un artiste qui connaît l'effet auquel il veut aboutir, et qui juge 
relativement secondaires les modalités techniques qui lui permettront d'obtenir le résultat recherché. Pour un 
ingénieur, un mathématicien comme Xenakis, en revanche, à la limite il n'est pas même légitime de songer à la 
forme résultante, avant d'avoir la certitude de la rigueur absolue de la méthode appliquée: c'est seulement à partir 
de là que pourra naître une solution cohérente, et surtout une solution telle que tous les éléments du projet 
devront se fondre dans une seule forme absolue.’ In Trevisiol, op. cit. 
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It is in Trevisiol’s ‘supporting’ quotation from Lootsma that a contradiction appears; for Xenakis, 
‘the logic of the engineer can improve upon the aesthetic ideas.’1256 In contrast, Sterken explains 
the subtle interaction between form and material (content) at work in the aesthetics of Xenakis 
as an architect, especially in the way in which the dynamic of the three-dimensional space is 
developed. In this regard, one could speak of a temporal unfolding of a spatial form, as if it 
concerned a mere ripple in space-time. As a temporary construction the life of the Pavilion was 
brief, no matter how strong its concrete was, and it disappeared rather quickly. Xenakis does not 
simply use this new material as an aesthetic solution (as Maarten Kloos argued)1257: his technique 
also constituted a critique of traditional architecture; even going as far as undermining the notion 
of stability and fixity, contained in the orthogonal, depth-perspectival thinking of old. This 
utopian project of the creation of a synthetic and dynamic space was contained in the notion of 
the ‘dynamic variation’ and the continuity of space – it became a truly three-dimensional 
architecture, whose designs could no longer be reduced to a two-dimensional plan; for Sterken, 
Xenakis considers the ‘instability and time as key elements of form by using developing regulated 
surfaces,’ prefiguring the contemporary architectural notion of the ‘dynamic fold.’1258 As Xenakis 
himself announces at the end of his essay on the Poème électronique, about this new architecture, 
which uses one new material (the reinforced concrete): 
It [concrete] will certainly be replaced by lighter, more malleable [materials]. It prepared the bed in 
which tomorrow's plastics will form the rich stream of shapes and volumes that not only hold organic 
beings but above all the most abstract mathematics. 1259 
                                                
1256 Lootsma, op. cit., p. 124 
1257 Maarten Kloos, ‘Iannis Xenakis: muziek, architectuur, ruimte,’ in Wonen TABK, No. 2, (1984), pp. 18-31; cited 
by Sterken, op. cit. 
1258 Sterken, op. cit., p. 220 
1259 ‘Il [le béton] sera certainement remplacé par des matériaux plus légers, plus malléables […]. Il prepare le lit où les 
matières plastiques de demain formeront le fleuve riche de forms et de volumes que recèlent non seulement les 
êtres biologiques mais surtout les mathématiques les plus abstraites.’ In Iannis Xenakis, Poème électronique, p. 135 
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In many ways, this thinking was further developed in his philosophy of music, specifically in his 
work Metastaseis, which translates as ‘transformations,’ and was inspired by a similar logic to the 
designing of the Pavilion. Referring to Metastaseis, Xenakis sees his contribution to contemporary 
music in the following terms: 
Masses of sounds controlled like clouds by means of probabilities that shape the clouds statistically. 
[...] as early as Metastaseis with its mass glissandos I set out to create a timbre evolving in space, not 
through the addition of other instruments but keeping to the strings. I think this is one underlying 
problem of music: the shapes of the aural aspect. Not so much the pitch or even the rhythm, but 
essentially the colour in abrupt or gentle change. 1260 
The block-like structures he describes are logically linked, not in a traditional musical sense of 
development, but through contrast of textures. In one of his interviews, Bálint Varga asked 
Xenakis how this structuring aspect of compositional technique worked for Xenakis, given these 
fundamentally differing blocks: 
It’s like sentences. In philosophical statements made by ancient Ionian philosophers [...] you have 
adjoining sentences that differ sharply in content. There’s no need to provide connecting lines. This is 
a matter of style of thinking, perhaps. You make an important statement that has an immediacy about 
it, and then you go on to the next one. Of course there’s a link between them, a relationship – 
otherwise the structure would collapse – but it’s not directly obvious.1261 
Xenakis compares this structuring to the abstract paintings of Kandinsky, Malevich and 
Mondrian, which, in his view, make use of simple patterns whose effect is owed to the way they 
are set off against one another, without a ‘smooth transition.’1262 These blocks, again in reference 
to the opening section of Metastaseis, can be seen to embody the characteristic of contiguity, the 
                                                
1260 Bálint András Varga, Conversations with Iannis Xenakis, London: Faber and Faber, 1996, p. 142 
1261 ibid., p. 143 
1262 ibid.. p. 143 
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second of the three aspects of the staticity of the Parmenidian being.1263 These blocks, according 
to Solomos, are a ‘hermetic totality’1264 a reflection of the homogeneity and compactness of this 
being. As has been noted elsewhere,1265 Xenakis’s privileged treatment of continuity of the sound 
material, exemplified by his use of glissandi, establishes, according to Iliescu, a certain relation 
between intemporality and the continuous state. 
The notion of instantaneousness which reminds us in this context of the 'now' of Parmenides allows 
Xenakis to make even the assumption of an abolition of all sense of anticipation. It thus appears to 
him as circular and as impenetrable as the concept of flux, for which it is actually a synonym.1266 
 
This leads to the dissolution not only of time, but also of the notion of space, as it posits an 
equivalency between the instant (in which time is reduced absolutely) and the point (an absolute 
reduction of space in the mathematical sense). According to Iliescu, one could imagine the 
Xenakian ‘sound being’ as an initial and ideal simultaneity completely existing in the zero-interval 
of the instant. 
 
                                                
1263 A.H. Coxon, The Philosophy of Forms: An Analytical and Historical Commentary on Plato's Parmenides, with a New English 
Translation, (Amsterdam, Van Gorkum, 1999), Coxon explains in the section on ‘Likeness,’ that ‘from identity 
and difference Parmenides turns to the related topics of likeness and unlikeness and of equality and inequality, 
between which he interposes a discussion of contiguity. In the preceding argument he had introduced the notion 
of “the different itself’ as opposite to “the same itself”, and asserted that they excude eachother; he now agues 
that the difference which is predicated of two or more subjects is in every case the same.’ (p. 143) 
1264 Solomos, op. cit., 1993 p 123 
1265 See our paper on the topic of the arborescence: Joris De Henau, ‘Gmeeoorh (1974) for Organ by Iannis Xenakis 
– Towards a Critique of the Arborescence’, in Anastasia Georgaki, and Makis Solomos (eds.), Proceedings of the 
International Symposium Iannis Xenakis, (Athens, University of Athens, 2005), pp. 150-160 
1266 Iliescu, op. cit., p .38. ‘La notion d’instantané, qui nous rappelle dans ce contexte le ‘maintenant’ parménidien 
permet à Xenakis de formuler même l’hypothèse d’une abolition de toute notion d’antériorité. Celle-ci lui 
apparaît ainsi comme ‘circulaire et aussi impénétrable que la notion de flux, dont elle serait en fait un synonyme.’ 
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The third aspect of this ‘sound being,’ immobility, is addressed by Xenakis in his Vers une 
philosophie de la musique.1267 He situates in Parmenides’s attempt to go the extreme consequences of 
his thinking on the  
‘[...] question of change by denying it, the opposite of Heraclitus. He discovered the principle of 
excluded middle and logical tautology and it was such a glare that he used them as a knife to cut into 
the evanescent changing meaning the notion of being, what is motionless, filling the universe with no 
birth and imperishable, and the non-being does not exist, limited and spherical [...]1268 
It is therefore not a reification of time in the Bergsonian sense, but a necessity: the devaluation of 
time can be explained, according to Iliescu,1269 by its incapacity in terms of an evanescent flux, to 
fix an ordered structure, on its own. In other words, it is not sufficient to trust time’s unfolding 
for a given order to appear. This implies the necessity of immobility, space’s characteristic, to be 
transposed in time. However, this is to be characterized as follows: 
Music can be defined as an organization of such operations and on the basis of relationships between 
beings or between the functions of sound beings. [...] As a very general point of view, fundamental to 
where we want to scrutinize and make music, the primary Time appears as a waxy material, a clay in 
which the operations and relations come to inscribe, to etch themselves, first for work purposes and 
later for the purpose of communication to third parties.1270 
                                                
1267 Iannis Xenakis, op. cit., 
1268 Xenakis, Musique architecture, p. 73: ‘[...] question du changement en le niant, à l’opposé d’Héraclite. Il 
découvrit le principe du tiers exclu et de la tautologie logiques et ce fut un tel éblouissement qu’il les utilisa 
comme un couteau pour découper dans le changement évanescent des sens la notion de l’étant, de ce qui est, un, 
immobile, remplissant l’univers, sans naissance et impérissable, et, le non-étant n’existant pas, limité et 
sphérique[...]’ 
1269 Iliescu, op. cit., p. 39 
1270 Xenakis, Musiques formelles, op. cit., p. 16-17: ‘La musique peut donc être définie comme une organisation de 
ces opérations et de ces relations élémentaires entre des êtres ou entre des fonctions d’êtres sonores. [...] De ce 
point de vue très général, fondamental, d’où nous voulons scruter et faire la musique, le Temps primaire apparaît 
comme une matière cireuse, une glaise dans laquelle les opérations et les relations viennent s’inscrire, se graver 
pour des fins de travail d’abord et par la suite pour des fins de communication au tiers.’ 
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Xenakis’ concept of a malleable time here becomes equivalent to space – a ‘temporal plastic’ art1271 
or ‘a plastic modulation of the sound material.’1272 However, music is not a simple reified 
temporal art, or at least it is not automatic. In fact, music participates both in the outside-time 
space and in the temporal flux.1273 
 
It would also be mistaken to identify only this first, often monumental phase of sculpting time in 
massive glissandi. Within his oeuvre, Xenakis could not justify repeating these grand gestures, as in 
the opening of Metastaseis, but found instead an increasingly discontinuous musical material. As 
Solomos explains in this regard, the central gesture par excellence of Xenakis may be the linear 
glissando. The melodic line is flattened to its exterior contours, and presents an absolute 
continuity. Solomos claims that this opening sound-object has a double nature, leading from a 
unison to a cluster over the complete register of the orchestra. It constitutes in one sense a mass: 
the listener looses herself in the 41 second part of a seven-minute composition, whilst the Gestalt 
of this glissando does not stem from a rich inner life. On the other hand, it consists of a gesture 
in which the complex lines, with a homogeneous timbre of strings, is extremely difficult to 
penetrate: ‘Impotent, [the listener] passively witnesses the progressive unfolding, the fatal 
fulfillment of a gesture.’1274 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1271 Xenakis, Musiques formelles, p. 19. Cited in Iliescu, op. cit., p. 39 
1272 Xenakis, Musiques formelles, p. 30.  
1273 Iannis Xenakis, Kéleütha. Écrits, Paris: L’Arche, 1994, p. 94-101 
1274 Makis Solomos, Iannis Xenakis, (Echos du XXe siècle), Mercuès: P.O. Éditions, 1996, p. 155: ‘impuissant, il 
assiste passivement au déploiement progressif, à l’accomplissement fatal d’un geste.’ 
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Beyond the glissandi: the sound being  as fragment 
Xenakis moved gradually away from the use of glissandi, although he retained the notion of the 
Gestalt.1275 However, this movement can be described as an increasing fragmentation of the 
gliding gestures.  
The smooth figure, serene, of the glissando, which transforms time into space, is removed in favour of 
gestures based on discretization, reintroducing the rhythmic pulse as a counterweight to the attempt to 
abolish time.1276  
An example of this sequence of increasingly discrete and brief fragments is Nomos alpha, which 
still uses glissandi, but on a much smaller scale than in Metastaseis, for example. A further 
development which retained traces of the glissando as a gesture, could be seen in the 
development of the UPIC computer interface, which allows one to draw the individual sounds 
and the overall form of a piece of music.1277 
                                                
1275 Iliescu wrote in this regard that, ‘The transformations undergone by the glissando – a sonic signature – reflect 
Xenakis' stylistic evolution since the 1950s. His earliest glissandi resulted from a direct conversion into sound of a 
visual element, the line. They provided a solution to a thorny problem with which Xenakis was confronted at the 
time when he composed Metastaseis: how to connect large vertical aggregates in a logical way. For him, replacing 
traditional harmonic writing – discontinuous chordal entities – with continuous lattices of glissandi was, in fact, a 
way of cutting the Gordian knot of serial hyper-complexity. In his orchestral works of the 1950s, the massed 
glissandi create a kind of sonic morphology, the evolutive shapes or figures also evoking the notion of “gestalt.” 
These shapes would still play an important part twenty years later, in compositions such as Empreintes (1975).’ 
See Mihu Iliescu, ‘Notes on the Late-Period Xenakis,’ in Contemporary Music Review, Vol. 21, No. 2-3 (2002), p. 
134; originally ‘Xenakis et le “destin” musical de l'Occident,’ in Makis Solomos (ed.), Présences de Iannis Xenakis, 
(Paris, CDMC, 2001), pp. 53-58 
1276 Solomos, op. cit., p. 156: ‘La figure lisse, sereine , du glissando, qui transforme le temps en espace, est évacuée au 
profit des gestes basés sur la discrétisation qui réintroduisent le rythme-pulsation comme un démenti à la 
tentative d’abolir le temps.’ 
1277 See for example, Anastasia Georgaki, Being interested in linking research with architectural design in many 
respects, invented the very idea of the interface for musical design. Though he did not invent rule-based design 
per se, his working method sublimated rule- based design, transforming it from mere ‘shop-talk’ to near iconic 
status. The table of architectural design has been transformed to an interactive acoustic terrain where the image 
was translated to sound. The sound-design system UPIC (1977), one of his pure technological achievements, 
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Another interesting example can be found in Musiques formelles, specifically the stochastic 
compositional technique used to create Syrmos for 18 instruments. This work was written in 1959, 
using stochastic transformations of 8 basic textures. 
a) horizontal parallel networks 
b) ascending parallel networks (glissandi) 
c) descending parallel networks (glissandi) 
d) crossing parallel networks (ascending and descending) 
e) pizzicati clouds  
f) atmospheres of col legno with short glissandi col legno 
g) geometrical configurations of convergent or divergent glissandi 
h) configurations of glissandi treated as regulated surfaces 
 
Xenakis explains that the mechanism applied here is in fact rather simple and forms a model for 
much more complex ones, but functions as a catalyst for further studies. Based on he idea of 
elementary grains, Xenakis argues that nothing stops the exploration and extension of this 
structuring method or composition of ‘sound beings’ which have more than three 
dimensions.1278 He refers in this case to the criteria for definitions of sound beings such as timbre, 
degree of order, density, variation and so on, as well as criteria for defining elementary structures of a 
more complex nature, ‘melodic and temporal structures of groups of sounds, instrumental, 
                                                                                                                                                  
stands as an autonomous tool outside his theories. This innovative invention not only exalts Xenakis’ 
pedagogical and compositional approach, but also opens new directions in the conception of music instruments, 
and especially on interface design as a medium between performer and computer. After all, we could say that 
Xenakis stands also as one of the mentors of new interfaces in computer and visual music.’  
1278 Xenakis, Musiques formelles, p. 97 
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spatial and cinematic structures,’ as demonstrated in Syrmos.1279 Crucially, the resulting sound is, 
again according to Xenakis, not guaranteed a priori by the calculations, but intuition and 
experience ought to play a guiding, decisive and test role.1280 
  
Figure 27: Iannis Xenakis,  Syrmos (1959), p. 181281 
It is at this point that the category of outside-time (hors temps) should be reconsidered: Xenakis 
explains in Musique/Architecture that it was with Debussy and Messiaen that the category of 
outside-time was reintroduced in music, in contrast to the general movement towards in-time 
structures:1282 ‘Effectively, atonality supresses the scales and accept the outside-time neutrality of 
                                                
1279 Ibid. 
1280 Xenakis, Musiques formelles, p. 98 
1281 The material presented on this page is a combination of the col legno texture (f) (violins I: 4-6) and crossing 
parallel networks (‘celli and basses).  I will return to this exact fragment in the analysis of Duel, as it borrows 
from these bars.   
1282 Iannis Xenakis, Musique Architecture, p. 82-83 
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the half-step.’1283 Xenakis considers Schoenberg’s technique as a ‘in-time ordering [ordonnance en-
temps].’1284  
 
A Philosophy of Revelation 
An important aspect of Xenakis’s philosophy, which has received relatively little attention,1285 is 
the notion of revelation, which is closely connected to the idea mentioned above, of the 
composer as artisan. For Xenakis, the ‘beauty’ of the theoretical consideration must always be 
controlled by the concrete realisation in the score. This idea of testing out an instrument, for 
example the organ or the piano, has been clearly testified by various musicians and 
performers.1286 This interest in the experiment is not a solipsistic one; it is a pragmatism leading 
to proposing artistic bets, which he seems to win more often than not.1287 Further according to 
Solomos, Xenakis insists in this regard on the notion of revelation, of intuition, of inspiration. ‘On 
                                                
1283 Ibid. 
1284 Ibid., p. 83 
1285 Solomos, op. cit., p. 115-117. Solomos quotes from Xenakis’s thesis Arts/Science. Alliages, as well as the opening 
of Musiques formelles, op. cit., p. 15 
1286 See Solomos, op cit. ,p .112. My own research revealed such intense preoccupation with the organ on the part of 
Xenakis, who sent for a comprehensive recording of each stop of the organ in New Britain. This material was 
used by Xenakis as an experiental database – in other words, he studied the instruments from a radically 
different perspective than traditional musicians and composers would have done. Although never ironic, in the 
final score of Gmeeoorh for organ (1974), this research has been transformed into a music of both intense 
dynamic contrasts (he prescribes boards to be fitted and depressed onto the totality of keys and keyboards, in 
order to achieve a cluster of extreme proportions, much like the complete orchestral cluster in the opening of 
Metastaseis). See: Joris De Henau, Gmeeoorh et la musique nouvelle pour orgue. Histoire et analyse, MA thesis, (Paris, 
Université Paris IV, Sorbonne, 2004); see also Peter Hill, ‘Xenakis and the Performer,’ in Tempo, Vol.  112 (1975) 
pp. 17-22; S. Pruslin, in Tempo Vol. 115 (1975), p. 54; also P. Hill, Tempo, Vol. 116 (1976), p. 54  
1287 Solomos, op. cit., p. 113 
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the spark of the moment where, suddenly, the unfulfilling stage of the experience leads finally to 
discovery.’1288   
 
This idea of sudden discovery is of course of great interest in the context of this thesis, as it 
reveals in a very similar way the actual objective element of the music, in a moment of ‘revelation’ 
or dialectical standstill. The produced image is, obviously, one produced here by a 
transformation of the material – the test-results of trying out the instruments to their physical 
limits, the engineering and calculations in the preparatory stages of composing – or in other 
words the stages the composer successively encounters are seen as experiences. This leaves 
traces in the composition, but themselves lack inspiration – according to Solomos, they leave the 
listener free to judge them.1289  
  
In the introduction to his thesis Arts/Science. Alliages, Xenakis implicitly pleaded for an 
philosophy, in which he considers this notion of revelation as autonomous. He distinguishes three 
dimensions in art: the inferential mode, the experimental mode, and the revelation. As to the 
latter, he writes:  
In addition to these two modes, the inferential and the experimental, art lives in a third [dimension]: 
that of immediate revelation, which is neither inferential nor experimental. The revelation of the 
beautiful is made immediately, directly, ignorant of the fact of art, as to the connaisseur. This is the 
power of art and it seems its superiority to the sciences; as it lives in the two dimensions of the 
inferential and the experimental, art possesses a third, the most mysterious of all, as it helps the art 
                                                
1288 Ibid., p. 113 ‘[...] sur le jaillissement de l’étincelle au moment où, brusquement, le stade ingrat de l’expérience 
débouche enfin sur la découverte.’ 
1289 Ibid., p. 113 
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objects escape from any aesthetic science, by allowing the caresses of the inferential and the 
experimental.1290 
In an interview with François-Bernard Mâche, Xenakis explains his philosophical position in the 
following terms. Mâche asks: 
The definition just mentioned ['of expressing music by intelligible means'] poses a political 
problem,1291 not just an epistemological one. Is this rationality that claims to be of universal value 
form the humanistic tone of the formula? Xenakis seems to rule out any design that refuses to 
assimilate the music to a human convention, and where it is not a matter for consciousness to 
“express” something, but to reveal a pre-existing reality.1292 
Xenakis answers that he does not believe his point of view to be particularly ‘humanist’ and 
criticizes a romantic humanism. For him, intelligence is everywhere. 
I start from the principle that there is an objective world. I can’t prove this, obviously, but it is an 
option. From the moment we take this option, we will discover around us an intelligible universe.1293 
                                                
1290 Iannis Xenakis, Arts/Sciences. Alliages, (Tournai, Casterman, 1979); translated by Sharon Kanach, Arts/Sciences. 
Alloys, (Stuyvesant NY, Pendragon Press, 1985), p. 4 
1291 For a further discussion of this connection with the political, see Mihu Iliescu, ‘Espace musical et espace socio-
politique: connotations de la conception massique de Xenakis,’ in Jean-Marc Chouvel, and Makis Solomos (eds.), 
L'espace: Musique/Philosophie, (Paris, L'Harmattan, 1998), pp. 265-278; translated into German by Annette Theis, 
‘Schlacht- und Klangfelder. Konnotationen einer Massenkonzeption bei Xenakis,’ in MusikTexte, No. 90, (2001), 
pp. 29-35 
1292 Mâche, François Bernard, ‘Exprimer l’intelligence I,’ interview with Iannis Xenakis, in L’Arc, Vol. 51, p. 18. ‘La 
definition qu’on vient de citer [‘’exprimer la musique par des moyens intelligibles’] pose un problem politique, et 
non seulement épistémologique. Cette rationalité qui pretend à une valeur universelle est-elle une forme par la 
tonalité humaniste de la formule. Xenakis semble écarter toute conception qui se refuse à assimiler la musique à 
une convention humaine, et où il ne s’agit pas, pour la conscience, d’ “exprimer” quelque chose, mais de reveller 
une réalité préexistante.’ See also Iannis Xenakis, Musique/Architecture,  
1293 Ibid, p. 18: ‘Je pars du principe qu’il existe un monde objectif. Je ne peux pas le prouver, bien sûr, c’est une 
option. Mais à partir du moment où nous prenons cette option, nous découvrons autour de nous un univers 
intelligible.’  
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Xenakis continues by suggesting a modification of the definition cited above, by saying that what 
is expressed is a worldview. He also modifies his theoretical stance of his earlier work, when he 
started to study and apply stochastics in music in the 1950s. 
But I was convinced that one had to take the problems of music that way. Later, I realized that the 
calculation of probabilities allowed me to solve some problems, but there were others that remained in 
the shadows: time, and mental structures.1294 
If anything, for Xenakis, the use of technology, a means humans have given themselves to act in 
a certain way, is not a political choice (as François-Bernard Mâche suggests of industrialization), 
but one of survival.1295 
Intelligence for Xenakis is not to be reduced to the use of technology exclusively, however, this is not 
only rationality in the sense of classical determinism. Mathematics also works in the [sphere of the] 
irrational; it constructs irrational edifices.1296 
 
On the praxis of montage: elements, objects and textures 
In this regard, a closer look into the actual practice of self-borrowing, in light of his philosophy 
of music, is required. Benoît Gibson describes how Iannis Xenakis used the technique of 
montage in his works.1297 He writes that 
                                                
1294 ‘Mais j’étais convaincu qu’il fallait prendre les problèmes de la musique par là. Plus tard, je me suis apercu que le 
calcul des probabilities m’avait permis de résoudre certains problèmes, mais qu’il y en avait d’autres qui restaient 
dans l’ombre: le temps, les structures mentales.’ Ibid.  
1295 This is consistent with the view of technology as an epiphenomenon of consciousness, as discussed above. 
1296 ‘Ce n’est pas seulement la rationalité au sens du déterminisme classique. Les mathématiques travaillent aussi dans 
l’irrationnel, elles construisent des edifices irrationnels.’ Ibid. 
1297 Benoît Gibson, ‘Self-borrowing in the instrumental music of Iannis Xenakis,’ in Anastasia Georgaki,  and Makis 
Solomos (eds.), Proceedings of the International Symposium Iannis Xenakis, (Athens, University of Athens, 2005), pp. 
265-274 and The Instrumental Music of Iannis Xenakis. Theory, Practice, Self-Borrowing, (Sharon Kanach (ed.), Iannis 
Xenakis Series), (Hillsdale, NY, Pendragon Press, 2011) 
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The formalization of music attempted by Xenakis encouraged the practice of montage by developing a 
conception of form based on the juxtaposition or superimposition of predefined pictures. Xenakis 
uses sectional forms; and many of his pieces fall into a series of independent sections on the basis of 
textural contrast.1298 
Crucially, this compositional strategy involves the return to earlier scores, from which he 
‘extracts fragments or passages that can then be reassembled to create new objects or 
textures.’1299 For him, the idea of an object ‘relies on the graphic representation where each 
component occupies a defined position.’1300 These objects are constituted by ‘geometric figures, 
arborescences or other forms derived from the principles of cellular automata.’1301 The textures 
moreover, are ‘created without restriction by juxtaposition or superimposition of independent 
elements.’1302 In reference to the different types of musical temporality, Gibson concludes that in 
‘Xenakis' terms, we could say that objects are formed “in–time,” various textures are created 
‘outside–time.’ 
 
For Gibson, this is part of a practical compositional technique. He argues that the choice of an 
element, object or texture is not isolated in terms of method: this choice  
also implies criteria according to which the material is selected and inserted. Depending on the type of 
material fit for a given context, Xenakis may select only part of the excerpt, for instance, a layer 
consisting of one instrument or a group of instruments. As independent sonorities these layers can in 
turn be combined with other textures or objects. Then the process of selection and insertion of 
                                                
1298 Gibson, The Instrumental Music of Iannis Xenakis, op. cit., p. 3 
1299 Ibid., p. 3. Gibson states that the notion of the object does not refer to Pierre Scheaffer’s sound object. See 
Pierre Schaeffer, Le traîté des objets musicaux, (Paris, Éditions du Seuil 1966), p. 268 
1300 Gibson, op. cit., p. 4 
1301 Ibid. 
1302 Ibid. 
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materials comprises for general cases depending on whether or not the excerpt is taking up entirely, 
inserted alone or combined with other elements.1303  
The borrowing of an instrumentation may be changed to achieve a lesser or greater density, 
compared with the original. Gibson points out that the textural borrowings can be ‘filtered’ or 
expanded ‘by hand.’1304 Another important element concerns their duration, which may equally be 
adapted to the new environment. However,  
Some elements and objects have an intrinsic length. In other cases, duration can be prescribed by 
theoretical considerations was simply chosen by the composer's free will.1305 
Gibson is categorical when he explains the centrality of the arborescence in terms of Xenakis’s 
self-borrowing:  
The designated objects of Xenakis’ self-borrowing is the arborescence. Confined in time, they possess 
their own duration. That is why, most frequently, Xenakis, borrows them without altering the 
structure.1306 
An example of a work using arborescences is, for example, Gmeeoorh for Organ (1974) 
                                                
1303 Ibid. 
1304 Ibid. 
1305 Ibid. 
1306 Ibid. 
 424 
 
Figure 28: Iannis Xenakis, Gmeeoorh (1974), graph,1307 p. 3 
 
Xenakis compositional practice underwent a change, precisely when he started to develop the 
technique of the arborescence, precisely building on more intuitive procedures.1308  
What matters is the complex of coordinated lines, the macroscopic object. From a compositional 
point of view, there is a difference between arborescences and textures of glissandi. […] With 
arborescences, the starting and ending points (or edges) are coordinated. Each new line stems from a 
branch or root.1309 
                                                
1307 transcription of Fonds Iannis Xenakis, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Gmeeoorh (1974), p. 3 
1308 See Benoît Gibson, The Instrumental music of Iannis Xenakis, op. cit., 138-151; See also Joris De Henau, ‘Gmeeoorh 
(1974) for Organ by Iannis Xenakis – Towards a Critique of the Arborescence,’ in Anastasia Georgaki, and 
Makis Solomos (eds.), Proceedings of the International Symposium Iannis Xenakis, (Athens, University of Athens, 2005), 
pp. 150-160 
1309 Gibson, op. cit., p. 140  
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A distinction with the opening of Metastaseis, which also built on the idea of lines branching off 
of a root, or Syrmos for 18 musicians, however, the arborescences were not drawn with a ruler – 
they are drawn in a freer fashion. As Gibson explain in this regard, a distinction exist between 
two kinds of arborescence, either 
as an ongoing flow of continuous motion or as objects. Considered as objects, arborescences are 
delimited in time. They can be reproduced and transformed as if representing a kind of generalisation 
of the melodic principle.1310 
Gibson points to the years 1973 and 1974, when the arborescences, originally simple tree-like 
structures, developed into more complex forms, ‘by means of a series of transformations and 
dynamic and timbral changes.’ 1311 The interest lies in how he describes the sound object, in the 
context of the music of Noomena: 
A drawing may define the outlines of an object, its general contours, its shape, but does not always 
reveal the details that make it interesting or ‘alive.’ We know that Xenakis gives great importance both 
to the global architecture of his compositions and to the minute details, sometimes even indicating the 
number of beats between two sounds. He often acts as if he were sculpting the interior of the sound, 
to bring the object to life, to deploy it in a multidimensional space.1312 
That the arborescences as individual structures could be understood as sound objects (or, in 
Xenakis’s terms, sound beings)1313 with a certain level of definition – i.e. they are not so fragmented 
or loosely defined as to be shapeless or characterless as mere abstract textures – comes to the 
fore when seen to be transcribed from the graphic preparatory score, ‘sometimes [even] reversed 
by the composer.’1314 This means that Xenakis imbued them with enough content as to warrant 
                                                
1310 Ibid. 
1311 Ibid., p. 151 
1312 Ibid. 
1313 the relation between sound objects, as I have argued, and the Xenakian sound being could be further elaborated. 
However, they are not entirely dissimilar in that a dialectic of becoming can be discovered at their core. 
1314 Gibson, op. cit. 
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their re-use, no matter to which level of transformation. In fact, as Gibson points out, Xenakis 
himself made a statement in an interview with Jean-Yves Bosseur1315 as to the imperative 
dynamic aspect of these objects: 
There has to be a dynamic effect; otherwise, they have no meaning,[…] They have to mean something 
from the sonorous point of view, even if they do not correspond to what you hear.1316     
 
Heteronomous music: the case of Duel  
In the composition Duel (1959), Xenakis establishes a framework for a game-theory based, 
competitive work which pits two orchestras with a conductor each against one another, defined 
as a zero-sum game.1317 The material with which they play the game consists in sonic events put 
at their disposal by the composer. Duel, moreover, is the first work by Xenakis which uses 
montage techniques throughout, as Benoît Gibson points out. 1318  Not unlike Feldman’s 
considerations of musical memory,1319 Xenakis investigates the nature of musical form, as he 
remarked in reference to Achorripsis, where he attemtps to avoid repetition of the material (or 
‘data’): 
Now the question is, when heard a number of times, will this music keep its surprise effect? Will it not 
change into a set of foreseeable phenomena through the existence of memory, despite the fact that the 
law of frequencies has been derived from the laws of chance?1320 
                                                
1315 Jean-Yves Bosseur, ‘Iannis Xenakis,’ in Le sonore et le visuel, (Paris, Disvoir, 1992), pp. 41-50 as cited by Gibson, 
op. cit., p. 151 
1316 ibid., p 49 
1317 For a non-musical example, see the classic game of nuts as formulated on  
http://tavistocksociety.wikia.com/wiki/Nuts  [accessed on 31 February 2013] 
1318 Benoît Gibson, op. cit., p. 15 
1319 See Chapter 6 
1320 Iannis Xenakis, Formalized Music, op. cit., p. 37; as cited in Benoît Gibson, op. cit., p. 14 
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A further element of this text is of note, namely, the idea that variations may be created (perhaps 
even by computers), and ‘there would thus arise a music which can be distorted in the course of 
time, giving the same observer n results apparently due to chance for n performances.’1321 
 
Similarly, for the score of Duel, Xenakis assembled six different texturse 1322  or ‘sonic 
constructions put into mutual correspondence’:1323 
Event I:  A cluster of sonic grains such as pizzicato, blows with the wooden part of the bow [col 
legno], and very brief arco sounds distributed stochastically 
Event II: Parallel sustained strings with fluctuations 
Event III: Networks of intertwined string glissandi 
Event IV: Stochastic percussion sounds 
Event V: Stochastic wind instrument sounds 
Event VI: Silence 
That these events qualify as individual, with a specific character or texture different from the 
other ‘events’ or textures, is specifically mentioned in Xenakis’ own analysis of this work.1324 As 
to the question how the combination of events can be judged, Xenakis explicitly builds a a 
‘qualitative matrix’ on the basis of his subjective evaluations.1325 It becomes clear that the 
introduction of Event VI (silence) changes the outcomes of any two simultaneous events, as it 
                                                
1321 Ibid.; Xenakis remarks that in the long run the ‘performances will be statistically identical with each other, the 
identity being defied once for all by the ‘vector matrix.’ See Formalized music, p. 37 
1322 Xenakis explains elsewhere in Formalized Music what sonic events constitute of; speaking of large ensemble of 
elements, including cicadas in a summer field, he argues that : ‘These sonic events are made out of thousands of 
isolated sounds; this multitude of sounds, seen as a totality, is a new sonic event. This mass event is articulated 
and forms a plastic mould of time [my stress], which itself follows aleatory and stochastic laws.’ 
1323 Iannis Xenakis, Formalized Music, op. cit., p. 113-114 
1324 Ibid., p. 114 
1325 Ibid. 
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creates so-called ‘saddle-points’ 1326  Each of the potential combinations is qualified from 
‘passable-’ to ‘very good,’ and each of these qualities is given a number (from ‘passable-‘=0 to 
‘very good’=5). Xenakis then changes the values of the combination of Event VI with itself from 
passable to good; he explains that the purpose here is ‘to find a mixed strategy; that is to say, a 
weighed multiplicity of tactics of which none may be zero [i.e. passable-].’1327 In order to make 
the game fair, Xenakis introduces further necessary modifications, both to the scores of 
particular combinations1328  and by showing how when the optimum strategies can vary so widely, 
a ‘final matrix’ with accompanying strategies is needed.1329 He concludes that 
Mathematical manipulation has brought about a refinement of the duel and the emergence of a 
paradox: the couple VI, VI, characterizing total silence. Silence is to be avoided, but to do this it is 
necessary to augment its potentiality.  
A further, aesthetic point to be made is that of a music which is, according to Xenakis, 
heteronomous.1330 As he explains, the introduction of an external conflict has been part of musical 
discourse in (European) folk music, in ‘competitive forms of music in which two 
instrumentalists strive to confound one another, […] all the while remaining within the musical 
context of the tradition which permits this special kind of improvisation.’1331 He sees a logical 
extension of this practice in modern music as legitimate: 
                                                
1326 In Matrix 1 (M1), without Event VI, ‘the largest minimum per row and the smallest maximum per column do 
not coincide, and consequently the game has no saddle point and no pure strategy.’ Event VI is qualified as ‘p’, 
which stands for ‘passable.’ However, Xenakis qualifies silence in exactly the same terms as all the other 
individual events on their own. In other words, it is only from the combination with one other Event that a 
quality other than passable is created. These also include passable-, passable+, good, good+, and very good. See 
Iannis Xenakis, op. cit., p. 114  
1327 Xenakis, op. cit., p. 119 
1328 Ibid. 
1329 Ibid., p. 119-120 
1330 Xenakis, op. cit., p. 112  
1331 Ibid. 
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A musical heteronomy based on modern science is thus legitimate even to the most conformist eye. But 
the problem is not the historical justification of a new adventure; quite the contrary, it is the 
enrichment and the leap forward that count. Just as stochastic processes brought a beautiful 
generalization to the complexity of linear polyphony and the deterministic logic of musical discourse, 
and at the same time disclosed an unsuspected opening on a totally asymmetric aesthetic form hitherto 
qualified as nonsense; in the same way heteronomy introduces into stochastic music a complement of 
dialectical structure.1332 
This idea of heteronomy at the level of the compositional process points to an ideal of an almost 
romantic nature: beauty is to be found in the tension at the level of form. To underline the point 
of this mediation of extremes, Xenakis gives an example of what he terms ‘a degenerate game,’ a 
version of Duel where one of the parties ‘play arbitrarily following a more or less improvised 
route, without any conditioning for conflict, and therefore without any new compositional 
argument.’ He calls this a false game.1333  
 
That Xenakis’s interest in the work’s form is indeed paramount; as explained above, the 
combination of particular textures and their relative weighing is based on criteria not further 
specified in his own analysis. As Gibson argues, the underlying technique is one of montage, on 
two fronts, in terms of its formal design and in the borrowing of materials from other works. 
The first, according to Gibson, is to be found at the formal level. Rather than understanding the 
heteronomy of a strategy designed outside of the music, as Xenakis argued, for Gibson montage is 
‘already latent’ in the formal conception of Duel: 
Each conductor must choose excerpts from a series of textures. The final result depends on the 
aesthetic value associated with the juxtaposition or superimposition of the sonic events. By leaving the 
                                                
1332 Ibid. 
1333 Ibid., p. 113 
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choice of the sonic events to the conductors, Xenakis generates an open form, a sort of montage in 
real time.1334 
It is at this point that the crucial link with music I have described earlier, in accordance with 
Gianmario Borio’s theorizations, can be seen as related to the idea of an aesthetic of the informel; 
however, this is not to recruit a composer such as Xenakis as a hitherto unknown member of a 
school of composition, but to show that similar ideas were developed by radically different 
composers around 1960. 
Xenakis himself expresses the difficulty of casting the calculations in definite terms and a 
defence of the aesthetics of this work: 
It is impossible to describe in these pages the fundamental role of the mathematical treatment of this 
problem, or the subtle arguments we are forced to make on the way. We must be vigilant at every 
moment and over every part of the matrix area. It is an instance of the kind of work where detail is 
dominated by the whole, and whole dominated by the detail. It was to show the value of this 
intellectual labour that we judged it useful to set out the process of calculation.1335 
It is clear, then, that Xenakis took seriously the dialectics at the core of the compositional 
process, and the way in which the work realizes this open-ended plan. Not only does this work’s 
conception provide an example of montage at the level of the materials used, as Gibson argues, 
Xenakis’s primary concern was formal; however, he also found that the sonic materials used 
were borrowed from earlier works, ‘to fill the empty spaces delineated by the formal 
structure.’1336 These borrowings are from three works in particular: Syrmos (1959), Achorripsis 
(1959), and NEG-ALE (1960). The extent of these borrowings has been listed in tables by 
                                                
1334 Ibid. 
1335 Ibid. 
1336 Gibson, op. cit., p. 16 
 431 
Gibson,1337 and can respectively be linked to Duel I, II and III (Syrmos), Duel IV and V 
(Achorripsis) and Duel IV (NEG-ALE).1338  
 
Figure 29: Iannis Xenakis, Duel  I  (1959), bars 1-3 
                                                
1337 Gibson, op. cit., p. 164-171 
1338 A few examples of the way in which borrowings are treated and combined in Duel can be found in Chapters I 
and II. Gibson, op. cit. 
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These so-called ‘borrowings’ in the case of Duel are basically literal quotations from the other 
works mentioned above. The above fragment from Duel I, or Event I, is borrowed from the score 
of Syrmos; bars 1 and 2 of Violin  I (1) can be found in bars 105-106 of Violin I (1) and bar 3 
corresponds to bar 107 (in retrograde) in Syrmos (see Figure 21 in this thesis, p. 386); the same is 
the case for Duel Violin 1 (2) – Syrmos Violin 1 (2). Duel Violin I (3-6), bars 1-3, is a borrowing 
from Syrmos Violins I (3-6) bars 105-107. Duel Violin II (1), bars 1-3, is a borrowing from 105-
107 in the same part in Syrmos. Bars 1-2 in Violin II (2) is borrowed from bars 106-107 in Syrmos. 
Bars 1-3 in Violin II (3-6) is borrowed from 105-107 in Violin II (3-6) in Syrmos. The violoncelli 
and bass parts are borrowed from bars 105-107 in the ame parts in Syrmos. 
For borrowings from Achorripsis (1959), they can be found in Duel IV, or Event IV. For example, 
these borrwings, according to Gibson, stretch beyond the pitch-based borrowings seen in Duel I. 
It concerns the bongo in bars 4 and 5 (see below), which are borrowed from the xylophone in 
Achorripsis, bars 77-78. 
 
 
Figure 30: Iannis Xenakis, Duel  IV , bars 1-7 
 
Figure 31: Iannis Xenakis, Achorr ips i s , p. 19, bars 77-781339 
                                                
1339 In fact, the two bongo parts in Duel IV (high and low, or ‘aigu’ and ‘grave’ in the original score) share the 
xylophone material, especially in the triplet section; however, it is the sequence of quintuplet, triplet, quintuplet 
which is prominent.  
 433 
Another borrowing from Achorripsis can be found in Duel V in the woodwinds; it concerns the 
piccolo, clarinet in E♭and the bass clarinet in bars 0-6, which correspond to the same 
instruments in bars 51-57. The oboe (bars 0-4) borrows from the same instrument in bars 60-64 
(in retrograde); bassoon, and contrabassoon borrow from 58-64 (in retrograde).  
 
Figure 32: Iannis Xenakis, Duel  V , bars 1-6 
 
Figure 33: Iannis Xenakis, Achorr ips i s , p. 14, bars 51-53 
  
 
Figure 34: Iannis Xenakis, Achorr ips i s , p. 14-16, bars 58-64 
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The manipulations of the material, in this case rather straightforward, point towards a dual 
concept of the material: one where the pitch content becomes exchangeable and receding to a 
second plane of importance; and one where the priority lies in the texture, in other words, a 
spatial (acoustic) frame of mind. In Duel, the temporality of the six individual sonic entities or 
fragments and their duration (each lasting about two minutes), 1340  are dissolved into a 
combination matrix, in which two of them will sound at the same time, in the same acoustic 
space. This means that Xenakis calculated not only the acoustic possibilities of these 
juxtapositions, but also the non-repetitive nature of these combinations, based on the urge not to 
repeat what in origin was stochastically designed musical material. Although Xenakis presents the 
retrograde of material borrowed from Syrmos, Achorripsis and NEG-ALE, he does not change the 
instrumentation of the individual borrowings. In other words, this compositional praxis is in 
essence concerned with a textural approach to the musical material. Moreover, the borrowings 
from Syrmos and Achorripsis show also a fastidious and faithfulness to the shape of the original 
arborescences. Aesthetically this could be described as a dialectic of form and content, where 
one fundamentally influences the other. Individual lines – as circumscribed by the range of the 
instruments – fit a larger design (with shapes of differing types: punctual sound-clouds, 
arborescences, etc.), however, in combination they form an aural texture, no longer either a 
simple or complex visual shape or two-dimensional design. Xenakis insisted on this sonic 
presentation as a necessary counterpart to what seems to some theorists a primordially visual 
way of thinking, even to the point of excluding the importance of the sonic result of this 
method.1341 At a deeper level, this search and recognition of the need for variability between 
performances, the age-old idea of competition in musical terms, and the openness of the 
                                                
1340 cf. the introduction to the score of Duel. 
1341 See Joris De Henau, ‘Towards a Critique of the Arborescence,’ op. cit.; Makis Solomos argues that for Xenakis it 
is the visual which takes precedence over any other concern. I argue that this is incorrect. 
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structural play of a limited number of choice materials, creating what can be termed an open 
form, can be related to the concern of this thesis with an aesthetic of the informel. In other words, 
a work like Duel unwittingly inscribes itself in a philosophical search for a music which finds a 
way out of the cul-de-sac of compositional hyper-determination and predictability, by drawing 
precisely on the will to victory in an essentially pointless endeavour of musical gamesmanship. 
Paradoxically, by following the rules the most conscientiously, a conductor, traditionally the 
locus of romantic delusional-projection and hero-worship for respectively the conductor’s ego 
and the audience’ desire for a stage presence of what is in nuce the composer’s impotent 
understudy – the as-if of the craft of real-time composition flowing from a magic wand – can 
potentially win a prize, which he has always deserved – in his/her own eyes – but never had 
received. The textural contrast of the six sonic events from which he or she can choose is a false 
one, in a sense the freedom to decide is minimal, as calculated by the omnipotent composer, but, 
at the same time, within this limited field of choices, the conductor must make the taboos – the 
rule of the game – his/her own. Doing so will bring the reward of the composer’s approval. In 
this regard, the textural combinatoriality noted and graded in the matrices in Formalized Music and 
the score of Duel represent the sense of inevitability of the pair of opposites: a determination for 
following a set of arbitrary rules will be rewarded, whereas the material itself is regulated so that 
no exact combinations will return, thus avoiding (in Xenakis’ view) the potential repetitiveness of 
stochastically generated material, and, furthermore, creating a new juxtaposition at every turn. 
 
In conclusion, I have argued that Xenakis’s music actively seeks a connection with larger 
philosophical questions. In this case, I have focused on the diverse readings of his philosophy of 
music in light of a) an aesthetics of music which encompasses the formalized tendencies and the 
aspects which clearly hint at affintites with the informel I have expounded elsewhere; and b) a 
compositional technique which draws on the idea of montage in the form of self-borrowing. In 
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this regard, Xenakis can be understood, as I argue in conjunction with a number of authors, to 
argue for a philosophy of becoming, rather than static being. This can be seen at work at the level of 
musical time, and the way in which Xenakis developed it. On the one hand he argues for a 
restauration of the outside-time category, whilst on other he expands the in-time by drawing on 
various elements planned beforehand. These include elements, objects and textures, borrowed 
and transformed from his other compositions, often contemporary, sometimes over the course 
of several years. Furthermore, his music philosophy allows for a reading of the works in 
dialectical terms, and reveals a thorough engagement with the pressures and demands of 
contemporary society. Xenakis did not only have a wide-ranging interest in the sciences and arts 
of his day, he also attempted to draw on traditional aspects of this culture which he saw as 
forgotten or wrongly excised from memory. The idea that music is a simple unfolding in time 
was brought to a halt in his work, in order to force the audience and the student of his work to 
re-engage and open the view of history, nature and art. The modernist musical artwork 
underwent considerable transformations in his hands and throughout his career, from artefact 
and traditional form, to progress; the works themselves argue for their own vibrancy as 
mediations of subject and object, intuition and rationality, in an age when this was no longer 
thought possible.     
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CONCLUSION 
 
Aesthetics, which historically categorised the arts as either plastic or temporal, had to adapt to 
the transformation of the duality of space and time, to a more interrelated approach. In this regard, 
a major conceptual change was effected in the twentieth century. Modernist artworks challenged 
the notion of the chronological unfolding of time as the ‘natural’ state of affairs. This change in 
the conception of time, no longer an isolated aspect – a ‘given’ factor as it were, which simply 
flows until the end of the composition – became a focal point in the theoretical and 
compositional strategies of twentieth-century composers of different stylistic and artistic 
backgrounds and convictions. In fact, the spatialization of musical time, which Wagner signalled 
in the famous scene between Gurnemanz and Parsifal, before the grail scene in the first act of 
Parsifal: ‘Du siehst, mein Sohn,/ zum Raum wird hier die Zeit’ (‘You see, my son,/here time 
becomes space’), became an important modernist problem. The problematic relationship between 
time and space, or the ‘rationalization’ and ‘reification’ of musical time refers – as Adorno argued 
in Philosophy of New Music – to the ‘pseudomorphosis of music and painting,’ essentially a critique 
of Wagner, Debussy and Stravinsky. However, as Gianmario Borio, Albrecht Wellmer and 
others averred, this lineage became the basis for the modernist alternative in the post-war period 
to the integral serialist compositional technique – which Adorno too saw as an essentially 
totalizing system. In the period before integral serialism, composers such as Edgard Varèse had 
attempted to bring compositional technique in line with the demands of the historical musical 
material, but in a different way to the explicitly ‘progressive’ line Adorno had distinguished and 
theorized. Varèse’s conception of time and space was specifically developed to avoid the 
arbitrarily closed tonal and dodecaphonic compositional ‘systems.’ In his view, moreover, it was 
not sufficient to replace one such system (tonality, even in its expanded post-romantic version) 
with another one (dodecaphony, with its insistence on using all 12 chromatic tones). Additionally, 
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an important aspect of Varèse’s compositional approach is in his treatment of timbre. In contrast 
to the merging of timbres (Schmelzklang) as propounded by romantic and symphonic composers, 
Varèse offered a separation of timbres (Spaltklang), stressing the individuality of the different 
instruments, including percussion instruments.    
 
In a later development of the importance and emancipation of the notion of timbre, as 
Gianmario Borio noted, a focus on texture became paramount. The composers studied in the last 
two chapters of this thesis theorized this idea from two different angles: one is intuitive, the 
other formalizing. However, as I have argued, both approaches expand the compositional-
technical arsenal by keeping a balance, if not a dialectic, between both of these tendencies. In 
this regard, their music forms artistic testimony to the idea that a progressive music according to 
Adorno’s criteria is possible, even if it meant that the reification of the material, by this stage 
rather fragmented, had to be reforged under these different circumstances. One element of this 
dialectic of rationalization and intuition can be found in the idea that the artwork as image 
becomes more pronounced at the level of the work itself: the notion that not only the listener or 
viewer receives a musical artwork as a dialectical image, but that the works themselves have a 
(silent) say in this matter. In this sense, Benjamin’s notion of the dialectical image as an 
alternative to traditional forms of philosophical interpretation, conceptualization and systematic 
forms of reading can be seen to have influenced Adorno’s late Aesthetic Theory. In it, he further 
develops the idea of a new art, which in terms of music revolves around the notion of musique 
informelle, which had to overcome the notion the mechanical compositional technique of the 
historically ‘necessary’ integral serialist music of the 1950s. However, as I have argued, with 
Borio, the utopian elements, combined with a certain nostalgia, had barred Adorno from 
touching upon the actual developments in the music around 1960. As a way to remedy this flaw, 
I propose to unveil a number of the aspects of Adorno’s aesthetics which heavily reference, both 
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explicit and implicit, Benjamin’s work. These theories includes Benjamin’s critique of traditional 
philosophies of history and time, his theory of a language of objects, and the notion of the 
dialectical image. The latter fuses the artwork as object with its interpretation, in a sense giving 
an insight in the work in a way which does not simply propound a subjectification of the work as 
an extension of one’s consciousness and hence dependent or dominated. In another sense, the 
work of art is allowed to reveal something true about the reified state of the contemporary 
consciousness, social and individual. Feldman’s work in this regard reveals techniques which 
borrowed concepts from abstract painting, specifically Abstract Expressionism, into his notion 
of the instrumental image. Xenakis too borrowed, but in his case it consists of montages of self-
borrowed fragments from his own compositions. 
 
However, Adorno’s aesthetic ‘preferences’ were thrown into a new light in the period after the 
Second World War, with the explosion of new artistic and musical styles. In this environment, 
Adorno reached back to concepts he had discussed with Walter Benjamin, before the war. 
Especially Benjamin’s conception of history, progress, and experience of art objects, informed 
this renewal of Adorno’s own aesthetics. Although not a one-way influence, Adorno’s 
interpretation of Benjamin’s concept of the dialectical image – as found in his unfinished Arcades 
Project, building on earlier conceptualisations of the image – developed this at both a theoretical 
and practical level. On the one hand, Benjamin’s theorizations of the image had never been 
purely abstract, but functioned as an interpretative strategy. As Benjamin himself had developed 
the image – as allegorical image, and image-in-thought (Denkbild) – into an image that can be read, 
the dialectical image became a central philosophical concept for Adorno. Adorno’s reading of 
musical works was transformed into an interpretation of their appearance as an image-to-be-read. 
This reading then, takes into account not only the score (as a graphic representation), but also 
the performance. The experience of music as fleeting, then, is momentarily arrested, brought to a 
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halt in a moment of illumination (or understanding) – this moment is unique, as both the object 
as well as the experience of it form a unique constellation, never to be repeated. However, as 
Benjamin had already understood, this moment of temporary illumination could be fashioned 
into an account – contributing ultimately to an understanding of the object-in-motion with the 
subject’s consciousness-in-motion. In other words, the import of the experience of art becomes 
knowledge. What is to be ‘known’ in this reading of the art object, is a revelation of its content. 
The fragmentary works, as attempts to give form to the ‘chaos’ (to paraphrase Beckett), reveals 
itself as unconscious historiography. The (mediated) interaction between composer and musical 
material, for example, in the work of Iannis Xenakis, reveals the tension between formalization 
and intuition. Agostino Di Scipio reads this as a means of protection against what Max Weber 
(and Adorno) called ‘means-ends’ rationalization. This avoidance of reification – in the form of 
totalizing compositional system – draws at the same time on the technical means at the disposal of 
a twentieth-century composer. In other words, the art object which wants to avoid the complete 
reified state of the culture object (Kulturobject) must draw – in Xenakis and Varèse’s eyes – on 
precisely these formalising strategies seemingly antithetic to the strived-for openness. Attempts 
to read Xenakis’s work only as an illusory play of formulaic elements, fails to understand the 
actual compositional strategy, which is built on the treatment of musical elements, objects and 
textures. As Gibson has shown, this strategy relies (almost secretively) on the borrowing of 
earlier compositional materials, re-forming them by using the technique of montage, framing 
them in a new musical context. This process of montage draws on graphic techniques, including 
the so-called arborescence, but also on computer-graphical interfaces (for example, the UPIC-
system developed by Xenakis, where one can draw the overall form, as well as the individual 
sound-curves). This process is one of internal spatialization; however, as Adorno fears, the 
disappearance of the ‘tools’ with which to compose these works would constitute a negation of 
their history. In that sense, it becomes important to recognise these technical means as part-and-
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parcel of the composition itself. In this way, the image presented by the composition cannot be 
reduced to the score, but needs to take into account the sketches and other preparatory 
materials; this is what Xenakis calls the ‘outside-time’ level of the compositional process, in 
contrast the ‘in-time’ – time unfolding in the composition itself.  
 
For Feldman, the absolute categorization of time and space had to be challenged in the same 
way that the idea of perspective in Western art, a dominant concept since the Renaissance. In his 
Between Categories, he sets out to distance himself from traditional conceptualizations of the 
musical work of art. By doing so, Feldman developed his own approach to the composition of 
music, supported by a significant philosophical interest in the work of, amongst others, Henri 
Bergson. 
 
The aesthetic of the informel was never fully developed by Adorno, but interestingly – given his 
earlier vehemence against music-as-pseudo-painting – rested on the aesthetic assumptions of 
French and German painters of the so-called art informel; they were rather presumptuously 
connected by a French art curator by the name of Michel Tapié – which in his view included the 
American Abstract Expressionists – another ‘collective’, as proposed by, amongst others, 
Clement Greenberg. Adorno’s late writings indicate the future of music by drawing on this form 
of art, however, not literally by proposing music-as-painting, but by analogy in the understanding 
of (open) form. Musical form had always been at the centre of Adorno’s critique, but as musique 
informelle, it proved most fruitful. Similar to Benjamin’s understanding of history from the 
actuality of the present (the ‘Now’), in an ever-changing constellation between the (art) object 
and the subject who experiences, Adorno referred to the openness of atonal composition in the 
Idealtype of Schoenberg’s Erwartung (1909-1924). However, as Gianmario Borio points out, this 
expectation is not a nostalgic one, but should be seen as Adorno’s critical evaluation of the 
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current (late 1960’s) state of musical composition, to be developed into a full-blown aesthetics of 
the informel.  
 
In this thesis, I have shown that Adorno’s aesthetics can fruitfully be read in light of the music 
and art of his time and that beyond the original scope of his work, it can be further seen as a 
contribution to the study of modernism in general and the modernist artwork in particular. The 
argument for a form of reading against the grain of some of the concepts studied in this thesis 
can be upheld and expanded even further in light of other composers mentioned in passing, as 
well as many others. I would argue here for a study of the work of such composers as Helmut 
Lachenmann, Luigi Nono, Bernd Alois Zimmermann and many others who have drawn 
inspiration from Adorno’s and Benjamin’s work. It is not only certain that the work of these 
authors and composers is full of tensions and challenges to the status-quo, but the aesthetic and 
philosophical relevance of the work of Benjamin and Adorno remains paramount in the study of 
any avant-garde modernist work, and beyond. Now and in the future, those aspects of 
contemporary and past artworks which seems second nature to us, will light up in a flashlike 
manner to reveal that which lies beneath the illusion of acceptability, normalcy and marketability, 
in a dialectical image. 
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---, Polla ta dhina for children’s choir and 48 musicians, (Warsaw, Modern Wewerka, 1962) 
---,  ST/48 for orchestra, (London, Boosey and Hawkes, 1956-62) 
---, ST/10 for ten musicians, (London, Boosey and Hawkes, 1956-1962) 
---, ST/4 for string quartet, (London, Boosey and Hawkes, 1956-1962) 
---, Stratégie for two orchestras, (Paris, Salabert, 1962)  
---, Synaphaï for piano and orchestra, (Paris, Salabert, 1969) 
---,  Syrmos, for 18 string instruments, (Paris, Salabert, 1959) 
---, Terretektorh, (Paris, Salabert, 1965-1966) 
 
 
 
 
